When the "good enemy" becomes the attacker, we must become the defender. Not of our own forces or bases, but the defender of the people.

To accomplish that, a counter-insurgent has several basic tasks. First, to secure the population physically and, as the Broken Windows theory shows, mentally. In Baghdad, the first thing they did was to seal off neighborhoods with concrete barriers, setting up check points, combat outposts and joint security stations. Finally, we stopped doing "presence patrols" in humvees and started "walking the beat".

In Broken Windows theory, this same approach had significant psychological effect on both the law abiding and non-law abiding citizens alike.

These findings may be taken as evidence that the skeptics were right- foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

The issue here was that the officer gave the impression of "order". What citizens feared most in Newark, NJ were attacks by strangers. By keeping strangers "moving along" and the disreputable locals behaving within "informal community rules", order or the perception of order was increased and maintained. Even when violence did not seem to immediately decrease.

In Iraq, one of the reasons that we partnered with local "concerned citizens" or "sons of Iraq", etc was because, as residents of the area, they would know better than we did who belonged and who didn't. They knew who the "strangers" were. With the barriers and check points in place, strangers were kept out of the neighborhoods or "moving right along" if they had any business being there.

Many checkpoints in Al Anbar would call someone in the village to verify the stranger had legitimate business there and would establish this contact as the "responsible party". They would also take the stranger's identification. This limited the stranger's ability to move about freely without the escort of the responsible party. It also meant that, if something did happen, the security forces would know where to start looking first and that meant the responsible party could be in trouble, too. This effectively limited both the active and passive support of the population for any outside infiltration or activities that could be dangerous to the rest of the population.

These check points were not always the best nor as thorough as they could have been or should be. Infiltration, poor training, intimidation, limited resources and many other aspects interfered with their ability to perform at a high standard. But, as Broken Windows shows, it wasn't really the physical capabilities that mattered, it was the psychological effect. The citizens perceived improved security so they acted on it. Someone was near by to hear their complaints, to act when danger was perceived or real. Even if they didn't always get there before the act occurred or apprehended the criminal afterwards. When perceived dangers existed, someone was there and would respond.

The same psychological effect acted on the insurgents. Not every checkpoint was attacked nor did insurgents try to or succeed in smuggling in arms or bombs through every checkpoint. Some attacks that did occur were extremely devastating, but something kept happening; the debris was cleared, the dead and wounded removed and the checkpoints remained. Even in relative success, the insurgents had failed.

Eventually, the odds of success in an attack or ability to smuggle in men and materials, even though still in favor of the insurgent, gave the impression that it was too costly. The presence of US military, IA and IP patrolling as well local "Sons of Iraq" gave the impression of security among the population and led some to provide information or make reports about suspected insurgents. It wasn't anywhere near a majority of the population, but it didn't matter. The ability of the insurgent to remain anonymous and retain the passive support or neutrality of the population was gone.

Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point expressed the idea that the tipping point wasn't dependent on gaining a majority, but that the right people at the right time were in the right place to sway just enough of the right people. Once a few felt safe enough to act safe and then to turn against the insurgents or, at least, to stop being neutral, thus, passive supporters, it quickly spread by word and example. It became a "good" social "epidemic".

In Lawrence's "algebraical factors", he calculated the number of foreign troops needed to secure territory. What he did not add to his calculation was the exponent that represented the power of the citizens arrayed against the insurgents. He barely considered it a possibility.

Of course, it wasn't just the check points manned by local citizens or police. Further, the locals weren't going to partner with us just because they didn't like the insurgents or extremists. In fact, some of the "local concerned citizens" who did partner with us had been insurgents. Many suggest that it was strictly a cold calculation of physical and political survival or even choosing the lesser evil.

Even in the last calculation, how did these people know that we were "the lesser evil" or simply better than the insurgents and extremist foreigners? After all, what were we doing different than the insurgents or extremists? For several years we drove through neighborhoods, barely stopping, on the way to find "bad guys". When we arrived or were attacked, we had a fire fight. People were killed, property was damaged and then we left, returning to our bases.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

In response to fear people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring: to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."

In Iraq, insurgents and extremists still remained in control of the territory and the people just by dent of their continuing existence, even if they were no more numerically superior than our forces in the area, within even a neutral population that either passively supported or were intimidated into that support.

Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

The insurgents and extremists were there among the people and we were not. We were still the aliens. We were separated by distance, by culture, by language, by perceived differences in security and, finally, by a hunk of metal.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen.

How simple it all must sound in a complicated combat theater. We stopped being occupiers and started walking the beat. The Sons of Iraq became an exponent, exponentially increasing our capabilities, not just in man power or coverage per square mile as Lawrence figured it, but a dynamic denominator that gave the US and coalition forces, the "aliens", a connection to the population, a shared common need and way to accomplish those goals.

That is what Lawrence assumed incorrectly. He assumed that the alien would just remain "alien" because they simply were and any actions after that kept them "alien", only compounding the disconnect.

So, the first rule of thumb for a first time patrolling force: stop being the alien!

Get out and talk to someone.

� Secure this line!

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testing comments

by kat-missouri on May 15, 2008 9:55 AM

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Kat - the "allow comments" box got un-ticked somehow during publishing (prolly one of the interior guard with a flea and tick collar wandered by). I went in and fixed it.

by John of Argghhh! on May 15, 2008 10:04 AM

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I gotta say this something i agree with, in some ways it's one alien versus another because much of AlQ can be seen this way too by locals.

by Argent on May 15, 2008 10:13 AM

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Iraq = Alien v. Predator

I realize that movies are an odd analogy, but I always thought this movie was interesting because, in the end, the actors and audience had to choose or identify with the "lesser evil."

The Predator, based on previous movies, hunted humans. But, he had a reason, an objective and a limitation to who, what and when he would attack. Thus, the risk factors and survivability of could be calculated. In short, if you didn't pick up a gun or act agressively, you could survive.

Further, the Predator resembled our own human ideas. He had a sense of right and wrong, he had some sense of "honor" and he attempted to communicate. Even if all of these things were not perfect, we could still "connect" with the Predator. Not to mention, he did walk on two legs and have two arms and hands, even if he was butt ugly.

The Alien, on the other hand, had a reason or objective, too, but the rhyme and limitations were missing. The Alien would attack anyone and anything in order to propagate. Therefore, the risk factor was exponentially increased and survivability was down across the board.

Further, no communications, just ugly hissing and stinky breath. No sense of honor or right or wrong. Just animal instinct of survivability. And, it was uglier than the predator. It didn't look or act like us. Yes, it was disgustingly ugly.

So, when you were watching the movie, Alien v. Predator, who did you root for?

Somewhere at the beginning, I was rooting for the aliens to kill each other and save the actors the trouble.

In the middle, I wasn't sure. I was leaning towards the Predator, but I still hoped they would kill each other and the rest of the humans would be saved.

At the end, I was definitely rooting for the Predator, hoping he would kill the Alien, feel like he did what he needed to do and then would leave without killing anymore of the actors.

I would add, finally, that, even "looks" aren't necessarily the guiding factor. If the ugly Alien had acted with some sort of humanistic behavior, like compassion, mercy, bravery, etc, protected the humans and fought the predator, even as ugly as it was, would we still feel disgust and reject it, or would we have overlooked its physical flaws in favor of its behavior?

