When the "good enemy" becomes the attacker, we must become the defender. Not of our own forces or bases, but the defender of the people.

To accomplish that, a counter-insurgent has several basic tasks. First, to secure the population physically and, as the Broken Windows theory shows, mentally. In Baghdad, the first thing they did was to seal off neighborhoods with concrete barriers, setting up check points, combat outposts and joint security stations. Finally, we stopped doing "presence patrols" in humvees and started "walking the beat".

In Broken Windows theory, this same approach had significant psychological effect on both the law abiding and non-law abiding citizens alike.

These findings may be taken as evidence that the skeptics were right- foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

The issue here was that the officer gave the impression of "order". What citizens feared most in Newark, NJ were attacks by strangers. By keeping strangers "moving along" and the disreputable locals behaving within "informal community rules", order or the perception of order was increased and maintained. Even when violence did not seem to immediately decrease.

In Iraq, one of the reasons that we partnered with local "concerned citizens" or "sons of Iraq", etc was because, as residents of the area, they would know better than we did who belonged and who didn't. They knew who the "strangers" were. With the barriers and check points in place, strangers were kept out of the neighborhoods or "moving right along" if they had any business being there.

Many checkpoints in Al Anbar would call someone in the village to verify the stranger had legitimate business there and would establish this contact as the "responsible party". They would also take the stranger's identification. This limited the stranger's ability to move about freely without the escort of the responsible party. It also meant that, if something did happen, the security forces would know where to start looking first and that meant the responsible party could be in trouble, too. This effectively limited both the active and passive support of the population for any outside infiltration or activities that could be dangerous to the rest of the population.

These check points were not always the best nor as thorough as they could have been or should be. Infiltration, poor training, intimidation, limited resources and many other aspects interfered with their ability to perform at a high standard. But, as Broken Windows shows, it wasn't really the physical capabilities that mattered, it was the psychological effect. The citizens perceived improved security so they acted on it. Someone was near by to hear their complaints, to act when danger was perceived or real. Even if they didn't always get there before the act occurred or apprehended the criminal afterwards. When perceived dangers existed, someone was there and would respond.

The same psychological effect acted on the insurgents. Not every checkpoint was attacked nor did insurgents try to or succeed in smuggling in arms or bombs through every checkpoint. Some attacks that did occur were extremely devastating, but something kept happening; the debris was cleared, the dead and wounded removed and the checkpoints remained. Even in relative success, the insurgents had failed.

Eventually, the odds of success in an attack or ability to smuggle in men and materials, even though still in favor of the insurgent, gave the impression that it was too costly. The presence of US military, IA and IP patrolling as well local "Sons of Iraq" gave the impression of security among the population and led some to provide information or make reports about suspected insurgents. It wasn't anywhere near a majority of the population, but it didn't matter. The ability of the insurgent to remain anonymous and retain the passive support or neutrality of the population was gone.

Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point expressed the idea that the tipping point wasn't dependent on gaining a majority, but that the right people at the right time were in the right place to sway just enough of the right people. Once a few felt safe enough to act safe and then to turn against the insurgents or, at least, to stop being neutral, thus, passive supporters, it quickly spread by word and example. It became a "good" social "epidemic".

In Lawrence's "algebraical factors", he calculated the number of foreign troops needed to secure territory. What he did not add to his calculation was the exponent that represented the power of the citizens arrayed against the insurgents. He barely considered it a possibility.

Of course, it wasn't just the check points manned by local citizens or police. Further, the locals weren't going to partner with us just because they didn't like the insurgents or extremists. In fact, some of the "local concerned citizens" who did partner with us had been insurgents. Many suggest that it was strictly a cold calculation of physical and political survival or even choosing the lesser evil.

Even in the last calculation, how did these people know that we were "the lesser evil" or simply better than the insurgents and extremist foreigners? After all, what were we doing different than the insurgents or extremists? For several years we drove through neighborhoods, barely stopping, on the way to find "bad guys". When we arrived or were attacked, we had a fire fight. People were killed, property was damaged and then we left, returning to our bases.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

In response to fear people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring: to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."

In Iraq, insurgents and extremists still remained in control of the territory and the people just by dent of their continuing existence, even if they were no more numerically superior than our forces in the area, within even a neutral population that either passively supported or were intimidated into that support.

Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

The insurgents and extremists were there among the people and we were not. We were still the aliens. We were separated by distance, by culture, by language, by perceived differences in security and, finally, by a hunk of metal.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen.

How simple it all must sound in a complicated combat theater. We stopped being occupiers and started walking the beat. The Sons of Iraq became an exponent, exponentially increasing our capabilities, not just in man power or coverage per square mile as Lawrence figured it, but a dynamic denominator that gave the US and coalition forces, the "aliens", a connection to the population, a shared common need and way to accomplish those goals.

That is what Lawrence assumed incorrectly. He assumed that the alien would just remain "alien" because they simply were and any actions after that kept them "alien", only compounding the disconnect.

So, the first rule of thumb for a first time patrolling force: stop being the alien!

Get out and talk to someone.

� Secure this line!

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testing comments

by kat-missouri on May 15, 2008 9:55 AM

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Kat - the "allow comments" box got un-ticked somehow during publishing (prolly one of the interior guard with a flea and tick collar wandered by). I went in and fixed it.

by John of Argghhh! on May 15, 2008 10:04 AM

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I gotta say this something i agree with, in some ways it's one alien versus another because much of AlQ can be seen this way too by locals.

by Argent on May 15, 2008 10:13 AM

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Iraq = Alien v. Predator

I realize that movies are an odd analogy, but I always thought this movie was interesting because, in the end, the actors and audience had to choose or identify with the "lesser evil."

The Predator, based on previous movies, hunted humans. But, he had a reason, an objective and a limitation to who, what and when he would attack. Thus, the risk factors and survivability of could be calculated. In short, if you didn't pick up a gun or act agressively, you could survive.

Further, the Predator resembled our own human ideas. He had a sense of right and wrong, he had some sense of "honor" and he attempted to communicate. Even if all of these things were not perfect, we could still "connect" with the Predator. Not to mention, he did walk on two legs and have two arms and hands, even if he was butt ugly.

The Alien, on the other hand, had a reason or objective, too, but the rhyme and limitations were missing. The Alien would attack anyone and anything in order to propagate. Therefore, the risk factor was exponentially increased and survivability was down across the board.

Further, no communications, just ugly hissing and stinky breath. No sense of honor or right or wrong. Just animal instinct of survivability. And, it was uglier than the predator. It didn't look or act like us. Yes, it was disgustingly ugly.

So, when you were watching the movie, Alien v. Predator, who did you root for?

Somewhere at the beginning, I was rooting for the aliens to kill each other and save the actors the trouble.

In the middle, I wasn't sure. I was leaning towards the Predator, but I still hoped they would kill each other and the rest of the humans would be saved.

At the end, I was definitely rooting for the Predator, hoping he would kill the Alien, feel like he did what he needed to do and then would leave without killing anymore of the actors.

I would add, finally, that, even "looks" aren't necessarily the guiding factor. If the ugly Alien had acted with some sort of humanistic behavior, like compassion, mercy, bravery, etc, protected the humans and fought the predator, even as ugly as it was, would we still feel disgust and reject it, or would we have overlooked its physical flaws in favor of its behavior?

If the shoe had been on the other foot, who would the actors and audience chosen to support?

sound familiar?

by kat-missouri on May 15, 2008 11:39 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

All of this redevelopment work going on leads to the obvious question of whether 3ID's operations are now including more PRTs and non-military support than they had been earlier this year. This is clearly a touchy subject, as it goes back to the long-running Iraq-related feuds between DoD and State/CIA. In earlier interviews, members of 3ID expressed great appreciation for the PRTs, but politely made it clear they weren't getting enough.

MG Lynch reports that while the number of PRTs has increased, staffing is not at 100% in his AO. In general, they are manned at the 80% level, though the newest teams are only at 60%. He seemed happy to be able to note that Karbala and Najaf were finally getting their own PRTs on the very day we spoke, and added that the State Department is, "soliciting for people to come in and fill those positions." This struck me as a case of stepping lightly around the feud, since the State Department has refused to force its employees to take these unpopular postings and instead has relied on volunteers to fill the billets.

In closing, I asked MG Lynch if there was anything I hadn't mentioned that he feels is not being heard back home. He replied with intensity, "I continue to find myself frustrated by the idea that the American army is at the breaking point!" He referenced 3ID's record-breaking rate of reenlistment, with fiscal year goals met in March despite having deployed 3 times since 2003 and currently finishing up a 15-month deployment. "But [they are] reenlisting because they believe that what they are doing is important--protecting our freedoms and way of life--in their souls. They believe in the mission, as I do."

