January 10, 2004
Meanwhile, up north...
Canada, apparently giving up on manning an army, is instead considering building one.
Literally.
It's a little unfair to poke 'em like this, considering we're trying to develop robot ground machines, too. But what's interesting in the article is the premise from which it would appear the decision preceded from.
Hat tip to CAPT H.
January 09, 2004
Thoughts by an Army Chaplain on his service in Iraq
I'll let Chaplain Huerta speak for himself.
Commentary by Maj. Carlos C. Huerta
Jewish Chaplain in Mosul, Iraq
Dec 12 2003
I am about to get on what soldiers call the "freedom bird,"
the aircraft that brings us back to the world.
You would think I would be ecstatic, since I will once again see my
wife, children, mother and friends. But, strangely, I am not.
I am caught in a twilight zone of anxiety and loneliness, mixed with
some measure of happiness. I leave Iraq with tears in my eyes, joy in
my heart, happiness in my soul and deep sadness in my being. I am so
glad to be seeing my family, but so sad to leave my other family.
I have to say good-bye to men and women who are willing to put
themselves in harm's way for me, ready to run towards bullets to save
me, ready to die for me. How does one say good-bye to that kind of
relationship and not feel pain, sadness and loneliness. How can I not
feel pain in my heart knowing the ones I'm leaving behind are still
in harm's way? I worry about their safety, I worry that they may not
see the day when they ride the freedom bird back to their loved ones.
The soldier in me wants to stay until the last bullet is fired in the
last battle in the last war for freedom. However, when I take a
minute to think about it, I realize it's impossible. Our role of
defending freedom for us -- and for others -- began when we were just
a colony. There can never be a last war, a last battle, because -- in
every generation -- there are those who wish to take freedom away.
As a Jew, I know Chanukah was a war for freedom -- religious freedom.
It was more than two thousand years ago that a tyrant forbid the Jews
to practice or teach religion. He decided the way we worshipped our
Creator had to be wiped off the face of the earth. We found that
unacceptable and, under the Maccabbees, went to war. We were
defending our right to worship our God; to teach our faith to our
children and to live as free men and women. Since then, little has
changed but the location.
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows... »
Here we are in Iraq, once again defending our freedoms from those who
wish to destroy them. We see the fight for freedom never ends --
there is never a last battle, a last bullet. We know, from
experience, that if freedom is to survive, there must be men and
women in every generation who are willing to pay the supreme
sacrifice.
As I climb aboard the "Freedom Bird" and leave my buddies behind, I
am sad and happy. I remember the good times we had, but I also
remember the pain, the bleeding, the dying we did together.
One incident in particular will always stay vivid in my mind. At the
site of two downed Blackhawks I, with a Soldier from the 1st
Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, our commander and Col. Joseph
Anderson, USMA 1981, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team Commander, went
through the wreckage and recovered the bodies of seven of our
Soldiers. I will always remember touching my friends, saying good-bye
to them and putting them in body bags.
I will always remember Anderson pulling the bodies out of the bird
and personally carrying each one off the roof. I can see him carrying
them down three flights of stairs as if he was carrying something so
precious and dear to him.
I will always remember Lt. Col. Mark Murray, my commander, tears
filling his eyes as he identified his Soldiers. I will also remember
the pain on the face and in the voice of Capt. Vincent Generoso, USMA
1996, the Charlie Battery Commander, as he told his soldiers they
lost five of their buddies. These are exemplary lessons in leadership
I will never forget; lessons of soldiering I will always carry with
me; lessons about the true cost of freedom I will pass on to anyone
who will listen.
This is why I reluctantly get on my transport home, despite the fact
I know my job is done and another waits. I carry a message in my
bosom, a message I am not sure I can ever express in words. It begins
with the words Duty-Honor-Country, but ends with words embodied in
the lives and actions of America's sons and daughters in uniform.
They stand alone, on guard through the dark night of oppression,
whenever and wherever it may be.
The message I carry is of great sacrifice, but also of great hope for
the future. It is a message that contains a firm belief in the
rightness of our cause, but sadness on what price we have paid -- and
will continue to pay -- for the freedoms we hold so dear.
I understand it can be no other way. George Orwell once said that we
sleep well at night because there are brave men and women awake,
standing guard, prepared to do great violence to those who would harm
us.
This holiday season, as our hearts turn to peace and joy, I hope we
take time to remember. We, as a community and a nation, must remember
that we celebrate the joy and peace of the holidays in safety and
security because of those men and women far away. Those men and women
who are prepared to do great violence to any who would harm us. It is
because of their sacrifices that we can worship where and when we
wish and celebrate the birth of the prince of peace.
So as I fly the freedom bird towards home, I wish all Americans
everywhere, of every faith, every race, every ethnic group, every
background, wherever you are, A Merry Christmas, Happy Chanukah,
Happy Kwanza and happy whatever-you believe-in. May this New Year be
one of health and happiness, one where the words of the prophet ring
true and no nation lifts a sword against another.
Enjoy, but in your enjoyment, remember. See you on the high ground.
HOOOOOAAHHH!
« Secure this line!
Another nice gun collection on-line!
Go vist Larry!
Some interesting tidbits in history today...
1861 1st Shot of the Civil War: Star of the West fired on outside
Charleston when she attempted to take supplies to the garrison of Ft. Sumter.
1861 Mississippi becomes 2nd state to secede
1936 M-1 Garand semi-automatic rifle adopted by the US Army - Patton described it thusly "The M1 was the finest battle implement ever devised." That rifle made our infantry the envy of everybody else.
Hat tip to Strategy Page!
Here's an interesting little tidbit.
From an email I got today. Can't verify it yet. I don't have anything useful to add, really. I also don't know if this is from a published source. If you've seen it elsewhere, let me know so I can handle it appropriately regarding copyright.
The Defense Department floated an interesting idea Jan. 6. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the Pentagon was considering putting a four-star general in charge of Iraq to facilitate the transition to Iraqi rule and to remain in command of U.S. forces in Iraq after the transition.