If the shoe had been on the other foot, who would the actors and audience chosen to support?

sound familiar?

by kat-missouri on May 15, 2008 11:39 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

All of this redevelopment work going on leads to the obvious question of whether 3ID's operations are now including more PRTs and non-military support than they had been earlier this year. This is clearly a touchy subject, as it goes back to the long-running Iraq-related feuds between DoD and State/CIA. In earlier interviews, members of 3ID expressed great appreciation for the PRTs, but politely made it clear they weren't getting enough.

MG Lynch reports that while the number of PRTs has increased, staffing is not at 100% in his AO. In general, they are manned at the 80% level, though the newest teams are only at 60%. He seemed happy to be able to note that Karbala and Najaf were finally getting their own PRTs on the very day we spoke, and added that the State Department is, "soliciting for people to come in and fill those positions." This struck me as a case of stepping lightly around the feud, since the State Department has refused to force its employees to take these unpopular postings and instead has relied on volunteers to fill the billets.

In closing, I asked MG Lynch if there was anything I hadn't mentioned that he feels is not being heard back home. He replied with intensity, "I continue to find myself frustrated by the idea that the American army is at the breaking point!" He referenced 3ID's record-breaking rate of reenlistment, with fiscal year goals met in March despite having deployed 3 times since 2003 and currently finishing up a 15-month deployment. "But [they are] reenlisting because they believe that what they are doing is important--protecting our freedoms and way of life--in their souls. They believe in the mission, as I do."

"The idea that the Army is broken is blatantly false," he continued. It is not the military personnel themselves who concern him nearly as much as their families. "It's the strain on families more than anything...Fifteen [months] isn’t 12 + 3,” he pointed out. "You miss two of something when it's fifteen... We've also gotta spend more time at home between deployments."

He repeatedly emphasized that it is the families who are much more of a worry for him than the soldiers. "It’s important the American public knows their army is not at the breaking point," he reiterated, "That they’re re-enlisting and believe in the mission."

With that in mind, MG Lynch was happy to report that the 3ID Headquarters will be formally transferring authority to the 10th Mountain Division on June 1. I asked him what he thinks are the biggest issues 10th MTN will be facing. He expects the major work to be on the Sons of Iraq program, "[ensuring] they remain part of the solution." Lynch said he believes about 60% of them were involved in insurgent-related activity at some point but, "Today they are part of the solution."

This transfer of SOI participants from their temporary employment as a kind of neighborhood watch into careers such as military, police, and various trades has been a constant challenge for a number of reasons. According to MG Lynch, most SOI want to join the Iraqi Army, but only about 1/3 of those applying meet the recruit criteria for physical condition, aptitude, age and literacy.

Instead of military service, many SOI are encouraged to join local police forces or attend trade schools, an effort which is "making some progress." MG Lynch said that in the Jurfa sector where recently there had been no police presence, the newly-reconstituted police force is composed entirely of former SOI members, and there is also an effort to employ some SOI as a kind of civilian service corps for cleaning up and repairing streets and structures.

Even among the SOI qualified to join the Iraqi Army, there are challenges. Potential recruits still "encounter sectarian resistance at the national level, something we have a difficult time understanding," says MG Lynch. "The concern is that these SOI are nothing more than a Sunni militia that will overthrow the government at some point. It is difficult because there is resistance to embracing the idea of getting Sunni to be functioning members of society."

But MG Lynch is not without optimism on this subject. "Slowly, slowly," he says, using a common Arabic phrase. "Everything here in Iraq is hard, and everything in Iraq takes time... It’s going the right direction, just happens to going very slowly."

On the other hand, the transition from 3ID heading up MND-C to the 10th MTN taking over is going very smoothly and quickly. "We are an experience-based army," says MG Lynch. "I find myself worrying zero percent of the time about transitioning... Constant transitions, but it works well." He expects no lapse in momentum when 10th MTN takes over. "I don’t have any concerns."

And so MG Lynch and the rest of 3ID HQ will be home by about June 3, after 15 long months at "war..." Or at something that no longer resembles war for most of them, so much as it resembles a cross between the later stages of a disaster recovery operation and the typical Peace Corps project.

� Secure this line!

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Great interview series, FbL! Well done.

by MaryAnn on May 14, 2008 6:33 AM

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Great job, indeed, FbL! Very interesting series.

So much sticks out, but this particularly struck me as I read:

" ... This is clearly a touchy subject, as it goes back to the long-running Iraq-related feuds between DoD and State/CIA. ..."

This quote reminded me of an interview that Powerline blog did with Douglas Feith about his new book, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. In it, Feith says:

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020415.php

" ... I’ve been doing many interviews about my book in recent days – and I’ve heard from many journalists and others that the book surprises them. It tells a story that contradicts key parts of almost all the major books about the Iraq war."

"For example, it refutes the notion that President Bush came into office determined to go to war no matter what – that the administration refused or failed to consider the arguments against war. In fact, as my book reveals, the most serious analysis of the downsides and risks of war was produced in the Pentagon by Rumsfeld and his top advisers – not by Colin Powell, Rich Armitage, George Tenet or other officials who are reputed to have been the voices of caution."

"My book contradicts the common allegation that Pentagon civilians did not plan for post-Saddam Iraq. It explains what is wrong with the charge that the State Department had a plan that Defense officials discarded. It explains what is wrong with the charge that Rumsfeld and his advisers were dupes of the Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi – and what is wrong with the assertion that we intended to “anoint Chalabi” as the leader of Iraq."

" ... And perhaps most newsworthy, the book explains for the first time anywhere the key postwar plan developed by the administration – the plan for political transition in post-Saddam Iraq. It was a plan developed in the Defense Department – and it aimed to prevent a prolonged US occupation of Iraq. It was a plan to put Iraqis in charge of their own government promptly after Saddam’s overthrow. It was a plan that built on our experience in Afghanistan, where the US overthrew the Taliban regime but did not establish a US occupation government. As I say in the book, it was a plan “which my office drafted, Powell and Armitage tried to delay, President Bush approved, Jay Garner began to implement, and L. Paul Bremer buried. ... ”

As is often the case, we can only imagine the difference that might have resulted if DoD and State had cooperated more fully. And yet again, it appears as though certain people at Foggy Bottom had an opposing agenda.

by fdcol63 on May 14, 2008 9:00 AM

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I asked MG Lynch if there was anything I hadn't mentioned that he feels is not being heard back home. He replied with intensity, "I continue to find myself frustrated by the idea that the American army is at the breaking point!" He referenced 3ID's record-breaking rate of reenlistment, with fiscal year goals met in March despite having deployed 3 times since 2003 and currently finishing up a 15-month deployment. "But [they are] reenlisting because they believe that what they are doing is important--protecting our freedoms and way of life--in their souls. They believe in the mission, as I do."

This is the MSM filter at work. Or even worse, the MSM in bed with the enemy (they learned a lot from media blitz during Vietnam).

To get the good new out you will just have get stories like this out to the Larger Blogs. You make want to try Pajama Media or certain large blogs for stories like this. Also, it maybe possible to get the Wall Street Journal to carries stories like this.