"The idea that the Army is broken is blatantly false," he continued. It is not the military personnel themselves who concern him nearly as much as their families. "It's the strain on families more than anything...Fifteen [months] isn’t 12 + 3,” he pointed out. "You miss two of something when it's fifteen... We've also gotta spend more time at home between deployments."

He repeatedly emphasized that it is the families who are much more of a worry for him than the soldiers. "It’s important the American public knows their army is not at the breaking point," he reiterated, "That they’re re-enlisting and believe in the mission."

With that in mind, MG Lynch was happy to report that the 3ID Headquarters will be formally transferring authority to the 10th Mountain Division on June 1. I asked him what he thinks are the biggest issues 10th MTN will be facing. He expects the major work to be on the Sons of Iraq program, "[ensuring] they remain part of the solution." Lynch said he believes about 60% of them were involved in insurgent-related activity at some point but, "Today they are part of the solution."

This transfer of SOI participants from their temporary employment as a kind of neighborhood watch into careers such as military, police, and various trades has been a constant challenge for a number of reasons. According to MG Lynch, most SOI want to join the Iraqi Army, but only about 1/3 of those applying meet the recruit criteria for physical condition, aptitude, age and literacy.

Instead of military service, many SOI are encouraged to join local police forces or attend trade schools, an effort which is "making some progress." MG Lynch said that in the Jurfa sector where recently there had been no police presence, the newly-reconstituted police force is composed entirely of former SOI members, and there is also an effort to employ some SOI as a kind of civilian service corps for cleaning up and repairing streets and structures.

Even among the SOI qualified to join the Iraqi Army, there are challenges. Potential recruits still "encounter sectarian resistance at the national level, something we have a difficult time understanding," says MG Lynch. "The concern is that these SOI are nothing more than a Sunni militia that will overthrow the government at some point. It is difficult because there is resistance to embracing the idea of getting Sunni to be functioning members of society."

But MG Lynch is not without optimism on this subject. "Slowly, slowly," he says, using a common Arabic phrase. "Everything here in Iraq is hard, and everything in Iraq takes time... It’s going the right direction, just happens to going very slowly."

On the other hand, the transition from 3ID heading up MND-C to the 10th MTN taking over is going very smoothly and quickly. "We are an experience-based army," says MG Lynch. "I find myself worrying zero percent of the time about transitioning... Constant transitions, but it works well." He expects no lapse in momentum when 10th MTN takes over. "I don’t have any concerns."

And so MG Lynch and the rest of 3ID HQ will be home by about June 3, after 15 long months at "war..." Or at something that no longer resembles war for most of them, so much as it resembles a cross between the later stages of a disaster recovery operation and the typical Peace Corps project.

� Secure this line!

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Great interview series, FbL! Well done.

by MaryAnn on May 14, 2008 6:33 AM

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Great job, indeed, FbL! Very interesting series.

So much sticks out, but this particularly struck me as I read:

" ... This is clearly a touchy subject, as it goes back to the long-running Iraq-related feuds between DoD and State/CIA. ..."

This quote reminded me of an interview that Powerline blog did with Douglas Feith about his new book, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. In it, Feith says:

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020415.php

" ... I’ve been doing many interviews about my book in recent days – and I’ve heard from many journalists and others that the book surprises them. It tells a story that contradicts key parts of almost all the major books about the Iraq war."

"For example, it refutes the notion that President Bush came into office determined to go to war no matter what – that the administration refused or failed to consider the arguments against war. In fact, as my book reveals, the most serious analysis of the downsides and risks of war was produced in the Pentagon by Rumsfeld and his top advisers – not by Colin Powell, Rich Armitage, George Tenet or other officials who are reputed to have been the voices of caution."

"My book contradicts the common allegation that Pentagon civilians did not plan for post-Saddam Iraq. It explains what is wrong with the charge that the State Department had a plan that Defense officials discarded. It explains what is wrong with the charge that Rumsfeld and his advisers were dupes of the Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi – and what is wrong with the assertion that we intended to “anoint Chalabi” as the leader of Iraq."

" ... And perhaps most newsworthy, the book explains for the first time anywhere the key postwar plan developed by the administration – the plan for political transition in post-Saddam Iraq. It was a plan developed in the Defense Department – and it aimed to prevent a prolonged US occupation of Iraq. It was a plan to put Iraqis in charge of their own government promptly after Saddam’s overthrow. It was a plan that built on our experience in Afghanistan, where the US overthrew the Taliban regime but did not establish a US occupation government. As I say in the book, it was a plan “which my office drafted, Powell and Armitage tried to delay, President Bush approved, Jay Garner began to implement, and L. Paul Bremer buried. ... ”

As is often the case, we can only imagine the difference that might have resulted if DoD and State had cooperated more fully. And yet again, it appears as though certain people at Foggy Bottom had an opposing agenda.

by fdcol63 on May 14, 2008 9:00 AM

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I asked MG Lynch if there was anything I hadn't mentioned that he feels is not being heard back home. He replied with intensity, "I continue to find myself frustrated by the idea that the American army is at the breaking point!" He referenced 3ID's record-breaking rate of reenlistment, with fiscal year goals met in March despite having deployed 3 times since 2003 and currently finishing up a 15-month deployment. "But [they are] reenlisting because they believe that what they are doing is important--protecting our freedoms and way of life--in their souls. They believe in the mission, as I do."

This is the MSM filter at work. Or even worse, the MSM in bed with the enemy (they learned a lot from media blitz during Vietnam).

To get the good new out you will just have get stories like this out to the Larger Blogs. You make want to try Pajama Media or certain large blogs for stories like this. Also, it maybe possible to get the Wall Street Journal to carries stories like this.

Keep up the good work Fbl.

by Ledger on May 15, 2008 3:44 AM

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Thanks for all the compliments, guys! I thoroughly enjoyed this trek through the 3rd ID brass. It was an education in not only what is happening in their AO, but in everything related to them and their work.

by FbL on May 15, 2008 6:50 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Another big factor in the improved security situation in 3ID's AO is the continuing development of Iraqis creating and maintaining their own security, of which Sons of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces (army and police) are a significant part. MG Lynch described the SOI program as "maturing" and swelling to 40,000 participants. The SOI "provide sustainable security, which is defined as locals under positive control securing their community."

Developments in Iraq Security Forces themselves have obviously pleased MG Lynch. "Great progress with ISF," he enthused, mentioning three patrol bases that are currently being transitioned to the control of Iraqi units. "It’s an amazing thing to me—the progress that is being made in the Iraqi Army."

Within the 3ID AO, the Iraqi Army is comprised of 14 brigade-size units that MG Lynch considers near fully functional. "In the majority of cases, they are capable of planning and executing operations on their own," MG Lynch reported. "All they need is logistic or supply support. [There are] several provinces where they are fully in the lead, including Wasit and al Kut."

The big issue with ISF today is the police. This is one area that obviously concerns MG Lynch. "Not making a lot of progress improving the capability of police," he laments. Corruption/lack of professionalism is a huge problem with many Iraqi police units.

Part of the challenge comes down to a problem with availability of Coalition personnel. There are 96 Iraqi Police stations within 3ID's AO, but there are only 27 Police Transition Teams (civilian/military training and mentoring units). This leaves the vast majority of new Iraqi police units under-trained and unsupervised. With the Iraqi Army now taking the lead more and more, this is 3ID's current focus in the area of ISF development. When I spoke to MG Lynch last week, a reorganization and restructuring of the Military Transition Teams was underway in an attempt to--wherever possible--move qualified Americans from the MiTTs into the PiTTs.

Despite generally good security in the AO, what MG Lynch calls "continuing pressure on the enemy" remains an important part of 3ID's mission. For example, as part of Marne Piledriver, there are significant combat operations in Wasit Province and al Kut (two of the provinces where Iraqi Army units are in the lead). However, Lynch was quick to point out the ways in which combat and stabilization operations go hand-in-hand in counter-insurgency. "At the same time," he said, "you do what you can do to meet the needs of the populations." This includes building governing institutions and relationships, efforts in which he has reported "significant progress."

When I asked MG Lynch about relations between the various religious factions, he replied flatly, "No sectarian violence at all." He said many local councils have Sunni/Shia working together very effectively, a pattern that is also seen in the SOI units. He believes he sees the population coalescing around common bonds and fundamental desires: "People identifying themselves as Iraqi, not as members of a sect." He spoke of a focus among Iraqis--across a variety of backgrounds--on basic safety, good jobs, and the opportunity to improve their station. "I’m convinced more than ever that the people of Iraq want what you and I want," he said with conviction.

I also asked MG Lynch if he believes the AO has "turned a corner," that if current troop levels and Iraqi capabilities were unchanged there would be no going back to the violence and chaos of the past. He declined to use such language, but he is obviously optimistic. "We’re working towards irreversible momentum," he replied. "And we’re close to that."

