



Transformation and the Illusion of Change:

Where is the Army really headed?
What is to be done?

**Presentation to Members of the House Armed
Services Committee, 21 April 2005**

**Douglas A. Macgregor, PhD, Colonel US Army, (ret)
Glenside Analysis, Inc**

Topics for Discussion

- **What you should take away from this presentation**
- **What has *Operation Iraqi Freedom* demonstrated?**
 - ✓ **Why are we re-learning old lessons?**
 - ✓ **What's the track record?**
- **What's really happening?**
 - ✓ **Command and Control**
 - ✓ **Congress should comparison shop**
- **What is to be done?**
 - ✓ **Accountability, Accountability, Accountability**
 - ✓ **What is the alternative to FCS?**
- **Concluding thoughts**

What should you take away from this presentation?

- **The Army's transformation plan creates brigades (units of action) that lack the capability to operate in the manner the Army Chief of Staff describes:**
 - ✓ **Increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of current divisional brigade combat teams.**
 - ✓ **Create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands of Regional Combatant Commanders and reduce joint planning and execution complexities.**
 - ✓ **Redesign brigades to perform as integral part of the Joint team.**
- **For what purpose is the Army changing? The purpose seems to be a larger pool of smaller units for rotational duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.**
- **Single-Service overhead at colonel, major general and higher levels is increasing and support requirements are growing.**
- **Modularization + Future Combat System (FCS) involves no net increase in army fighting strength, will cost \$48 billion (modularity) + \$108 billion (FCS) + \$25 billion (communications network), and will equip only one-third of the army in 20 years!**



The Robb-Silberman report demonstrates that political leaders have a duty to second-guess the generals.


“The problem in Iraq wasn't some rogue Pentagon intelligence operation that ran roughshod over the CIA and DIA. Far from it, the problem was a "climate of conformity" across the entire intelligence community that firmly believed that Saddam still had WMD. Instead of disagreement, there was almost no internal intelligence debate at all.”

“Intelligence Fable,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 5, 2005; Page A18.

The problem inside the Army is just as serious.


What Congress must do:

- Look carefully at so-called expensive “reform” plans.**
- Most programs for “transformation” have ulterior motives - preserving existing command slots, papering over branch inefficiencies, deflecting serious questions about real reform, and maintaining as much of the organizational and institutional status quo as possible.**



What has Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated?


- **3rd Infantry Division Brigades were expanded to 5,000 + soldiers to operate independently across Iraq. Marine Regiments expanded to 6,000+!**
- **Perfect Situational Awareness based on superior networking is an illusion! 3rd Infantry Division routinely surprised by events on the battlefield.**
 - ✓ **Accurate, devastating firepower from tracked armored platforms, not light infantry, was the critical factor in victory during close combat in urban and open terrain. (*Thunder Run*)**
 - ✓ **3rd ID led with armor, not light infantry mounted in Humvees or Strykers.**
 - ✓ **Armed Helicopters employed in deep attack without ground forces easily defeated.**
 - ✓ **Neither logistics nor fuel efficiency improved since 1991.**
 - ✓ **Theater Missile Defense is not adequate to cope with Iran and other opponents.**
- **Light Infantry without mobile armored firepower was stopped by a weak enemy.**
 - ✓ **101st Airmobile Division unable to conduct offensive operations without Armored TF.**
 - ✓ **In the drive to Baghdad, Marine Tank Battalions led the attack.**



The risk-averse Army General Officer culture of mass=capability buttressed by rigid, top-down control over Army forces produced a slow, deliberate advance behind massive bombardment.

(5 day bombing halt/No change in thinking since 1991)

What did OIF show us? Dispersed Mobile Warfare is a 360 Degree Fight. Only Formations Structured for Independence Can Win in this Setting!



5-6,000 = Combat Formation

“The battle space was so dispersed in width and depth that FM communications between any units larger than infantry or armor battalion/task force-sized elements was unfeasible. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) were often more than 40 kilometers apart, forcing the division command to conduct all command and control functions via TACSAT.”

ADA OIF Lessons

Why are we re-learning old lessons?

"The casualties are the lowest in any Army vehicles, despite how often the Abrams (Tank) is targeted - about 70% of the more than 1,100 tanks used in Iraq have been struck by enemy fire, mostly with minor damage."