Keep up the good work Fbl.

by Ledger on May 15, 2008 3:44 AM

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Thanks for all the compliments, guys! I thoroughly enjoyed this trek through the 3rd ID brass. It was an education in not only what is happening in their AO, but in everything related to them and their work.

by FbL on May 15, 2008 6:50 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Another big factor in the improved security situation in 3ID's AO is the continuing development of Iraqis creating and maintaining their own security, of which Sons of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces (army and police) are a significant part. MG Lynch described the SOI program as "maturing" and swelling to 40,000 participants. The SOI "provide sustainable security, which is defined as locals under positive control securing their community."

Developments in Iraq Security Forces themselves have obviously pleased MG Lynch. "Great progress with ISF," he enthused, mentioning three patrol bases that are currently being transitioned to the control of Iraqi units. "It’s an amazing thing to me—the progress that is being made in the Iraqi Army."

Within the 3ID AO, the Iraqi Army is comprised of 14 brigade-size units that MG Lynch considers near fully functional. "In the majority of cases, they are capable of planning and executing operations on their own," MG Lynch reported. "All they need is logistic or supply support. [There are] several provinces where they are fully in the lead, including Wasit and al Kut."

The big issue with ISF today is the police. This is one area that obviously concerns MG Lynch. "Not making a lot of progress improving the capability of police," he laments. Corruption/lack of professionalism is a huge problem with many Iraqi police units.

Part of the challenge comes down to a problem with availability of Coalition personnel. There are 96 Iraqi Police stations within 3ID's AO, but there are only 27 Police Transition Teams (civilian/military training and mentoring units). This leaves the vast majority of new Iraqi police units under-trained and unsupervised. With the Iraqi Army now taking the lead more and more, this is 3ID's current focus in the area of ISF development. When I spoke to MG Lynch last week, a reorganization and restructuring of the Military Transition Teams was underway in an attempt to--wherever possible--move qualified Americans from the MiTTs into the PiTTs.

Despite generally good security in the AO, what MG Lynch calls "continuing pressure on the enemy" remains an important part of 3ID's mission. For example, as part of Marne Piledriver, there are significant combat operations in Wasit Province and al Kut (two of the provinces where Iraqi Army units are in the lead). However, Lynch was quick to point out the ways in which combat and stabilization operations go hand-in-hand in counter-insurgency. "At the same time," he said, "you do what you can do to meet the needs of the populations." This includes building governing institutions and relationships, efforts in which he has reported "significant progress."

When I asked MG Lynch about relations between the various religious factions, he replied flatly, "No sectarian violence at all." He said many local councils have Sunni/Shia working together very effectively, a pattern that is also seen in the SOI units. He believes he sees the population coalescing around common bonds and fundamental desires: "People identifying themselves as Iraqi, not as members of a sect." He spoke of a focus among Iraqis--across a variety of backgrounds--on basic safety, good jobs, and the opportunity to improve their station. "I’m convinced more than ever that the people of Iraq want what you and I want," he said with conviction.

I also asked MG Lynch if he believes the AO has "turned a corner," that if current troop levels and Iraqi capabilities were unchanged there would be no going back to the violence and chaos of the past. He declined to use such language, but he is obviously optimistic. "We’re working towards irreversible momentum," he replied. "And we’re close to that."

In the final installment (tomorrow): economic development, transition and expected challenges for 3ID's MND-C replacements, and the burden of long and repeated deployments.

� Secure this line!

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leave the guns, take the schwarma...

by MajMike on May 13, 2008 10:25 AM

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...the Iraqi Army is comprised of 14 brigade-size units that MG Lynch considers near fully functional. "In the majority of cases, they are capable of planning and executing operations on their own," MG Lynch reported. "All they need is logistic or supply support. [There are] several provinces where they are fully in the lead, including Wasit and al Kut."

That is interesting.

I would assume that the IA and ISF would need to secure those supply lines and supply depots with some sort of air power. This coincidently is part of Bill’s role.

I would guess that IA would have to be trained and Trusted with expensive and quite lethal aircraft and radar gear (we would not want them retaliating against their own people to settle old scores – or being infiltrated by AQ and launching air attacks against coalition forces.

A secure Air Force is not impossible in Iraq – but how long will it take to build?

Btw, keep up the good reporting Fbl.

by Ledger on May 15, 2008 3:26 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

When interviewing senior leaders of 3ID, I have always prepared by scouring the Internet for information about the division's activities. Such information was usually available in copious quantities--through numerous radio and TV interviews with local stations, audio and written interviews with bloggers, and even a website devoted to chronicling 3ID's efforts. I did not realize how unusual this was... until I sought information on other U.S. Army division-level commands in Iraq last February and came up largely empty.

I asked MG Lynch what inspired such an obviously intentional program of local/alternative media engagement. His opening sentences surprised me with their carefully-considered conviction and intensity: "I do believe it’s imperative that the American public know how their national treasures are being committed--both people and money...It’s important that we tell the story." It was obviously not about "countering the mainstream media" or "balancing the reporting" so that good and bad news get equal time. For MG Lynch, it was about making sure that the American public be as informed as possible about the broad story of what their military is doing and what results from those efforts.

MG Lynch went on to explain that during his time as spokesman for Multi-National Forces - Iraq in 2006, he had been made acutely aware of the challenges in getting out that broad story. "I had a year of dealing with the media and I understood the complications of trying to get the story back to the American public. [But] the public deserves to know what is going on."

As spokesman for MNF-I, he'd had a front-row seat to the pattern of a "bad" story such as a particularly bloody battle, or a mistake, or a soldier misdeed being almost instantly scooped up and reported in the national media, while positive news often went nowhere. That pattern continued when he took command of 3ID. He voiced his irritation to me with particular intensity. "I find myself so frustrated trying to get through the national media filter. Good news—which is generally what I have to tell these days—just doesn’t get through."

As an example, he relayed his experience with what his parents have been hearing about Iraq while he is deployed. "I’ve called my parents every Sunday, my entire adult life... One Sunday about 2/3rds of the way through the deployment, I called and my father asked, 'Are you still over there? Because there aren't any reports about you anymore.'"

He also reported his reaction to one day overhearing a news anchor state that, "The news from Iraq today is that there is no news."

"That’s not true. That's just not true," he recalled responding with vehemence. And so, the decision was made to focus on local and alternative media outlets to make sure Americans at home were informed about what was happening in 3ID's AO.

MG Lynch reports he has been pleased with the results so far. "I've been very happy with what we’ve done recently--lots of cards and letters from people who have heard of the progress we’re making, but didn’t hear it from major media...I don’t’ know how we as a society look at the bad news and not the good news...But there is so much good news over here. It is palpable, the progress being made.”

That progress can be seen and felt in both the numbers and activities associated with 3ID's work in Iraq. When 3ID arrived in the AO fourteen months ago, Coalition forces were dealing with 25 attacks per day, and significant combat operations continued through much of 2007. By January when I began interviewing the 3ID senior leadership, attacks in the AO had fallen to four per day, though proactive combat operations continued in carefully-targeted areas.