In the final installment (tomorrow): economic development, transition and expected challenges for 3ID's MND-C replacements, and the burden of long and repeated deployments.

� Secure this line!

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leave the guns, take the schwarma...

by MajMike on May 13, 2008 10:25 AM

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...the Iraqi Army is comprised of 14 brigade-size units that MG Lynch considers near fully functional. "In the majority of cases, they are capable of planning and executing operations on their own," MG Lynch reported. "All they need is logistic or supply support. [There are] several provinces where they are fully in the lead, including Wasit and al Kut."

That is interesting.

I would assume that the IA and ISF would need to secure those supply lines and supply depots with some sort of air power. This coincidently is part of Bill’s role.

I would guess that IA would have to be trained and Trusted with expensive and quite lethal aircraft and radar gear (we would not want them retaliating against their own people to settle old scores – or being infiltrated by AQ and launching air attacks against coalition forces.

A secure Air Force is not impossible in Iraq – but how long will it take to build?

Btw, keep up the good reporting Fbl.

by Ledger on May 15, 2008 3:26 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

When interviewing senior leaders of 3ID, I have always prepared by scouring the Internet for information about the division's activities. Such information was usually available in copious quantities--through numerous radio and TV interviews with local stations, audio and written interviews with bloggers, and even a website devoted to chronicling 3ID's efforts. I did not realize how unusual this was... until I sought information on other U.S. Army division-level commands in Iraq last February and came up largely empty.

I asked MG Lynch what inspired such an obviously intentional program of local/alternative media engagement. His opening sentences surprised me with their carefully-considered conviction and intensity: "I do believe it’s imperative that the American public know how their national treasures are being committed--both people and money...It’s important that we tell the story." It was obviously not about "countering the mainstream media" or "balancing the reporting" so that good and bad news get equal time. For MG Lynch, it was about making sure that the American public be as informed as possible about the broad story of what their military is doing and what results from those efforts.

MG Lynch went on to explain that during his time as spokesman for Multi-National Forces - Iraq in 2006, he had been made acutely aware of the challenges in getting out that broad story. "I had a year of dealing with the media and I understood the complications of trying to get the story back to the American public. [But] the public deserves to know what is going on."

As spokesman for MNF-I, he'd had a front-row seat to the pattern of a "bad" story such as a particularly bloody battle, or a mistake, or a soldier misdeed being almost instantly scooped up and reported in the national media, while positive news often went nowhere. That pattern continued when he took command of 3ID. He voiced his irritation to me with particular intensity. "I find myself so frustrated trying to get through the national media filter. Good news—which is generally what I have to tell these days—just doesn’t get through."

As an example, he relayed his experience with what his parents have been hearing about Iraq while he is deployed. "I’ve called my parents every Sunday, my entire adult life... One Sunday about 2/3rds of the way through the deployment, I called and my father asked, 'Are you still over there? Because there aren't any reports about you anymore.'"

He also reported his reaction to one day overhearing a news anchor state that, "The news from Iraq today is that there is no news."

"That’s not true. That's just not true," he recalled responding with vehemence. And so, the decision was made to focus on local and alternative media outlets to make sure Americans at home were informed about what was happening in 3ID's AO.

MG Lynch reports he has been pleased with the results so far. "I've been very happy with what we’ve done recently--lots of cards and letters from people who have heard of the progress we’re making, but didn’t hear it from major media...I don’t’ know how we as a society look at the bad news and not the good news...But there is so much good news over here. It is palpable, the progress being made.”

That progress can be seen and felt in both the numbers and activities associated with 3ID's work in Iraq. When 3ID arrived in the AO fourteen months ago, Coalition forces were dealing with 25 attacks per day, and significant combat operations continued through much of 2007. By January when I began interviewing the 3ID senior leadership, attacks in the AO had fallen to four per day, though proactive combat operations continued in carefully-targeted areas.

MG Lynch now reports that with less than two attacks per day against Coalition forces in his AO, current activity highlights a marked shift to stability-related operations. The most recent division-wide effort is Operation Marne Piledriver, which has a battle component aimed at isolated pockets of insurgents and al Qaeda, but is largely focused on improvements to infrastructure and economic development. Says MG Lynch, "Where there used to be major points of violence, now we’ve got people with their needs being met by the government of Iraq and by us... Conversation [when I talk to residents] is about jobs, not about security."

Coming up in Part II and Part III: greater detail about security, the challenge of the Iraqi police forces, economic development and governmental "capacity-building," sectarian relations, MG Lynch's thoughts on a "broken" army, and the imminent transfer of authority for MND-C to 10th Mountain Division.

� Secure this line!

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I read a quote somewhere recently (I forget where) that said the Japanese people knew how badly they were losing the war because the state-run media kept reporting Japanese "victories" closer and closer to home.

Unfortunately, we've got a somewhat similar, but reversed, case here: stories of our successes in Iraq are just not being reported at all by the liberally dominated MSM simply because these stories don't fit their bias and their agenda, especially in an election year.

Like a 2-way street, propaganda flows both ways.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 8:14 AM

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I remember that quote, too.

I honestly hesitate to paint the MSM with a broad brush that attributes to them active malice or conscious bias, but I am honestly at a loss to explain what we are seeing.

Like any good military officer, MG Lynch refused to speculate on why, just merely described his experience and situation in relation to the media. But he was passionate about the problems this causes and about how important it is to keep people informed.

I have often lamented that a biased/incompetent/lazy media is a terrible liability for us. Citizens require information in order to make good decisions about who we want to lead us and where we want to be led. Incomplete or misleading info damages our ability to govern ourselves. It was sad to see another example of that, but encouraging to talk to a senior officer who so clearly "gets" this in relation to the greater government/society.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 8:54 AM

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" ... I honestly hesitate to paint the MSM with a broad brush that attributes to them active malice or conscious bias ... "

You're much too generous, IMHO, FbL. Oh, certainly, there are exceptions to every rule. And there are some professionals within the MSM who stand out in my mind as being as honest, unbiased, and balanced as they can be, even though I know how liberal they are.

But I'm firmly convinced that a majority of them have very clear biases and agendas, and are using the powers they enjoy by virtue of their positions in the MSM, as well as in academia and Hollyweird, to advance their agendas and goals in the larger cultural war(s) in which we're engaged.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 9:36 AM

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Unfortunately, we've got a somewhat similar, but reversed, case here: stories of our successes in Iraq are just not being reported at all by the liberally dominated MSM simply because these stories don't fit their bias and their agenda, especially in an election year

You know, it stems from a long history of journalism that has never been unbiased or objective, a profession that has attracted as many charlatans and liars as great writers, a profession that decided that it had not only a responsibility to inform people's decisions, but to help shape them. I think that last is where they got into trouble.

There is something about the ego that believes its own press.

For instance, some people keep touting that the media will fall to outside pressure from alternative media. I don't know about that. We may crow at our victories, but remember that somewhere out there the young are already text messaging via blue tooth technology to every phone within a three mile radius while I still wait for this comment to post.

For old media, though, the day they hit the pinnacle and then started sliding for the bottom? It was 1972. Richard Nixon was a crook and a liar. A newspaper brought down a president. And, ever since then, the media has not focused on information so much as created the great white hunters of journalism who each sees that pinnacle as the one they must surpass in order to achieve their own fame and fortune.

It's not about the truth or objectivity. It is not about serving people, whatever lie some first year journalism student may tell him or herself.

Funny how they think everyone else is lying to them instead.

by kat-missouri on May 12, 2008 9:50 AM

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See why I love him? LOL

Good job, FbL!

by Maggie on May 12, 2008 10:05 AM

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Funny how they think everyone else is lying to them instead.

Innit, though?

I told a photojournalist to wait by the helicopter while I went to get a briefing and warned him that there were Khmer Rouge in the forest who would kill him if he went into the trees.

He did and they did.

by BillT on May 12, 2008 10:13 AM

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I always get a kick out of references to the MSM being so liberal....let me explain before y'all jump down my throat.

As far as television news goes, I'm seldom, if ever, in the house by the time the evening news comes on. The vast majority of news and opinion I recieve comes via the radio that I take to work with me every day.

Here in the Indiana cornfields we have a choice of two talk radio stations......WLW and WKRC.....both belonging to Clear Channel Communications.

WLW's line up is local to Cincinnati, and includes Bill Cunningham.....remember the flap about him using Senator Obama's middle name (Hussein) during an introduction of Senator McCain.....anyway, it's all right wing all afternoon.

WKRC is the other choice.....Laura Ingram at 9:00AM.....Rush Limbaugh at noon.....Sean Hannity at 3:00.......all right wing all day.

