*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if (Don Surber uses it this way a lot) someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone".

Snark me and the eastereggs, huh. Like we don't check them for mods.

What movie is this from?

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if (Don Surber uses it this way a lot) someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone".

Chemistry trivia $1000:
This reaction of two aldehydes in the presence of base produces and alcohol and an organic acid. Hint: it's a reaction that's named after an Italian chemist.
[And a bit of trivia people care even less about than my obscure military stuff]

(And we're still waiting for you to finish that history of firearms thing you had going.)

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if (Don Surber uses it this way a lot) someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone".

World mythology for $400
In Japanese mythology this warrior fights his way both in and then out again of hell.

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if (Don Surber uses it this way a lot) someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone".

Who is the main hero of the Book of the Dun Cow, and he dies shortly after eating what? (Bonus: why is he forced into eating it?)

John R.S. Batiste

Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)

September 25, 2006

My name is John Batiste. I left the military on principle on November 1, 2005, after more than 31 years of service. I walked away from promotion and a promising future serving our country. I hung up my uniform because I came to the gut-wrenching realization that I could do more good for my soldiers and their families out of uniform. I am a West Point graduate, the son and son-in-law of veteran career soldiers, a two-time combat veteran with extensive service in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, and a life-long Republican. Bottom line, our nation is in peril, our Department of Defense's leadership is extraordinarily bad, and our Congress is only today, more than five years into this war, beginning to exercise its oversight responsibilities. This is all about accountability and setting our nation on the path to victory. There is no substitute for victory and I believe we must complete what we started in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Donald Rumsfeld is not a competent wartime leader. He knows everything, except "how to win." He surrounds himself with like-minded and compliant subordinates who do not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq, or the human dimension of warfare. Secretary Rumsfeld ignored 12 years of U.S. Central Command deliberate planning and strategy, dismissed honest dissent, and browbeat subordinates to build "his plan," which did not address the hard work to crush the insurgency, secure a post-Saddam Iraq, build the peace, and set Iraq up for self-reliance. He refused to acknowledge and even ignored the potential for the insurgency, which was an absolute certainty. Bottom line, his plan allowed the insurgency to take root and metastasize to where it is today. Our great military lost a critical window of opportunity to secure Iraq because of inadequate troop levels and capability required to impose security, crush a budding insurgency, and set the conditions for the rule of law in Iraq. We were undermanned from the beginning, lost an early opportunity to secure the country, and have yet to regain the initiative. To compensate for the shortage of troops, commanders are routinely forced to manage shortages and shift coalition and Iraqi security forces from one contentious area to another in places like Baghdad, An Najaf, Tal Afar, Samarra, Ramadi, Fallujah, and many others. This shifting of forces is generally successful in the short term, but the minute a mission is complete and troops are redeployed back to the region where they came from, insurgents reoccupy the vacuum and the cycle repeats itself. Troops returning to familiar territory find themselves fighting to reoccupy ground which was once secure. We are all witnessing this in Baghdad and the Al Anbar Province today. I am reminded of the myth of Sisyphus. This is no way to fight a counter-insurgency. Secretary Rumsfeld's plan did not set our military up for success.

Secretary Rumsfeld's dismal strategic decisions resulted in the unnecessary deaths of American servicemen and women, our allies, and the good people of Iraq. He was responsible for America and her allies going to war with the wrong plan and a strategy that did not address the realities of fighting an insurgency. He violated fundamental principles of war, dismissed deliberate military planning, ignored the hard work to build the peace after the fall of Saddam Hussein, set the conditions for Abu Ghraib and other atrocities that further ignited the insurgency, disbanded Iraqi security force institutions when we needed them most, constrained our commanders with an overly restrictive de-Ba'athification policy, and failed to seriously resource the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces as our main effort. He does not comprehend the human dimension of warfare. The mission in Iraq is all about breaking the cycle of violence and the hard work to change attitudes and give the Iraqi people alternatives to the insurgency. You cannot do this with precision bombs from 30,000 feet. This is tough, dangerous, and very personal work. Numbers of boots on the ground and hard-won relationships matter. What should have been a deliberate victory is now an uncertain and protracted challenge.

Secretary Rumsfeld built his team by systematically removing dissension. America went to war with "his plan" and to say that he listens to his generals is disingenuous. We are fighting with his strategy. He reduced force levels to unacceptable levels, micromanaged the war, and caused delays in the approval of troop requirements and the deployment process, which tied the hands of commanders while our troops were in contact with the enemy. At critical junctures, commanders were forced to focus on managing shortages rather than leading, planning, and anticipating opportunity. Through all of this, our Congressional oversight committees were all but silent and not asking the tough questions, as was done routinely during both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. Our Congress shares responsibility for what is and is not happening in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our nation's treasure in blood and dollars continues to be squandered under Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership. Losing one American life due to incompetent war planning and preparation is absolutely unacceptable. The work to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime was a challenge, but it pales in comparison to the hard work required to build the peace. The detailed deliberate planning to finish the job in Iraq was not considered as Secretary Rumsfeld forbade military planners from developing plans for securing a post-war Iraq. At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a post-war plan. Our country and incredible military were not set up for success.

Our country has yet to mobilize for a protracted, long war. I believe that Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration did not tell the American people the truth for fear of losing support for the war in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld failed to address the full range of requirements for this effort, and the result is one percent of the population shouldering the burdens, continued hemorrhaging of our national treasure in terms of blood and dollars, an Army and Marine Corps that will require tens of billions of dollars to reset after we withdraw from Iraq, the majority of our National Guard brigades no longer combat-ready, a Veterans Administration which is underfunded by over $3 billion, and America arguably less safe now than it was on September 11, 2001. If we had seriously laid out and considered the full range of requirements for the war in Iraq, we would likely have taken a different course of action that would have maintained a clear focus on our main effort in Afghanistan, not fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe, and not created more enemies than there were insurgents.