MG Lynch now reports that with less than two attacks per day against Coalition forces in his AO, current activity highlights a marked shift to stability-related operations. The most recent division-wide effort is Operation Marne Piledriver, which has a battle component aimed at isolated pockets of insurgents and al Qaeda, but is largely focused on improvements to infrastructure and economic development. Says MG Lynch, "Where there used to be major points of violence, now we’ve got people with their needs being met by the government of Iraq and by us... Conversation [when I talk to residents] is about jobs, not about security."

Coming up in Part II and Part III: greater detail about security, the challenge of the Iraqi police forces, economic development and governmental "capacity-building," sectarian relations, MG Lynch's thoughts on a "broken" army, and the imminent transfer of authority for MND-C to 10th Mountain Division.

� Secure this line!

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I read a quote somewhere recently (I forget where) that said the Japanese people knew how badly they were losing the war because the state-run media kept reporting Japanese "victories" closer and closer to home.

Unfortunately, we've got a somewhat similar, but reversed, case here: stories of our successes in Iraq are just not being reported at all by the liberally dominated MSM simply because these stories don't fit their bias and their agenda, especially in an election year.

Like a 2-way street, propaganda flows both ways.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 8:14 AM

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I remember that quote, too.

I honestly hesitate to paint the MSM with a broad brush that attributes to them active malice or conscious bias, but I am honestly at a loss to explain what we are seeing.

Like any good military officer, MG Lynch refused to speculate on why, just merely described his experience and situation in relation to the media. But he was passionate about the problems this causes and about how important it is to keep people informed.

I have often lamented that a biased/incompetent/lazy media is a terrible liability for us. Citizens require information in order to make good decisions about who we want to lead us and where we want to be led. Incomplete or misleading info damages our ability to govern ourselves. It was sad to see another example of that, but encouraging to talk to a senior officer who so clearly "gets" this in relation to the greater government/society.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 8:54 AM

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" ... I honestly hesitate to paint the MSM with a broad brush that attributes to them active malice or conscious bias ... "

You're much too generous, IMHO, FbL. Oh, certainly, there are exceptions to every rule. And there are some professionals within the MSM who stand out in my mind as being as honest, unbiased, and balanced as they can be, even though I know how liberal they are.

But I'm firmly convinced that a majority of them have very clear biases and agendas, and are using the powers they enjoy by virtue of their positions in the MSM, as well as in academia and Hollyweird, to advance their agendas and goals in the larger cultural war(s) in which we're engaged.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 9:36 AM

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Unfortunately, we've got a somewhat similar, but reversed, case here: stories of our successes in Iraq are just not being reported at all by the liberally dominated MSM simply because these stories don't fit their bias and their agenda, especially in an election year

You know, it stems from a long history of journalism that has never been unbiased or objective, a profession that has attracted as many charlatans and liars as great writers, a profession that decided that it had not only a responsibility to inform people's decisions, but to help shape them. I think that last is where they got into trouble.

There is something about the ego that believes its own press.

For instance, some people keep touting that the media will fall to outside pressure from alternative media. I don't know about that. We may crow at our victories, but remember that somewhere out there the young are already text messaging via blue tooth technology to every phone within a three mile radius while I still wait for this comment to post.

For old media, though, the day they hit the pinnacle and then started sliding for the bottom? It was 1972. Richard Nixon was a crook and a liar. A newspaper brought down a president. And, ever since then, the media has not focused on information so much as created the great white hunters of journalism who each sees that pinnacle as the one they must surpass in order to achieve their own fame and fortune.

It's not about the truth or objectivity. It is not about serving people, whatever lie some first year journalism student may tell him or herself.

Funny how they think everyone else is lying to them instead.

by kat-missouri on May 12, 2008 9:50 AM

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See why I love him? LOL

Good job, FbL!

by Maggie on May 12, 2008 10:05 AM

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Funny how they think everyone else is lying to them instead.

Innit, though?

I told a photojournalist to wait by the helicopter while I went to get a briefing and warned him that there were Khmer Rouge in the forest who would kill him if he went into the trees.

He did and they did.

by BillT on May 12, 2008 10:13 AM

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I always get a kick out of references to the MSM being so liberal....let me explain before y'all jump down my throat.

As far as television news goes, I'm seldom, if ever, in the house by the time the evening news comes on. The vast majority of news and opinion I recieve comes via the radio that I take to work with me every day.

Here in the Indiana cornfields we have a choice of two talk radio stations......WLW and WKRC.....both belonging to Clear Channel Communications.

WLW's line up is local to Cincinnati, and includes Bill Cunningham.....remember the flap about him using Senator Obama's middle name (Hussein) during an introduction of Senator McCain.....anyway, it's all right wing all afternoon.

WKRC is the other choice.....Laura Ingram at 9:00AM.....Rush Limbaugh at noon.....Sean Hannity at 3:00.......all right wing all day.

Being not entirely backwoods, we do have the new fangled sateylight tv....so suppertime is a choice between Bill O'Riley.....and Lou Dobbs.

*laughing*.....to Us Working Rubes in the cornfields of middle America, right wing talk radio IS the main stream media.

Basically, I don't pay any attention to ANY of them..........there is no such thing as "fair and balanced" and there never has been, at least in my lifetime. Back in the 60's, the Repubs watched Channel 5 news in Cincinnnati (NBC national).....the Dems watched Chanel 9(CBS national).......

Now, you may jump.......

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 10:43 AM

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My own personal "awakening" to this issue came in 1992, when the media obsessed over the "bad" economy.

At first, I had the same thought as FbL: Certainly, they're just reporting the news. I gave them the benefit of the doubt, but asked myself this:

Even if they're reporting the economic news "objectively", the constant reinforcement of "bad" economic news would undoubtedly result in a growing downward spiral, like a snowball rolling downhill, as people who hear the bad news worry and become increasingly reluctant to buy or invest. The economy would just get worse.

We now know that the economy was actually in an upswing. But none of this positive news was reported.

And then I saw the media's obession with the Clintons in the 1990's, and everything since.

The revelations of bias since new media and the internet has simply solidified my opinion that there is, indeed, not just negligence and lazy work being done by the MSM, academia, and Hollyweird, but that much of this is being done with serious intent.

They've learned much from the examples of Riefenstahl, Eisenstein, Goebbels, et al. Even with the inroads that new media has made, they know the power they still hold.

They know they can shape and mold people's opinions. They do it everyday with commercial advertising, creating needs and preferences, overtly and subliminally.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 10:45 AM

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R Jewell, the points you make are why I hesitate to ascribe ideological intent to the situation. And the talk shows (I do not listen to most of the ones you describe) talk more politics than straight news, so they may say Iraq is improving, but they are not reporting details or the "big picture" that MG Lynch talks about communicating.

But when you look at the national newspapers, national news, and AP/Reuters/AFP from which the newspapers and radio news breaks draw their stories, good news has been largely ignored. However, it seems that recently there is more "good news" reporting than a couple months ago. I'm beginning to suspect that's because in many places in Iraq it's becoming extremely difficult to find the bad news--and one thing I AM becoming convinced of is that far too many in the media are terribly lazy.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 11:10 AM

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Addendum to my comment to R Jewell:

My suspicion that many in the media are lazy has come about both by observing how much they get wrong that could be easily checked, and by realizing how hard it really is.

