Update 3 from the Castle's Sailor-in-Iraq, Joe Honan.
[Joe]
"Farmer Joe" Honan, US Navy Agriculture Specialist.
You know how I said last update that I worked well with the General’s staff on the sheep feed program? Well because of my sins I have been given a second “hat” as the Multinational Forces West Civil Affairs Office Agriculture representative. That’s right, they asked me stay on the General’s staff to do farming. The good news is that I’ve managed to extend myself past sheep and now have visited poultry and fish farms. Its up to the big leagues once I get to see the dairy cows.
To help, the Marines gave me a Gunnery Sergeant. A good man typical of the breed. We met and he said “Sir I don’t know why I have this job, I wanted to run convoys but they said since I grew up on a farm in Michigan I had to do agriculture. I didn’t learn anything as a kid, I just did heavy labor, and spent most of time trying to get out of that!”
I just smiled and said “Gunny, you and me are going to get along just fine.” We have a great officer/NCO relationship. I think big strategic thoughts and he stands on people’s necks until it happens.
Seriously though I don’t think that I’m missing anything because I don’t have an agricultural degree. The issues hare are pretty straightforward. The know how to farm, and most have some type of AG Degree, but the infrastructure here is about thirty years out of date. Some was destroyed in the fighting, some through neglect by the government which in the heavily centralized Saddam era was the only group to do it. The big issue is that power has been disrupted, so there is no electricity for the irrigation pumps or fuel for the generators in the poultry hatcheries. Farmers have been staying afloat by selling livestock or bits of equipment, making the problems worse.
The good news however is that we are not dealing with the “bottom billion.” The people that the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation help survive on less than an acre of land. The farms I’ve visited are large and run by people that know agriculture. I visited a poultry farm a few days ago, the man had incubators, satellite breeder farms, a feed mill and was starting a slaughter house. We asked what his three big issues were, and he said he wanted visas so some of his men could go visit Tyson, electricity at the agriculture college lab so they could do blood tests on his flock, and someone to pave the road so the trucks could come in and buy feed in the rainy season.
Of course, since I wrote that above paragraph, I’ve learned not everyone is as locked on as the poultry guy. There has been some interest in developing fish farms in the area. So to understand what we had to deal with, we found a fish farm one of the civil affairs teams had helped and went to go see them. We knew it was on the Euphrates and across from the water treatment plant, but couldn’t find it. So we pulled the MRAP over and asked directions. Turned out we were right there, but I missed it, because I was looking for stuff like fish and water as a marker. Instead we get pointed to a dry empty hole, with an irrigation ditch leading to a broken pump. No one is there, but I corral the neighbor and ask about the farm. The basic story is that they filled the pool, caught some fish in the river, but the pumped stopped, and in about two days the water went down, and then for some reason the fish died, so they put more in but they died too. Now I’m no expert as you know, but you don’t have to be CSI to know that when the circulation stops there is no aeration of the water, evaporation lowers the water level which increases the temperature, and the high salt content of the soil leeched into the water. Any one of which can kill fish.
Moral of the story is: help the guys that know what they are doing. A few small projects for the poultry farmer goes farther in stabilizing the economy and creating jobs than does building stuff from scratch because someone asks you to. The only way to do this is to get out and about and see as much as you can. So we now have a list of five farmers who buy fish food from the Al Anbar poultry king. We figure since they buy feed, they have to have fish, and will track those guys down to see ground truth. Well anyway, the book for “Post-Combat Operations” hasn’t really been written yet, and its a lot of fun trying to build this airplane while its flying.
We drove past an Iraqi checkpoint and I saw a little girl hanging out there with her father, watching our three armed and armored HUMVEES going past like she’d seen it a million times. I thought about what a weird world she lived in, and how its one we’re hopefully making better for her children.
Anyway, I have a couple of pictures I’ve included. I blacked out the faces of the locals because I never got their permission.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Good work there Farmer Joe, in that there Brown Water Navy.
by Boquisucio on May 7, 2008 11:21 AM
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 05/07/2008 News and Personal dispatches from the front lines.
by
David M on May 7, 2008 12:12 PM
The folks to talk to about fish farming are Auburn University's Department of Fisheries & Allied Aquacultures. They've been supporting fish farming in Alabama for a looooong time, and I bet they could come up with ways to make aquaculture work in Iraq.
http://www.ag.auburn.edu/fish/
by
Theodore on May 7, 2008 1:10 PM
Shipmate: Active duty USN here.
I may have a very small way to help you out, nothing huge but perhaps useful. Email if you can and I'll provide details.
by
Chap on May 7, 2008 9:48 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
Heh.
"The obvious models for intervention were Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet General Staff planned the Afghanistan invasion based on these models. However, there was a significant difference that the Soviet planners missed. Afghanistan was embroiled in a civil war and a coup de main would only gain control of the central government, not the countryside. Although participating military units were briefed at the last minute, the soviet Christmas Eve invasion of 1979 was masterfully planned and well-executed. The Soviets seized the government, killed the president and put their own man in his place. According to some Russian sources, they planned to stabilize the situation, strengthen the army and withdraw the majority of Soviet forces within three years..."
"...Invasion and overthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting the hundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army was trained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were not trained for the platoon leader's war of finding and closing with small, indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrain and circumstances were to their advantage."
So, doesn't that sound eerily familiar?
Wanna guess the source?
It's from The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Written by former Afghan Army Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali, and Lester Grau, an analyst at the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Published by the USMC Studies and Analysis Division, USMC Combat Development Command.
In 1995.
It's what I'm currently reading.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Have you read his previous book, The Bear Went Over the Mountain? Told from the Soviet's side. Some of the battles are the same ones in The Other Side.
by Blackhawk on May 2, 2008 6:17 PM
Sounds like a very good book. But be careful. While the setup you describe sounds similar to what confronted the U.S. in Iraq; i hope the book clearly defines what the Soviet goals were. Remember, the Soviets had been planning or leading up to this for a long time. The tactical move was swift, and probably not planned for that exact time; but they had been approaching it for some time. If you look at the Soviet writings from the 60's and 70's; they did the only verifiable population census and "knew" that to dominate that would have to kill and make refugees of 5 million of the population. Which they did. They also wanted control: the natural gas; the gems; and the access to the warm water ports. They also were able to put missile and bomber assets at Shin Dhan--from which to take out Diego Garcia, among other targets.
All I'm saying is that in comparing similities between force structure; tactics etc... make sure you have a complete view of comparative goals as well. That will give the lessons of the two conflicts much more meaning.
by don on May 2, 2008 8:02 PM
One shouldn't read too much into it, Don. Iraq 2003 and Afghanistan 1979 are not complete analogues. It was just... the similarities are interesting - and some of them - the focus on the coup-de-main approach (the essence of Rumsfeld's concept of war) and how it didn't achieve the results we expected (because of what *did* turn out to be underlying, but not obvious, parallels - and the difficulty in swapping mindsets. We were ultimately more flexible, I think, and have done a better job, thus far, with raising the bar with indigenous forces, which is where the Soviets foundered.
Blackhawk - yes, I actually have both.
by
John of Argghhh! on May 3, 2008 7:04 AM
These "by-the-gallon" comparisons are odious.
History reminds us what the price of gasoline USED to be, and no amount of comparing gasoline pricing to the price of 18-year old Scotch single-malt Whiskey is going to change history.
Just for grins, what is the LOWEST price any of you ever paid for gas?
For me, it was 17.9 cents per gallon, in a little independent station right behind the Annheiser-Busch brewery in St. Louis, in 1963.
So, please, PLEASE, P.L.E.A.S.E. stop giving us these comparisons, they don't mean a thing, and they distract one from careful consideration of what should be done about the major issues involved with petroleum marketing.
by
Rivrdog on May 4, 2008 12:04 AM
Sorry, man, but "Coup de main" mean "HELPING HAND",
probably what the commies had in mind for their
fellow local subversive in Kabul under King Daoud...
So, "Grand Coup" will mean Masterful or
daring strike,
"Mauvais coups" are criminal acts by scumbags.
So the Soviet invasion is both a "Mauvais Coup" and a "Grand Coup"...
With a "Coup de Main" from idiotic friends like
the Russians, it is far worse than having ennemies.