What do we do now? We are where we are, plagued by the mistakes of the past. Thankfully, we are Americans and with the right leadership, we can do anything. First, the American people need to take charge through their elected officials. Secretary Rumsfeld and the Administration are fighting a war in secret that threatens our democratic values. This needs to stop right now, today. Second, we must replace Secretary Rumsfeld and his entire inner circle. We deserve leaders whose judgment and instinct we can all trust. Third, we must mobilize our country for a protracted challenge, which must include conveying the "what, why, and how long" to every American, rationing to finance the totality of what we are doing, and gearing up our industrial base in a serious manner. Mortgaging our future at the rate of $1.5 billion a week and financing our great Army and Marine Corps with supplemental legislation must stop. Americans will rally behind this important cause when the rationale is properly laid out. Fourth, we must rethink our Iraq strategy. "More of the same" is not a strategy, nor is it working. This new strategy must include serious consideration of federalizing the country, other forms of Iraqi national conscription and incentives to modify behavior, and a clear focus on training and equipping the Iraqi security forces as "America's main effort." Fifth, we must fix our inter-agency process to completely engage and synchronize all elements of America's national power. Unity of effort is fundamental and we need one person in charge in Iraq who pulls the levers with all U.S. Government agencies responding with 110 percent effort. Finally, we need to get serious about mending our relationships with allies and getting closer to our friends and enemies. America can not go this alone. All of this is possible, but we need leadership and responsible Congressional oversight to pull this off.

I challenge the American people to get informed and speak out. Remember that the Congress represents and works for the people. Congressional oversight committees have been strangely silent for too long, and our elected officials must step up to their responsibilities or be replaced. This is not about partisan politics, but rather what is good for our country. Our November elections are crucial. Every American needs to understand the issues and cast his or her vote. I believe that one needs to vote for the candidate who understands the issues and who has the moral courage to do the harder right rather than the easier wrong. I for one will continue to speak out until there is accountability, until the American people establish momentum, and until our Congressional oversight committees kick into action. Victory in Iraq is fundamental and we cannot move forward until accountability is achieved. Thank you.

* * *

Paul D. Eaton

Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)

September 25, 2006

My name is Paul D. Eaton and I retired from the United States Army on January 1, 2006, in the grade of Major General. From June 2003 until June 2004, I was the Commanding General of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) in Iraq, charged with rebuilding the Iraqi Army.

I will not debate the wisdom of going to war in Iraq. The President issued his broad policy guidance, electing to use force of arms, and left execution-level detail to his Secretary of Defense with serious implications for the United States and our allies. The nation went to war and the war is ongoing, prosecuted by the nation's best and brightest in all ranks, my two sons among them. We very much need to succeed.

I will discuss at length the history of the work to stand up Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the largely ignored year one, the competencies of those charged with the prosecution of this war, and those remedies I believe necessary to achieve success.

Setting the Stage

The most important function of government is to assure the security of the governed. Iraqis believe the same and observed to me that it is "better to live for 40 years under a dictatorship with order than 40 days of chaos." The United States has failed to secure the peace after having artfully changed the Iraqi regime. We went in with a bad plan. We have failed to understand the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare in Iraq, and are responsible for the current state of affairs in a country the size of California with a population of 27 million souls. The leadership that has lead us to this point fails today to understand the strategic planning requirements to solve the Iraqi dilemma, stating essentially that their strategy is to stand up Iraqi Security Forces and to withdraw U.S. forces. Stay the course is not a strategy.

For the U.S. now, viable Iraqi Security Forces -- read "Iraqi security" -- is not a strategy; it is the end state, the objective. The strategy is in the "how" to get to the objective. It is basic military planning to identify the objective first, and then to develop the operational lines that will enable the achievement of the objective. The failure to properly lay out objective and operational lines for Phase IV has lead to lost time, resources and the loss of diplomatic and political capital. Most importantly, it has presented the opportunity for the insurgency to flourish with the ensuing sectarian violence, in the security vacuum Mr. Rumsfeld allowed to develop -- with a very high human toll.

The Beginning

Much has been written and spoken about the insufficient troop strength to manage Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the lonely position taken by then Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, who called for several hundred thousand soldiers -- not for the defeat of the Iraqi Army, rather for post-conflict work. Phase IV planning was amateurish at best, incompetent a better descriptor. This planning reflected the Rumsfeld dogma of using just enough troops for a precarious Phase III. Phase IV planning failed to identify the end state and the means of getting there. The critical component, the establishment of the New Iraqi Army, consisted of a two-page Powerpoint briefing developed by General Franks and approved by Mr. Rumsfeld. The key points of the briefing were that the Iraqi Army would be volunteer and representative of Iraq's population; would restrict recruiting to avoid political and criminal undesirables; and would be trained by corporate trainers, not Soldiers. The goal was to develop nine light motorized Infantry battalions the first year, eighteen more the next year.

While serving as the Commanding General of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, I was given the order to go to Iraq to create the Army on May 9, 2003, one week after the President's speech aboard aircraft carrier Lincoln. To state the obvious, a very late order. I spent the next three weeks in meetings with my future boss, Mr. Walt Slocombe, and my team at Fort Benning to lay out the way ahead.

I reported to Baghdad on June 13, 2003, and met with Colonel Roland Tiso and four other men borrowed from the CENTCOM staff to craft the future of Iraq's Army. The Joint Manning Document (JMD), the document that would provide me a staff of 248, would not begin to be filled until October, and would never hit the 50% mark. Between June and October 2003, I relied upon a revolving door of volunteers and men and women on loan from other staffs for between two and six weeks, dependent upon their donor unit.

It was immediately clear to all of us that we were an economy-of-force operation, a very low Department of Defense priority. Efforts to establish alliances by reaching back to the United States met with indifference at all levels. As the Coalition Provisional Authority became increasingly challenged, my operation became increasingly isolated from U.S. Armed Forces. Our allies stepped into the breach - I am very grateful to Great Britain, Australia, Spain, Jordan, Poland, Italy, and Romania for their very talented soldiers and their country's assistance. Iraqis would very soon join my staff with superb results.

In the first two weeks, we identified the training location, let the contracts to build out the barracks, contracted the training to the Vinnell Corporation, found the uniforms and weapons and designed the Iraqi Army. Recruiting the Army began on July 7, 2003, and training began upon completion of a battalion set of barracks, on August 2, 2003. We were directed to avoid use of U.S. military assets at all costs, and to use Iraqi sources for all equipment possible. Our budget was $173 million for year one, with the objective to create nine battalions.

Two weeks into training it became obvious that we had a flawed plan -- we needed soldiers to train the Iraqi Army, not contracted civilians, regardless of their competence and stellar prior-military backgrounds. We set out to change Secretary Rumsfeld's plan.