Preparing to interview all these senior leaders of 3rd ID (and the ambassador) has been a huge education for me. I had to not only be aware of what has happened to the 3ID in Iraq since they arrived, I had to make sure I knew as much as possible about recent Iraq history and culture, current issues in Iraq, economics, tribalism, and the interactions of the various sects and ethnicities.

Beyond that, I had to brush up to be sure I was clear in my knowledge of military structure, culture, and COIN theory. On a personal level, even learning about each interviewee's background and resume gave me clues about what to expect.

I already knew a great deal about many of these things, probably much more than the average American. But that wasn't enough. In order to gain the kind of credibility that would get me serious answers to serious questions, I needed to be extremely well-informed. I also needed to know and understand enough that I could recognize if I were being spun, comprehend the answers I was given, and know enough about the subject at hand to ask meaningful follow-up questions (sadly, my success in doing that is not 100%).

I spent hours and hours of prep time for what at times could be as little as 20 minutes with an interviewee. Rather than do all that, it is so much easier to simply assume the worst about my interviewee and engage in Gotcha journalism. No extra prep required: simply assume he's a liar and use a single data point to attempt to "prove" YOUR point. In such cases, it becomes all about you rather than the story. Then again, that's probably another reason why we see so much bad journalism: ego.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 11:41 AM

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No extra prep required: simply assume he's a liar and use a single data point to attempt to "prove" YOUR point. In such cases, it becomes all about you rather than the story. Then again, that's probably another reason why we see so much bad journalism: ego.

i wouldn't go totally with "no extra prep time", I believe people do and have done a lot of work to get their story, but it reminds me somewhat of some bad thesis that I've read (my own included) that had a lot of info and then, with a deadline approaching, rushed to conclusions to make the story fit, make it work and make it to deadline.

But, the most important aspect of that is that there is a huge bit of egoism that goes into writing a story and conveying a point. Journalism school doesn't beat that out of you, it just gives you new names and ways to shove it under a rug.

Journalists are no different than we are, they put their pants on one leg at a time. I know that, when I write something here, there is a good bit of ego that goes into it, so I have to imagine that it is the same for anyone writing any story.

I keep that in mind when I read.

I believe that people's experiences do shape them and how they interpret information. That is liberal or conservative, Democrat, republican, atheist or faithful...name it, and I believe it does. It actually takes a significant amount of control and concentration to try to edit out such concepts as "bias" from either the writing or the publishing aspect. Very little of any such purity exists.

Therefore, I take the Fox Maulder approach to journalism: trust no one.

by kat-missouri on May 12, 2008 12:12 PM

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Point well made FbL.

Your prep work always shows, believe me.

I, on the other hand, am far too lazy to go through that, and prefer instead to call a cell phone *somewhere* in Florida and go straight to the source....."gottchajournalism" works good on one of your kids......they're used to it.

And "boots in the sand in Florida" are tickled to have Gen. Patreaus inbound BTW.

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 12:14 PM

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I'm sure they ARE tickled re: Petraeus. As I'll get into in the next post or so, 3ID is a case study in how amazingly fast and how effectively the U.S. military has adapted to Petraeus' strategy/COIN. The changes 3ID has had to move through in tactics/activities just in their deployment are stunning. That wasn't a point that MG Lynch drove home in the interview, but the topics we covered and what I sat and listened to MG Lynch say just hit me like a ton of bricks. The U.S. military has done an incredible thing in Iraq in the last 12 months. Just amazing. I think we are going to see that 3ID is the vanguard of what will soon start to be obvious in Southern Iraq and the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area as they settle down (still coping with significant insugent/AQ/criminal activity).

by FbL on May 12, 2008 12:39 PM

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As I saw the Patreus strategy, it was (maybe I oversimplify)...... "OK, everybody go turn off the AC, pack your ruck, and get to work"

Soldiers respond to that...........as do their leaders

The day we put the first air conditioner in the first Officer/NCO/EM club in Viet Nam we might as well have started packing to come home.

Patreus is old enough to remember that lesson......and smart enough to have learned from it.

CENTCOM Hq will respond just as well......From what I hear, Adm Fallon put in a lot of air conditioners.........

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 1:12 PM

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I think we are going to see that 3ID is the vanguard of what will soon start to be obvious in Southern Iraq and the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area as they settle down

I take it you're using "the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area" in the same sense you'd use "the Northern San Diego/Santa Barbara area"?

by BillT on May 12, 2008 3:12 PM

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Yes, Smarty Pants! I know that was a geographically haphazard reference, but I meant it to refer to everything from Baghdad to the Kurdish territories. :P

And yes, the above was my FbL Voice, not my Reporter Voice. *double Pbbbttttt

by FbL on May 12, 2008 3:19 PM

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I meant it to refer to everything from Baghdad to the Kurdish territories.

I *know* that. However, it's a tad *north* of the of 3ID's AO -- unless MG Lynch is planning to drop by for coffee and a ride in the B-206 FTD...

by BillT on May 13, 2008 9:42 AM

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Okay, what we have here is a SERIOUS failure to communicate. :P

What I meant was that I believe the developments we are seeing in 3ID's AO (MND-C) are a vanguard of what we will soon be seeing in the areas of Northern and Southern Iraq that are currently not as far along (those areas are NOT part of 3ID's AO. The AO goes southward to Karbala and Najaf, but it's still part of MND-C. You'd think the "C" in Central would mean Baghdad city itself, but it includes just the southern part of Baghdad province).

So, have I communicated clearly now? :P

by FbL on May 13, 2008 9:50 AM

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Okay, "Vanguard" was a confusing choice of word here. I meant it in the metaphorical sense rather than the military one. Sorry.

by FbL on May 13, 2008 9:55 AM

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I get *so* confused when you mix metaphoricals.

BTW, the push is already *on* in Mosul...

by BillT on May 13, 2008 1:41 PM

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That's what we've been hearing, BillT. Stay safe. :)

by FbL on May 13, 2008 2:45 PM

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That's what we've been hearing, BillT.

Fine kettle of fish. Ya hang with the brass and go all *formal* 'n' stuff with us gringo peons...

*Red Alert! scuttling for the bunker*

by BillT on May 13, 2008 3:52 PM

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Geez! What is it with you always accusing me of going formal on you?! :P

I speak too casually and without specificity, and you pick my comments to pieces; I get direct and clear, and you accuse me of getting snobby.

That was NOT the Royal We I was using in that comment. *sigh*

Luv ya, anyway. :P

by FbL on May 13, 2008 6:54 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

He repeats himself a couple of times, re-enforcing the idea about social epidemics without getting to the meat of it. I believe this leaves French rushing to the end where he tries to squeeze in the idea of the three types of people that effect a social epidemic. Though, he does use some examples that are good in their context. He talks a little about "broken windows theory", but never names it or references it in the book, The Tipping Point, or even from the original authors of the concept.

Broken Windows was a theory developed in 1982 by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson. Both, The Tipping Point and Broken Windows should be read by anyone who is deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan or any other nation where success depends on securing and shaping the population. Deploying units should have rudimentary understanding of "broken windows", not only on what it is operationally, but why it is important to do it.