You end up hanging with your balls cut off
and your intestines on the ground...
by
Ming the Merciless on May 4, 2008 4:46 PM
Ming - from the French, coup-de-main means "blow of the hand." In military parlance, it meant assault by "other than artillery."
The official DoD definition is: "(DOD) An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke."
Without addressing the merits of the rest of your comment... because it's late and I'm tired, I'll will stand by my usage of the term.
by
John of Argghhh! on May 4, 2008 10:00 PM
Two more titles on the subject that are worth reading are "the Bear Trap" by Yousef & Adkin and "Hidden War" by Borovik. Assume you're familiar with "Feast of Bones" Fiction but well researched. (Of course I'm biased as my platoon Sgt. in Grenada offered a case of beer to anybody who got a Soviet, perforated or no.)Like the blog.
by Andrew on May 5, 2008 1:34 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
Medina and Lawrence: Trying to Draw Parallels in a Paradoxic Universe
[Kat]
At Small Wars Journal: Lawrence and his Message
during a bout of illness when even Lawrence’s prodigious reserves of strength were utterly sapped, that he developed his epiphany regarding the route to victory in the desert. Over the course of a few days he developed the guiding principals which helped him bring his Arab forces to the apogee of success. Thus it was not in his abilities as a cultural polymorph, but in the clarity of thought which he brought to the military problem he faced, that we may derive something useful today.
From Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence notes his strategy:
the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that?[snip]
Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind;[snip]
Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this ground, to save it from our attack-in-depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles[snip]
it seemed they would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. If so, they would need six hundred thousand men to meet the ill-wills of all the Arab peoples,
Bateman goes on to describe Lawrence's ultimate plan:
In earlier operations Lawrence had already demonstrated the vulnerability of the Turkish controlled city of Medina to interdiction of its logistical supply line via the single track railway which ran through the Hejaz desert. His new contribution was to note that, seemingly counter-intuitively, the possession of Medina by a Turkish garrison of some 20,000 was advantageous to British.
In simple terms, the more Turkish soldiers he could force into holding Medina and the Hejaz railway which supplied it, the fewer Turkish soldiers there would be to face the conventional strength of the main British forces.
Read the rest at Small Wars
The final point that Gentile and Bateman jump to is that Iraq has become our Medina. That it serves both the AQ and Tehran's interests to keep us in Iraq.
My response in flash traffic.
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows �
1) Lawrence notes, immediately, that he is talking about bedouins and not urban populations. They require something else. Iraq's population is largely existent in urban centers. the problem would have been if we had concentrated only on securing Baghdad (as we did in the beginning) and not any other population centers. Baghdad would have been Medina.
Strangely, though, it turned into Zarqawi's Medina. The why of it is very simple and applies to the greater reason why Iraq and Baghdad are important.
Historically, Baghdad has been the center of the Islamic empire for many more centuries than Istanbul. It has a significance, both historically and ideologically, for any group, be that Al Qaida or Shi'ite Tehran. Much more so for the AQ variety because a good portion of their ideology is based on both real and mythological history. (One reason that they resemble Nazis and their quest for the third Reich).
I would say that, simply put, to lose Baghdad or to never gain it, is to lose Baghdad permanently. For the Salafists, anyway. The Iranians, if they are at all pragmatic, would consider the back door approach through politics and economic ties would give them leverage at a later date to "win" Baghdad.
2) One might note that the Bedouins of Lawrence's time had a significant advantage over, say, foreign fighters. Aside from the fact that they came from the tribes that were banned together, you can't say that the Bedouins drove into villages and massacred all the local people in horrific ways. Unlike, say, the AQ folks or even some of the hold overs from the Ba'ath or their own.
In fact, historically, it's the Turks that are more comparable to the AQ types in that regard. I recall two memorable moments, highlighted in the movie on Lawrence, both circling around the massacre of innocent villagers. One results in Lawrence, et al, attacking a column of Turks and giving back as good as the Turks had given. The second is the Bedouin who charges the Turks by himself. The shiehk explaining that the man was the last of his tribe that was earlier massacred by the Turks.
In short, there are some parallels, but it would take a pick up stick master to put all the pieces in some sort of context from the historical acts of others compared to recent acts to come up with a true comparison.
But, reversing what Bateman said, had the Bedouin set about massacring anyone they thought was even remotely connected to the Turks, threatened any tribe or village that had not joined them against the turks with complete destruction, etc. Would they have received the same protection and been revered as the liberators?
And, if the Turks had, instead of putting their boots further on the necks of the Arabs, in turn protected the populations and tribes from these roving bands of criminal murderers, then we would have had a Mao moment.
You know, where Mao explains that, if a guerrilla army cannot turn itself into an actual army with its discipline and real political concepts accepted by the population, they would be considered roving bandits that prey on the population, not legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the people.
If I was looking for a parallel to Iraq, that would be much closer to reality.
But...
3) Who's Medina is Iraq? Who has to own it at all costs? Many here are certain that it is not the United States. That may be true, but I have rarely, if ever, seen anyone talking about why anyone else, rather AQ or Tehran might need to own Iraq.
In fact, AQ spent a lot of human, material and monetary resources to gain Iraq. To no avail, it would seem.
Does the United States lose out in its long term goals or does it win? I'm not talking about Iraq. I am talking about the long term goal to discredit, disrupt and, ultimately, destroy Islamic terrorism. Or, more succinctly, the Salafist ideology that foments the the kind of terrorism we have been subjected to.
I am not going to say that its perfect or that that long term goal is simply met and succeeded in Iraq, but it is an excellent start.
To round out that comment at Small Wars, AQ has not only made Iraq and Baghdad an ancient historical point of their ideology, but, more recently, in 1998, Osama made Iraq a center of his grievances. When we went there, AQ could not ignore our presence. It became a point of necessity, of proof of their ideological imperative.
They lost. But, equally importantly, whether democratic and free or whatever, Iraq as an ally, friendly to the west, becomes a thorn in the sides of both the AQ and Tehran, even if Baghdad is equally or somewhat friendly to Tehran.
So, in context to our long term goals, whose Medina is Iraq?
� Secure this line!
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Laurence, while a good movie, was not a big stregic ploy. Mostly tactical to pin down as many Turks as possible for two main reasons. One, to keep the Turks off balance after their defeat and retreat at the Canal and two, to syphon off as many troops as possible from the Galipoli front that was quickly becoming a mess.
The Brits armed the Arabs with light arms and as shown in the movie light artillery. These were tribes, many different tribes, more interested in finding and controlling water. The Turkish influence on their daily life was not great. Big oil wasn't going to be discovered for another 20 years and France and Britan just replaced the Turks as the overall administrators. That's the way countries controlled markets back then...you took them over. The French, British, Dutch, German (before the war) colonial systems were huge. They controlled commerce both ways and took a slice out of every middle. Our Revolution was more about the ability to sell Cod fish on the open market then having to tranship all catches through a wholesaler in Britain.
If while drilling for water they found water instead of all that black goo they didn't want and couldn't use, events for Laurence would have been less then tactical. His main purpose was to screen the canal and keep the Turks off balance, not build countries and empower the Arabs.
Just think of what would have happened if the Brits were able to force the Straights and supply Russia and keep them in the war with the Czar in power.
by Fishmugger on May 1, 2008 6:37 AM
I can't believe I'm even remotely defending this piece by Bateman.
Kat, the point of the piece was that Iraq is a tool by which Iran keeps us tied down and wasting resources so we can't go after them or go on the offensive elsewhere. Which is the great failing of the piece since it sets up a different pathway under which a) attacking Iran ends the influence they have in Iraq. Simply realize that they're stinging us along by the nose and shift to the real target, the real head of the snake or b) cutting deals with Iran stops all the nonsense.
Which, is rather wrong. Iran's part of the problem, but not all of it. Doing Iran doesn't fix the problems in Iraq for which Iran isn't culpable.
But, if you accept that Iran is doing proxy war stuff, then, yeah, he's mostly right. By doing that they tie up massive numbers in a perversion of the '3:1' rule.
The rest of it is just nitpicky. The main thrust was US and Iran, not Iraq as itself. Complaining that his analogy isn't 100% accurate isn't going after the central idea, which is the only thing of real consequence here: Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants.
They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)
by ry on May 1, 2008 1:29 PM
oo "analogies, not xeroxes" I'm going to xerox that one.
