


Revolutionizing the Way America Fights

Transformation and War in the 21st Century



**A
Transformational
Event:
Brigadier General
Billy Mitchell
sinks a battleship
from the air.**

**A Presentation To
the U.S. Air Force
Command and Staff
College
12 January 2006**

Topics for Discussion

1. What should you take away from this presentation?
2. Why airmen should care about what happens inside the Army!
3. The Challenge of Mobile, Dispersed Warfare
4. Toward a Structure that supports a Unified Concept of Maneuver and Strike
5. Organizing Ground Combat Power for integration within the emerging ***Global Reconnaissance-Strike Complex***.
6. Summary of Key Points
7. Concluding Thoughts: Where are we headed?

**What should you take
away from this
presentation?**

What you should take away from this presentation:

1. Aerospace power is decisive in land warfare. This strategic condition (***global reconnaissance-strike complex***) demands a new operational concept for Maneuver and Strike to achieve unity of purpose and action in the Joint Force.
2. America's industrial-age military is organized around familiar instruments and means not ends. Single-service thinking and structures constitute the main problem. The result is an overly expensive, unsustainable defense budget linked to industrial age modernization schemes that don't work.
3. In contemporary warfare, ***economy of force*** must be the organizing imperative of all military operations. Plans that depend for success on flooding the battlespace with soldiers and marines will fail.
4. Lists of targets and stockpiles of precision munitions no more constitute a strategy than do masses of soldiers on the ground or fleets of warships at sea.
5. Breaking from the past requires new concepts, new structures and new leaders who display the capacity for original, independent thinking and a readiness to take risks are needed. Civilian leadership is crucial.

For anything of substance to change, new legislation to replace the 1947 National Security Act is essential!

Why Airmen should care about what happens inside the Army!

- **How airmen interface with ground force commanders matters!**
- **Airmen should be more than passive receptors of the Army component's plan. Waiting for a request for fires and just filling that request is not enough.**
- **Airmen should be involved in the entire scheme of maneuver from inception to execution.**
- **Airmen must care about how ground forces are built because ground force leadership, organization and capabilities influence how Air Forces operate with Army ground forces.**
- **The Army's generals have a definite philosophy for employing Air Forces, but the Air Force generals do not have a philosophy for ground force employment--as a result, the Army imposes its operational will on the Air Force without a countervailing point of view.**
- **Given that the Army generals tend to see aerospace power as long-range artillery in most settings, this is not necessarily in the national interest.**

Ground combat forces should exploit and magnify the effects of aerospace power, not simply depend on it for effectiveness!



“It is my opinion that press reports of statements by high ranking officers to the effect that we have the best equipment in the world do much to discourage the soldier who is using equipment that he knows to be inferior to that of the enemy.”

-BG J. H. Collier, Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division (1945)

“Our best tank weapon, and the boy that has saved us so many times, is the P-47 fighter!”

-SGT Harold E. Fulton, Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division (1944)

According to a recent study on “modularity” by the Institute for Defense Analysis:

“... By the year 2011, the Army will field a force that is 70% smaller in terms of heavy battalions, 63% smaller in terms of heavy companies and 11% smaller in terms of infantry battalions.” (More overhead, more logistical support, fewer combat troops)

According to GAO:



Modularity + Future Combat System = \$200+ billion, results in no net increase in army fighting strength, and equips one-third of the Army in 20 years. (35% cost increase in two years for just 15 sets of FCS equipment?)

The Challenge of Mobile, Dispersed Warfare

“The power of an army lies in its organization.”

Major General J.F.C. Fuller, 1927

Dispersed Mobile Warfare is a 360 Degree Fight.



- Dispersion requires the lowest tactical level to operate autonomously on the basis of the operational commander's intent.
- Dispersion increases dependence on stand-off attack systems from the air and sea.
- Mass \neq Capability. In fact, mass is a disadvantage as it is easy to target. Smaller, highly maneuverable, self-contained, mobile formations are required.
- Dispersion necessitates liberation from centralized logistics; a problem the army has yet to seriously address.

Implications for Ground Forces of the Emerging Global Reconnaissance-Strike Complex




Today, U.S. forces can identify and strike targets quickly and accurately nearly anywhere, creating conditions for operations with the strategic impact of MacArthur's offensive at Inchon in 1950 wherever the effects of strikes are concentrated, provided that ground maneuver forces are tightly integrated *with the strike and information power of the joint force.*

However...

- Combining strike and maneuver as a single joint entity and sustaining it inside the Joint Force is the highest form of operational art.
- Theater-level **strike structures** and trained **strike coordination elements** are vital to unity of action. (*Theaters of Joint Strategic Action*)
- Army combat forces that arrive quickly to prevent the enemy's recovery must also be able to kill and survive. (*Tactics of infiltration on the operational level*)

The Army's Gordian Knot: Too many echelons, too slow to decide, too expensive to modernize.



Conventional forces need a new, inherently joint and flatter organization for combat - new joint operational architecture! But army career patterns, thinking about war and culture are inextricably intertwined with this structure.