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows... »
To understand the magnitude of this idea, it is necessary to understand the senior command structure of the U.S. military. Each area of the world has a four-star general or admiral in command. In addition, there are several functional commands, like the Transport Command. The Transport Command also has a four-star general in charge, and they used to be called Commanders in Chief or CINCs, until Donald Rumsfeld changed the name to something we can never remember. We still call them CINCs.
Iraq falls under the command of Central Command, and CENTCOM's CINC is Gen. John Abizaid. U.S. ground forces in Iraq are under the command of a three-star general, Ricardo Sanchez, who reports to Abizaid. Under this proposal, Iraq would be carved out of Abizaid's domain. With a four-star in command, Iraq would become in essence its own regional command, effectively ranking with Pacific Command or Southern Command. The Iraq commander would bypass Central Command and report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The logic of this appointment would be that not only ground troops, but also air and whatever sea assets were involved in Iraq would be placed under the new general's command.
This is important because this is very much not the way the U.S. military operates. Iraq is part of CENTCOM'S domain, and pulling it out from under CENTCOM means a new headquarters must be created to support the four-star in Iraq. This is not as trivial as it sounds. A regional command has to have a large staff to manage everything from logistics to intelligence. If the new four-star reported to CENTCOM, then he could access that staff. This reshuffle, however, would explicitly cut Iraq out from under CENTCOM, and one four-star would no longer report to another. So the United States is going to go to a lot of effort -- while short on staff officers -- to create a staff suitable to a very active theater of operations. This is not a trivial undertaking.
The question is why? It is possible the answer is political, but this seems wrong. The Defense Department wants to counter the influence of Paul Bremer -- or the influence of his successor -- and sending a four-star to Baghdad reporting to the Joint Chiefs will do that. Not only is this a lot of effort for some bureaucratic gamesmanship, it is also futile. The White House determines who runs Iraq policy. It is a national security issue of the highest order, so slipping an extra star into the deck isn't going to have much influence. Secretary of State Colin Powell is not likely to buckle at the sight of a four-star general.
The other explanation is that the Defense Department is expecting intensifying conflict within CENTCOM's area of responsibility, so that command responsibilities will outstrip the capacity of Abizaid and his staff. CENTCOM has three potential theaters of operation in its area of responsibility. Apart from Iraq, operations are possible against Syria or in Saudi Arabia, should the House of Saud start to totter. CENTCOM is also responsible for Afghanistan, where fighting continues, and Pakistan, where President Pervez Musharraf's survival -- personal and political -- is unclear. We should add that, in the end, U.S. troops will move into northwestern Pakistan to liquidate the remnants of al Qaeda. Lastly, CENTCOM is responsible for Africa, where seriously intensified operations were planned and postponed over the summer due to the situation in Iraq.
At some point, CENTCOM could be involved, for example, in operations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, an intervention in Pakistan and an African campaign. This will not happen simultaneously -- if Washington can help it -- but even sequential operations require extensive planning that will outstrip the capacity of any single regional command to manage.
Creating a new CINC in Baghdad (a Middle East Command) -- and just as important, creating a suitable staff -- effectively creates a new area of responsibility. If this is confined solely to the countries contiguous to Iraq -- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran -- then this is a huge area of responsibility. Indeed, all of these don't have to be carved out for the new Middle East Command. There can be a standby command in the wings ready to take up the slack if needed.
It seems to us, however, that what the Defense Department envisions is a command responsible for the Afghan-Pakistani theater of operations -- a
Southwest Asia Command or Indian Ocean Command; another command responsible for operations between east, west and north Iraq; and the Arabian Peninsula being assigned as events dictate. In other words, the Defense Department is putting forward the idea of another regional command because it anticipates the possibility of intensifying combat operations throughout the region. The war in Iraq might be coming under control, but from the standpoint of the Defense Department, the end of the Iraq campaign is the preface to follow-on campaigns.
If the four-star is appointed in the spring, he will be able to pull his staff together by summer. That will allow him the fall for planning, which would mean that operations under his command could begin by late 2004. Put another way, a bit more crassly, Baghdad Command will be good to go right after the November 2004 elections.
« Secure this line!
SSG Alford Update.
Jen Martinez has an update on SSG Alford. While you can't say he's doing well - he is doing what he did well before his illness: fight!
Some thoughts regarding US troops abusing Iraqis (and getting away with it)
CPT Patti's husband (recent retiree whose wife is a company commander in Iraq has this to say in a recent email:
I want to congratulate you guys on being very, very diplomatic.
I don't have to be.
This is bullshit.
We've just nearly courtmartialed a fast rising Battalion Commander (LTC West) for merely discharging his weapon in the vicinity of an EPW. Instead we throttled his career, charged him a months pay and made him retire.
We've courtmartialed and stripped of their rank soldiers - including a couple of WOMEN - for mistreating Iraqi EPWs.
We might be courtmartialling two Florida Guardsmen for taking a moment out from patrols to get married for crying out loud.
And now these folks want us to believe a story involving deliberate, premeditated murder on the part of our soldiers...
Sorry - I did 21 years in uniform...and haven't been out 3. My wife is commanding a company in Baghdad right now...she was home for one week over Christmas. I consider myself in touch.
It doesn't add up. We refused to engage the mortarmen who wounded 34 at Log Base Seitz because the shelling came from a built-up, populated area. We respect their bleedin' Mosques more than they do for crying out loud.
What such allegations do are two fold: First, they appeal to the seemingly endless capacity of the Arab mind to deceive itself when it is convenient. Secondly, it puts the US Army in the impossible position of disproving a negative (that is, proving it "didn't" happen.)
While that might not be sufficient to mollify Zeyad, or whatever his name is, the fact is he has certain responsibilities as well...among them is the responsibility to be able to exercise a modicum of judgment.
We've all grown up being advised that if it "sounds to good to be true" it probably is. Well, that advice works the same when trying to pin attrocities on your enemies.
I'll likely rant on this...sure.