I dunno I think Kat brings up a fair point. To the question "whose Medina is Iraq?" I think Iran is not the answer. AlQ and the US to a degree yes but both can afford to loose it and/or could extend their reach further if desired. Pakistan in an odd way maybe. The US' real problem is political which is derived from domestic will. But I have no doubt the US could do more if it was felt to be needed. AlQ has also sunk a lot into Iraq and I don't feel they could say it yields much good for them. However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.
by
Argent on May 1, 2008 2:13 PM
Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants.
They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)
One, he talks about Iran, but very off handedly. I didn't think he really identified who or what equated to "bedouins". Also, yes, I would agree with you, that anology stunk because the bedouins didn't have any fixed assets. Iran does. Thus, you are correct, if we just wanted to stop this nonsense, we could drop some heavy water on Tehran and be done.
But, since he didn't really specify who or what (or if everyone) benefited from our being tied up in Iraq, I went down the list of immediate potential beneficiaries and it ends up with two: Iran and AQ. Secondary beneficiaries might be a whole host of nations who have turned Iran into their proxy (like DPRK, Russia, China, etc).
But, if you get back to the main antagonists, it's Iran and AQ. Thus, as argent notes my final question: Who's Medina is Iraq?
However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.
I agree, but there is one part that always slips by us when we are talking about the necessities of having to win a particular battle or not and that is where fanatical ideology comes in.
Our enemy is sometimes rational and sometimes not. They really do resemble Nazis in the regard that they tie certain strategic necessities to their ideological demands. Baghdad isn't just the place that the US is and where we provide big targets in the form of our military or even where we could be held down and made to spend ourselves stupid.
Baghdad and, by extension Iraq, are part of their entire ideology that insists on the re-institution of the caliphate. Now, whether that is plausible or not is neither here nor there, but when their entire ideology is based on real or mythological history, their entire existence depends on their ability to make that ideology a physical and political reality. I believe fully that this reason is the number one reason why Zawahiri continues to tell the would be jihadists that the primary battle front is in Iraq.
In terms of the top reasons why I would not want to give up Iraq, that would be #1. When we detroy their history, we destroy their ideology.
We are stealing their history right now and they can't stop us.
by kat-missouri on May 1, 2008 3:06 PM
Kat, it appears to this Very Grumpy Old Vet, you have this thing about finding the most dense briar patch and you walk right through the middle of it. Anybody with any common sense walks around it, but they miss some very important truths, in doing so. Thank you.
To get to your subject, my concern with this whole conflict is this. We are starting to look at this conflict as THE model for all modern warfare. This present strategy will work in this region primarily because of the Bedouin Code. This code is not universal, but region-specific. The big thing is to keep a conventional force with a COIN option.
You raise the issue of Iran. I believe they are looking at this situation in many ways. They see the Americans in the two countries on its borders, human shields. These conflicts are draining people, money and weapons. This is everything they want, without the grief. The character you want to watch is Sadr. He figures he is playing it smart. He's got his fingers in just enough things that he can control them. Eventually, he'll become the new Saddam. I guess this is just the way things are, and we just need to accept them. Or do we? Kat, did you read the script, as you can tell, I surely haven't seen it. The old Sea Hag, named, "History" may just have a completely different view. For all I know, "History" may show Sadr just "hanging" around off some bridge. I think we have him some 90 year-old spinster virgin school-teachers to have with him for all of eternity.
Kat, Thank you, for all your hard work.
Grumpy
by Grumpy on May 1, 2008 3:23 PM
Actually, I apparently have a very different read of Bateman than you do, Kat(not in the face, not in the face). Bateman *did* say toward the end who the Bedo, Brits, etc are in the last paras I thought. The Brits are Iran(they're benefiting from Lawrence's work), the Bedo are the various insurgents that Iran may/may not be supporting in Iraq(they're the people doing the grunt work as the BEdo were for Britain), and the Coalition forces, mostly the US, are the Turks(who're beeing bled white or dispersed to hell and gone). IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear.
So I didn't see you walking into the Briar Patch(as Sir Grumpy did) so much as being really nit-picky as if this were a lit-crit mag or something.
So, I'm cornfused as to what you did or didn't see. Maybe i ought to go read it again?
by ry on May 1, 2008 6:35 PM
Kat and Ryan, my point about the "Briar Patch" is this, Ryan, you are the same. Both of you, you do your homework and try to deal with some very tough issues. You are both shedding light into some into some very areas.
Thanks, to both of you,
Grumpy
by Grumpy on May 1, 2008 7:13 PM
IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear.
So, you must wonder why we give them what they want? And, I don't necessarily mean that we leave, but what other options to do we have?
I would say that, while they are thinking in the lines of keeping us from physically attacking them, that may never have been in the cards. Or, at least, not in this decade. I may be mistaken, but the point of the strategy to "drain the swamp" was not simply to draw in jihadists and kill them on end.
Democracy, freedom. Two borders of Iran, as you pointed out in an earlier post, are now with whole different governments sitting on them. And, all the smuggling does not go one way.
Let us not imagine that there is not strategic gain here that has real long term benefits in our total regional or global strategies to change terrorist supporting states.
Aren't we always arguing that this is not always necessarily done at the pointy end of a missile?
by
kat-missouri on May 1, 2008 11:54 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
The Hidden War: Take 2
[Kat]
The Hidden War: Send them Levis
I believe it was 1989 or '90, right before the collapse post attempts at "Perastroika" or reformation. The report talked about the rise of the black market in Moscow. The most popular items? Levi Jeans and Music. Michael Jackson was very popular.
How were these items purchased? American Dollars. The black market circumvented the official economic process and took the revenue right out of the pockets of the government, putting it in the hands of small businessmen. It was an ad hoc free market. Capitalism at its most laissez faire. Of course, it included books, toys, televisions and every other sort of product we could produce. With every item purchased, the idea of capitalism and freedom came with it in a subliminal message wrapped up in packaging and transferred through osmosis as it was held in the hand of its new owner. Even if it was a coke that only lasted ten minutes or a song that lasted three, it was all that it took for the dream to be implanted.[snip]
You want to defeat a nuclear Iran that is reaping double revenues by making statements which destabilize the oil market? Cold War, but faster. We don't have to send in the B 117. Flood their markets with cheap American goods via blackmarkets that only accept American Dollars. Send them CDs and CD players and microwaves. Smuggle in music and books.
Send them Levis and let the best ideology win.
The Hidden War - Take 2: Send them Barbie Dolls
A top Iranian judiciary official warned Monday against the “destructive” cultural and social consequences of importing Barbie dolls and other Western toys.[snip]
“The irregular importation of such toys, which unfortunately arrive through unofficial sources and smuggling, is destructive culturally and a social danger,” said the letter, a copy of which was made available to The Associated Press. …
“The displays of personalities such as Barbie, Batman, Spiderman and Harry Potter … as well as the irregular importation of unsanctioned computer games and movies are all warning bells to the officials in the cultural arena,” his letter said.
Re-emphasizing HotAir's commentary: where's the air lift of Barbies when you need it?
PS...a side benefit of all that smuggling of things across the Iraq/Iran border. The flow goes both ways. They send in bombs, we send in Barbies. While the exchange seems unfair and one sided on the immediate front, in the long run, the people who will be changed irrevocably are on the other side of that border. And, it will cost us less in men and money than actual ground or even air war.
Saving lives, one Malibu Barbie at a time.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
The real irony is that these subversive "Great Satan" toys are made in ..... China.
by fdcol63 on April 30, 2008 7:08 AM
Absolutely. The greatest irony. Satanic toys made in China representing American culture.
by
kat-missouri on April 30, 2008 7:57 AM
May a Zionist Barbie place a pox on your Persian house.
by Boqusucio on April 30, 2008 9:24 AM
This reminds me of when I was in high school in rural Alabama. There was a rumor of a klan rally to be held in the area & it was my fervent wish to rent a helicopter & airdrop a few cases of black baby dolls onto it...man that would've been sweet.
Wayne
"Reporting as Ordered, Sir!"
by Wayne on May 1, 2008 2:15 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
TINS: Okay, there I was...