I traveled to Jordan to set up a potential equipment buy, but found another opportunity. The Jordanian Army is the most professional Arab Army and was willing to assist. We set up a plan whereby the Jordanian Army would retrain officers from the old Iraqi Army for 10 weeks, exposing them to a professional Army, under the British model, with strong leader competencies. Those men in turn would receive non-commissioned officers trained by coalition forces at our training base in Kirkush, Iraq, and create the cadre that would train Iraqi recruits. Iraqi veterans training Iraqi soldiers under the oversight of ten-man Coalition Support Teams (CST) per battalion of Iraqi Soldiers. This is really the U.S. COHORT model of unit development.

I briefed this plan, essentially a second phase in my operation based upon a requirement to adapt, to Mr. Rumsfeld on September 5, 2003, and got his approval to proceed with an accelerated adapted plan that would produce an army of 27 battalions and associated command and control, from national to squad in the first year, and start the Navy and Air Force, with a budget of $2.2 Billion. We laid out our basing plan for the Iraqi Armed Forces and the architecture for the three services. At one point the Secretary stuck his finger at me and said, "Just don't make this look like the American Army." Still don't know what he meant. He also stated that we were his last priority, behind Police, Border Troops, Iraqi National Guard or Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), and Facilities Protection Service (FPS).

That "last priority" comment would prove interesting. We had a superb team of men and women who knew exactly how to man, train and equip an Army; a budget of $2.2 Billion and a huge manpower pool from which to draw an Army. I would discover later that priority one -- the Iraqi police -- was an unfolding disaster.

We began to implement the plan aggressively with the arrival of the $18 Billion supplemental that held our budget, sustained a serious setback with the Pentagon rejection of the equipment contract and another when Mr. Wolfowitz withheld $253 Million destined to build out a division's set of barracks. The Deputy Secretary was reportedly unhappy with the development of the Iraqi Police and held these funds hostage. I did not yet have responsibility for the Police. These decisions would delay unit development for several months.

In February, Mr. Wolfowitz sent then-Major General Karl Eikenberry to assess ISF development. His conclusions were that the Iraqi Armed Forces were on track, but that Police and Border Troops were not. He ordered that money and personnel should be diverted from my operation to support police development. A zero-sum game.

The result became what would be my third phase of ISF development. I reconfigured my headquarters to become the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), with two subordinate headquarters, CMATT and CPATT, or Civil Police Assistance Training Team. I gained 23 men from Steve Casteel and a new British Brigadier to head up CPATT. On March 9, 2004, I was now charged with development of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Iraqi National Guard, Iraqi Police, Border troops and Facilities Protection Service.

Our initial assessment revealed a stunning lack of progress, a failure to understand the man, train and equip functions, an unworkable command and control network, a logistics and administration system that didn't work -- in short, a national police and border force that were in complete disarray, ill-equipped, and with untrained leadership in dysfunctional facilities. We had a lot of work to do -- we had lost nine months.

General McCaffrey's recent report reveals that Iraqi Security Forces, the second most important security forces on the planet after our own, continue to lack fundamental equipment. The Secretary of Defense has failed to resource his main effort, the objective to stand up the ISF enabling us to withdraw U.S. forces.

The Man in Charge

The President charged Secretary Rumsfeld to prosecute this war, a man who has proven himself incompetent strategically, operationally, and tactically. Mr. Rumsfeld came into his position with an extraordinary arrogance, and an agenda -- to turn the military into a lighter, more lethal armed force. In fact, Rumsfeld's vision is a force designed to meet a Warsaw Pact type force more effectively.

We are not fighting the Warsaw Pact. We are fighting an insurgency, a distributed low-tech, high-concept war that demands greater numbers of ground forces, not fewer. Mr. Rumsfeld won't acknowledge this fact and has failed to adapt to the current situation. He has tried and continues to fight this war on the cheap.

I decided to write my New York Times op-ed piece critical of Mr. Rumsfeld, printed March 19, 2006, after I read the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is a flawed document that represents a poor compromise, reducing the size of ground forces at the moment we need to mobilize far greater ground combat units. It was clear that the architect of the mistakes of the past continued to make flawed decisions that would have an even more lasting impact on the security of the nation. Mr. Rumsfeld and his immediate team must be replaced or we will see two more years of extraordinarily bad decision making by the President's most visible cabinet member. Allow me to offer a recent quote from David Brooks of The New York Times: "When asked if he should have expanded the military back in 2003, to give the current commanders more manpower, Bush used words that were uncharacteristically jargon-ridden: 'The notion of warfare has changed, and therefore, we're modulizing (sic) the army so that it becomes more operational and easier to move.' That sounds more like a transformation briefing paper than the president."

The President is not well served by his Secretary of Defense, a man history will not handle kindly.

The Way Ahead

So, what to do?

Replace the Secretary of Defense with a proven leader who has the vision to get the country's defense establishment back on track. The Army is under strength and its equipment is in terrible shape. A Secretary who understands how to build alliances at home and abroad. Who understands the operational art and understands the contemporary operating environment.

We need a "Manhattan Project" to resource the development of the ISF-- more and better equipment, triple the 4,000 advisor complement in Iraq. Work all the operational lines to achieve success here. We need a bipartisan commission with complete transparency to deliver a series of recommendations to the President that leadership on both sides of the aisle can endorse. This is not a purely military problem -- the interagency process must be brought to bear. This conflict should be as important to each of our President's cabinet members as it is to the Soldiers who fight this war.

The war on terror demands we mobilize the country and significantly increase the size of our ground forces. We cannot allow Iran to become the hegemon of the Gulf, fearless in the face of a United States that has culminated at the ground combat force level.

The President's decision to depart from containment and to finish a war that Saddam started in 1990 can be challenged and will be for a long time. We can debate the mistakes of the past, the nobility of the venture, and the improbability of success. But we will all be better off to help this Administration through its last two years by forcing upon it the remedies needed for victory.

* * *

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

September 25, 2006

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it is an honor and a privilege to participate in the discussion of what may be the most important security matter of this generation. I will not discuss the mistakes that brought us to this point in Iraq, but rather focus on what we must do if we wish to achieve success. Any discussion of what I perceive to be mistakes will be only to provide context for the subsequent recommendations.

Our removal of the Saddam Regime introduced major instability not just in Iraq, but in the greater Middle East. For generations, historians will argue why. For our purposes, we simply have to accept it as a fact. We are where we are and cannot go back. We must bring a stable, friendly government to Iraq. Failure will be a strategic defeat with a loss of power in the Middle East of such magnitude that our children will be struggling to recover from it. Thus we have to answer one fundamental question: how do we accomplish the goal of a stable, united, friendly Iraq? Frankly, neither the Administration's approach of staying the course nor the various proposals for an announced, time-phased withdrawal will accomplish that goal.