But wanted you guys to know I, for one, don't suffer the lame accusations of fools likely. I won't say it absolutely couldn't happen...but I've lived long enough to know that the highly unlikely rarely is.
Tim (aka CPT Patti's Husband)
All I can add is - I agree. All my sources in the sandbox are just as annoyed as Tim.
What is he referring to? This. Read the comment streams as well - perhaps as importantly.
Greyhawk of Mudville Gazetter weighs in here.
Matt at Blackfive has his own opinion. While you are there, get a little lesson in leadership.
UPDATE: SGT Hook weighs in.
by
John
on
Jan 09, 2004
|
Global War on Terror (GWOT)
»
Sgt Hook links with:
What I DO Know
»
Mudville Gazette links with:
Season of Lies III
»
Mudville Gazette links with:
MilBlogs
January 08, 2004
Since we've been peering into the heads of senior US leaders...
Let us now take a look at what the Russians think of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
They aren't happy with what they see. On several levels. Political, military, ideological.
Remember - this is written from a military perspective. Military people analyze from a threat capability perspective, not a threat intent perspective.
Their view is valid from a military planning standpoint.
UPDATE: What is really interesting is how they overlay their value system and politico-social expectations from within their own society on their analysis. Exactly the same problem discussed by our senior military leaders below in that we have insufficient Foreign Area Officers who truly understand the areas we are dealing with from a deep cultural perspective - that whole HUMINT thing. Of course, being the guy whose 'gone native' makes your analysis easy to ignore by the bigwigs, as has happened time and again - because it doesn't fit their pre-conceived notions or short-term perceived needs.
You'll need Adobe Reader, sorry!
by
John
on
Jan 08, 2004
|
Global War on Terror (GWOT)
»
The Unrepentant Curmudgeon links with:
Required reading
Ever get grumpy about the fact that aviators get flight pay?
Y'know, guys like SGT Hook?
This is why. Sometimes the airplane breaks. And unlike a car, you can't just pull it over to the shoulder. You have that pesky gravity thing working against you.
And things like this happen.
This is where the crew normally ride, actually, it's the engine and rotor head - there is nothing else..
Everybody walked away unhurt. If you use these guys (yeah, I know, this is a Longbow, work with me people) as a taxi service, you *want* them to be able to do this.
From the email that came with the pics:
I just got these pictures of my son-in-law's helicopter a few days ago. Apparently he was escorting a convoy in northern Iraq on 10 Dec when his bird caught fire in-flight. He performed an emergency landing (note plowed field where he landed) and he and his CPG (Co CDR) walked away. He told my daughter that as he was going back to get his helmet rounds started cooking off and he changed his mind. A short while later, the fuel blew. Soldiers from the convoy formed a perimeter immediately after the landing and a Blackhawk crew extracted them to base. Obviously, we're extremely thankful for his and his CPG's safety.
Hat tip to Mike L.
Why do they hate us?
Because we live like this. And have the society that encourages that kind of spirit and forward looking.
They'd rather we lived like this.
Hat tip to Ghost of a Flea for this... and perhaps as importantly, for pointing out this potential addition to the Arsenal of the Blogosphere's VRWC, and this to Castle Argghhh! during it's on-going remodel.
Here is a peek inside the skulls of some more of the big guys.
This is the summary from a conference conducted last month. It's usefulness here is to give wider dissemination to what the big guys are looking at for the future of the armed forces.
Meeting: 34th Annual IFPA / Fletcher School Conference: Security Planning & Military Transformation After Iraqi Freedom, 2-3 DEC 03 at US Chamber of Commerce Building, Washington, DC
Objective: To discuss challenges and opportunities facing the United States and Coalition Partners as they develop and implement politico-military strategies for the 21st century
Co-Sponsors: Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Chief of Naval Operations
Attendees: CJCS, CNO, CMC, CSA, VC USCG, USAF & USN Ops Deps, COM SOUTHCOM, COM STRATCOM, DCOM NORTHCOM, DASD Strategy, Rep Curt Weldon (R-PA), Director OSD Force Transformation, USS Arms Control & International Security, DCOM JFCOM, various senior military, gov’t and academic SMEs, assorted Allied and Coalition Flag & General Officers.
For those of you reading this who aren’t acronym-savvy (don’t feel bad, I have trouble keeping up) CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CNO- Chief of Naval Operations, CMC – Commandant of the Marine Corps, CSA, - Chief of Staff, Army, VC USCG – Vice-Chief, US Coast Guard. Ops Deps (Operations Deputy), Commanders of Southern Command, Strategic Command. (SOUTHCOM, STRACOM), Deputy Commander Northern Command (NORTHCOM), DASD (Deputy Secretary of Defense), OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense), JFCOM- Joint Forces Command, SME – Subject Matter Expert. In other words, at least 6 four-star generals, 4 of the five who make up the Joint Chiefs, and two of the combatant commanders, lots of three and two stars, and civilian luminaries. Large brain trust and concentration of experience and talent.
Executive Summary: This conference did not waste much time defining or debating the merits of Military Transformation. It focused instead on defining the various paths ahead for implementing US Military Transformation in light of Lessons Learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) and the Global War on Terrorism.
This is good – rather than blindly stumble forward under inertia – stop and assess for a minute. War has a way of focusing people.
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows... »
Key Themes:
· US Security Environment has changed to the extent that Cold War force structure, nuclear posture, basing footprint, forward presence and manpower requirements are no longer suited or relevant to the altered landscape. Result: too much high priced dead wood
· All military speakers from all services espoused the need for a new Joint & Expeditionary Mindset---and every service endorsed the Sea-Basing concept and claimed a future sea-basing role for itself [ed. Note: click link for a description of the sea-basing concept]
· In contrast to earlier presentations, service chiefs and combatant commanders stressed organizational, mindset and procedural changes over procurement, manpower growth, modernization or technology injections as key to increasing capabilities and combat power.