...buzzing around in email, talking to mid-level policy wonks in various PA shops around the Puzzle Palace and Combatant Commands, and I'm having this chat with a "Senior Government Official" as we were discussing the overall labyrinthine (and oft-times conflicting) blogging policies... among other things, the recently published blogging policy of the Combined Arms Center, put out by LTG Caldwell. [Update: the way that reads, you might take away that I'm not happy with LTG Caldwell's guidance - on the contrary, I think it's one of the best out there on the topic. -the Armorer]
The subject which lit this particular jet was some commentary about "Strategic Communications" and related subjects, which we had ricocheted to off a policy paper and onto a tangent... which led to a discussion of MountainRunner's blogpost on the subject of StratComms. Most specifically, this part:
Earlier this year, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen wrote the Pentagon placed too much emphasis on the strategic in "strategic communication." The modern environment of New Media and strategic corporals (or captains if you prefer) blur the distinctions (and stovepipes) of tactical, operational, and strategic communication and perception management.
Cue frustrated government official:
When can we get over scientisifyin' everything and just talk to people?
Everything in, around, and from the Pentagon is a strategic something-or-other so it sounds important and people can budget money for it. I've asked a couple of dozen people who have "strategic communication" on their business cards just what the term "strategic communication" means and none could tell me. I'd get a blank stare from them and then something like ... "I can't tell you. It's strategic." I'm with the Admiral on this one. If you can't define it you shouldn't be working on it. And what all this rhetoric boils down to is (as stated in the Marine Corps Strategic Communication Manual): do the right thing and then tell people you did the right thing. And then if you did the wrong thing tell people you did the wrong thing and fix it.
Honesty is the best policy.
I come from the old school, Communication = exchanging ideas, CommunicationS = wires, paper, phones, the hard stuff to do it with.
In my old world we typically used the "John Wayne Method" of communication. I keep quiet unless you do something wrong. I tell you that you did something wrong and to stop. You don't stop I warn you one more time and tell you how I'm going to make you stop. You don't stop and I do what I told you I was going to do. And then I hold your scrawny, beaten carcass up for the world to see as an example of what happens when you don't do the right thing. It was all really simple then. No spinning, no perception management, no strategic anything. It was usually a very short say-do loop.
As a leader of troops I found this the most efficient way to do things.
Don't over-think, see - say - do. You may not like what I say but you will DO what I say -- or suffer.
AND if informing and educating is NOT INFLUENCING WHY DO WE SPEND I-DON'T-KNOW HOW MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR A DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION???
Why is this so hard?
Ok, I'm through ranting now.
Maybe ...
I responded with: Ooh. This *would* be a funblog! , while suggesting he start blogging...
His response (gratifying to know you're read by *someone*...)
Yeah, and if they fire me for blogging then blog I will. It'll be H&I Fires defined by grid squares.
Sweeeeeeeet.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Now here's a guy that gets it. Say what you mean, and mean what you say, with a little walk softly and carry a big stick mixed in for good measure.
by XBradTC on April 29, 2008 9:49 AM
John, WELL DONE! We, the Military/Veteran Community, need to remember, there is an over ridding responsibility for support of our troops in harm's way. Does this mean we always agree on the "facts" of the situation? No, but when we correct, we correct the facts and do it respectfully within the Military/ Veteran Community. We may not think about it, so much, but this community reflects on our original oath in joining the military in service to this Nation. The question comes up, just how tight or disciplined are we talking about? Are we talking of the cold world of absolute math, where 2 + 2 will always equal 4 on the hex or base ten scale? This is the world of absolutely no flexibility, Good grief, even in the world of machinery, there must be enough space for lubricant or it will freeze. Even when we think of math, we think of the low levels of computer languages, there is a built in flexibility or even the computer then "freezes up".
John, maybe I'm standing in need of correction. There is an obsolete term, let me see if I can remember it. Oh yeah, I think it's called, "common sense with a military/veteran plugin".
XBradTC, about the big stick, having it is one thing. The real thing to have is the wisdom of knowing, how, when and where to use it.
Everybody have a GREAT week,
Grumpy
by Grumpy on April 29, 2008 10:55 AM
Sounds like my parenting philosophy.
by
HomefrontSix on April 29, 2008 1:26 PM
The profoundly populist world-view of Jacksonian Americans contributes to one of the most important elements in their politics: the belief that while problems are complicated, solutions are simple. False idols are many; the True God is One. Jacksonians believe that Gordian Knots are there to be cut. In public controversies, the side that is always giving you reasons why something can’t be done, and is endlessly telling you that the popular view isn’t sufficiently "sophisticated" or "nuanced"—that is the side that doesn’t want you to know what it is doing, and it is not to be trusted. If politicians have honest intentions, they will tell you straight up what they plan to do. If it’s a good idea, you will like it as soon as they explain the whole package. For most of the other schools, "complex" is a positive term when applied either to policies or to situations; for Jacksonians it is a negative. Ronald Reagan brilliantly exploited this. As in the case of Andrew Jackson himself, Reagan’s own intuitive approach to the world led him to beliefs and policies that appealed to Jacksonian opinion right from the start.
by
Cannoneer No. 4 on April 29, 2008 2:42 PM
People say they value truth, but they don’t like pain, and resent the bearer of unwelcome truths.
by
Cannoneer No. 4 on April 29, 2008 3:42 PM
"If it’s a good idea, you will like it as soon as they explain the whole package."
Whoever quoted this is full of bull. People do not always like a good idea once explained because they don't always view it as a good idea.
by
Argent on April 29, 2008 6:54 PM
"If it’s a good idea, you will like it as soon as they explain the whole package."
Someone once decided it would be a good idea to send me out with a Low Light Level camera to film the night crossing of an NVA regiment from Cambodia into the Delta.
From 300 feet.
Just as the TOT arrived.
They explained the whole package and I *still* didn't like the idea one iota...
by
BillT on April 29, 2008 11:24 PM
Hey, Bill - it looked good when it left here...
by
John of Argghhh! on April 30, 2008 9:09 AM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
A Dissertation on Getting It Right
I'm now working with my second group of IqAF helicopter pilots -- evidently, I didn't scare the first group that badly one single bit. These guys were evidently well-briefed before they came up here from Taji, because they opened the door to our office, looked around grinning and said, "Good morning!", made a beeline for yours truly and promptly introduced themselves. I saw two familiar squadron patches, so I've got a good idea who described me to them...
After the initial sim period (our sims are visual, non-motion, so there's a whale of a cognitive disconnect between what your eyes tell your brain and what the seat of your pants conveys), we were decompressing in the shade and started trading aviation background info. I thought you might like to know that there was one part of the Basra op that was planned *right* and went according to plan from Day One all the way through. I'll let Ali tell it -- it was his story, after all.
"So, on the first day, we knew the troops will be needing the ammunition, the food, the medicine for casualties. The C-130 [an IqAF Herky, BTW] lands and offloads the ammunition first. We put the ammunition into the Huey IIs and fly resupply. The Bad Guys shoot to drive us off, but we shoot back and continue into the area to land because the troops, our troops, need ammunition.
"More ammunition and food go on the Mi-17s because the packages are large and heavy, only ammunition goes on the Huey IIs. We all go, Huey IIs and Mi-17s. Again the Bad Guys shoot and try to drive us off, keep us from landing. Again, we shoot back and go in and land, we offload the ammunition and the food.
"Then we all go back to where the C-130 is, and we get more ammunition, more food, and fly it to the troops. The Bad Guys shoot, but not so much, because the troops are moving around in the city now, and we don't shoot because the Bad Guys are close to the troops, close to the people of the city and we land, again.
"My copilot says to me, 'This is not as bad as the Vietnam films on the TV, but now *I* will have a "Hey, No Sh*t" helicopter war story to tell!' "
Heh. Fast learners...
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
That is way kewl, Bill!
by Oldloadr on April 27, 2008 8:30 AM
So, are you going to be offering a TINS:Storytelling elective for this bunch of stoonts? Could be used if grounded by sandstorms, ya know. Covering
-scrubbing Identifying Information to protect the guilty
-proper utilization of the amusing side-anecdote
-dialogue and internal voice as a narrative aid
by
bad cat robot on April 27, 2008 10:19 AM
BCR -- You just might have something, there.
Wind's kicking up to 30mph, the next crew arrived early, the previous crew is stranded because of the storm, the PAR is overdue for calibration and tomorrow the generator goes offline for maintenance.