On the positive side, our strategy for Iraq, as expressed by Ambassador Khalizad and General Casey, is solid. "Clear-Hold-Build" is a sound approach for counterinsurgency. While the character of insurgency has changed significantly in the last 30 years, the fact remains that it can only be defeated by good governance. The first step, security for the people, is the fundamental responsibility of any government. If we fail to provide that security, nothing else matters. Only when people are secure in their daily lives do they have the freedom to support their government. The "Clear" and "Hold" steps of our strategy address that issue. The "Build" phase addresses the other basic requirement of good governance - providing the people with hope for a better future. However, it must be their view of a better future, not ours.

Given this well thought-out strategy, it is particularly distressing that the Administration has failed to resource any part of it. The Administration has repeatedly stated that war in Iraq is critical to security of the United States, yet it has asked nothing of the majority of U.S. citizens. While asking major sacrifices, to include the ultimate sacrifice, from those Americans who are serving in Iraq, we are not even asking our fellow citizens to pay for the war - instead we are charging it to our children and grandchildren. In short, the burden has fallen on the less than one percent of Americans who have served in Iraq. And we have not even provided them with sufficient personnel, equipment or resources to accomplish their mission. The disconnect between our rhetoric and our actions is astonishing.

To move forward in Iraq, we have to achieve three things:

Create unity of effort across all U.S. agencies and contractors.

Put the U.S. Government on a wartime footing.

Truly make supporting the Iraqi government and security forces our priority effort.

The first requirement in fighting an insurgency is unity of effort. To date, the Administration has refused to empower one individual to cut through the bureaucratic infighting and focus our effort in Iraq. As a result, the U.S. civil, military and contractor efforts are poorly coordinated and at times seem to be working at cross purposes. The lack of unity on our part makes it even more difficult to unify the fractious efforts of the new Iraqi government. Given the stove-piped nature of our bureaucracy and the diverse range of contractors we have chosen to employ in Iraq, achieving this unity will be difficult. Historically, successful unity of effort comes from placing a single individual in charge of the effort in-country. In the U.S. system, this must be the ambassador. That individual is given guidance by the President and is genuinely his personal representative. Based on the President's guidance, the ambassador sets the policy, strategy and approach for all U.S. forces in-country. There can not be separate chains of command that the various elements of the U.S. effort can use to bypass the in-country authority. It must be made clear to all U.S. personnel that bypassing the ambassador is cause for immediate relief.

Once the ambassador has the authority, he needs the right people. We need legislation now that does for the entire U.S. Government what Goldwater-Nichols did for the services. While it took a decade or more for the legislation to have its desired effect, Goldwater-Nichols forced us to learn to operate as a team. Since we know that insurgencies are measured in decades, not years, legislation passed now can provide critical assistance to the ambassador in coordinating U.S. efforts. Such legislation must go beyond what Goldwater-Nichols did for the services. It must provide the career, monetary and disciplinary incentives that will allow our federal agencies to encourage and, if necessary, order the right personnel to serve overseas. Insurgencies cannot be defeated by military action. They require all elements of government. To date, we have failed to provide civilian personnel in sufficient numbers with the right expertise and maturity to advise the new Iraqi government.

Once unity of effort is established and personnel provided, we can then effectively focus resources on our Clear-Hold-Build strategy. The Administration has rightly stated that our number one priority is building the Iraqi security services. Yet it has failed to provide sufficient advisors or equipment for the Iraqi forces essential to the "Clear" and "Hold" efforts. More importantly, it has consistently failed to provide sufficient civilian expertise and presence for the essential "Build" element of the strategy.

It is clear that while the armed forces are at war, the nation as a whole, the U.S. Government and even the Pentagon itself are not. The U.S. Government, and the Pentagon in particular, have continued with business as usual. While some parts of the Pentagon are working exceptionally hard to support our forces in Iraq, the rest of the organization has continued its peacetime routine. I must note here that I have never served in the Pentagon so my observations are those of an outsider, unfamiliar with the internal operations of the Department of Defense and service staffs.

However, to an outsider, this failure to mobilize seems to be rooted in the Pentagon's continuing belief that this war will be short, and therefore we must not disturb the normal operations of the institution for what is perceived as a short-term commitment. Here is a prime example of paying lip service to the concept of a "long war" but not taking the actions that indicate we believe our own rhetoric. Our enemies and allies recognize this lack of seriousness. The simple act of making the war a genuine priority will greatly discourage our enemies and encourage our allies. But our actions must match our deeds.

Simply put, the leadership has to failed acknowledge we are in a war and failed to act in a wide range of areas. Two of the most important are personnel policies and procurement policies.

The current U.S. Government personnel systems are actively hostile to a successful counterinsurgency effort. The current systems grew out of the personnel reforms of 1900 that were implemented by Secretary of War Elihu Root. These systems worked well for our forces in World War I and World War II, but were failing by the time of Korea and broke down badly in Vietnam. Insurgencies are long struggles by nature. The Chinese fought for twenty-seven years. The Vietnamese for thirty years. The Palestinians have been at it for almost forty years with no end in sight. Yet our military and civilian personnel policies still emphasize short tours with rapid rotation of key personnel. The cliché is that our military did not have ten years of experience in Vietnam, but one year of experience, ten times. Almost all thoughtful studies point to the enormous problems caused by the one-year tours. Unfortunately, those personnel polices have only gotten worse. Today a large number of our forces spend only three to seven months in country. And, of course, we still have no system to provide the language and cultural training essential to working effectively with the Iraqis.

The armed services have all the necessary authority to change our personnel policies. It is a failure of leadership and imagination that has prevented it. As in Vietnam, the military personnel system has simply refused to adjust to the reality on the ground. I have heard cynics say we would rather lose the war than change our personnel system.

As stated above, we need legislation now that provides the incentives to insure we have the right mix of civilian personnel necessary to provide effective advisors to the Iraqi civilian ministries. If incentives prove insufficient, we must grant all our federal departments the authority they need to order their personnel overseas. While this sounds harsh, it is necessary. Where this authority already exists, it must be used.

The Administration has stated repeatedly, and correctly, that only the Iraqis can win this war. Yet its actions again do not match its rhetoric. We still provide insufficient numbers of advisors, and too often advisors are treated as the second team in both the civilian and military worlds.