In basic business or group dynamics where the success of a project depends on the majority or totality of the group in performing the same way, leaders need to get "buy in" from their members. When people believe in something, they act on it, introduce it to others and...well, an internal "tipping point" is reached and the group begins to see serious gains towards their goals.

To do that, people need information so that they can "reason" themselves into the importance of the project. The Tipping Point is long and dry and would be best exerted for people below NCO for direct education. But, Broken Windows shows immediate examples and outcomes.

For instance, why do we no longer drive through neighborhoods on "presence patrols", but, instead, park and walk? Because studies over three decades old said that there were more benefits and eventually less danger:

And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.

What the citizens had feared most were attacks by strangers. What the foot patrol did was put the officer in contact with the citizens. He knew who they were, who belonged and who didn't.

Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer—call him Kelly—knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules.

These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for this neighborhood. If someone violated them, the regulars not only turned to Kelly for help but also ridiculed the violator.[snip]

...two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.

In Newark, NJ, 1982, long before New York implemented the strategy or Iraq was a distant twinkle, counter-insurgency was at work.

What else did we learn from "Broken Windows"?

� Secure this line!

The government points to huge spending. Unfortunately, the Department for International Development is mainly pushing this money into corrupt Kabul government ministries, not into the provinces. This would be all right if we had time — but we are losing the consent of ordinary Afghans in the villages by not pulling projects into Helmand that would support the valiant efforts of our young men and women in dealing with the insurgency.

In short, as in Iraq, you have to do both security and reconstruction. It can't be an "either/or" situation. It has to make a difference to people directly in a community and it must be visible. If we built a list of priorities, what would you put on it first? We are still building the giant "ring road" that, when finished, will allow greater movement of government aid, military forces and product to market. Hopefully, not the poppy kind although that is already what is happening on completed roads.

Do schools come next? Or, wells? Or, electricity? Or, agriculture? Graineries?

What if many of these things are bing done, but piece meal across the nation, without connection from community to community? In short, using "broken windows theory" (also once referred to as the "oil spot" plan) as was done in Ramadi and Fallujah, requires a rolling economic, security and political plan.

There is a huge disconnect between aid programs through NGOs, military operations and Afghanistan government activities. Complicated by various issues such as NGOs who feel that they have to operate separately from the military in order to have trust and get things done. Which they are limited on anyway, as Holloway points out, because the areas are often considered too dangerous to leave their small enclaves or the big bases.

Then there is NATO and the various limitations on their operations and areas. In fact, one would have to hope that Petraeus is capable of wrangling these various entities into some semblance of a single plan and direction. How to get them to concentrate on a few, visible and important projects in a specified area. Particularly one that is "hot".

Of course, the issue with money going into the hands of corrupt government officials is similar to problems in Iraq. Nothing gets done at the local level, but, in some ways, it buys off the bigger players and keeps them on our side (nominally) of the fence. In Iraq, US forces simply started by-passing this to some degree by co-opting local officials, paying them off (much cheaper in the long run) and putting the money right in the hands of the locals either through the local co-opted official and unofficial leaders or by planning and paying for much needed projects right out of their own pockets.

Does that happen in Afghanistan? If it does, it's either "not so much" or "not enough".

Still, where I disagree with Holloway in the beginning is whether we need more forces to do it effectively or less. In Iraq, it took more because they actually had to secure the area at the same time they built. They had to live out among the people.

US Marines, arriving after many deployments to Iraq, having learned these very lessons, are now starting to deploy out to their forward operating bases. Will COPs be next?

Holloway goes for the 9 thousand mile approach. Withdraw, let them sort it out and simply support with money, weapons, etc with NGOs providing most of the work. Besides, he notes, Afghanistan is no more important than any other troubled third world spot. And, except for it being the cradle for the 9/11 attacks, it has no real significance in comparison. At least, that is what I gather. We can some how keep track of the AQ folks another way.

Of course, I disagree with that view of Afghanistan as I do with Iraq for similar, but different reasons. Iraq was, in fact, stealing history from the Islamists who have the grand caliphate as its united goal, however achievable that really is. It was central to the rest of the Middle East. In their back yard, so to speak, and they, the Arabs and surrounding terror supporters, could not ignore the realities of extremist activities and the real danger to themselves from a failed state with an active Islamist guerrilla force. We couldn't let the extremists have it, no matter what.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, was far away from the people and the money of the Arab lands in the ME. People could send money, support and men to that war without feeling the direct effects. Certainly, no political activities in Afghanistan was going to bring democracy, freedom or any sort of political or ideological pressure on the boiling pot of the ME.

Not letting Afghanistan go then comes down to a few necessities. Not the least of which is that, if we can win, why would we concede one iota of scrubby brush land of Afghanistan back to Al Qaida? As the incubator for 9/11 and the modern Islamist global war, to let that go is to become the Russians to the mujihadeen in the 1980's. Without ever committing the number of forces or money that the Russians did. "Paper tiger" would be the least of our worries.

Still, I agree with him. Our counter-insurgency efforts have been lackadaisical from a central planning and execution aspect.

The next question is: should we talk to the Taliban?

Yes.

Keep in mind the Iraq model. Not every insurgent is a terrorist and not every terrorist is an insurgent. We have to be much better at separating the elements and creating solutions based on boots on the ground, community truths and realities.

It is unclear whether, after all this time, we have really learned that lesson or been in a position to do so.

Do we need more troops in Afghanistan? Why, yes, I believe we do. One may ask why we haven't done so or considered it until of late when we sent the Marines. It is often couched in the "either/or" reflection of Iraq: if we weren't in Iraq, we would be winning in Afghanistan. I believe that is a "yes" and "no" as well.

I believe there are some very interesting, long term and over arching strategies that effected our decisions about how much effort and troops we placed into one combat theater or another. I noted a central idea above: Iraq is in the heartland and had the most impact on the centers where extremism are supported physically, materially and monetarily.

Without being too obfuscating, in Generation Kill I wrote about a very classic maneuver warfare tactic: feinting in one direction while bringing up the central attack on a totally unexpected front. In the words of Sun Tzu, attacking where the enemy is least prepared. Check the map showing the "feint" and "push" to Baghdad.

Holloway gets it to some degree. Why would we put major effort into one theater when so many are troubled and possibly create a much broader and more serious threat? Or, in context of Iraq and Afghanistan as I noted above, when one area is likely to be much more important and effective in the over all, long term, strategic war of ideologies against Islamist extremists?

We move some forces into Afghanistan (feint) where it looks like our major effort against the main body is going to be and then attack the weak center. Keeping in mind, this is a global war that requires a global strategy. Thus, global theaters fall into the same categories and strategic necessities as any immediate and local theater or front. In brief, we hold the main AQ force in Afghanistan/Pakistan (where's Osama and Zawahiri?) while we destroy them, their ideas, their support base, some place else.

In military speak, Iraq got inside of AQs OODA Loop. They had to play catch up in Iraq because they weren't there in force and they enacted bad strategies that back fired. Not just in Iraq, but within the greater Islamic community they hoped to influence. We made them use money, men and materials along with a large amount of wasta (cache) to try to take back an historically and strategically important center.