Regional unified command



(Standing Joint Force Headquarters)



MNVR



STRIKE



IISR




SUSTAIN

Fewer echelons, faster decision cycle, less expensive to modernize

- Because American air and naval forces frequently reach the scene of the action in crisis or conflict ahead of Army forces, Army warfighting capabilities must be organized to provide joint force commanders with the forces they need—early and without deploying redundant Army headquarters from the continental United States.

- For ease of integration with air and naval forces, ground forces should be organized around maneuver, strike, IISR, and sustainment.

Operational Level of War is Joint and Integrated!



✓ Ensures that all service components act as a single unified force.

✓ Flag Officers are drawn from all Services.

✓ C2 is distributive.

✓ Command and control involves human thought and human interaction. It is structure and content, not medium. (**Recon-Strike Structure** within integrated Joint C2 is key)

✓ Surveillance and Reconnaissance are about sensing activity and reporting it.

✓ Intelligence is about both directing surveillance and reconnaissance to where it is needed, then, correlating it and providing contextual background to give it relevance and meaning before passing it to the commander.

✓ Communications and computers are essential tools, not processes.


What does a U.S. Army without brigades, divisions and corps look like?



Brigadier General

Commands 5,000 – 5,500 Troops

**Combat Maneuver Group is a Capability-Based
Force Module for Close Combat**



Note: This close combat module contains all the arms of combat including armed manned and unmanned aviation. Modules in a reorganized Army for strike, IISR and sustainment will vary in size from 3,500 to 7,000. All are linked to other service components on a Joint Rotational Readiness scheduled modeled on naval forces.



3,739 Troops

RECON

M
A
N
E
U
V
E
R

M
A
N
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V
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R

Fires
Battalion

Support
Battalion

**Brigade
Combat
Team**

Versus



5,500 Troops

RECON SQDN

M
A
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U
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M
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Strike Battalion

C4I Battalion

Support Battalion


**Combat
Maneuver
Group**

✓ **Perfect Information and/or Perfect Situational Awareness is an illusion! Forces should be Network-enabled, not Network-dependent.**

✓ **Density of combat power (soldiers with accurate, devastating direct firepower from tracked armored platforms) at lowest level must be high – combat formations must be able to take casualties and strike back.**

**Brigadier General
Combat Maneuver Group Commander**

Colonel Deputy Commander ← → **Colonel Chief of Staff**




Combat Group C2 and Staff:

- 1. Independent: Responds directly to Joint Force CDR.**
- 2. True Joint C4ISR: Integrates Army, USAF/USN aviation and strike assets.**
- 3. Empowered to decide and act: Collects, analyzes and exploits information.**
- 4. Absorbs additional BNs or gives up BNs as necessary.**



Culture, Thinking, Organization and Leadership are all linked!



✓ Institutional military culture—the totality of behavior patterns, beliefs, and values—is a vital factor in determining success or failure in war and transformation.

“We cannot afford to confine Army appointments to persons who have excited no hostile comment in their careers... This is a time to try men of force and vision and not to be exclusively confined to those who are judged thoroughly safe by conventional standards.”

Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, British Army, 1940

Rapid Prototyping is Key to Continuous Interaction of Technology with Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines Inside New Organizations for Combat.

- When rapid obsolescence is high risk, “wildcatting” with new designs in the hands of soldiers, even aggressively courting failure, is absolutely necessary.

Thirty years passed between the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the dropping of the atomic bomb in 1945. We should see at least as much technological change in the next 10 years as the world experienced in that 30-year period.

(Hafnium/Spiral Mass Accelerator/Directed Energy)

- Examine limited numbers of prototypes under fire before billions of dollars are committed.

“Many of the ideas prevailing at *Intel* about where the disruptive microprocessor could be used were wrong; fortunately, *Intel* had not expended all of its resources implementing wrong-headed marketing plans while the right market direction was still unknowable. As a company, *Intel* survived many false starts in its search for the major market for microprocessors.”

Clayton Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma*

Summary of Key Points

- **America needs a powerful, standing *professional army* designed for close integration with air and naval power in the conduct of global expeditionary warfare.**
- **Single-service thinking and structures are the problems. Integrated structures, new leadership and new organizations are the solutions.**
- **A coherent view of war that crosses service lines to animate such a force does not exist. Operational art involves the integration of opposing viewpoints. The USAF needs to develop a larger view of warfare in order to change the way our air and ground forces fight.**

What should happen next?

- **Legislate a new national security act (unified C2 replaces JCS). It is long overdue.**
- **Perform Objective Analysis & Simulation with competing force designs.**
- **Demand real experimentation. An end to “First the verdict, then the trial!”**
- **Capture the budget & budget schedule plus structure base line. Time, money and resources are running out.**

Where are we headed?

If America's goals were to seize and hold territory, to increase the world's population under American authority, then mass armies designed to occupy and transform foreign societies into reflections of America would be the right instruments in war.

But these are not America's goals.

America is running out of patience, money and soldiers in Southwest Asia.

“The problem in Iraq wasn't some rogue Pentagon intelligence operation that ran roughshod over the CIA and DIA. Far from it, the problem was a "climate of conformity" across the entire intelligence community that firmly believed that Saddam still had WMD. Instead of disagreement, there was almost no internal intelligence debate at all.”

“Intelligence Fable,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 5, 2005; Page A18.