While we still have a long way to go, we have made significant improvements to the advisory system at the tactical level. Unfortunately, we have not done so well at levels above battalion. The key areas that need improvement are the size and the resources provided to the advisory teams. Currently we assign only ten men to a team. This is simply an insufficient number to provide the close contact the Iraqi Army needs to achieve full capability. Advisory teams should be 50-60 men per Iraqi battalion, with proportionate increases at every level above that. Further, we need to get serious about training for these personnel. The Army and Marine Corps currently provide short courses prior to deployment. In Vietnam, these courses lasted from six months to a year, to insure the advisors had at least a working knowledge of the language and a true understanding of the role of an advisor. Advising a unit is much more difficult than commanding one. A successful advisory tour should be an essential step on the path to promotion. Only our very best officers and non-commissioned officers should be selected, trained and deployed in these critical billets. In short, our military leadership must match its actions to its rhetoric.

On the civilian side, we have failed to provide both the numbers and experience necessary to assist the Iraqis in establishing functioning departments that provide the essential civil element of any counterinsurgency. In addition to effective legislation, it will require a major mental shift in the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government to emphasize providing these key personnel for our effort in Iraq.

Another critical problem area is procurement. Everyone is painfully aware of how long it took us to provide armored HMMWVs for our troops in Iraq. It took even longer to provide armored trucks. This is despite the fact that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were, and continue to be, the largest casualty producers in the conflict. Finally, three years after we encountered the first IEDs, we are nearing the point where we will have some form of armor for our forces. We are just beginning to provide the same for Iraqi forces. The Pentagon considers this a major achievement.

I find this amazing. Since the first IEDs exploded in the summer of 2003, we have known that there are better, safer vehicles available than the armored HMMWV. Yet we have made very little effort to provide them to our troops. The Pentagon has purchased M1117 Armored Security Vehicles, a vastly superior vehicle to the HMMWV. Yet over three years into the fight, we have procured only about 1,000 of these vehicles. While Katrina had a devastating impact on the one facility that produces these vehicles, I find it remarkable that a nation that could go from producing a few hundred planes per year to over 50,000 a year in three years at the beginning of WWII is still limited to 48 M1117's per month. In fact, U.S. industry can produce more and faster. The Administration has simply refused to dedicate the resources necessary to make it happen.

The M1117 Armored Security Vehicle is just one of a number of vehicles vastly superior to the armored HMMWV for the missions in Iraq. AM General, in partnership with the Turkisk firm Otokar, produces the Cobra using the HMMWV drive train and frame but with armored, boat-shaped hull that provides greatly improved protection from blast. Further, it can be equipped with a fully protected weapons turret. It can provide the smaller vehicle necessary to operate in many of the restricted urban areas in Iraq. In addition to purchasing these vehicles for U.S. forces, we should buy large numbers for the Iraqi Army. While we provide armored HMMWVs for most U.S. troops, we still expect our Iraqi allies to travel in open-backed trucks.

These two examples are symptoms of a much greater problem -- the Pentagon's refusal to act as if we are at war. Since World War II, America has prided itself on providing whatever its servicemen and women needed to get the job done. In this war, we have not. Our procurement has not only been slow, we have failed to buy the best available. Further, the Administration has categorically failed to maintain or replace the equipment necessary for the units in the U.S. to be ready for other potential operations. The Chief of Staff of the Army and Commandant of the Marine Corps have highlighted the fact their services need almost $30 billion just to reset the force, never mind procuring the better, more effective equipment currently available.

The American people have not refused to provide what our service people need, the Administration has refused to ask. It is essential that we fund both the backlogs and the new procurement on a wartime basis. We did not ask our soldiers to invade France in 1944 with the same armor they trained on in 1941. Why are we asking our soldiers and marines to use the same armor we found was insufficient in 2003? The failure to provide the best equipment is a serious moral failure on the part of our leadership. This brings me to my final point.

The critical issue is leadership. All of the suggestions I have made will not be carried out unless the leadership believes it needs to be done. Given the fact that the Secretary of Defense has not acknowledged the numerous, serious mistakes made to date, I do not believe it is possible for him to provide the leadership necessary to succeed in Iraq. It is time for him to provide the nation the last in a long series of services, and step down.

In conclusion, we have lost three critical years in the essential task of rebuilding Iraq. We need to take action now to make our effort match our strategy. If we are unwilling to do so, then we will fail.

DATE: 11 DECEMBER 2005

TRANSLATION BEGINS

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

To the dear brother, beloved friend, and noble gentleman Abu-Mus’ab, may God protect him and keep him safe and remedy his mistakes, and may He raise his rank in the two realms and honor his abode; from his loving brother, ‘Atiyah, may God forgive him.

May God be praised resoundingly, and may peace and prayer be upon Muhammad, His servant and His messenger, as well as upon his family, his companions, and his soldiers.

Greetings and God bless you. We pray to God that you are safe and sound, enjoying the strength you have been granted through the grace of God, the Almighty, and All-Powerful. We pray to God for your victory over the enemies, and that He will grant you patience, keep you steadfast, and extend to you His support. We pray that He brings tranquility to you and all of your brothers, and that He covers you with mercy, and that He is a support and help to you, for indeed grace is from God and God alone.

Dear brother, I will be brief and rely on God Almighty. Then I will trust in your patience, your high manners, the sincerity of your love for me, and that you think well of me. I trust that you remedy shortcomings and guard against flaws and errors, and that you will overlook things if there arises something inappropriate from your brother. I shall get right to the point and skip the generalities and get into the details. The purpose of the path belongs to God, and from Him I derive aid and guidance. Any success that I may attain shall come only through God. I have put my trust in Him and on Him I rely.

My dear brother, who is content, God willing, Abu-Mus’ab the worthy, may God grant him success. God knows how highly we think of you and how much we are confident in you and in your faith and loyalty, we consider you as such and God is your Judge. You are better than us. You forged ahead and you were true and you didn’t hesitate, falter, or lay down arms. Instead, you persevered in God the Jihad and the struggle. God gave you good attributes and bestowed honorable characteristics upon you, such as sincerity of direction, fervor for the religion, empathy for the afflictions of his people and support for them, high aspirations to do what you see as right and true, even if the whole world opposes you, a strength of will and determination that many people lack, even among the people of righteousness and knowledge, and courage and truthfulness.

We think of you this way, among other good qualities and innate characteristics, along with good faith. We perceive you as such, for my thinking of you has not altered and has not changed. I have known people and their tribulations, since there is hardly any grief that goes unnoticed by a hired mourner-woman, except by God’s will. I am not any smarter than you here, for you know yourself and your flaws and faults more than anyone else, oh servant. However, I am reminding you of God’s blessing upon you and what He has granted you, which we ourselves know.