Now that AQ in Iraq is all but busted, it's time to start looking towards Afghanistan and shoring up the forces that constituted our "feint". Just like Rolling Thunder took out Baghdad and then forces focused to outlying regions or enemy forces, we have taken the center of the ME, the center of jihad, and now need to move to the peripherals: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iran.

� Secure this line!

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Examples like Basra and Afghanistan expose how ineffective the British and European "Soft Sell" approach (less confrontational) is when dealing with insurgencies and armed militias in a Muslim culture.

It may work in a constabulary environment where the population has been utterly defeated and is ready for peace. But it fails miserably with a culture that glorifies death, whose civilian population has been spared the worst of the horrors of war, and who don't recognize that they have been truly vanquished.

by fdcol63 on April 30, 2008 7:42 AM

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When you consider the route of your Line of Communications from your Sea Port of Debarkation, and then add in the source of your Cl III, you begin to understand why we don't have 160,000 troops surged into Afghanistan.

We need fewer caveated boots on the FOB and more of the right kind of boots, like Police Mentoring Teams and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams. Fewer non-indig trigger pullers and more trainers of indig trigger pullers.

by Cannoneer No. 4 on April 30, 2008 8:03 AM

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Kat, I'd like to make a couple of points about your piece here.

First, you ask "If we built a list of priorities, what would you put on it first?"

Howzabout we ask the Afghans themselves. There's a current program called the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan. For anyone interested in this nation's grassroots reconstruction, if you don't know about this, you should read up. I've written about it here, with some interesting stats, and some commentary on the usefulness of most NGO's. The most telling stat is that because of the Community Development Councils' local nature, and the fact that communities must contribute a minimum of 10 percent of the total project costs in either labour, funds, or materials, less than one percent of the initiatives launched through the NSP have been destroyed or targeted by insurgents.

The locals have skin in the game, and won't tolerate the Taliban thugs tearing down what they just built themselves.

As far as negotiating with the Taliban is concerned, it's already being done. When I interviewed BGen David Fraser, who commanded RC South during Op Medusa last year (as the Cdns, Brits, Dutch and others were taking over from the U.S.), one of his primary objectives was to separate the hard-core ideologues, often from outside Afghanistan, from the locals who just needed a paycheque and some security for their family. And the Afghan gov't has been actively seeking to bring former Taliban back into the fold for years now. They even created the National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to facilitate that process.

With all due respect to General Petraeus, at the end of the day, the decisions about who to go after and who to negotiate with should really be up to the Afghan government, shouldn't they?

Anyhow, it's an interesting discussion, that's for sure...

by Damian on April 30, 2008 10:12 AM

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Cannonner No.4, I'm with you on the OMLT and POMLT teams - more would be better. But I'd also like to see better coordination between those teams nation by nation. The U.S. sings off a different OMLT songbook than the Canadians, who train Afghans a bit different than the Brits, etc. So when "trained" ANA or ANP forces operate for the first time with NATO militaries other than the one that trained them, there can be hiccups. Heck, even between Afghan troops who were trained up differently by different NATO countries. The problem with coordinating that is that everyone seems to think they do it best, and it's the other guy who should compromise...

Fewer non-indig trigger pullers and more trainers of indig trigger pullers.

I'd disagree with you a bit on this: we need more trainers of indig trigger pullers, but we also need more non-indig trigger pullers, especially in RC South. Hence the utility of the 24th MEU rolling into Helmand to augment the Brits, recently. And my country's been calling for another battle group on the ground in Kandahar for quite awhile now.

I just don't think it's an either-or proposition.

by Damian on April 30, 2008 11:48 AM

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And the Afghan gov't has been actively seeking to bring former Taliban back into the fold for years now. They even created the National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to facilitate that process.

One of the most interesting things from late last year and early this year has been the Afghan government insisting on expelling Brit and German diplomats who were ostensibly negotiating outside of the national government's purview. I guess the real question is, at what level is that negotiation acceptable.

In Iraq, many negotiations start from the ground or local area out. Frankly, I think this is the proper process. Waiting for national reconciliation in Iraq was taking too long and I believe that is the issue in Afghanistan.

With all due respect to General Petraeus, at the end of the day, the decisions about who to go after and who to negotiate with should really be up to the Afghan government, shouldn't they?

Yes and no. As I was explaining above, you really have to know the local actors and separate them, as we agree, from the outsiders and then separate them again based on who locally is going to be reconcilable and who won't. That has to happen within AO's. In Iraq, individual units built their own intelligence and moved from that, not from any monstrous top down level or even waiting for the Iraqi government to decide how they were going to handle, for instance, the "de-ba'athification" issue.

What they did locally was find the guy we needed to co-op to help control the area. If he was former Ba'ath or what have you, it only mattered whether he could be potentially tied to direct crimes under Saddam or really attrocious acts against Iraqis in the current context. Otherwise, he became a viable candidate for co-op. Were we suppsed to, should we have, waited for the national government to figure out how they were going to handle reconciliation with former Ba'ath members? I don't think so. That would have been ludicrous, suicidal and the least direct method.

I would say that, that same metric has to apply in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, there were several levels of actors within each AO. Some were national movements (like old Ba'ath), some were tribal, some were criminal gangs and then there were the outsiders. I imagine that it is the same in Afghanistan yet complicated by the much larger and multitudinous tribes, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.

I don't expect that Petraeus is going to decide back at Centcom who we should or should not negotiate with. What I believe that Petraeus will do will be directing the forces there to take control and develop their own AOs, their own leads, their own priorities and their own target/negotiation lists. I imagine, no matter what, that people like the Haqqani network joining national reconciliaiton will be more related to national government over all, but that units operating in the areas where they are prevalent will do their best and utmost to cleave off any extraneous or peripherals to that organization in order to isolate them more effectively from the population and make their transition to being a part of the political process more likely. That last part will be the unit's responsibility, not the central government.

Particulary as their ability to project anything into those areas, force, construction, etc, is limited without us. Petraeus will most likely work towards getting the Afghan government to see it our way. Just as I don't expect that Petraeus can decide on whether every actor is either a target or potential negotiation, neither do I expect the Afghan government to know. At least not fully. Nor to make such decisions on the very local level.

Second, I believe that Petraeus did wonders on getting a unified view and performance of counter insurgency out of the US military in Iraq, across the marines, Army, Air Force and Navy, making it truly joint. Being the commander of MNF-I gave him some clout, but if you understand anything about the "joint" operations aspect, it is a lot about getting commanders across the armed forces and down through the ranks to "buy in" to the program. Iraqi and American forces.

I imagine that is going to be his focus at CentCom to some respects. First to get all of our forces in Afghanistan operating in a specific direction and second to get our allies to work with us in the same manner. The last is probably going to be the most difficult, but, considering that Petraeus also had to get the various Iraqi factions to do the same, he has plenty of experience at working with prideful knuckel heads ( our Canadian friends excluded of course; he who bleeds with me and all that...)

by kat-missouri on April 30, 2008 1:37 PM

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our Canadian friends excluded of course

Precisely! Because everyone knows we Canucks are already perfect the first time around! Just ask us!

*rolling eyes*

I just wish ISAF and the U.S. could have a central "lessons learned" clearing house where all the ideas that actually demonstrated results could be shared, then a central decision could be made that this is how the coalition does it.