*sigh* No good deed ever goes unpunished...
by
BillT on April 27, 2008 10:30 AM
BCR you aught to know better than encourage Bill to listen to his voices.
by
Argent on April 27, 2008 10:32 AM
Those voices are the only thing that keeps him stable...
by Oldloadr on April 27, 2008 10:53 AM
***Mo' TINS, Unkabill. Mo' TINS pleaseeee!***
As the kiddies breathlessly await.
by Boquisucio on April 27, 2008 10:59 AM
Sa-weeeeeet.... TiNS going Global!
by AFSister on April 27, 2008 6:17 PM
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 04/28/2008 News and Personal dispatches from the front lines.
by
David M on April 28, 2008 12:44 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
by
CW4BillT
on
Apr 27, 2008
Update #2 from Joe, the Castle's Sailor in Iraq.
The take-away? Toujours souple!
It’s been an interesting time here, going from Naval Intelligence Officer to State Department Sheep Expert
One thing that I’ve learned over my military career is that when things go wrong there are really only two things you can do. First, control the bleeding as much a possible, and second make sure it turns out so you can tell an amusing story about it later.
A few days ago I find out from the provincial team that the Marine Brigadier General in charge of civil affairs wants a briefing on a sheep feed program I inherited from the previous Ramadi area agriculture rep. Now it’s not the first time I’ve spoken to general officers but the provincial agricultural rep said he would do it. So several layers of agricultural experts get together and I used my experience as a planner and came up with some planning assumptions, courses of action and a way ahead for what we were trying to do. Everyone is nodding their heads, and the staff rep says the general is coming by at 1300. The provincial rep says “I can’t be here at 1300!” and all eyes tuned towards me.
Again, no big deal, I set up a meeting to go over my slides at 0900 and we all split up to go to work. I put some slides together, finished around 10pm, and went off to enjoy the rest of the night. Next morning I’m in my room about 0830 thinking “roll into the slide review, go work out, finally take a shower, change my uniform and go brief.”
It’s at that moment when there’s a knock on the door and I hear “hey they changed the meeting time, its happening right now.” …well thank God I at least shaved already.
So I pile into a three day old uniform that has mud stains from Ft Campbell I can’t get out, grab my draft slides and off I go.
Turns out the meeting is to cover a multitude of issues in his office, not ours, so my briefing is all wrong for the audience. . There is a slide for every issue he is addressing, (the agriculture one is blank, except for my name.) The meeting goes about as well as I could expect, especially when I find out that he asked a bunch of question when he was here last time that I didn’t know about. But I got some expert help and did hold my own. I wasn’t fired and any meeting with a general officer where I am not at attention the whole time can’t be all bad.
I just like the first impression he has. “Honan, oh he’s the dirty, unprepared sheep expert who shows up late.” That will great on my next fitness report.
Seriously though, I saved his staff hours of work on a project they had no idea about, so I gained some silver bullets to be used later. It’s been an interesting time here, going from Naval Intelligence Officer to State Department Sheep Expert, I had the Civil Affairs Team in stunned silence while I compared the local Awassi breed’s wool to the Merino, Shropshire and Hampshire breeds. If I can get my old sheep shears sent out maybe I’ll get back into the game. Its funny how life works sometimes.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Yes,
Life can be very interesting like that. Sometime back I was trying to to a group of folks explain why Confederate uniforms were in so many shades of grey. It all came down to the wool. Depending upon the amount and chemical balance of the lanolin, the type of sheep, the diet it was fed, etc, all worked towards the final hue. Up until the advent of modern analine dyes, you could never really be certain just what shade of the colour you were striving for was going to come out of the vat.
Turns out there is, in fact, a LOT to learn about sheep that is quite useful, besides what sort of sauce to serve with them :)
by AW1 Tim on April 22, 2008 8:32 AM
..a squid briefing a jarhead on the relative merits and beauty of particular sheep...
i guess EVERYONE is trying to take over the Cav's business now!
by MajMike on April 22, 2008 8:39 AM
According to Granny Aching all sheep need is turpentine--externally, internally, whatever.
I look forward to seeing the Navy Sheep-wrangler patch.
by
bad cat robot on April 22, 2008 10:06 AM
Hmmm. The so'jers sure seem attached to those sheep. They even seem to be jealous. Guess after multiple tours over there the so'jers romantic opportunities are pretty baaa'd.
by John S. on April 22, 2008 11:24 AM
John S beat me to it. I was thinking that Navy men talking about sheep to marines is bound to be a cause for concern. ;)
by kat-missouri on April 22, 2008 11:59 AM
Hey, if anyone asks...she came on to me.
by monkeyboy on April 22, 2008 12:02 PM
Now, how'd that Weird Al AC/DC parody go?
Ohhhh, yeah.
"Dirty Deeds Done With Sheep"...
by
BillT on April 22, 2008 12:41 PM
MC Hammer Sheep: "baaaa...ca-a-n't to-o-o-u-uch this!"
Georgia satellite sheep: d-o-o-n't h-a-a-nd me no lines and k-e-e-e-p your h-a-a-nds to yourself!
by kat-missouri on April 22, 2008 1:04 PM
We have 1001 NZ sheep jokes you could modify for the occasion. In fact this sailor's prolly going to hear the entire lot over time.
by
Argent on April 22, 2008 6:16 PM
Kiwi Sheep jokes? Where is Murray? Is it true NZ has a thousand words for grass?
by Old Fat Sailor on April 22, 2008 8:17 PM
Sir-
No matter what cluster screw you get dropped into the main thing is banking those silver bullets. Better to have and not need then need and not have....
ISC Rich Cook
by Rich Cook on April 23, 2008 9:31 AM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
A non-update update from Joe Honan, the Castle's Sailor in Iraq.
No actually, it’s really not another update.
I’ve been busy this week with a special project improving habitability on camp Ramadi by utilizing wasted space. It’s taken all my skill as a planner to design this and gather materials.
Actually the habitat being improved is mine. I’ve been working on making the container unit a little more livable using material that was abandoned by units leaving the country (Including a 21” TV).
It’s amazing what you can find if you expand your definition of “abandoned by the dumpster” out about 100 meters or so.
Other than that, good week, went to the range and got to shoot until I was tired of it, and went out to visit the Farmer’s Union . These guys are pretty much like farmer’s the world over.
I’ll put some actual thoughts on paper once I get my head around what we are trying to do.
Anyway…behold your tax dollars at work.
Click here for "Before." Click here for "After."
Keeping my head in the game.
Joe
JimC is *especially* going to approve of the "After." As we all well know - modern warfare, most lavishly equipped military in the world or not... the scavenger gene resides in *all* of Uncle Sam's soldiery, perhaps most especially the ones that float to work. - the Armorer
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
huzzah for the squid! ya can't go wrong decorating with the harp of Erin.
by MajMike on April 21, 2008 10:55 AM
Seconding Maj Mike
Not to mention you can't go wrong with clean and neat compared to sleeping in a bombed out concrete crud hole.
Yes? Yes.
by kat-missouri on April 21, 2008 11:21 AM
Looks pretty good. Just remember to not sit up quickly while in the rack...
Been there, done that!
PeterT USN-RET
by PeterT on April 21, 2008 11:22 AM
Cool!
There's hope yet -- I'm still living out of a pair of 2x2x3 Stanley Tuff Boxes...
by
BillT on April 21, 2008 1:43 PM
I most heartedly approve of the Green Banner. "We Stand Before Lances."
by JimC on April 21, 2008 4:51 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
Oooops! We've Been Defeated!
Zawahiri sez so.
Al Qaida claims 'defeat' for US troops in Iraq
Baghdad, 18 April 2008 (Gulf News)
Al Qaida has released a new audio recording saying that US troops in Iraq have failed.
The 16-minute message from Al Qaida deputy leader Ayman Al Zawahiri was posted on Thursday on several websites linked to militant Islamists.
"Where the American invasion stands now, after five years, is failure and defeat," Al Zawahiri said in the recording, the authenticity of which could not be immediately verified.
Gee, glad he didn't call it a debacle, too. That would have stung.
Hmmpf. The tape was as big a yawner over here as it was back home in kat-country.
ZaWahabi would've gained a tad more cred if the tape hadn't sounded like it was recorded inside a sewer pipe...
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Humpff how long before he is telling us "There are no American infidels in Baghdad. Never!"