I am setting this out as an introduction to what I am going to say to you in the way of opinion, advice, and instruction, for my discourse will be primarily about the negatives and cautioning against things that are perilous and ruinous. I won’t be touching on the positives and good things, since they are the true nature, praise and credit be to God, and they are the overwhelming majority, by the grace of God. So, don’t trouble yourself about that, because the topic is one of correction and instruction, not a topic of appreciation, praise, and interpretation. If God wanted, and He were to present us to you, then you would find us to be your loved ones and your brothers, the most just of people towards you, the most sincere of them, the most sympathetic towards you, the most protective of your right, and the most forgiving of them, God willing.

After all, you are truly the mujahidin against the enemies of God, standing on the edifices of truth and allegiance with God, making the religion manifest while being endorsers of it. You are the ones who have spited America, the greatest unbelieving crusader power in history; and you are the ones who have spited it, and you have broken its prestige and thrown it to the ground. May God will for you a good reward with which you would continue the path at a critical time for the vast good work of awakening the generation and resurrecting the Muslim nation. May God bring you to it through His grace and blessing. Just some of this would be enough for renown in this world for someone who would want that, and for loftiness in the hereafter for someone who has earned it. We ask God that He guide us and you and that He grant us understanding in religion. He is Magnanimous, Generous, Kind, Benevolent, and Merciful.

So, my brother and my dear one, may God bless you and may He strengthen you and protect you. Listen to these words from me. Put them before your eyes and commit them to memory. Know that if something within them disagrees with you somewhat, they are actually good, by God; and perhaps you would not hear them from anyone except someone who loves you, and perhaps you have needed someone to say them to you, and you won’t find someone in your present position, except if God wills.

My dear brother, today you are a man of the public. You have attracted people’s attention, and your actions, decisions, and behavior result in gains and losses that are not yours alone, but rather they are for Islam, and [they affect] Islam, Muslims, and especially the mujahidin, the faction waging jihad, on the ground today. This, even though it may be a blessing from God in some ways, is a trial, a burden, and a great test in other ways. God is testing you and burdening you, and you do not know whether you will be saved or not. You are at great risk, for rightly guided people have often wanted to get out of a test like this altogether!

My brother, you have been entrusted with this position (the position of leader of the largest group of mujahidin on the ground today who are fighting the Americans and spiting them), and this glory and reputation has happened to you. People have differed regarding you, between lovers and haters, praisers and insulters; or, fanatics for one side or another. You have ended up with a voice that reaches the enemies and the Muslim nation. Your actions have come to impact the entire world, and they are monitored and analyzed.

It is hard for you, my brother, to bear the burden of this position and carry it out. Perhaps you have been remiss in it, or been unable to do it. Perhaps you thought, because of some influencing factors, that you are doing something good, while you are going afoul and making mistakes in important and grave things sometimes. Because of this, corruption and havoc, which God wouldn’t have intended, are taking place.

This is a matter that requires great perfection, which does not exist in any of our men today. So, it is necessary to employ the principle of complementing deficits, which is the basis of what I want to draw your attention to. It is necessary that you review this matter, my brother, because general leadership of the Muslim nation and the position of guidance bind you greatly. Indeed it is hard for the one who is higher than you. You cannot handle it if you act alone and think that you can do it. Your assuming of responsibility for it in such a manner bears difficulty and danger. Please consider this issue, because your mistakes may grow numerous and you won’t be able to absorb people, govern them, lead a community of people and populations, and guide them.

It is necessary, then, to perfect the deficits through people who help and the brothers who consult and are supportive, and by going back to the leadership which is higher than you and more capable, and so forth. You need to keep in mind that you are leader in the field that is under a greater leadership that is more potent and more able to lead the Muslim nation. You must leave some of your ideas or many of them to the advising brothers, especially your leadership and those who came before you in this matter.

My dear brother, you are achieving successes and striking the enemies of God and hitting and doing much, which is a good and great thing that we are not lowering at all and we ask God to bless and increase, but this isn’t everything. The path is long and difficult, and the enemy isn’t easy, for he is great and numerous and he can take quite a bit of punishment as well. However, true victory is the triumph of principles and values, the triumph of the call to Islam. True conquest is the conquest of the hearts of people, and the regard for seeing the Treaty of Hudaybiyah as a victory.

Policy must be dominant over militarism. This is one of the pillars of war that is agreed upon by all nations, whether they are Muslims or unbelievers. That is to say, that military action is a servant to policy. We as people of Islam are people of policy, wisdom, reason, and are good at applying its fundamentals of justice, mercy, good deeds, et cetera.

Our shari’a is the most perfect of the orthodox, merciful shari’as, praise be to God. Our religious scholars said, “That which is absolute in its monotheism (perfection in monotheism), is merciful in its shari’a tenets (ease, simplicity, clarity, practicality, and other characteristics of it). Therefore, unless our military actions are servant to our judicious shari’a policy, and unless our short-term goals and successes are servant to our ultimate goal and highest aims, then they will be akin to exhaustion, strain, and illusion. It will be a bit like the happiness of children over something at the beginning of the day, which wears out by the end of the day and its evening! We ask God for security and safety.

Therefore, don’t be misled, my dear brother, by quick and incremental successes. Be watchful of your mistakes, however small, for if mistakes pile up upon you, they will destroy you. Don’t underestimate any shortcoming from any angle that comes over you, but rather hasten to plug it and shore it up. You should be thinking about the consequences while relying on God in all of this and while taking what is in shari’a opinions.

I had previously talked with you and with many of the brothers about what happened in Algeria, so do remember that. My brother, what use is it for us to delight in some operations and successful strikes when the immediate repercussion is a defeat for us of our call, and a loss of the justice of our cause and its logic in the minds of the masses who make up the people of the Muslim nation, who are ignorant and simple, and upon whom the afflictions of stultification, misguidance and corruption pile, and increased domination by the enemies, more oppression, more humiliation visited upon us, and more ills, troubles, loss in capabilities, and wasted opportunities?! We must take heed of this and adopt all of the shari’a opinions and push ourselves to do this, for “the mujahid is he who strives with his life for the cause of God,” as our Prophet said, peace be upon him. Indeed, we will persevere in the jihad and the struggle against the enemies of God until the last spark of life, and last drop of blood, God willing; whether we are successful in Iraq, or not, or if we reach something, or not. However, it is shameful for us to waste the opportunities that God has granted through our own negligence and carelessness and our not adopting the [shari’a] opinions.