Being not entirely backwoods, we do have the new fangled sateylight tv....so suppertime is a choice between Bill O'Riley.....and Lou Dobbs.

*laughing*.....to Us Working Rubes in the cornfields of middle America, right wing talk radio IS the main stream media.

Basically, I don't pay any attention to ANY of them..........there is no such thing as "fair and balanced" and there never has been, at least in my lifetime. Back in the 60's, the Repubs watched Channel 5 news in Cincinnnati (NBC national).....the Dems watched Chanel 9(CBS national).......

Now, you may jump.......

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 10:43 AM

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My own personal "awakening" to this issue came in 1992, when the media obsessed over the "bad" economy.

At first, I had the same thought as FbL: Certainly, they're just reporting the news. I gave them the benefit of the doubt, but asked myself this:

Even if they're reporting the economic news "objectively", the constant reinforcement of "bad" economic news would undoubtedly result in a growing downward spiral, like a snowball rolling downhill, as people who hear the bad news worry and become increasingly reluctant to buy or invest. The economy would just get worse.

We now know that the economy was actually in an upswing. But none of this positive news was reported.

And then I saw the media's obession with the Clintons in the 1990's, and everything since.

The revelations of bias since new media and the internet has simply solidified my opinion that there is, indeed, not just negligence and lazy work being done by the MSM, academia, and Hollyweird, but that much of this is being done with serious intent.

They've learned much from the examples of Riefenstahl, Eisenstein, Goebbels, et al. Even with the inroads that new media has made, they know the power they still hold.

They know they can shape and mold people's opinions. They do it everyday with commercial advertising, creating needs and preferences, overtly and subliminally.

by fdcol63 on May 12, 2008 10:45 AM

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R Jewell, the points you make are why I hesitate to ascribe ideological intent to the situation. And the talk shows (I do not listen to most of the ones you describe) talk more politics than straight news, so they may say Iraq is improving, but they are not reporting details or the "big picture" that MG Lynch talks about communicating.

But when you look at the national newspapers, national news, and AP/Reuters/AFP from which the newspapers and radio news breaks draw their stories, good news has been largely ignored. However, it seems that recently there is more "good news" reporting than a couple months ago. I'm beginning to suspect that's because in many places in Iraq it's becoming extremely difficult to find the bad news--and one thing I AM becoming convinced of is that far too many in the media are terribly lazy.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 11:10 AM

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Addendum to my comment to R Jewell:

My suspicion that many in the media are lazy has come about both by observing how much they get wrong that could be easily checked, and by realizing how hard it really is.

Preparing to interview all these senior leaders of 3rd ID (and the ambassador) has been a huge education for me. I had to not only be aware of what has happened to the 3ID in Iraq since they arrived, I had to make sure I knew as much as possible about recent Iraq history and culture, current issues in Iraq, economics, tribalism, and the interactions of the various sects and ethnicities.

Beyond that, I had to brush up to be sure I was clear in my knowledge of military structure, culture, and COIN theory. On a personal level, even learning about each interviewee's background and resume gave me clues about what to expect.

I already knew a great deal about many of these things, probably much more than the average American. But that wasn't enough. In order to gain the kind of credibility that would get me serious answers to serious questions, I needed to be extremely well-informed. I also needed to know and understand enough that I could recognize if I were being spun, comprehend the answers I was given, and know enough about the subject at hand to ask meaningful follow-up questions (sadly, my success in doing that is not 100%).

I spent hours and hours of prep time for what at times could be as little as 20 minutes with an interviewee. Rather than do all that, it is so much easier to simply assume the worst about my interviewee and engage in Gotcha journalism. No extra prep required: simply assume he's a liar and use a single data point to attempt to "prove" YOUR point. In such cases, it becomes all about you rather than the story. Then again, that's probably another reason why we see so much bad journalism: ego.

by FbL on May 12, 2008 11:41 AM

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No extra prep required: simply assume he's a liar and use a single data point to attempt to "prove" YOUR point. In such cases, it becomes all about you rather than the story. Then again, that's probably another reason why we see so much bad journalism: ego.

i wouldn't go totally with "no extra prep time", I believe people do and have done a lot of work to get their story, but it reminds me somewhat of some bad thesis that I've read (my own included) that had a lot of info and then, with a deadline approaching, rushed to conclusions to make the story fit, make it work and make it to deadline.

But, the most important aspect of that is that there is a huge bit of egoism that goes into writing a story and conveying a point. Journalism school doesn't beat that out of you, it just gives you new names and ways to shove it under a rug.

Journalists are no different than we are, they put their pants on one leg at a time. I know that, when I write something here, there is a good bit of ego that goes into it, so I have to imagine that it is the same for anyone writing any story.

I keep that in mind when I read.

I believe that people's experiences do shape them and how they interpret information. That is liberal or conservative, Democrat, republican, atheist or faithful...name it, and I believe it does. It actually takes a significant amount of control and concentration to try to edit out such concepts as "bias" from either the writing or the publishing aspect. Very little of any such purity exists.

Therefore, I take the Fox Maulder approach to journalism: trust no one.

by kat-missouri on May 12, 2008 12:12 PM

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Point well made FbL.

Your prep work always shows, believe me.

I, on the other hand, am far too lazy to go through that, and prefer instead to call a cell phone *somewhere* in Florida and go straight to the source....."gottchajournalism" works good on one of your kids......they're used to it.

And "boots in the sand in Florida" are tickled to have Gen. Patreaus inbound BTW.

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 12:14 PM

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I'm sure they ARE tickled re: Petraeus. As I'll get into in the next post or so, 3ID is a case study in how amazingly fast and how effectively the U.S. military has adapted to Petraeus' strategy/COIN. The changes 3ID has had to move through in tactics/activities just in their deployment are stunning. That wasn't a point that MG Lynch drove home in the interview, but the topics we covered and what I sat and listened to MG Lynch say just hit me like a ton of bricks. The U.S. military has done an incredible thing in Iraq in the last 12 months. Just amazing. I think we are going to see that 3ID is the vanguard of what will soon start to be obvious in Southern Iraq and the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area as they settle down (still coping with significant insugent/AQ/criminal activity).

by FbL on May 12, 2008 12:39 PM

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As I saw the Patreus strategy, it was (maybe I oversimplify)...... "OK, everybody go turn off the AC, pack your ruck, and get to work"

Soldiers respond to that...........as do their leaders

The day we put the first air conditioner in the first Officer/NCO/EM club in Viet Nam we might as well have started packing to come home.

Patreus is old enough to remember that lesson......and smart enough to have learned from it.

CENTCOM Hq will respond just as well......From what I hear, Adm Fallon put in a lot of air conditioners.........

by R Jewell on May 12, 2008 1:12 PM

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I think we are going to see that 3ID is the vanguard of what will soon start to be obvious in Southern Iraq and the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area as they settle down

I take it you're using "the Northern Baghdad/Mosul area" in the same sense you'd use "the Northern San Diego/Santa Barbara area"?

by BillT on May 12, 2008 3:12 PM

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Yes, Smarty Pants! I know that was a geographically haphazard reference, but I meant it to refer to everything from Baghdad to the Kurdish territories. :P

And yes, the above was my FbL Voice, not my Reporter Voice. *double Pbbbttttt

by FbL on May 12, 2008 3:19 PM

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I meant it to refer to everything from Baghdad to the Kurdish territories.

I *know* that. However, it's a tad *north* of the of 3ID's AO -- unless MG Lynch is planning to drop by for coffee and a ride in the B-206 FTD...

by BillT on May 13, 2008 9:42 AM

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Okay, what we have here is a SERIOUS failure to communicate. :P

What I meant was that I believe the developments we are seeing in 3ID's AO (MND-C) are a vanguard of what we will soon be seeing in the areas of Northern and Southern Iraq that are currently not as far along (those areas are NOT part of 3ID's AO. The AO goes southward to Karbala and Najaf, but it's still part of MND-C. You'd think the "C" in Central would mean Baghdad city itself, but it includes just the southern part of Baghdad province).

So, have I communicated clearly now? :P

by FbL on May 13, 2008 9:50 AM

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Okay, "Vanguard" was a confusing choice of word here. I meant it in the metaphorical sense rather than the military one. Sorry.

by FbL on May 13, 2008 9:55 AM

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I get *so* confused when you mix metaphoricals.

BTW, the push is already *on* in Mosul...

by BillT on May 13, 2008 1:41 PM

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That's what we've been hearing, BillT. Stay safe. :)

by FbL on May 13, 2008 2:45 PM

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That's what we've been hearing, BillT.

Fine kettle of fish. Ya hang with the brass and go all *formal* 'n' stuff with us gringo peons...