And I don't care if that good idea is Canadian, or American, or Estonian, fer heaven's sake.

But everybody gets prickly about how their own troops do things, and I worry that we're letting that get in the way of the results.

Besides that, I think it would be useful if those in charge remembered that perhaps those currently operating in RC South (Brits, Canadians, Dutch etc) might well be doing it right, but not doing enough of it because of a lack of boots on the ground. Sometimes it's not about the quality of the work, but rather achieving the quantity required to hit a tipping point ("surge" anyone?).

by Damian on April 30, 2008 2:02 PM

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Sometimes it's not about the quality of the work, but rather achieving the quantity required to hit a tipping point ("surge" anyone?).

I'd agree, but also add that they need the empowerment to take certain actions, build things, negotiate truces, etc, etc, etc right there and probably don't have it.

by kat-missouri on April 30, 2008 2:35 PM

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Why am I posting this...

If we could walk with the Taliban, talk with the Taliban,
Grunt and squeak and squawk with the Taliban,
And they could squeak and squawk and speak and talk to us.

by Toluca Nole on April 30, 2008 3:06 PM

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Damian - I'll be speaking with the Director of the Army Center for Lessons Learned here at Fort Leavenworth tomorrow.

I'll ask if there isn't at least ABCA-derived access available to people.

I suspect there is, but I could be wrong, and we could certainly over-use the NOFORN marking on things.

by John of Argghhh! on April 30, 2008 3:44 PM

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Fantastic, John. Here's another question to ask him: does the "lessons learned" info flow the other way (from allied militaries to the U.S. services)? Much as I respect the professionalism of your men and women in uniform, your nation doesn't have a monopoly on good ideas or more effective execution of those ideas.

Given my experience trying to get good American ideas officially adopted up here, I'd bet there's better information sharing through informal networks within Kandahar and Kabul than there is between the HQ's responsible back home in each country. Those responsible for policy tend to be fairly parochial, whereas the fighters just want to do it the best way possible, so they don't get killed for making a mistake someone else already made and learned from.

by Damian on April 30, 2008 4:12 PM

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Damian, logistically it is an either or situation. There is a finite total end strength that can be supported in Central Asia through Karachi, Chaman and Torkham. The more non-indig trigger pullers, the fewer non-indig trainers of indig trigger pullers.

Coalition warfare is fighting by committee. The profession of arms tends to attract national
chauvinists because they are more likely than others to consider defen[s/c]e of their Westphalian nation-state worth killing and dying over.

We need to maximize the utility of every ISAF and OEF boot at the end of that long supply line. Send the caveated contingents home. Stand the ANA up faster. Task organize ANA units into ISAF/OEF formations until eventually its the ISAF/OEF units attached to Afghan Corps. Instill a healthy spirit of competition in the ANA between the proteges of different nations to prove on the batttlefield who got trained the best.

It's their country. We need to do less direct action on their behalf, and more Foreign Internal Defense.

by Cannoneer No. 4 on April 30, 2008 9:29 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Reconstructing the Samarra Shrine (this is for the Vets for Freedom, salute to Cpt Pete Hegseth ret.)

"It's a beautiful thing that they are rebuilding the mosque," said Abdul Jabar Salah, an unemployed father of three standing in line on Tuesday outside the mayor's office, waiting to apply for a job helping with reconstruction of the shrine.

"We're hopeful that as the mosque rises, so, too, will our economic situation. All things, though, depend upon security," he said.

Zawahiri tries to stay relevant in Algiers (fails miserably)

Asked about the targeting of civilians by alleged Algerian readers, Zawahiri continued to justify the attacks by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. He characterised them as efforts to secure the lives and property of Algerian citizens and as jihad to liberate Algerians from "America, France and the children of France".

Algerian analysts say al-Zawahiri depicted a picture that was far from reality in Algeria.

Political analyst Ali Merdji said al-Qaeda's number two was trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to depict Algeria as an arena for fighting the Americans and French. The recording is an attempt to "introduce the bloodthirsty elements of al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb in a new way, i.e. resistance groups fighting colonisation in Algeria," Merdji said.

"This trick won't be bought by the Algerians who understand the criminal nature of the terrorist organisation, which has a long record of terrorist operations, especially as they are the first victims of that organisation's followers," he added.

This is how you do "strat comm".

Al-Zawahiri's repeated calls to kill Americans and French in Algeria contradict the principles of Islam, a local imam told Magharebia.

"The texts of Islamic history show that Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) used to advise his companions during the wars not to hurt Christians and Jews, even by hints, and he advised them not to hurt monks in their places of worship," Abdelkrim said. If this was at the time of war, he asked, then how about the time of peace?

Sadr and Al Qaida teaming up again (repeat 2004 when they both got their gluteous maximus handed to them)

The Broken Windows Theory in Sadr City

"Tell the mayor – the mayor of Baghdad, the big mayor – tell him we'll be here tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, and we'll be very disappointed if he's not here. The prime minister needs this to happen," he said during a Friday trip to Sadr City. "We gotta get going."

General Hammond is pushing for services – trash pickup, medical care, water, electricity – for a southern slice of the volatile district. It's part of a US plan to win Iraqis away from Moqtada al-Sadr's sway. And they see a window of opportunity as fighting in Mr. Sadr's Baghdad stronghold shows signs of quieting.

Mahdi Army Fades Away

After a month of fighting, the Mahdi Army has disappeared from the streets of Basra, the largest city in the south. The army and police are everywhere, and people are providing information on where Mahdi Army personnel are hiding out, and the locations of their weapons caches. Up north, in the Sadr City section of east Baghdad, the Mahdi Army is still fighting hard. But the army and police have the upper hand, and are pushing the Shia militiamen back block by block.

Women in Action

No all you male pervs! Don't let the title of the post fool you. This is about female soldiers in Iraq in the Lioness program.

I don't know about bitter, but definitely clinging to bible and gun:

Usually, the women soldiers went along to be available in case there were women detainees or women in the area.

“The firefight finds you,” Breslow-Kynaston said. “Your mission out there isn’t to go be in a firefight. It’s to be in the convoy.”

Morgan is sturdy and strong, a tattooed “tough gal” who learned to handle firearms as a young girl on the rifle range and to shoot squirrels out of tall trees in Arkansas.

“Some people had requested some females to be attached with the companies and go out and search the Iraqi women,” she said. “They asked for a couple of volunteers. I was one of the first ones they came up to and asked if I would mind going out. Of course, I was all for it.”

She grew up in a religious family and wondered if she could go to hell for killing people. Combat taught her that if you stop to think, you die. She lived through the “longest second of my entire life” while pointing her weapon at another human being and trying to decide whether to fire, she said in the film.

� Secure this line!

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No matter what is thrown at our troops they adapt, they fix, they change, they cope. Will this story ever get told propperly? All the little stories? Nobody is sitting on their hands. They're out building schools, clinics, cleaning up the water, working on the grid. Our people are amazing. We should maybe hire them to do that work here after this is over.

My old boss came up with a great idea. Those North Viet battalions that kept the trail open despite our constant bombing should have been hired to work on the Turnpike in New Jersey. He was ahead of his time.

Oh well

by Fishmugger on April 29, 2008 8:56 AM

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