Good stuff here. Trying to get both outside the old way of doing business at the same time transform our processes and practices on the fly – without spending lots of time and energy developing new stuff in the old peacetime fashion. While looking ahead and building for the future – don’t ignore what you can change, right now, with resources on hand – and using your best brains for the task – the guys who are inventing stuff while they do it. And not send it back to the ‘institutional Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Corps” to be studied and approved. It goes back to be integrated into doctrine and training. In wartime, the warfighters should be driving the doctrine train. Not always true. The warfighters ignore stupid doctrine emanating from the schools – but the problem is the newbies coming over to warfight have the doctrine disconnected from the operational reality. We were really bad at that in Vietnam.
· Doing More with Less was a consensus Transformation theme. USAF claims 2 B-1s with right sensor/intel support plus small diameter bombs can be more lethal than traditional 64 aircraft strike package. CNO repeated his intent to shrink Navy manning to free up resources and properly train and support those who remain. CSA Schoomaker lamented he had more than a million people in AC/RC Army but could access only a small portion because of archaic organization and force structure.
While I understand what they’re after in saying this – “Do More With Less” is more often than not an excuse from seniors to subordinates about failures at the higher level that aren’t going to get fixed any time soon.
· Chief lessons from Afghanistan: Letting SOF NCOs and JOs [Junior Officers] run ad hoc fight in flat org chart without oversight, doctrine or senior command structure resulted in agility, flexibility and adaptive warfare that let 80 SOFs (with 24/7 air support) take down Taliban and defeat Al Qaeda on their home turf. Afghanistan stagnation started when the Colonels and support staffs arrived in country. Sec Def challenge is to empower the former and reconstruct the latter. (Robert D. Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly)
This is all part and parcel of developing the ‘Expeditionary Mindset’ they are talking about. Then, on the flip side, we are attempting to build C2 systems that allow senior commanders to truly micromanage. A little cognitive dissonance for me here. But then, I’ve been making a living these last four years trying to figure out exactly that – how to build truly net-worked C2 systems that enable, not disable, flexible command.
· Despite all the hoopla about US prowess in SOF, fact is that all services remain woefully short of FAOs [Foreign Area Officer – regional specialists) and linguists in languages relevant to likely future conflicts or insurgencies. Winning at insurgencies depends more on day-to-day small tactical and PR successes over the long haul rather than ordnance on sexy targets or battlefield victory. (Kaplan)
· We tend to think of US harbors as the main targets of maritime of terrorist attack but the five maritime choke points: Panama and Suez Canals, Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Gibraltar are most vulnerable. Presented evidence that Al Qaeda has experimented with hijacking LNG tankers, tugs and divers to practice taking down softer maritime targets like the choke points and off-shore oil and gas wells. (Mansoor Ijaz)
· Future portends three kinds of terrorist attacks: Nuisance (soft targets), Symbolic (to demonstrate that they can) and Structural (actually take down an important institution or capability). Al Qaeda has ceded most Nuisance and Symbolic attacks to local terrorists while leadership concentrates talent, resources and long term planning on Structural attacks (Ijaz)
· Many speakers think deterrence is still the key to preventing future conflicts, BUT…Nobody knows how to deter attacks from nonstate actors willing to die in the attacks!
Service Chief’s Perspectives:
Marines (CMC Mike Hagee)
· Strategic context has changed. Assured Access problems will increase. Sea Basing is the answer.
· He gave the CNO’s speech on Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet
· USMC doesn’t need more people to do its job----made no unkind jabs about the Marines having to go back to Iraq next Spring to relieve/assist the Army in doing its (peace keeping/nation building) job
· Also absent from the pitch was any carping about combining Marine TacAir with Navy airwings and CMC seemed satisfied with USAF handling of JFACC in OIF
Army (CSA Pete Schoomaker):
· Admits Army lost its way on path to relevance and readiness after the Cold War
· Now has sixteen focus areas to get Army back on track. Top Four are:
o Taking care of the soldier
o Developing a Joint and Expeditionary mindset
o Restructuring the AC/RC to attain relevant balance
o Developing Modularity (smaller, more agile building block units)
· No more Legacy, Interim, Objective Force. Current Force improves day-by-day to become the Future Force
· Army has enough troops to do the mission in Iraq, but AC/RC force structure flaws means he doesn’t have the right troops to sustain the mission.
· If he asked for two more divisions, they couldn’t be trained and deployed in less than two years---too late to help current problem.
· In Q&A, insisted Army is not planning to acquire V-22 but left the door open to considering the option as Marines gain ops experience and Army completes a revamp of Army Aviation----clearly a wait and see…
· Said Army is on board with Sea Basing and he would move to figure out and implement their proper role
USCG (VCCG Tom Barrett)
· Can’t separate all the various elements of the Global War on Terrorism (military, commercial, domestic, international, environmental protection)
· Coast Guard has to do them all but is only resourced to do some of them at any one time.