The more they lose the more they make the most execrable bluffs. So perhaps it is good news he brings.
by
Argent on April 20, 2008 11:04 AM
Uhhh, yeah, right, I'll believe that one when I see it. We're there, until it's over. It ain't over until it's over. But we should not go to war unless, we DECLARE WAR, under absolutely no other circumstances. This is the Constitutional standard.
Grumpy
by Grumpy on April 20, 2008 2:14 PM
I guess that explains where asshats like Pelosi and Murtha have been getting their GWOT Progress Reports!
by AFSister on April 20, 2008 6:13 PM
ZaWahabi would've gained a tad more cred if the tape hadn't sounded like it was recorded inside a sewer pipe... –Bill
Sewer pipe… Hey, you’re talking about Michael Moore’s Minuteman. You have heard the old saw: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s turd.” Or, something like that. 8 ^ )
Oh well, I never liked the guy anyway. Bill, if you get a chance will do us a favor and flush the old log away.
by
Ledger on April 20, 2008 10:20 PM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
by
CW4BillT
on
Apr 20, 2008
National Defense University and Zawahiri Concur: Iraq is a Mess
[Kat]
Keeping in mind this was written last fall after some really bitter fighting to secure Iraq from Al Qaida and force them up to Mosul:
Pentagon institute calls Iraq war 'a major debacle' with outcome 'in doubt'
And it's reported by McClatchy, nearly six months after it was written, which I sometimes think is the second Al Qaida propaganda wing.
Updated: Small Wars has the details. This report is definitely not what the media is making it out to be -
The Miami Herald piece on a NDU "occasional paper" (Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath), quoted alternately as a Pentagon or NDU study, raised some flags here at SWJ. So we asked the author, Joseph Collins, to provide some context. His reply:
The Miami Herald story ("Pentagon Study: War is a 'Debacle' ") distorts the nature of and intent of my personal research project. It was not an NDU study, nor was it a Pentagon study. Indeed, the implication of the Herald story was that this study was mostly about current events. Such is not the case. It was mainly about the period 2002-04. The story also hypes a number of paragraphs, many of which are quoted out of context. The study does not "lay much of the blame" on Secretary Rumsfeld for problems in the conduct of the war, nor does it say that he "bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It does not single out "Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley" for criticism
.
Get out of here! The media distorting something? Say it ain't so, Joe.
But, Zawahiri Concurs, Five Years Later, Iraq is a Mess for the US (he doesn't mention his own problems there, of course)
To redeem McClatchy a bit, I would point to their Iraqi bloggers:
At last I'm in Adhmiyah neighborhood
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend
Please Let Me Marry Her and Then Kill Me
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
The report may have been written last fall, but the Preface is dated Nov. 2007, and the report's first printing is April of this year.
Therefore, the report originating in Autumn are of no consequence; it conclusions, also, regarding the decision to invade Iraq have no bearing on an Autumn origin either.
by doug on April 18, 2008 9:32 AM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
Al Qaeda in Iraq : When losing, flail away and kill as many as you can.
At least that's one way to spin this. In a sense, it reads like a document that might have emanated from the Fuerhrer-Bunker in Berlin in April of 1945 (I can only wish in our timeline with AQI we were at the April 45 time tick...) But first...
Yesterday, I linked to Cassandra's crie-de-coeur over at Villainous Company, regarding her view of a rising willingness of the Usual Suspects to express their contempt of those of us who donned the uniform or support those who wear it. Oddly enough, they aren't as contemptuous when the Powers That Be send us off to do thing that the Usual Suspects approve of... well, they aren't as openly contemptuous, anyway.
I'm not reopening that discussion here, so much as I'm going to cherry-pick from her commenter who took issue with her, a Mr. Schwag.
You finally put it all together Casandy. The majority of Americans now feel contempt for the military.
Why is it that the "greatest military of all time" can't defeat a few thousand camel jocks?
Gas is now over $4 and all we hear is about how great are "heros" are.
You and your ilk have trashed our country and soon you will get a major domestic ass kicking.
Heh. So much to work with, so little time.
Of course, Cassandra never said the majority of Americans now feel contempt for the military, that's Mr. Schwag expressing his earnestly held belief and the hopeful vision that helps him sleep at night.
Better yet, Mr. Schwag, carrying the banner of goodness and light and holding himself up as a paragon of progressive virtue and tolerance and all-round cuddly behavior gives us this gem:
Why is it that the "greatest military of all time" can't defeat a few thousand camel jocks?
Snerk. Can I toss the "bigot" flag here on our representative of the progressive Left?
Heh. Oddly enough, in this space, we have more respect for the residents of the Middle East than it would appear Mr. Schwag does. We're going to return to this comment later.
Gas is now over $4 and all we hear is about how great are "heros" are.
Guess that whole "It's all about oiiiiiiiiiiiiillllll!" meme isn't working too well, but $4 a gallon gas (leave aside the $9 a gallon cost in Europe) is apparently directly attributable to we military people, and guys like Jason Dunham, Paul Smith, Michael Monsoor, and Michael Murphy. Gosh, I'm surprised he didn't manage to throw in there that they are all white males, too. I suppose the charitable reading of that is - when gas is over $4 a gallon, that's *all* we're supposed to hear about... because that's personally affecting Mr. Schwag, and, well, as Fred said in the first comment to the post below this one "Pathological narcissism is the defining disease of our age." (Admittedly, this is dangerous ground for a blogger to tread...)
So, I said I'd come back to it, so, let's come back to it:
Why is it that the "greatest military of all time" can't defeat a few thousand camel jocks?
Cassie really pretty much answered this in her response:
Why is it that police can't totally eradicate crime?
Well, they probably could, if they were allowed to turn America into a police state, but who wants to live that way? There are tradeoffs between liberty and security, and we choose how much freedom we are willing to give up in return for a given degree of safety.
If we were allowed free exercise of military power in Iraq, we'd have little trouble guaranteeing security. The political reality is that we are constrained by the chattering classes (that would be people like you) who like to chant idiotic slogans like "No blood for oil!" and "Stop the illegal, immoral occupation of Irak!"
Since I usually try to avoid being a "me too!" blogger, I have something to add, so lets get back to AQI and flailing around and killing people.
We took out the Japanese and the German governments because we effectively waged a war of attritional annihilation on them. One in which we killed a great many people who probably really didn't need killing. And we learned in Vietnam, that fighting a civil war in the mode of a war of attrition, but being unwilling to *really* wage a war of annihilation, causes you to kill a great number of people and not accomplish your goal. Which makes all that killing, well, a bad thing. If you are going to go to the level of killing, you'd certainly like to be successful at what you are doing, and not lose your soul doing it. So now, we've been constrained by our leadership, international opinion, and yes, the "chattering classes" to not do so much killing.
We've constrained ourselves. And we find, among other things, it makes things take a lot longer (but with a helluva lot fewer casualties on both sides) than the "grind them to pulp" approach of WWII. And now we take shite for it from persons like Mr. Schwag.
Let us quote from a recent letter, from Abu Safiyan, in Diyala, intended for Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the non-Iraqi leader of AQI. Just one section will be sufficient.
Economical War: How can we foil the enemy economically?
1- Attack the gas and oil fields, wells and pipelines for the apostate government and focus our efforts on such attacks.
2- Attack each targets such as gas and oil tankers even oil ships in Basra, Kirkuk, and Baghdad.
3- Attack all the targets that strengthen the enemy economically and militarily. Such as the electric stations and lines which feeds the enemy’s military establishments including the Shi’a, the Awakening and the government’s army which belong to Maliki (such as police station and military bases). Blow up all power lines.
Currently we must focus our efforts to attack oil fields and pipelines, why?
Results and Solutions: Because…
1) It will halt payment of the Military and Police salaries and the Awakening movement associated with the occupier and Maliki’s malignant government. Even the American Army will weaken since it depends on the Iraqi oil and gas wealth. The enemy will gradually drown step by step.
Chemical, Biological agents and Nitric Acid War
1) Throw large amounts of Nitric Acid even Bacteria and other materials that can spread illnesses and kill people until the enemy melts in the lakes and valleys. Even place it in the enemy’s water pipes which will spread the killing and dangerous illnesses among them. The enemy will become afraid and confused and think that we have a dangerous chemical weapon. But in fact it’s a psychological war that places fear in the enemy and exhausts them psychologically and they will gradually foil.