*Red Alert! scuttling for the bunker*

by BillT on May 13, 2008 3:52 PM

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Geez! What is it with you always accusing me of going formal on you?! :P

I speak too casually and without specificity, and you pick my comments to pieces; I get direct and clear, and you accuse me of getting snobby.

That was NOT the Royal We I was using in that comment. *sigh*

Luv ya, anyway. :P

by FbL on May 13, 2008 6:54 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

He repeats himself a couple of times, re-enforcing the idea about social epidemics without getting to the meat of it. I believe this leaves French rushing to the end where he tries to squeeze in the idea of the three types of people that effect a social epidemic. Though, he does use some examples that are good in their context. He talks a little about "broken windows theory", but never names it or references it in the book, The Tipping Point, or even from the original authors of the concept.

Broken Windows was a theory developed in 1982 by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson. Both, The Tipping Point and Broken Windows should be read by anyone who is deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan or any other nation where success depends on securing and shaping the population. Deploying units should have rudimentary understanding of "broken windows", not only on what it is operationally, but why it is important to do it.

In basic business or group dynamics where the success of a project depends on the majority or totality of the group in performing the same way, leaders need to get "buy in" from their members. When people believe in something, they act on it, introduce it to others and...well, an internal "tipping point" is reached and the group begins to see serious gains towards their goals.

To do that, people need information so that they can "reason" themselves into the importance of the project. The Tipping Point is long and dry and would be best exerted for people below NCO for direct education. But, Broken Windows shows immediate examples and outcomes.

For instance, why do we no longer drive through neighborhoods on "presence patrols", but, instead, park and walk? Because studies over three decades old said that there were more benefits and eventually less danger:

And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.

What the citizens had feared most were attacks by strangers. What the foot patrol did was put the officer in contact with the citizens. He knew who they were, who belonged and who didn't.

Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer—call him Kelly—knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules.

These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for this neighborhood. If someone violated them, the regulars not only turned to Kelly for help but also ridiculed the violator.[snip]

...two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.

In Newark, NJ, 1982, long before New York implemented the strategy or Iraq was a distant twinkle, counter-insurgency was at work.

What else did we learn from "Broken Windows"?

� Secure this line!

The government points to huge spending. Unfortunately, the Department for International Development is mainly pushing this money into corrupt Kabul government ministries, not into the provinces. This would be all right if we had time — but we are losing the consent of ordinary Afghans in the villages by not pulling projects into Helmand that would support the valiant efforts of our young men and women in dealing with the insurgency.

In short, as in Iraq, you have to do both security and reconstruction. It can't be an "either/or" situation. It has to make a difference to people directly in a community and it must be visible. If we built a list of priorities, what would you put on it first? We are still building the giant "ring road" that, when finished, will allow greater movement of government aid, military forces and product to market. Hopefully, not the poppy kind although that is already what is happening on completed roads.

Do schools come next? Or, wells? Or, electricity? Or, agriculture? Graineries?

What if many of these things are bing done, but piece meal across the nation, without connection from community to community? In short, using "broken windows theory" (also once referred to as the "oil spot" plan) as was done in Ramadi and Fallujah, requires a rolling economic, security and political plan.

There is a huge disconnect between aid programs through NGOs, military operations and Afghanistan government activities. Complicated by various issues such as NGOs who feel that they have to operate separately from the military in order to have trust and get things done. Which they are limited on anyway, as Holloway points out, because the areas are often considered too dangerous to leave their small enclaves or the big bases.

Then there is NATO and the various limitations on their operations and areas. In fact, one would have to hope that Petraeus is capable of wrangling these various entities into some semblance of a single plan and direction. How to get them to concentrate on a few, visible and important projects in a specified area. Particularly one that is "hot".

Of course, the issue with money going into the hands of corrupt government officials is similar to problems in Iraq. Nothing gets done at the local level, but, in some ways, it buys off the bigger players and keeps them on our side (nominally) of the fence. In Iraq, US forces simply started by-passing this to some degree by co-opting local officials, paying them off (much cheaper in the long run) and putting the money right in the hands of the locals either through the local co-opted official and unofficial leaders or by planning and paying for much needed projects right out of their own pockets.

Does that happen in Afghanistan? If it does, it's either "not so much" or "not enough".

Still, where I disagree with Holloway in the beginning is whether we need more forces to do it effectively or less. In Iraq, it took more because they actually had to secure the area at the same time they built. They had to live out among the people.

US Marines, arriving after many deployments to Iraq, having learned these very lessons, are now starting to deploy out to their forward operating bases. Will COPs be next?

Holloway goes for the 9 thousand mile approach. Withdraw, let them sort it out and simply support with money, weapons, etc with NGOs providing most of the work. Besides, he notes, Afghanistan is no more important than any other troubled third world spot. And, except for it being the cradle for the 9/11 attacks, it has no real significance in comparison. At least, that is what I gather. We can some how keep track of the AQ folks another way.

Of course, I disagree with that view of Afghanistan as I do with Iraq for similar, but different reasons. Iraq was, in fact, stealing history from the Islamists who have the grand caliphate as its united goal, however achievable that really is. It was central to the rest of the Middle East. In their back yard, so to speak, and they, the Arabs and surrounding terror supporters, could not ignore the realities of extremist activities and the real danger to themselves from a failed state with an active Islamist guerrilla force. We couldn't let the extremists have it, no matter what.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, was far away from the people and the money of the Arab lands in the ME. People could send money, support and men to that war without feeling the direct effects. Certainly, no political activities in Afghanistan was going to bring democracy, freedom or any sort of political or ideological pressure on the boiling pot of the ME.

Not letting Afghanistan go then comes down to a few necessities. Not the least of which is that, if we can win, why would we concede one iota of scrubby brush land of Afghanistan back to Al Qaida? As the incubator for 9/11 and the modern Islamist global war, to let that go is to become the Russians to the mujihadeen in the 1980's. Without ever committing the number of forces or money that the Russians did. "Paper tiger" would be the least of our worries.

Still, I agree with him. Our counter-insurgency efforts have been lackadaisical from a central planning and execution aspect.

The next question is: should we talk to the Taliban?

Yes.

Keep in mind the Iraq model. Not every insurgent is a terrorist and not every terrorist is an insurgent. We have to be much better at separating the elements and creating solutions based on boots on the ground, community truths and realities.

It is unclear whether, after all this time, we have really learned that lesson or been in a position to do so.

Do we need more troops in Afghanistan? Why, yes, I believe we do. One may ask why we haven't done so or considered it until of late when we sent the Marines. It is often couched in the "either/or" reflection of Iraq: if we weren't in Iraq, we would be winning in Afghanistan. I believe that is a "yes" and "no" as well.

I believe there are some very interesting, long term and over arching strategies that effected our decisions about how much effort and troops we placed into one combat theater or another. I noted a central idea above: Iraq is in the heartland and had the most impact on the centers where extremism are supported physically, materially and monetarily.

Without being too obfuscating, in Generation Kill I wrote about a very classic maneuver warfare tactic: feinting in one direction while bringing up the central attack on a totally unexpected front. In the words of Sun Tzu, attacking where the enemy is least prepared. Check the map showing the "feint" and "push" to Baghdad.

Holloway gets it to some degree. Why would we put major effort into one theater when so many are troubled and possibly create a much broader and more serious threat? Or, in context of Iraq and Afghanistan as I noted above, when one area is likely to be much more important and effective in the over all, long term, strategic war of ideologies against Islamist extremists?

We move some forces into Afghanistan (feint) where it looks like our major effort against the main body is going to be and then attack the weak center. Keeping in mind, this is a global war that requires a global strategy. Thus, global theaters fall into the same categories and strategic necessities as any immediate and local theater or front. In brief, we hold the main AQ force in Afghanistan/Pakistan (where's Osama and Zawahiri?) while we destroy them, their ideas, their support base, some place else.

In military speak, Iraq got inside of AQs OODA Loop. They had to play catch up in Iraq because they weren't there in force and they enacted bad strategies that back fired. Not just in Iraq, but within the greater Islamic community they hoped to influence. We made them use money, men and materials along with a large amount of wasta (cache) to try to take back an historically and strategically important center.

Now that AQ in Iraq is all but busted, it's time to start looking towards Afghanistan and shoring up the forces that constituted our "feint". Just like Rolling Thunder took out Baghdad and then forces focused to outlying regions or enemy forces, we have taken the center of the ME, the center of jihad, and now need to move to the peripherals: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iran.

� Secure this line!

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Examples like Basra and Afghanistan expose how ineffective the British and European "Soft Sell" approach (less confrontational) is when dealing with insurgencies and armed militias in a Muslim culture.