· Maritime Domain Awareness is key to USCG mission success
· Keys to Coast Guard Transformation:
o Increased Authority (recent ISPS Code adoption helps)
o Improved Capabilities (Deepwater recap + C4ISR upgrades)
o Expanded Capacity (can’t now do all missions on same day
o Partnerships (DOD, IA, international, State & Local)
USAF (LtGen Duncan McNabb, DCS P&P)
· OEF/OIF Lessons Learned were significant
o Airpower was so closely integrated with the ground campaign as to be indistinguishable from it
o Air Force needs a much more Expeditionary Mindset to match moving to AEF (Air Expeditionary Force) organizational foundation
o Had to build 38 new bases for OEF/OIF. Must do better job of building them on a shoe string (expeditionary redux)
o Kill Chain Compression: Big progress, but a long way still to go. If the loitering B-1 that put ordnance on the restaurant where Saddam was reportedly dining an hour after first reports had been able to do so in 30 min…or 10 min, things may have been resolved differently
· Everybody wants more of the support (CAS, PE, Space, ISR, lift) which USAF provides, but AF desperately needs to recapitalize to make up for deferred spending on basic force recapitalization and modernization
· With the Baby Boomers retiring in droves and fewer new wage earners entering the workforce, pressure on DOD budget will increase. Doing Transformation right, and doing it now is the only to assure adequate resources for the future force
· Pillars of USAF Transformation:
o Reorganization (AEFs, providing adequate resources for what remains)
o New CONOPs (Truly Joint, maximize complementary capabilities, minimize redundancy, more trust of other services/nations to fill preselected gaps)
o Rapidly develop and field Transformational technology
· Less may be more. E.g. smaller fleet of more capable C-17s with sufficient crews and improved CONOPs are outperforming far larger fleet of C-141s
Navy (CNO Vern Clark)
· He is zealously following Rumsfeld’s admonition to “Challenge every assumption!” Ditto for the other service chiefs
· What Transformation means to him:
o People (new Human Resources Paradigm)
o Force Structure ( CVN-21, DD(X), LCS)
o Organizations (New Building Blocks e.g. ESGs)
o Change how we do things / Think about things
o Truly Joint CONOPs
· OEF/OIF Navy Lessons Learned: (Same themes as USNI Expo and EWC Speeches)
o Value of True Readiness
o Need for less predictability
o Synergy and value of joint operations
o Importance of Persistence in conduct of forward Naval Power Projection
· The Genius of our people is our true Asymmetric Advantage over our opponents
o Regrettably, we are saddled with a Cold War Mentality HR System and thinking that still considers labor to be “free.”
o Not only is manpower not “free” but it takes entirely too much of the Navy budget to pay for it
o He is on record as the only Service Chief who is on record as wanting to significantly shrink manpower on his watch
· DD(X) and Smart Ship reduced manning will help
· Sea Swap concept of leaving the ships deployed while rotating the crews is saving operational and personnel costs
· With 30-50 year service life of ships, gotta plan Transformation into all new construction ships
Director, Office of OSD Force Transformation (Art Cebrowski)
· Template for Effecting DOD Transformation:
o Continuous Change (Not his job because this is not Transformational)
o Multitude of Exploratory Jumps (Small leaps ahead)
o Big Bets (DOD can never bet the farm, but these are high risk/high payoff never before attempted paths towards significant new capabilities or efficiencies)
· Issues of Regret (Offer potential but can’t afford to do everything so they have not yet been fully developed yet)
o Fires (Non-lethal, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy)
o Maneuver (Sea-basing, Vertical Battlefield, Lift for Operational Maneuver)
o Protection (Urban Ops, Battlefield Medical Care)
o Command & Control (Joint Interdependency vs. Joint Interoperability)
o ISR (Demand-Centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space)
o Logistics (Joint Demand-Centered Logistics)
· Achieving Balance (Transformational Policy must strike a middle road between:)
o Military Victory vs. Political Victory
o Cooperative Engagement vs. US Primacy (going it alone)
o Punishing the Foes vs. Winning the Battle
o Defending the Commons Areas (sea, space, cyberspace) vs. Winning the Close Fight ( Littorals, Low Altitude, Land Battles)
· Future Force Impact of OIF/OEF
o Must fix the Intel Collection to Analysis Gap (amount of data collected grows exponentially while analysis capacity lags far behind)
o Race to Baghdad outran logistics, comms and transportation
o Must shift Logistics from “Pull” to “Push” system (using models, sitreps, sensing) to keep up
o Shift to Tactical Units Cross-Supply to fill the gaps at the front
o “Days of Supply” shown to have no validity in today’s combat
o “Just in Time” is better
o “Sense and Respond” is the future goal
o In future, computer attacks will be as much a part of military ops as any other activity
o In future, computer attacks will be as important as ordnance on target
· How we position the future forces will be one of the key Transformation elements
o Surging from CONUS is the least desirable option
o Forward garrisons ala Cold War are not likely
o Sea-Basing solves many problems
o Surging from Strategic Distance is next best option
o No longer relevant or appropriate for future conflicts:
o Long cycle times
o Deliberate planning
o Non Joint Conops, doctrine or operations
· DOD Transformation Elements:
o Continuing Process
o Creating / Anticipating the Future
o Co-evolution of Concepts
o New Competitive Areas / Processes / Competencies
o Fundamental Shifts in the Underlying Principles
o Mostly About Changing Behaviors
Issues for Defense Companies:
· Real Jointness, especially in CONOPS and acquisition policy, seems to have taken hold at last. We can no longer think in terms of single customer bases, must match our offerings and organization to the emergent new reality
· Most of the Transformational concepts endorsed at this conference were related to changes to processes, organization and doctrine rather than modernization, procurement and technology upgrades. We need to think about how our business model can evolve to satisfy those markets
· Many Transformation elements deal with doing more with less or getting more capability out of what is already in the inventory. How do we accommodate that and still make a buck?
· Art Cebrowski’s list of Issues of Regret catalogs the DOD important Transformation interests that no one is working on. Are these not key opportunities for the first company to offer a workable / affordable solution before the competition gets organized?
· Sea-Basing appears to be one of the pillars of the future US military strategy. Do we have a dog in that fight? Why not?
Quotable Quotes:
“Desert Storm was not a joint operation---it was joint deconfliction. Iraqi Freedom was joint integration. What we need is joint interdependency in which services give up capability and rely on the other services.”
CSA GEN Pete Schoomaker
“The biggest problem in American industry today is failure to harvest talent, insight and experience resident in their own middle management. They prefer to hire outside gurus to solve their problems.”
Strategic Management Prof Paul Bracken, Yale
“If you apply computer power to a flawed process, you merely get the wrong answer faster.”
ADM Jim Ellis, COM US STRATCOM
One thing I see missing from here – but they weren’t at this conference, either – is building a new intel structure that better shares data and greatly expands the role of HUMINT (human intelligence) over technical means of intel gathering. It doesn’t matter how much stuff you gather if you don’t understand the cultural context in which it was generated. Things as simple as the Japanese cultural norm that makes it difficult for a Japanese to come out and say “No” directly. That is considered impolite. You are supposed to pick up on the non-verbal cues, (as well as the fact that they haven’t said “Yes” directly, either) to understand that you are being turned down. Many, many Gis have gotten in trouble in Japan with women because they don’t understand that little subtle nuance of Japanese culture. In the US, we have enough trouble getting randy young men to understand that No means No. It’s even harder to get them to understand that in Japan, a lack of Yes means No. Things like that abound when trying to understand data gathered by technical means being analyzed by someone who has no cultural clue.