For, in terms of abiding by the [shari’a] opinions that the shari’a has advised to be considered, and which experience and perception has shown to be a cause of attaining what is desired, I say that dereliction and negligence in this is not permissible if the aim, the desired goal, is a duty!! Therefore, our command here is the sum of two things: A legal regulation from shari’a and monotheism, which means taking [shari’a] opinions and reliance on God.

Yes, what you are in, is a matter that has taken you by surprise and happened to you without any planning on your part, or seeking of honor or desire. Yes, that is true, and God willing it is hoped that God the Generous, the Almighty will help you with it and not weary you, but it is also incumbent on you to know your own capability and all our capabilities and to take into account what you are capable of and able to do, and not to rush into things or be hasty, since perhaps someone who rushes may end up late! All right, then, what is to be done? What am I commanding you to do?

If you were to ask am I commanding you to abandon the matter that you are in? My response: No, not necessarily, which means that it is not required, although it is a possibility if you find at some point someone who is better and more suitable than you, as I had previously advised you. Unless, something prevents that, such as weakness or fear of some harm, or things of that nature, and that is something that you are more capable of determining and evaluating. However, I order you, my brother, to remedy the deficiency, as previously mentioned.

As you know, this is the principle of legal powers in the shari’a: That proper fitness be ordained, and if not possible, then that which is better should be sought as much as possible; also, that the shortcoming of the one who is flawed be fixed with what legitimate means and ways are possible. Therefore, it is incumbent on you to mend your flaws in many things. It is not sufficient that you have with you a shari’a council and groups of guys who lack expertise and experience, no matter who they are.

On the whole, I will advise you on a number of measures in this arena:

- That you abstain from making any decision on a comprehensive issue (one with a broad reach), and on substantial matters until you have turned to your leadership; Shaykh Usamah and the Doctor, and their brothers there, and consulted with them. Also, you should consult with your mujahidin brothers who are with you in Iraq itself, such as our brothers Ansar al-Sunnah and others, no matter how much you have to say about, or reservations about, them, or some of them. An example of this is the issue of announcing a war against the Shi’ite turncoats and killing them. Another is, expanding the arena of the war to neighboring countries, and also undertaking some large-scale operations whose impact is great and whose influence is pervasive, and things of that nature.

Furthermore, there should even be consultation with good people who are not mujahidin, among which are the people of the country where you are, the Sunnis and the like; even if they are religiously unorthodox at times, or even hypocritical, as long as they are Muslims who agree with us in the resistance and jihad, not standing by the unbelievers. An example would be many of the religious scholars and tribal leaders and so forth. This is because consulting with them (and this does not necessarily mean accepting their opinion every time, or even most of the time) and having them participate in the matter is a wise policy that is supported by evidence from religious law, reason, history, and the knowledge of nations and their experiences.

I will speak further about embracing the people and bringing them together and winning them over and placating them and so forth, for this, my brother, is a great way towards victory and triumph that is not lesser than military operations, but rather in truth is the foundation while military operations must be a servant that is complementary to it. Therefore, when you embrace the people and enjoin them through your morals, kind words, your conduct and upbringing, you will have gained a greater means of victory over your enemy, with God’s permission. If the people love you and are grand in their love of you and affection, and God brings their hearts to you, then that is more successful and helpful to your word, and more safeguarding of you against all harm that your enemy is planning.

- I command you, my brother, and I am your brother and I have nothing except these words that are between the two of us and God as the third party, that you send messengers from your end to Waziristan so that they meet with the brothers of the leadership, and the rational and experienced people and the shaykhs here, because you have a greater chance to send messengers (brothers that you choose) than your brothers have here. God willing, you have the ability to enlist guys and men who have not been exposed, and who can move about and carry messages and convey responses to you and such.

Just make this one of your most important priorities and be serious about it and strive for it, and may God make it easier for you. I am going to say something to you that may seem to you like an exaggeration, but you should think about it: Readying the brothers and mobilizing them and preparing them to be messengers between you and the leadership here is more important than preparing and sending the brothers for some operations like the recent operation of the hotels in Amman!

Truly, I am not joking, but the significance of your correspondence with your brothers here, and continued mutual discourse and consultation, as well as going along with them in well-laid plans, and mutual understanding, harmonizing, and guidance, are more important than many of the large scale operations. So strive, my brother, God bless you, and send your men so that they can bring you instructions, advice, ideas, suggestions, consultation, criticism, and mature opinion from your brothers.

I am now on a visit to them and I am writing you this letter as I am with them, and they have some comments about some of your circumstances, may God guide you, with due confidence, affection, respect, and esteem. They wish that they had a way to talk to you and advise you, and to guide and instruct you; however, they too are occupied with vicious enemies here. They are also weak, and we ask God that He strengthen them and mend their fractures. They have many of their own problems, but they are people of reason, experience, and sound, beneficial knowledge. I saw that their opinion centered on a group of observations and instructions, of which you will find a summary in the Doctor’s message that the Americans published. It is a genuine letter and it represents the thoughts of the brothers, the shaykhs, and all of the intellectual and moral leadership here. Please meditate closely on it, focus thoroughly on all of its ideas, apply what you can from it, and make them part of yourself. You should leave the path of excuses and of starting differences. This letter represents the majority of, and a synopsis of, what the brothers want to say to you, especially in the following areas:

- Winning over the people, bringing them close, being cautious about alienating them, befriending them, helping them, accepting their foibles (which means [accepting] what they possess, including strength, weakness, propriety, impropriety, goodness, and ill; which doesn’t negate the continuation of guiding them towards goodness and betterment), molding them, gaining their sympathy at all their levels and ranks, using the utmost caution to not be harsh with them or degrade them or frighten them or be hasty in judging them or even be hasty in reforming them in a way that they might not comprehend, which might cause them provocation, wherein they would turn on us and you with hostile animosity. However, [you should do this] with gentleness, gradual open-mindedness, while overlooking and being quiet about many of their mistakes and flaws, and while tolerating a great deal of harm from them for the sake of not having them turn away and turn into enemies on any level.