It may work in a constabulary environment where the population has been utterly defeated and is ready for peace. But it fails miserably with a culture that glorifies death, whose civilian population has been spared the worst of the horrors of war, and who don't recognize that they have been truly vanquished.

by fdcol63 on April 30, 2008 7:42 AM

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When you consider the route of your Line of Communications from your Sea Port of Debarkation, and then add in the source of your Cl III, you begin to understand why we don't have 160,000 troops surged into Afghanistan.

We need fewer caveated boots on the FOB and more of the right kind of boots, like Police Mentoring Teams and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams. Fewer non-indig trigger pullers and more trainers of indig trigger pullers.

by Cannoneer No. 4 on April 30, 2008 8:03 AM

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Kat, I'd like to make a couple of points about your piece here.

First, you ask "If we built a list of priorities, what would you put on it first?"

Howzabout we ask the Afghans themselves. There's a current program called the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan. For anyone interested in this nation's grassroots reconstruction, if you don't know about this, you should read up. I've written about it here, with some interesting stats, and some commentary on the usefulness of most NGO's. The most telling stat is that because of the Community Development Councils' local nature, and the fact that communities must contribute a minimum of 10 percent of the total project costs in either labour, funds, or materials, less than one percent of the initiatives launched through the NSP have been destroyed or targeted by insurgents.

The locals have skin in the game, and won't tolerate the Taliban thugs tearing down what they just built themselves.

As far as negotiating with the Taliban is concerned, it's already being done. When I interviewed BGen David Fraser, who commanded RC South during Op Medusa last year (as the Cdns, Brits, Dutch and others were taking over from the U.S.), one of his primary objectives was to separate the hard-core ideologues, often from outside Afghanistan, from the locals who just needed a paycheque and some security for their family. And the Afghan gov't has been actively seeking to bring former Taliban back into the fold for years now. They even created the National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to facilitate that process.

With all due respect to General Petraeus, at the end of the day, the decisions about who to go after and who to negotiate with should really be up to the Afghan government, shouldn't they?

Anyhow, it's an interesting discussion, that's for sure...

by Damian on April 30, 2008 10:12 AM

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Cannonner No.4, I'm with you on the OMLT and POMLT teams - more would be better. But I'd also like to see better coordination between those teams nation by nation. The U.S. sings off a different OMLT songbook than the Canadians, who train Afghans a bit different than the Brits, etc. So when "trained" ANA or ANP forces operate for the first time with NATO militaries other than the one that trained them, there can be hiccups. Heck, even between Afghan troops who were trained up differently by different NATO countries. The problem with coordinating that is that everyone seems to think they do it best, and it's the other guy who should compromise...

Fewer non-indig trigger pullers and more trainers of indig trigger pullers.

I'd disagree with you a bit on this: we need more trainers of indig trigger pullers, but we also need more non-indig trigger pullers, especially in RC South. Hence the utility of the 24th MEU rolling into Helmand to augment the Brits, recently. And my country's been calling for another battle group on the ground in Kandahar for quite awhile now.

I just don't think it's an either-or proposition.

by Damian on April 30, 2008 11:48 AM

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And the Afghan gov't has been actively seeking to bring former Taliban back into the fold for years now. They even created the National Commission for Peace and Reconciliation to facilitate that process.

One of the most interesting things from late last year and early this year has been the Afghan government insisting on expelling Brit and German diplomats who were ostensibly negotiating outside of the national government's purview. I guess the real question is, at what level is that negotiation acceptable.

In Iraq, many negotiations start from the ground or local area out. Frankly, I think this is the proper process. Waiting for national reconciliation in Iraq was taking too long and I believe that is the issue in Afghanistan.

With all due respect to General Petraeus, at the end of the day, the decisions about who to go after and who to negotiate with should really be up to the Afghan government, shouldn't they?

Yes and no. As I was explaining above, you really have to know the local actors and separate them, as we agree, from the outsiders and then separate them again based on who locally is going to be reconcilable and who won't. That has to happen within AO's. In Iraq, individual units built their own intelligence and moved from that, not from any monstrous top down level or even waiting for the Iraqi government to decide how they were going to handle, for instance, the "de-ba'athification" issue.

What they did locally was find the guy we needed to co-op to help control the area. If he was former Ba'ath or what have you, it only mattered whether he could be potentially tied to direct crimes under Saddam or really attrocious acts against Iraqis in the current context. Otherwise, he became a viable candidate for co-op. Were we suppsed to, should we have, waited for the national government to figure out how they were going to handle reconciliation with former Ba'ath members? I don't think so. That would have been ludicrous, suicidal and the least direct method.

I would say that, that same metric has to apply in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, there were several levels of actors within each AO. Some were national movements (like old Ba'ath), some were tribal, some were criminal gangs and then there were the outsiders. I imagine that it is the same in Afghanistan yet complicated by the much larger and multitudinous tribes, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.

I don't expect that Petraeus is going to decide back at Centcom who we should or should not negotiate with. What I believe that Petraeus will do will be directing the forces there to take control and develop their own AOs, their own leads, their own priorities and their own target/negotiation lists. I imagine, no matter what, that people like the Haqqani network joining national reconciliaiton will be more related to national government over all, but that units operating in the areas where they are prevalent will do their best and utmost to cleave off any extraneous or peripherals to that organization in order to isolate them more effectively from the population and make their transition to being a part of the political process more likely. That last part will be the unit's responsibility, not the central government.

Particulary as their ability to project anything into those areas, force, construction, etc, is limited without us. Petraeus will most likely work towards getting the Afghan government to see it our way. Just as I don't expect that Petraeus can decide on whether every actor is either a target or potential negotiation, neither do I expect the Afghan government to know. At least not fully. Nor to make such decisions on the very local level.

Second, I believe that Petraeus did wonders on getting a unified view and performance of counter insurgency out of the US military in Iraq, across the marines, Army, Air Force and Navy, making it truly joint. Being the commander of MNF-I gave him some clout, but if you understand anything about the "joint" operations aspect, it is a lot about getting commanders across the armed forces and down through the ranks to "buy in" to the program. Iraqi and American forces.

I imagine that is going to be his focus at CentCom to some respects. First to get all of our forces in Afghanistan operating in a specific direction and second to get our allies to work with us in the same manner. The last is probably going to be the most difficult, but, considering that Petraeus also had to get the various Iraqi factions to do the same, he has plenty of experience at working with prideful knuckel heads ( our Canadian friends excluded of course; he who bleeds with me and all that...)

by kat-missouri on April 30, 2008 1:37 PM

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our Canadian friends excluded of course

Precisely! Because everyone knows we Canucks are already perfect the first time around! Just ask us!

*rolling eyes*

I just wish ISAF and the U.S. could have a central "lessons learned" clearing house where all the ideas that actually demonstrated results could be shared, then a central decision could be made that this is how the coalition does it.

And I don't care if that good idea is Canadian, or American, or Estonian, fer heaven's sake.

But everybody gets prickly about how their own troops do things, and I worry that we're letting that get in the way of the results.

Besides that, I think it would be useful if those in charge remembered that perhaps those currently operating in RC South (Brits, Canadians, Dutch etc) might well be doing it right, but not doing enough of it because of a lack of boots on the ground. Sometimes it's not about the quality of the work, but rather achieving the quantity required to hit a tipping point ("surge" anyone?).

by Damian on April 30, 2008 2:02 PM

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Sometimes it's not about the quality of the work, but rather achieving the quantity required to hit a tipping point ("surge" anyone?).

I'd agree, but also add that they need the empowerment to take certain actions, build things, negotiate truces, etc, etc, etc right there and probably don't have it.

by kat-missouri on April 30, 2008 2:35 PM

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Why am I posting this...

If we could walk with the Taliban, talk with the Taliban,
Grunt and squeak and squawk with the Taliban,
And they could squeak and squawk and speak and talk to us.

by Toluca Nole on April 30, 2008 3:06 PM

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Damian - I'll be speaking with the Director of the Army Center for Lessons Learned here at Fort Leavenworth tomorrow.

I'll ask if there isn't at least ABCA-derived access available to people.

I suspect there is, but I could be wrong, and we could certainly over-use the NOFORN marking on things.

by John of Argghhh! on April 30, 2008 3:44 PM

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Fantastic, John. Here's another question to ask him: does the "lessons learned" info flow the other way (from allied militaries to the U.S. services)? Much as I respect the professionalism of your men and women in uniform, your nation doesn't have a monopoly on good ideas or more effective execution of those ideas.

Given my experience trying to get good American ideas officially adopted up here, I'd bet there's better information sharing through informal networks within Kandahar and Kabul than there is between the HQ's responsible back home in each country. Those responsible for policy tend to be fairly parochial, whereas the fighters just want to do it the best way possible, so they don't get killed for making a mistake someone else already made and learned from.

by Damian on April 30, 2008 4:12 PM

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Damian, logistically it is an either or situation. There is a finite total end strength that can be supported in Central Asia through Karachi, Chaman and Torkham. The more non-indig trigger pullers, the fewer non-indig trainers of indig trigger pullers.