Steve Komarow, USA Today, March 30, 2005

"... in Najaf, two battalions of the Army's tanks did what a lighter marine battalion could not, inflicting huge casualties on Mr. Sadr's insurgents while taking almost none of their own."

Alex Berenson, The New York Times, August 29, 2004

"Accusing as I do without exception all the great Allied offensives in 1914, 1916 and 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question -- what else could be done? And I answer it, pointing to the battle of Cambrai (where tanks were first used), 'this could have been done'. This in many variants, this in larger and better forms ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the generals had not been content to fight machine gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that that was waging war."

Sir Winston Churchill, 1920



The Track Record

Korean War 1950-1953

“The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten.... The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking and I said so out loud. The unwillingness of the army to forgo certain creature comforts, its timidity about getting off the scanty roads, its reluctance to move without radio and telephone contact, and its lack of imagination in dealing with a foe whom they soon outmatched in firepower and dominated in the air and on the surrounding seas ...”

Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1967), page 88.



- **In 1947, Army senior leadership testified to Congress: “ No major war for at least a decade.” Focused 563,000 troops on paramilitary occupation duty.**
- **Army senior leadership stripped out the third battalion from every regiment in divisions to keep command slots at expense of troops and fighting power.**
- **Army senior leadership insisted Korea was “infantry country” with result that in 1950 only the North Korean enemy had tanks.**
- **Army senior leadership blamed Army’s failures in Korea on Truman Administration, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Congress.**

What's really happening?

... the Army has not yet made a number of key decisions that could further increase requirements for equipment and personnel. First, the Army has not yet decided whether to recommend an increase in the number of active brigade combat teams from 43-48. Also, it is assessing the costs and benefits of adding one more combat maneuver battalion to its new modular brigades. Finally, the Army has not yet finalized the design of higher echelon and support units... The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial, continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates.

Report of the General Accounting Office, 16 March 2005


- 1. No holistic approach. Not a single brigade has been fully “modularized” with all of the additional intell/recon equipment the Army says is needed.**
- 2. Army has not analyzed the cost of:**
 - Reorganizing any of the echelons above division units or enhancing the capabilities of more headquarters with added communications/intelligence;**
 - No change in Division and Corps echelons. (Divisions get 4 smaller brigades)**
 - Upgrading the equipment of the ARNG brigades (many of which don't have the “previous generation” of equipment (such as SINCGARS), much less funding for new items).**

Status Quo (+)

ARMY COMMAND LEVELS
Under Unit of Action Scheme

Alternative

FROM 5 TO 4 COMMAND LEVELS
with Combat Maneuver Group (CMG)
Concept for C2



- ✓ *Breaking the Phalanx* and *Transformation under Fire* eliminate colonel and “Army only” major general levels of command. Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld’s concepts and with the way USAF and USN forces operate now. New career pattern creates more time for Joint professional experience and education.
- ✓ Inherently Joint C2 on operational level drives integration lower, speeds decision cycle, reduces echelons and number of C2 nodes that must be modernized with new communications capabilities.
- ✓ Meets CSA guidelines for transformation.

Congress should do some comparison shopping!



3,739 Troops

**19 Units
of Action
(UA)**

RECON

M	M
A	A
N	N
E	E
U	U
V	V
E	E
R	R

- 58 M1 Tanks
- 82 M2/3 BFVs
- 36 LRAS Humvees
- 10 120mm Mortars
- 16 155mm SP Guns

**Fires
Battalion**

- Target Acquisition Battery

**Support
Battalion**

- UAVs and UCAVs



5,500 Troops

**16 Combat
Maneuver
Groups
(CMG)**

RECON SQDN

M	M	M
A	A	A
N	N	N
E	E	E
U	U	U
V	V	V
E	E	E
R	R	R

- 114 M1 Tanks,
- 131 M2/3 BFVs
- 12-16 Armed Helicopters + 2 UH60s
- 27 120mm SP Mortars
- 24 155mm SP Guns,
- 6-8 MLRS (Rocket)
- Target Acquisition Battery + Radars and UCAVs
- Joint C4ISR/MI
- C2 /MPs/SHORAD

Strike Battalion

C4I Battalion

Support Battalion

Versus

Note: Some assets assigned to SPT BN in UA are assigned to other BNs in Combat Group.

(Numbers for UA are a moving target!)