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January 07, 2004
Thoughts from the new Chief of Staff, Army...
From a friend. Note even the Chief of Staff has his pay dicked up by those twits at DFAS who can't get the pay of Guardsmen and Reservists called to active duty straight.
Sad the CSA can't get paid. Sadder that it may take that in order to get the command emphasis to get the problem fixed. Mebbe it's time to privatize...
Other good nuggets in here. I'll let you warriors, soon-to-be-warriors, and used-ta-be warriors make your own judgements.
Hey SGT Hook - wanna get stabilized in Hawaii?
Have just finished with about 5 hours with the CSA in this "strategic thinking" course I'm in and wanted to pass on some of his thoughts. Although this course is designed to train senior leaders to think strategically, his comments transition through a number of areas and levels of command. Would be willing to dialogue further in any of these areas, but my purpose in sharing is to provide some insights from our Chief's perspectives. Believe you'll find them insightful.
- One way you know if your organization is ready for war is how much ammunition you shoot and training with body armor. CSA specifically mentioned 3ID's [3rd Infantry Division] efforts to increase STRAC allocations. [ed. note - STRAC = Standards in Training Committee. In this case it refers to number of rounds allocated per year for training]
- America underfunds its military. Strategically, our country's industry base is not geared to support Army's requirements (only one 5.56 manufacturer and surging means to add another shift; we also can only produce 80 up-armor HMMWV's per month). Active engagement with Congress to resource - Congress is open and willing.
- PERSCOM. "May have to take it completely down in order to build it
back up". [ed. note: This is Personnel Command, the Army's HR people]
- DFAS. CSA has had a pay problem himself every months since his return to active duty. In addition, yesterday DFAS [Defense Finance and Accounting System - the paymasters] sent a letter to his wife that he had died. These bureaucracies need to get fixed.
- Global War on Terrorism. "Isn't just about a battle, it's about war. Strategically, military component is only one element of power. Must get all elements of power involved in the war".
- 150 Members of Congress already signed up for an increase in end strength. However cost to Army is $1.2B/yr for every 10K people. [Perspective - sounds like a huge number, but it's only 120K per body. That covers salary and taxes, clothing and equipment, weapons, training, housing, transporting, etc. It's not an outrageous number]
- We already have a 20K increase through stop loss/move. [Yes, and that's starting to cause some retention problems elsewhere, boss.]
- Will relook stabilization. Army has 56K [troops] in a PCS transition at any one time. Will reassess the TTHS [ed. note -Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students ]account. Does not make sense to him to move a Master Gunner to FT Bragg and teach him a whole new skill set, while he can be stabilized at great benefit to him, his family, the installation, and the Army.
- His biggest strategic issue: What kind of volunteer Army do we need to recruit for the future. He is concerned that we have 15% of the active force non-deployable at any one time.
- Has noted that since 9-11, the quality of the Army is better.
Currently up to 97% HS grads, CAT IV is .2% [CAT IV is the lowest acceptable level of mental capacity, as measured by the intake exams upon enlistment]
- Headgear. Beret will stay. But commanders should determine
appropriate headgear based on METT-T [Army shorthand for take circumstances into acount - term is miltary jargon for Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops & Time Available] i.e. soft caps for motor pools, etc.
- Is relooking purpose and value of Class A [Business casual Army? This is the 'coat and tie' uniform]. Will direct all BDU [Battle Dress Uniform - green camouflage] and DCU [Desert camouflage uniform] wear American flag on right shoulder to emphasize Expeditionary mindset.
- Must train and equip leaders, not only for the Army, but for America
- Asymmetrical warfare: Terrorists operate at strategic level and military tactical operations at tactical level. Needs to be fixed.
- Build trust and confidence in subordinates through...Allowing them to do their job, understand what your boss is doing and take something off his plate. The more in-box/email you do, the more you get back. Keep your priorities in order, and allow time to think and conceptualize.
- Strategic leaders visualize, and then communicate complexity in a concise, simple manner. "If you want to get into the weeds, you'll see more shit go by quickly"
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows... »
- He is amazed at how fast soldiers at the lowest levels understand and resonate with his focus points and vision.
- Most important part of his vision is a joint and expeditionary
mindset. "I am first a joint officer and then an army officer". He has
voted in the Tank in favor of a joint issue, even at the expense of the Army
as a service. So has CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and CMDT [Marine Corps Commandant] and CSAF [Chief of Staff, Air Force - the CSA's peers]. He signed a piece of paper at confirmation that if a conflict between his role as CSA and his role as a member of the Joint Staff, that the Joint Staff is supreme.
- Training. Must change conditions to be adaptive, relative, responsive.
- Joint Interdependence. "We cannot operate the Army the way we used
to. Must move toward Joint Interdependence which means we will give up
capability to gain some other capabilities". Two defining report cards for
the Army: 507 Maint Company (Jessica Lynch) and TF Hawk (Kosovo) - took 270 C17 sorties to get 24 AH64's to Albania. Reason is doctrine says to move
MLRS for SEAD, Infantry for protection, etc. "We have to learn that we
don't need it all to cross the LD". [amen, brother!]
- "All of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and Congress realize the next several decades will be the decades of Land Forces. We just need to organize and to get to the fight."
- Effectiveness vs Efficiency. "I don't care how hard people work as long as we win. I don't care what it takes to get the water to the soldier, as long as when he turns on the spigot, water comes out". Bureaucracies attempt to be efficient; professions attempt to be effective. [Let's have another amen!]