2) The enemy must be killed using all dangerous materials such as nitric acid, bacteria and destructive chemical materials against the enemy’s personnel and nature. We need specialists in this sensitive field.
This is how AQI wishes to fight. Anyone not with them, is the enemy and killable. Sounds a lot like the Fuerher Directives emanating from Berlin in those last dark days of despair.
1) Throw large amounts of Nitric Acid even Bacteria and other materials that can spread illnesses and kill people until the enemy melts in the lakes and valleys. Even place it in the enemy’s water pipes which will spread the killing and dangerous illnesses among them. The enemy will become afraid and confused and think that we have a dangerous chemical weapon. But in fact it’s a psychological war that places fear in the enemy and exhausts them psychologically and they will gradually foil.
It's taken this long because we aren't fighting like this. It will take longer because we won't fight like this - and this isn't the native Iraqis talking about doing this - this is the mostly foreign fighters of AQI.
We fight with one hand tied behind us. As, in many respects, we should. But I love the lack of a sense of history that says, "You suck because you can't beat these guys as fast as you beat the Germans and Japanese, but if you fight them like you fought the Germans and Japanese I'll castigate you for being too brutal and "horror" you might sweep me up in your damned military as you mobilize the entire country and that would *really* get in the way of my self actualization."
These people aren't serious. They're just anti-anything not their idea. And when it's their side that wants to do it... I'm guessing they'll man the barricades to call me a traitor for not being all that supportive - just as I was not, and am not, that supportive of our efforts in the Balkans.
Feh.
For a .pdf of the whole letter, Click here.
To get to the Defenselink article with the briefing slides - click here.
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
this Abu Safiyan dude seems to have a nitric acid fetish...
what's he going to do, dye us yellow?
by MajMike on April 17, 2008 10:30 AM
Most times, I just think idiots like Mr. Schwag aren't worth the time and effort to debate or converse with.
But at other times, I recognize the danger inherent in allowing them to control the dialog without offering substantive rebuttals to counter their inane propaganda.
by fdcol63 on April 17, 2008 10:35 AM
He wants to know about paying for the war? How about we cut out all the earmarks first, like those for Berkley's "nutritional lunch" program that includes lemon grass salads and vinagraitte somethng or other?
I could name a few other earmarks that would net us at least another three months of war costs off the top of my head.
by
kat-missouri on April 17, 2008 10:45 AM
kat,
You've identified the main problem here with regard to Mr. Schwag and his ilk:
They don't believe that the Iraq war is necessary or that we're even currently being confronted with a major national security threat that is more important than the price of oil or whatever other pet domestic programs they'd rather spend Federal money on.
by fdcol63 on April 17, 2008 10:58 AM
"Attack the gas and oil fields, wells and pipelines...in Basra, Kirkuk, and Baghdad."
The Iraqi response to *that* hereabouts translates as, "Wanna dance?"
by
BillT on April 17, 2008 11:18 AM
Dude...and they dance scary. ;)
by
kat-missouri on April 17, 2008 11:22 AM
yes Nitric acid. Perhaps he wants the greener gardens after sucking dust too long. Osmosis has brought it into his cranial cavity it seems. Which, frankly, is a good thing.
by
Argent on April 17, 2008 11:26 AM
Um, drinking nitric ain't that good for y'all(0.00001M can still make you very sick, bleeding ulcers from prolonged ingestion are not cool). Injecting it into pipes shortens the lifespan of the infrastructure. The smell alone will scare most people. Playing with nitric acid at low concentrations makes your skin turn yellow(and then peel off ina very random way) but at high concentrations it is no freakin' joke. I don't think it's 'weaponizable' but nitric iteslf is no joke.
It does sound a lot more like 'Security Theatre' than anything else, but it does show a shift in attitude. No holds barred. They're willing to start fighting with poisoned arrows. This could a be disasterous shift for them since it will cut them off from the people upon which they depend on for resources, hiding places, and intelligence. If you're using your Mao this puts them well down on the scale, they're crashing thru the floor of phase one into a whole new realm of idiocy.
This is why I agreed with Barnett in that time was on our side, not theirs.
by
ry on April 17, 2008 11:59 AM
I am vaguely recalling that among desert tribal people one of the Big No-nos is poisoning wells (which the water supply could be considered). Is that still current?
by
bad cat robot on April 17, 2008 12:23 PM
" ... they're crashing thru the floor of phase one into a whole new realm of idiocy ..."
Or, one can hope ..... total desperation.
And if they are THAT desperate, our efforts in Iraq have not been a "major strategic blunder".
For within the span of 5 years in Iraq, and 6 1/2 years in Afghanistan, we have created the conditions that forced them to drop their masks, which allowed the Iraqis and other Muslims to see them for the barbaric monsters they truly are, and thus turned the world's opinion against them.
by fdcol63 on April 17, 2008 12:28 PM
It does sound a lot more like 'Security Theatre' than anything else, but it does show a shift in attitude. No holds barred. They're willing to start fighting with poisoned arrows.
I am reading Ry's link to Abu Muqawamba and so i would suggest it is a multitude of things. First, yes, theater, because theater is the bread and butter of terrorism.
Secondly, yes, terrorism, because they have allegedly ruled out poison gas attacks as "beyond" the necessary or desired since it could back fire in their whole scheme of "theater for the masses".
But, I am trying to be careful reading too much into this or into Abu Muqawamba's piece because some of it smacks of propaganda.
Especially as the Abu piece notes that Haidar claims the mujihadeen are leaving Iraq because there are enough Iraqi fighters there now to keep on the effort. What BS is that? Right after he says that the tribes turning on them made it difficult to manouver.
Their major efforts and top numbers were in 2005-6. Careful not to swallow too much propaganda.
by
kat-missouri on April 17, 2008 12:43 PM
Very nice John. Very nice. I read Cassandra's piece. It was a bit wordy and lacked some of the usual bite, which lead me to think it was alot closer to the things that hurt most than some of what I've read of hers, but even so, I understood and agreed. As for the detractors, well, "these people aren't serious. They're just anti-anything not their idea." hits the nail square on the head. Except that I do think they are serious, or at least they beleive they are, the just don't have the education or experience to understand that they are just seriously wrong.
ha.
by
SangerM on April 18, 2008 1:26 AM
Personally, I hope that the al Qaeda drones take that advice about nitric acid and "bacteria" and putting it into the water. It will be a great way to flush out (no pun intended) the bad guys, since the nitric acid will hydrolize and be diluted by the water (unless they're bringing it in by tankers) and the bacteria will be killed in the treatment process.
Re: Cassie's diatribe, it always amazes me how people can cherry-pick idiot comments (on the left and right) to justify the villians that they imagine are out there. I don't suppose it would ever occur to you all that the intense anger in the middle and left of center (since Bush's rating is 67% in the red side) is focused at the Powers That Be and not the guys and gals wearing the uniforms who are just trying to do their jobs.
If Cassie wasn't so focused on waving the flag, maybe she'd see that the real villians are those people in authority who don't give the military the resources needed to win the war and to finish the mission. If you perceive the left aiming their anger at military spokespersons such as Petraeus, maybe that's because the real villians don't have the guts to come out and face the music.
by
Jason on April 18, 2008 9:07 AM
If Cassie wasn't so focused on waving the flag, maybe she'd see that the real villains are those people in authority who don't give the military the resources needed to win the war and to finish the mission. If you perceive the left aiming their anger at military spokespersons such as Petraeus, maybe that's because the real villains don't have the guts to come out and face the music.
Or maybe people say something about the military because they are an easy target, an object, in people's minds, the great military industrial complex not made of men, but machines. You can say whatever you want about machines. Much harder to say it about your fellow citizens that you hope one day will defend your ideas too.
Nope. I'm sure people target the military for the same reason they always have: they can't say anything.
Now their wives can, don't you know, and they don't mind doing that.
by kat-missouri on April 18, 2008 9:38 AM
I am vaguely recalling that among desert tribal people one of the Big No-nos is poisoning wells (which the water supply could be considered). Is that still current?
Yup.
Dirtbags have "justified" breaking all the other taboos, so why would they shy away from Chem-Bio Warfare?
by
BillT on April 18, 2008 10:33 AM
� Dismissed, Soldier!