Coalition warfare is fighting by committee. The profession of arms tends to attract national
chauvinists because they are more likely than others to consider defen[s/c]e of their Westphalian nation-state worth killing and dying over.

We need to maximize the utility of every ISAF and OEF boot at the end of that long supply line. Send the caveated contingents home. Stand the ANA up faster. Task organize ANA units into ISAF/OEF formations until eventually its the ISAF/OEF units attached to Afghan Corps. Instill a healthy spirit of competition in the ANA between the proteges of different nations to prove on the batttlefield who got trained the best.

It's their country. We need to do less direct action on their behalf, and more Foreign Internal Defense.

by Cannoneer No. 4 on April 30, 2008 9:29 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Reconstructing the Samarra Shrine (this is for the Vets for Freedom, salute to Cpt Pete Hegseth ret.)

"It's a beautiful thing that they are rebuilding the mosque," said Abdul Jabar Salah, an unemployed father of three standing in line on Tuesday outside the mayor's office, waiting to apply for a job helping with reconstruction of the shrine.

"We're hopeful that as the mosque rises, so, too, will our economic situation. All things, though, depend upon security," he said.

Zawahiri tries to stay relevant in Algiers (fails miserably)

Asked about the targeting of civilians by alleged Algerian readers, Zawahiri continued to justify the attacks by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. He characterised them as efforts to secure the lives and property of Algerian citizens and as jihad to liberate Algerians from "America, France and the children of France".

Algerian analysts say al-Zawahiri depicted a picture that was far from reality in Algeria.

Political analyst Ali Merdji said al-Qaeda's number two was trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to depict Algeria as an arena for fighting the Americans and French. The recording is an attempt to "introduce the bloodthirsty elements of al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb in a new way, i.e. resistance groups fighting colonisation in Algeria," Merdji said.

"This trick won't be bought by the Algerians who understand the criminal nature of the terrorist organisation, which has a long record of terrorist operations, especially as they are the first victims of that organisation's followers," he added.

This is how you do "strat comm".

Al-Zawahiri's repeated calls to kill Americans and French in Algeria contradict the principles of Islam, a local imam told Magharebia.

"The texts of Islamic history show that Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) used to advise his companions during the wars not to hurt Christians and Jews, even by hints, and he advised them not to hurt monks in their places of worship," Abdelkrim said. If this was at the time of war, he asked, then how about the time of peace?

Sadr and Al Qaida teaming up again (repeat 2004 when they both got their gluteous maximus handed to them)

The Broken Windows Theory in Sadr City

"Tell the mayor – the mayor of Baghdad, the big mayor – tell him we'll be here tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, and we'll be very disappointed if he's not here. The prime minister needs this to happen," he said during a Friday trip to Sadr City. "We gotta get going."

General Hammond is pushing for services – trash pickup, medical care, water, electricity – for a southern slice of the volatile district. It's part of a US plan to win Iraqis away from Moqtada al-Sadr's sway. And they see a window of opportunity as fighting in Mr. Sadr's Baghdad stronghold shows signs of quieting.

Mahdi Army Fades Away

After a month of fighting, the Mahdi Army has disappeared from the streets of Basra, the largest city in the south. The army and police are everywhere, and people are providing information on where Mahdi Army personnel are hiding out, and the locations of their weapons caches. Up north, in the Sadr City section of east Baghdad, the Mahdi Army is still fighting hard. But the army and police have the upper hand, and are pushing the Shia militiamen back block by block.

Women in Action

No all you male pervs! Don't let the title of the post fool you. This is about female soldiers in Iraq in the Lioness program.

I don't know about bitter, but definitely clinging to bible and gun:

Usually, the women soldiers went along to be available in case there were women detainees or women in the area.

“The firefight finds you,” Breslow-Kynaston said. “Your mission out there isn’t to go be in a firefight. It’s to be in the convoy.”

Morgan is sturdy and strong, a tattooed “tough gal” who learned to handle firearms as a young girl on the rifle range and to shoot squirrels out of tall trees in Arkansas.

“Some people had requested some females to be attached with the companies and go out and search the Iraqi women,” she said. “They asked for a couple of volunteers. I was one of the first ones they came up to and asked if I would mind going out. Of course, I was all for it.”

She grew up in a religious family and wondered if she could go to hell for killing people. Combat taught her that if you stop to think, you die. She lived through the “longest second of my entire life” while pointing her weapon at another human being and trying to decide whether to fire, she said in the film.

� Secure this line!

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No matter what is thrown at our troops they adapt, they fix, they change, they cope. Will this story ever get told propperly? All the little stories? Nobody is sitting on their hands. They're out building schools, clinics, cleaning up the water, working on the grid. Our people are amazing. We should maybe hire them to do that work here after this is over.

My old boss came up with a great idea. Those North Viet battalions that kept the trail open despite our constant bombing should have been hired to work on the Turnpike in New Jersey. He was ahead of his time.

Oh well

by Fishmugger on April 29, 2008 8:56 AM

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I'm thinking the ambush was the same event from the Taliban perspective. You always start a good ambush with a bang.

Most armies just don't send someone down to self-immolate, preferring things like Claymores, det-cord, TNT and C4...

Just not wrapped around the troop.

by John of Argghhh! on April 29, 2008 9:25 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

These studies offer many similarities, yet, often differ in one area: economics. Many studies, particularly statistical studies on the background of known terrorists, tend to note that many a young "terrorist" comes from a poor family and that they are often poorly educated. In first world nations, the quality and availability of education is linked to the economic status and ability of the state as well as the individual to give or gain information and education. Thus, reducing "education" or, better yet, "critical thinking" to an economic imperative. A number. In short, the lack of education and critical thinking skills reduces their judgment and leaves them open for suggestion and indoctrination into radical and often violent ideologies and movements.

Other studies have indicated that terrorists or rebels evince from middle and upper economic classes. These are often spurred on by their education where they are exposed to these ideas or where education brings into question their commonly held beliefs, leaving them open for indoctrination into often violent ideologies and movements. This education is available due to their economic capabilities or those of their parents or state. Again, reducing the creation of radicals to a number.

My problem with this is that, in truth, both are correct. Poor, middle and upper economic classes are drawn to radicalization. But, since their over all economic or "number" status is not equal, I am hard pressed to identify economics as the common denominator. Then again, I tend to reject such ideas of Marxist reductionism of the human experience for both ideological and intuitive reasons. Not the least of which is that, indeed, people across all economic classes can be drawn to an ideology, religion, a community, a political party, etc, etc, etc.

I also read several books not long ago about the origins of terrorism. In fact, one called "The Origins of Terrorism", written in 1996, spoke about "self-selection" where individuals with little contact with other actual terrorists, became radicalized and sought out organizations that most resembled their own ideas of their own volition. The book actually used terrorist organizations like the Weathermen, the Red Brigade and the Badr-Meinhoff group as examples. Yet, it's something that we've seen in the last seven years with Islamic extremists.

Crenshaw noted that these groups were able to exist and commit terroristic acts because, even though many would not agree with their tactics, some agreed with their ideas. That led to tacit acceptance and indirect support for their efforts such as witnesses simply refusing to give information. Eventually, that changed because the community at large began to reject their methods as too violent and extreme compared to the alleged offenses of any government or individual. In effect, their target package was too big and did not align with the community's concept of responsible parties and acceptable targets.

It also changed because, internally, these groups began to separate as individuals within the organizations began to become more radical and urged more violent acts while others considered they had gone as far as their conscience (their morals?) had allowed them to go and still others believed that even the acts they had already committed had already gone past some internal red line. Morals.

We are seeing that right now within the the current crop of terrorists. The Awakening, both Sunni and Shia, is basically the community rejecting the radicals because they crossed the communities' "red line". The radicals were killing too many people, the "wrong" people, who often had little to do with the actual complaints of the insurgents. While these groups were prepared to kill certain people, even in gruesome and horrific ways, they still had to justify it to themselves and to the community at large.

We also see it in the internal debates from the radicals themselves who have been issuing communiques critical of or urging certain acts even long before Zawahiri ever wrote Zarqawi to tell him to knock off the public, horrific and too wide targeting of individuals. Zawahiri had written at least two other books and several pamphlets about his radicalization and the failures of past "jihad" organizations. In Knights Under the Prophet's banner, he explained that the Ikwan in Egypt had lost support because, when they bombed and shot several "officials" it resulted in some unfortunate collateral damage. One of the bombings resulted in the death of a young girl riding her bicycle in the yard. that occurred just before the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was tracked down and imprisoned. That is no coincidence. They lost the support of the people. They became easier to find.