- Training - Education - Experience. "When experience is tied to training and education, it is a huge multiplier". Mentioned the recent combat experience of 3ID and the tremendous multiplier it gives the Division's warfighting capability even through refit and reorganization. Also defines his rational of "building the bench" - need to get future senior leaders the experience they need.
- Chaos. Some want to order it. A strategic leader learns how to move it forward. "Strategic leadership is like skiing - once you get it, it starts making sense". Many 3 and 4 stars can't think strategically, yet many Platoon Leaders can. Recognize this capability in leaders and reward them".
- Transformation. "As far as I'm concerned there is not a damn thing sacred about what we are doing in the Army except our values. Right now the sun, moon, and stars are lined up. Inertia is in place because the Army is in motion and supplemental is flowing. But fastest way to drive cattle is slowly. Takes most energy to get it off its feet. We are in a tremendous window of opportunity".
- "I'm often asked how far can I move the Army? I tell them as far as I can. The Army is tremendously resilient. You can't fool around on the margins if we're going to change. We're going to move very quickly and we will be well resourced. Only thing that can't change are our values"
- Not necessarily "Do the Right Thing" - rather "Do What's Right"
« Secure this line!
Today in history...
1709 Russians in Veprik defeat Swedes by pouring boiling porridge on
them.
Embarrassing way to get yer butt kicked, even if it didn't help in the end, and the town was forced to surrender. Here's a little blurb on the battle from a history of the Great Northern War. What I find interesting is the casualties among the senior leadership of the Swedes. Battle command was a different ball game back then.
Siege of Veprik
Charles at the beginning of January decided to drive the Russian army from the Vorskla and Psel Rivers in order to secure the future attack route in the direction of Akhtirka, Belgorod, and Moscow. The first step of this plan was the siege of Veprik, located on the left bank of the Psel. The garrison consisted of 1,500 Russian soldiers and some sotnitsa of cossacks. They had three cannon.
Gyllenkropk in his account wrote, "The cossack town, Veprik, was made in the form of a redoubt with four sides, We had trouble surrounding it. The wall had no bastions and did not have hard defenses. The moat was small.
The Swedes surrounded the town and then threw two infantry and three cavalry regiments with artillery against Veprik. The king tried to persuade the town commandant, Colonel Urlov, into capitulation, if he did not the king threatened to hand him on the gate. The brave commandant sent the following answer to the king: "By the command of my lord I must defend to the last possibility and , knowing that the king values bravery, I don't believe that his highness would take, in the event of victory, such cruelty." Irritated by such an answer, on 5 January the king himself, taking with him an incomplete artillery and dragoon regiment, went to Veprik to aid in the Swedish storm. Arriving there he again sent the offer to the defenders, but they answered this demand of the king with cannon fire. Then the Swedes opened fire on the town from four batteries. The brave defenders of Veprik stoically held fast. On the morning of 6 January the Swedes again opened artillery fire. Under cover of heavy fire three columns from different sides were thrown into the storm of the fortress. But one column moved late and a simultaneous storm was not achieved. Instead of one general attack there were two at separate times. Both attacks were thrown back by the garrison.
This unsuccessful storm of Veprik cost the Swedes over 1,200 men killed and wounded. The wounded included Prince Wirtenburg, General Shatakelberg, and Field Marshal Rensheld, who received a concussion. The Swedish historian Steel wrote: "Losses during the storm of Veprik can be compared to the losses of a large battle. Especially grievous for the Swedes was the fact that they lost in it the pick of their officers. Meanwhile after the devastation wrought on the army by the front, now still smaller than previously was it possible to lose people for nothing."
On 6 and 7 January the Swedes prepared to renew the attack, but before that the king again sent the commandant an offer to surrender. The besieged garrison already was in no condition to continue battle with the Swedes. All military supplies were expended. The commandant, after repelling three cruel storms, was required to agree to surrender. Having taken the town, the Swedes burned it and ruined the population. In connection with the Swedish efforts to widen their area of winter quarters over the Vorskla River the Russians brought their main strength from Sum in Akhtirka in order to block the path of the Swedes to Belgorod or Kharkov. Colonel Kellin was sent to strengthen the defense of Poltava. A special detachment under command of Sheremetev was sent to the west to cut the Swedish communications lines to Poland.
The Swedes were not able until the beginning of spring to move their army into the region between the Psel and Vorskla Rivers. All their efforts to advance in the direction of Belgorod ended in failure. The Russian army by the beginning of spring was divided in two parts; one part was located on the left bank of the Vorskla under command of Menshikov, and the second part under command of Sheremetev was concentrated in fortified Mirgorod, between the Sula and Psel Rivers.
Around the lunchroll...
The effervescent Susie has some suggestions on how the Axis of Weasel might be able to reintegrate themselves into a state of grace.
Kate at Electric Venom sinks her fangs into a Judge. Well, actually, two. And the letter of the day is Sssssssssss.
Momma Montezz exposes WMD use at the Dean Campaign. For shame. (Dean, not Momma!)
Better up the watch at Hastings...
The Royal Navy is about to get smaller than the French Navy - for the first time since the 17th Century.
Look for Chirac the Nose to try to change his name to "Jacques the Conqueror" to repay those cheeky Brits for daring to invade Iraq with his blessing.
Hat tip to the Flea.
January 06, 2004
A test.
SWWBO sends us this test.
I passed. Will you?*
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows... »
*If you're a regular reader of this blog, you will. Anyone who would flunk this test from this blogger's perspective probably hasn't/won't spend much time here!
« Secure this line!
Moonbats got you down? Need a Cluebat™?
But these are the smelly, nasty, stringy haired anti-globalization kinda vandal Moonbats? Ya just don't want to get close enough to whack 'em upside da haid to give 'em a Clue™?*
C'mon down to the Imperial Armory! We have a brand new Long-Range Cluebat™!

The LRC is designed to be launched from any 1.5 inch Cluebat™ Launcher! If you don't have your own riot grenade launcher, you can use any basic bullet launching device you have, just add our cup to it, insert the baton round (less casing, please, we have them available in bulk) and away you go! (The pistol is the Amorer's Walther PPK CO2 pistol he uses in the basement range to keep his aim true.)