- Paying attention to the class of religious scholars and shaykhs in Iraq in particular, and in the world as a whole, and respecting them as a whole, and not opposing any of them, no matter what, and no matter what errors they made in shaping the hearts of the public, until such time as God opens the way. At that time, we will have another message. All except for situations that are particular, specific, and very narrow, in which the theologian’s deviation is very clear, such as that of Sayyid Tantawi, or the evil ‘Ubaykan, for example. [This should be the tack taken] even though we could get by without talking with any one of them, because shari’a policy sets this [tack] for us and confirms it for us. The long and short of the matter is that the Islamic theologians are the keys to the Muslim community and they are its leaders. This is the way it is, whether you like it or not. Thus, we address them with utmost kindness in word and speech, and we demonstrate respect and reverence for them in phrasing, in order to be harmony with them and with the public behind them, which are the masses of the Muslim nation. Therefore, if you appear before the community in the guise of a pariah to the class of religious scholars, contradicting them, disrespecting them, and insulting them, then you will lose the people and you will fail in any call [to religion] or political act.

For this reason, we should win them over by keeping quiet, overlooking things, and saying nice things, in spite of disagreement with them in most things both theoretical and practical. This involves trying to contact the rightly guided religious scholars and those with good in them, even if it involves humoring them a bit, harmonizing with them, consulting them, asking them questions, and win them over in Iraq, in the [Arabian] Peninsula, and elsewhere. It also includes praising them and urging them to fulfill the obligation to help and wage jihad, and to command [that which is right], and forbid [that which is wrong], and to carry the mantle of this religion. It also includes lauding them for the good they do, and being quiet about their shortcomings.

Since this is necessary, it is highly advisable to be polite and to show complete respect, regret, compassion, and mercy and so forth. You must incline yourself to this, and be humble to the believers, and smile in people’s faces, even if you are cursing them in your heart, even if it has been said that they are “a bad tribal brother,” and what have you.

Among the most crucial of things involved is exercising all caution against attempting to kill any religious scholar or tribal leader who is obeyed, and of good repute in Iraq from among the Sunnis, no matter what. Instead, we should confront anyone evil by many other means of discourse and fervor of speech, and such, and with a bit of wisdom, patience, and deliberateness. We should continue in our jihad, and when God opens the way, and we have the wherewithal, then we can behave differently in accordance with what is appropriate for that time. Perhaps it will be he, himself (the one who was your enemy) who will come to you humbled, belittled, apologizing, frightened, cowering as he asks for forgiveness. Then, God will spare you any act that has a bad end, and you will have the deciding hand, and there will be other modes, the highest of which is forgiveness and good deeds, and the very least of which is justice.

- The other matter is to take caution against being zealous about the name “al-Qa’ida”, or any name or organization. Although all mujahidin are our brothers, the Sunni are our brothers and our friends, as long as they are Muslims, even if they are disobedient, or insolent; whether they come into the organization with us or not, for they are our brothers, our friends, and our loved ones. We should cooperate with them, help and support them, and work together. Besides, how do you know you won’t be humbled tomorrow, while they will be strengthened? You may diminish while they increase! You draw your strength from God first, and from your brothers second. It is by God’s grace that people’s hearts are with you. Otherwise, many people will have waged jihad before you and attained more than you will have gained.

Ask me whatever you like about Algeria between 1994 and 1995, when [the movement] was at the height of its power and capabilities, and was on the verge of taking over the government. The government was on the verge of a downfall at any moment. I lived through that myself, and I saw first hand; no one told me about it. However, they destroyed themselves with their own hands, with their lack of reason, delusions, their ignoring of people, their alienation of them through oppression, deviance, and severity, coupled with a lack of kindness, sympathy, and friendliness. Their enemy did not defeat them, but rather they defeated themselves, were consumed and fell. God reigns as He commands, as the Almighty, and He controls the matter from beginning to end.

It wouldn’t hurt, indeed it is a desired gesture, for advice to the effect that they unite with us or enter al-Qa’ida and go under Shaykh Usamah to continue to go from us to our brothers in the form of guidance, debate, and discussion between the brothers and loved ones in order to reach what is preferred, and proper, and the best of all. However, there should not be bias or injustice, or animosity or oppression, but rather it should be through sincere advice, discussion, courtesy, and good dialogue about knowledge, jurisprudence, and opinion, with complete civility and maintaining rights. After all, if your brother does not end up convinced and does not agree with you, he is still your brother and your friend. It would be a dispute between your and him, which does not require hatred, clashing, hostility, or enmity. It is, rather, of the sort of dispute of the companions [of the prophet] within the branches of shari’a and in the understanding of legal judgments, indeed even in some conceptions and beliefs; even while maintaining fraternity, friendship, affection, mutual respect, amity, mutual sympathy, etc.

These were the most important critical points as they come to me now. I will now enumerate for you all of the various fragments of advice and thoughts. I hope God makes us, as well as you, beneficial through them:

Brother Abu-Musa’b, may God protect and guide you. Bless you, my brother. Know that we, like all the mujahidin, are still weak. We are in the stage of weakness and a state of paucity. We have not yet reached a level of stability. We have no alternative but to not squander any element of the foundations of strength, or any helper or supporter. We are unceasing in our efforts to unite our nation’s strength and resources.

Yes, we do have some strength, thanks to God, of the type that our enemy does not have, faith in God Almighty, ideology, absolute monotheism, reliance upon God Almighty, et cetera, as well as the righteousness of the cause, brotherhood, connectedness, and many other things from among the elements of strength. Among these, meaning the elements, is the fact that our strength lies in our weakness and determination, being as we are a part of this great nation, the nation of Muhammad, whom God has blessed, and being as the Muslim nation is with us, loving us, harboring us, supporting us, sympathizing with us, and concurring with us. Also among these, are our mettle and the mettle of our soldiers, which are the waters that our fish inhabits. So on, and so forth of that which is obvious. So, if we waste this great foundation, then we would be remiss, profligate, and liable to fail.

Thanks to God, there is plenty of good, my brother. Our jihadi ranks and you and your brothers are good, God willing. However, do not act alone and do not be overzealous. Beware of becoming arrogant because of people’s praise, or because of their pressure upon you to constantly act. Instead, you have to complement your shortcomings by consultation and queries with your brothers. Do not be hasty in reforming and mending the Muslim nation. Do not rush victory over the enemy, for the war and our journey are truly long. The important thing is to keep your reputation and that of the mujahidin pure, especially your organization, and to gain peoples’ affection and love, and to strive for it. Of course, this is subject to the limits of our shari’a. Thanks to God, what our shari’a allows is a wide scope, including keeping quite and looking the other way until you have total power and control, as I said before.