Continuing To Expose E-Mail to the Light of Day
"I'm not surprised they are good pilots...they just flew in an air force owned by an a$$hole."
[Dusty said that, in response to Bill's email-turned-into-a-post below. It's kind of how I have viewed the French Army in my interactions with them - they really are good soldiers, and a pretty good Army, operationally. They've just been cursed with lousy ownership when it comes to the highest levels of management. I'll step aside and let Bill tell his story. - the Armorer]
Some of you may recall I mentioned this incident last month after John smacked me on the ass engaged me in some light-hearted electronic badinage. That item remained as sort of a subthread in subsequent e-mails -- background info only, because, like all aircraft accident investigations, the Investigating Board goes over all the evidence (wreckage, witness statements, the whole ball of wax) until they produce the final report.
In this case, mechanical failure and enemy action were pretty much non-starters -- no evidence, It looked like a simple case of spatial misorientation in a sandstorm -- the question was, *why* did it happen? Lotsa theories, but humor me and keep reading.
I sent this to John yesternight and he though it needed saying.
Too bad that story can't be told. It should be. All of it.
Sigh. And that's not because *we* can't run it, it's because, well, it's a good story about *them* and they can use 'em.
I've OPSECed the daylights out of it, but you'll get the picture...
Continued in Flash Traffic...
Flash Traffic (extended entry) Follows �
I just blessed off on the four Iraqi stick-jockeys who came here to have their Instrument Instructor skills honed and evaluated. [names, ranks and squadrons redacted] all of them smacked their simulated birds into the simulated ground the first time I put them IMC, but they were "flying" an unfamiliar airframe. By the second hour, they were over being sim-sick and ready to go. No problem with their basic flying skills -- all were at least as good as the US helicopter pilots with the same flying hour level, and they all have multiple-thousand hours of stick time.
After the second sim period, I briefed them on attitude indicator failure and how to keep right-side up using only the non-electric instruments -- basically, the same things the pioneer mail pilots used in the 'Thirties. For the first two minutes, they were a bit shaky, but after they got their scan adjusted, they were good -- *very* good, in fact. After they landed, I got everybody outside for a break and one of them said, "Now I know why the Mi-17 crashed." He was on the IqAF investigation board.
Originally, everybody I talked to said all the IqAF pilots had zero instrument skills, but what I saw makes me call bullshit on that. These four were just plain *good* at instruments.
The Iraqi pilot continued, "When you started talking about the attitude indicator, I didn't realize you meant the artificial horizon, then when you failed it, I suddenly realized. And then I realized what killed the Mi-17 crew. I *knew*.
"In American helicopters, the little airplane stays still and the artificial horizon moves up and down and sideways. It is opposite with Russian artificial horizon -- the horizon stays still and the little airplane moves up and down and sideways.
"The Mi-17 has *Russian* artificial horizon."
The Iraqi Mi-17 pilots got their instrument training in the Huey. When they took off, they were nose-low -- *all* helicopters take off nose-low, it's the only way to get the beasts in the air, The little airplane on the artificial horizon went to the bottom of the gauge, as it was designed to do, and when they went IMC, the frikkin' Russian attitude indicator made them believe they were still straight and level for the first couple of seconds. By the time they got their scan going, they were still in a dive, probably only fifty feet above the ground.
Crunch.
I sent each one of the students off with a packet of instrument training pubs and slides. Got a couple of squadron patches in return -- [redacted] flies the Mi-17.
On a related note (related to oft-cited US opinion of Iraqi flying skills based on Gulf I and OIF), I think we might be painting with too broad a brush. [names and units redacted] flew fighter-bombers in Iran-v-Iraq and both had their bacon saved by the US Navy. The Aegis picket ships (who painted everything within 500 miles or so) would often give egressing Iraqi aircraft notice of bandits closing on their locations. When DS kicked off, most of the Iran-v-Iraq vets decided they weren't going to shoot up people who'd previously saved their asses -- but if they'd flat out refused to fly, they would have been shot; if they flew to Syria, they thought they'd be shot down by the Iraqi ADA ring oriented on Israel; they couldn't go to Turkey because Turkey was a Coalition partner. So, they went to Iran, got thrown in jail and beaten up for a while, and then were released at the end of hostilities. Most of the non-flying done in OIF was due to the Saddam's Got Control of the Situation Syndrome, but a bit of it was Iran-v-Iraq vets -- fixed- and rotary-wing -- hot-starting engines on purpose and frying them to ground the aircraft.
How much is true and how much is eyewash for the old gringo? Dunno, but both Su-7s on display here have slag for engine guts.
Now, before you lump me for telling tales out of school, consider the following:
1. The Iraqi board *knew* that spatial misorientation killed the Mi-17 crew, but they couldn't figure out *why* -- all the instruments were working normally and the crew, although inexperienced, had instrument training. Knowing the *why* won't change the causal findings, but it'll take a smidgeon of the onus off the dead pilots.
2. That's not the first time I've heard stories about what went on in the Gulf during Iran-v-Iraq -- just the first time I've heard them from the ones who were warned.
And now Dusty provides the coda:
"He's right about the Russian ADIs...they are the reverse of our design and VERY difficult to use the first time you try (given my MiG-23 sim experience in Hungary)...check that--it's impossible the first time. Everything is exactly backwards in the fixed-wing aircraft, i.e., what looks like a right bank in a US attitude indicator is a left bank in a Russian one, etc. If the little airplane moved as they say, that would be OK, but the ones I saw were out-and-out nauseatingly difficult to decipher.
As far as foreign pilot skills go, every fight I've ever been associated with assumes every SOB on the other side is an Eric Hartmann about to be unleashed. If they turn out to be less-than, so much the better. Then again, ask Randy Cunningham (on visitors' day) about Major Tomb.
I'm not surprised they are good pilots...they just flew in an air force owned by an a$$hole."
And to top it off - this might be the first "Marquee Post" where all the headliners of this space contributed something!
� Secure this line!
Reporting As Ordered, Sir! �
Wow. That is some fascinating stuff. Thanks so much for sharing it!
A question: So the Iraqis are training on one style of artificial horizon, then using another style for operations? Was that something that nobody had picked up on?! If so, is anything going to be done to align the training and operational equipment?
by
FbL on April 16, 2008 8:59 AM
Wow... talk about a lightbulb moment.
You're right: It makes perfect sense now. Damn.
by AFSister on April 16, 2008 9:05 AM
I think that goes along with Iraq now purchasing american weapons, etc.
by
kat-missouri on April 16, 2008 9:17 AM
I wonder how difficult it is, institutionally speaking, to overcome problems like the one you described? Up in the snowy, white north, we get people arguing all the time that we should be buying relatively cheap Russian or even more expensive European kit (especially aircraft). The example usually cited is the Indian military, which buys from whomever they can.
I wonder what a hodgepodge of equipment like that does to your safety, interoperability, orphan stock costs, and training costs?
by
Damian on April 16, 2008 9:56 AM
Damian,
This story is EXACTLY what happens when you get a hodgepodge of equipment. Tragic.
by AFSister on April 16, 2008 10:26 AM
Well, it's what happens if you can't maintain some structural separation.
Back when I weont on my final trip to the Sandbox for saber rattling, Operation Desert Thunder, the Kuwaiti Army had a brigade each of Pact gear, French gear, and US gear, and kept track of it that way. They didn't swap people out from unit to unit willy-nilly.
But it certainly complicates things, no matter how you manage it.
by
John of Argghhh! on April 16, 2008 10:42 AM
This also brings up an interesting additional facet concerning when people accuse the US of aiding Iraq against Iran back in the day.
In real life, actions have both negative and positive consequences. People who either focus all on the negative or the positives, to the exclusion of the real deal, are bombs waiting to go off if you strap them to your mission payload.
And they're not going to go off when you think they are going to go off either.
Such people make an extreme disaster of operations, precisely because they either look at America's support of Iraq and try to use it to destroy America's support of Iraq in the here and now by overplaying the negatives, or they look at the so called "positives" of cheap, inaccurate, "better" Russian hardware for the Iraqis in order to discount the advantage of interoperability and training which would come from getting the Iraqis the M-16 family of armaments.
Russia's quality control seems to be rather weirdly different to AMerica's, if not in the suckage compartment. Their industrial or technological base isn't the problem, it's the way they do quality control. Take a look at how they maintain, or rather