For those of you who have arguments with multiple Moonbats and need to spray the room with Clues™, we have this option:
So, as you can see, the Armory is now equipped to add a whole new dimension to dealing with Moonbats!
*Irony, satire, humor. Don't go bashing Moonbats on your own unless you are being physically attacked. It pisses off the Police, cuz' the government has exclusive rights to violence initiation. Think about that for a minute.
January 05, 2004
For those of you who only come here for the guns 'n stuff...
I apologize for the paucity of posting. We're remodeling, and I just spent the last five days making these arthritic hands back and neck paint. Walls are easy - but the damn hallway has 10 trimmed openings and 9 doors. That's a lot of tedious detail work, lemme tell ya!
Anyway, if I get NOTHING ELSE done today, I will at least present the Loyal Citizens of the Empire with photos of the newest Cluebat™ to enter armory stocks and that will be available for issue to LC's who wish to give moonbats a clue, but don't wish to get too close to the dirtier, smellier variety (like a lot of those anti-globalization vandals).
I know you've all wanted to see what a:
ROUND A RIOT
1.5 IN BATON MR
L5A4B1
Looks like.
If ya haven't figured it out yet - it's a rubber bullet. And ya don't want to get hit by one.
January 04, 2004
Here are people blinded by their rage...
and who trivialize history in amazing ways.
I bring you MoveOn.org's latest masterpiece - dutifully saved here in case they pull it under pressure - so that you can see just what confused, and willfully ignorant people these are!
Bush=Hitler.
It's a big Quicktime Movie, so be patient. If you're hitting this dial-up... well, you know what your access costs, not me!
If wanna do our bandwidth a favor, download it and watch it rather than stream it. Thanks!
You can read this hoser while you are waiting for the download. It's a written eqivalent.
UPDATE: The Simon Wiesthenthal Center is not impressed, either - and agrees with my assessment that these people trivialize history...
“Politics and preparing for a presidential election is one thing, but comparing the Bush Administration’s fight against Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein with the policies of Adolf Hitler is shameful and beyond the pale and has no place in the legitimate discourse of American politics,” said Rabbi Marvin Hier, the Center’s dean and founder.
“This ad is not about Democrats or Republicans - it is about lies and a distortion of history,” he added.
So they say, here. (No, they don't say they agree with me directly - this is just great minds reaching the same conclusion... get a grip!)
by
John
on
Jan 04, 2004
|
Global War on Terror (GWOT)
»
Blackfive - The Paratrooper of Love links with:
Monday Menagerie
From the Mind of Mog...
A slightly different take on the Global War on Terror, or, more accurately according to MOG, the Proxy War by the EU upon the US.
I don't know if I connect the dots in the same way Mog does, but it's useful to step outside your paradigm now and then and see how it's holding up.
Mog's view is here.
The article which drives it is here.
This lays out a tilt to things I've not been aware of. Anybody else got news or views or visibility on this? Instapundit blogged it, but I missed it because I don't read him since he doesn't 'roll me...! 8^)
Today in history...
In a move still lamented today by the Violence Policy Center - the US government saves Samuel Colt - beginning the end of the virtual monopoly on hand-guns by rich people and the government. Lefty-Lib-GFWs have been unhappy ever since. Some of you might find something to argue about in here in this interpretation of the history of the handgun that comes from the Ordnance Branch of the US Army....
1847 - Colt sells his first revolvers to the U.S. government: Samuel Colt rescues the future of his faltering gun company by winning a contract to provide the U.S. government with 1,000 of his .44 caliber revolvers. Before Colt began mass-producing his popular revolvers in 1847, handguns had not played a significant role in the history of either the American West or the nation as a whole. Expensive and inaccurate, short-barreled handguns were impractical for the majority of Americans, though a handful of elite still insisted on using dueling pistols to solve disputes in highly formalized combat. When choosing a practical weapon for self-defense and close-quarter fighting, most Americans preferred knives, and western pioneers especially favored the deadly and versatile Bowie knife. That began to change when Samuel Colt patented his percussion-repeating revolver in 1836. The heart of Colt's invention was a mechanism that combined a single rifled barrel with a revolving chamber that held five or six shots. When the weapon was cocked for firing, the chamber revolved automatically to bring the next shot into line with the barrel. Though still far less accurate than a well-made hunting rifle, the Colt revolver could be aimed with reasonable precision at a short distance (30 to 40 yards in the hands of an expert), because the interior bore was "rifled"--cut with a series of grooves spiraling down its length. The spiral grooves caused the slug to spin rapidly as it left the barrel, giving it gyroscopic stability. The five or six-shoot capacity also made accuracy less important, since a missed shot could quickly be followed with others. Yet most cowboys, gamblers, and gunslingers could never have afforded such a revolver if not for the de facto subsidy the federal government provided to Colt by purchasing his revolvers in such great quantities. After the first batch of revolvers proved popular with soldiers, the federal government became one of Colt's biggest customers, providing him with the much-needed capital to improve his production facilities. With the help of Eli Whitney and other inventors, Colt developed a system of mass production and interchangeable parts for his pistols that greatly lowered their cost. Though never cheap, by the early 1850s, Colt revolvers were inexpensive enough to be a favorite with Americans headed westward during the California Gold Rush. Between 1850 and 1860, Colt sold 170,000 of his "pocket" revolvers and 98,000 "belt" revolvers, mostly to civilians looking for a powerful and effective means of self-defense in the Wild West.
In 1863, Lincoln gets the military back in line. Grant still became President, something he could never do in this day and age - unless, perhaps, he ran as a Democrat, for whom, apparently, all sins are to be forgiven.
1863 - Union General Henry Halleck, by direction of President Abraham Lincoln, orders General Ulysses Grant to revoke his infamous General Order No. 11 that expelled Jews from his operational area.
And, in 1942, our first Big Win on the ground in the Pacific:
1942 - Japanese forces begin the evacuation of Guadalcanal.