Lieutenant Colonel Twiddy, Mech TF CDR in the 3rd ID Brigade that executed “Thunder Run” needed more troops for his mission in a brigade that contained 70 Tanks! What is the Army doing with this UA?

What is to be done?

Answer: Accountability, Accountability, Accountability.

- **Perform Analysis & Simulation with competing force design alternatives.**
- **Demand real experimentation with multiple options.**
- **Capture the budget, schedule, performance, and structure base line.**
Identify changes: Modularity started out at \$20 billion, now \$48 billion.
What happened?

“Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker will conduct an in depth review of the program a minimum of three times a year. Secretary Harvey, in close consultation with General Schoomaker, will also serve as the approval authority for all major changes to the program.”

“Army announces restructuring of FCS program,” 5 April 2004, in aftermath of Senator John McCain’s hearing on the FCS.

And,

Desert Storm – Mogadishu – Kosovo – Tora Bora – Anaconda – OIF 5 day halt in front of Baghdad – OIF No planning for post-conflict – OIF Abu Ghraib

What is the alternative to FCS? Rapid Prototyping!

➤ In his book, *The Innovator's Dilemma*, Clayton Christensen explains what should happen.

“Many of the ideas prevailing at Intel about where the disruptive microprocessor could be used were wrong; fortunately, Intel had not expended all of its resources implementing wrong-headed marketing plans while the right market direction was still unknowable. As a company, Intel survived many false starts in its search for the major market for microprocessors.”

➤ Examine limited numbers of prototypes under fire before billions of dollars in scarce investment funding are committed. (Intel model)


➤ Remember, transformation begins when the force employs new technology and develops the concepts and organizations to exploit new, emerging capabilities.



EXAMPLE: 21-23 ton Armored Gun System variant with Hybrid-Electric Engine, 35mm or 40mm Automatic Cannon + MGs, Retractable ISR mast, Band Track, Composite Armor. This prototype already exists.

Concluding Thoughts:

- Congress should notice that every Army Chief of Staff since 1991 has touted some big “reform plan,” yet very little has changed since 1991.
- Compel objective analysis & experimentation. Equating near-term need for pool of units to rotate through Iraq/Afghanistan with transformation is wrong answer.
- Modularity + FCS = \$200+ billion, results in no net increase in army fighting strength, and equips one-third of the Army in 20 years. (35% cost increase in two years for just 15 sets of FCS equipment?)
- Regional wars are not only possible, they are likely. Must be able to fight them. Future enemies will be tougher. For what purpose is the Army transforming?
- Current transformation could result in some future combination of the French experience in 1940, Task Force Smith (Korea) in 1950 and Task Force Ranger (Mogadishu) in 1993.



“In 1934, military spending had accounted for one-fifth of all government expenditure; by 1938 it accounted for over one-third... In the end, the changes which had occurred (in the French Army) were basically incremental adjustments, albeit important ones, of a corpus of doctrine that had not fundamentally changed.”

Julian Jackson, *The Fall of France*


Back-up Slides

“The essential idea for change occurred in part by chance, but in an environment that contained all the essential elements for change and *to a mind prepared to recognize the possibility of change.*”


Elting E. Morrison, *Men, Machines and Modern Times* (1989)

Combat Group C2 and Staff:

1. Responds directly to Joint Force CDR.
2. Integrates Army, USAF/USN aviation and strike assets.
3. Collects, analyzes and exploits information.
4. Absorbs additional BNs or gives up BNs as necessary.
5. Capable of independent operations inside Joint Force.




**Colonel
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander**
**Lieutenant Colonel
BCT Executive Officer**



Brigade Combat Team C2 and Staff:


1. Cannot respond directly to Joint Force CDR. (Example: SBCT placed under BG Ham in Mosul.)
2. Must operate as part of larger Task Force or Division.
3. Could absorb one additional BN, but can not give up elements and still operate.
4. Limited capacity for integration of strike assets and exploitation of information.

Operational Level of War Must Be Joint



Command and control structures in the regional unified commands must ensure that all Services act as a single unified force.

Streamlining C2 should result in less overhead!



★ ★ ★ ★
**Army Materiel and
Doctrine Command, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia**

★ ★ ★ ★
**Army Land Combat
Command,
Fort Monroe, Virginia**

Unit of Employment X (Division) Headquarters will contain over 2,000 soldiers! What is happening? What happened to reach-back? What will happen in a world with WMD? Where is the agility, responsiveness?