Imagine being Zawahiri today and having to learn or try to teach that lesson all over again. He must be extremely frustrated (ed...good). He isn't the only one. After the 1992 destruction of the Ikwahn uprising in Syria, there were many analysis written by former participants that evaluated their operations including whether they should or should not have acted in certain ways that allowed the global community to accept their destruction as "just".

In any case, over and over again, we see the same pattern. Where it ends is with individual and group "red lines" or conscience or morality or values or humanity. Whatever we want to call it, it is those lines, when reached or crossed, that begin to effect the ability for radical, violent organizations to operate or remain effective.

Argent discussed in comments that he rejected the idea of calling it "morals" because there so many imperatives within a culture that effect these morals, not the least of which is religion which, on the face of it, we do not share with our current adversaries.

The Christian subset of morals is one thing but there are other subsets, each religion, each culture. We're talking largely incompatible dialects. What you are talking about is really more like humanism which I think would not be your intention at all.

I have to disagree with that for several reasons. First, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all referred to as "Abrahamic" religions because, at their base, they share a common beginning or point of reference. They do share common ideas. How we address them and the types of consequences that go with transgressing against them are often different, at least in today's society. Yet, we do share some very basic concepts.

I'll eschew Argent's example for a less ribald one. Take stealing. Almost universally, stealing is unacceptable. It harms the bonds of trust within a community, causes discord and can lead to retribution that, in many cultures even today, could cause long standing rivalries that tear a community apart.

Even in communities where theft is considered an art and honorable profession (such as gypsies and various other societies) there are still limits to what is acceptable. In the gypsy culture, for instance, it is acceptable to steal from everyone that is not a gypsy, but it is less acceptable to steal from a fellow gypsy, even less acceptable to steal from a gypsy within the tribe and, finally, the least acceptable to steal from a family member within the tribe.

Believe it or not, these groups will expel people from their families and tribes for those acts, even though stealing in general is acceptable. Why? because stealing from family, friends and fellow tribe members creates discord and may damage their ability to stay together. In tribal societies, staying together means survival.

At its base, we share a common morality: stealing is bad for the community. The real difference here lies in who we admit as our "family" or "tribe" and what we consider mitigating circumstances. Even in our society today, we accept things as mitigating the actual crime. We are probably less likely to hand down extreme sentences for some impoverished elderly lady who steals a loaf of bread because she is poor and hungry. There was a time when our western culture found it acceptable to hang children as young as twelve for stealing said loaf of bread.

This is not pointed out to create any sort of "equivalence", but simply to indicate that there are core values, morals, concepts, what have you, that most communities share. What is different is the set consequence for such acts and what things, if any, could be considered "mitigating" circumstances.

To some degree, those accepted consequences and mitigating circumstances are part of a community's morality or values. That may be where we part ways, but it does not mean that we cannot find some common ground, even if we decline to accept every moral or consequence as moral.

Where do numbers come in to this discussion? Numbers come into play in what Malcolm Gladwell called, "The Tipping Point". Numbers work both ways. In Origin of Terrorism, the number of members that join a group can act as a "tipping point" that moves a group to finally act on their previously internal discussions of ideology. Similarly, Malcolm Gladwell's "tipping point" show that it can work the opposite way when the number of people believing or acting in a specific way can act to the good. What we would normally call "peer pressure", which we know can be both positive and negative.

That is where "numbers" come to play. The question is, what part of a community needs to be effected, how wide and how public does the rejection of terrorism have to be in order to prevent even a single member of the community from acting?

� Secure this line!

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1. I am not nearly as certain education yields critical thinking skills. Rarely is schooling teaching concepts like problems solving, critical evaluation, philosophy etc and even higher studies like University are weak in this area. It's my opinion the majority of school work is about acceptance of facts... much like loading a memory bank with data. Recall the times tables, recall the constitution, recall the theory of evolution, recall the biblical teaching, recall the musical notes etc. The exams then test the quality of memory recall but not the ability to think.

In general I don't think there really is all that much personal resistance worldwide to indoctrination into any kind of movement, concept or ideal. West or East North or South people join ideologies all the time. Religions, militaries, peace movements, charities, scams, pubs, terrorists, political parties, clubs, hell blogs when you get right down to it. What seems to matter is the individuals connection to the ideal and the availability of the groups. If economics is a connection yes I get you but I think there are loads more ways to connect than that.

2. I think you view economics the wrong way around sometimes. I seem to recall this from an earlier discussion about China-Taiwan possibilities. You view economics as a cause. But I take the position economics can at times be an effect instead of a cause. Here you are searching for economics as a cause of terrorism. But the economic status of the terrorist may well not be a cause but instead an effect from other things. let me give two little things which might help explain my view because I realize what i just typed might be hard to swallow.

One is that the US might not be an advanced free nation because it is rich. It may be that the US is rich because it is an advanced free nation.

Or if one looks at my own situation of economic ditch dwelling one can say lack of money caused me to be depressed this that or the other. Or one can say I am poor because I am depressed this that or the other.

No doubt economics can be a cause but I'm hoping you're able to see that this rule isn't absolute and the possibility that economics may be an effect instead of a cause as well.

3. I think you absolutely right about the moral line crossing being what we're seeing. The easier targets morally like US soldiers etc got too hard and the movement to soft targets was fraught with moral peril. Even US solders are getting more difficult morally. There seems to be an improvement with community connect now though it's not easy for me to be sure not actually being there. However I do not underestimate the mutability of this enemy.

4. Well my words were really quite general for one thing. I was including all world religions with emphasis on the universality of the language. Looking at Abrahamic is really localizing the language. Also, despite the common roots of the Abrahamic religions, there is quite a significant movement from that origin in moral structure.

Yes there are some basic morals which might be said to be universal languages.

5. Actually the more i think about it the more I'm convinced the core fuel of morals are the concepts behind survival at a social level. Which also explains why individual survival can be quite immoral at times. Yes this covers lots of areas. Maybe a universal language is survival. Certainly something that war talks.

6. I don't really understand where you are going now. We go from moral benchmark of theft to tipping points. I agree with both but how does it relate? and how does it flow into terrorism it's like you missed a chapter or something.

The part of the community that needs to be effected is simple I thought. The communities which are a source of and sustainance for terrorists.

On the very last sentence I am very wary of ideas of an absolute. Stopping every last possibility is an absolute. It's my experience as well total eradication is one of the hardest goals to achieve and usually destined for failure and/or waste.

by Argent on April 28, 2008 3:08 AM

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Kat, there's some problems here, me thinks.

The similarities thing. There've been some very smart(and often very arrogant, like Meade) people who've gone looking for these commonalities for at least 150 years. What they've been able to come up is: shelter, food, warmth, sex. That's it. When you get down to it, and rigorously look at this stuff, that is it. You can find 'primitive' socities(deep Africa, deep Amazon) where theft isn't about to tear the society apart: it's El Heffe's due as biggest and strongest. In a sense, what Heffe can steal and give to his harem, right hand man, etc, is what keeps it together, what keeps it functioning. Theft is necessary and a glue. Hence, why whenever anyone really gets down to it, there are only a few true commonalities between societies. These are defined as needs: the need for shelter, the need for food, the need for warmth, the need for procreation/other sexual drive. That's it. If you're looking for some unitary idea to describe it all, as a universal 'cause' for events, you're not likely to find it. We can't even do it for very simple systems like hydrogen molecules(either qualitatively or quantitavely) and now you're going to come up with a universal theory of human behavio(u)r? I applaud the boldness, but damn, gina.

There are some things that can and cannot be described by mathematical models. What can(select examples)? Movement. Reasons for having many offspring in certain conditions(like pre-industrialized societies). What it can't: why people believe in a religion, that there is no god(s)(set theory says you cannot make this claim, you don't know every element in the set(the universe)).

YOu can and cannot describe things with economics. Depends on what you're talking about. Be warned: people have gone before you in trying to do this(Kennedy with The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, and he turned out to be very wrong on many things because he only looked at economics).

I'm with Argent/Trias: universal ideas/absolutes are tricky things. They aren't as easy as a lot of people think. Look at the mess we wind up with schisms within the class of people who adopted Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". Even with such as that there's no way you can predict their behavio(u)r despite a very rigid belief system. dangerous ground Kat. Some things in life don't have a single cause, and forcing a system you're studying into such an arrangment can be very wrong. It works in labs because we *can* force things in such a way as only one variable can actually vary. But when you get out there on the cutting edge, sometimes you can't. Reduction is a tool of scientific method, but over reduction is an abuse.

Math's okay, but it does have limits(as does purely qualitative methods). Trying to find the exact tipping point in a human system, before rather than after the fact, is likley to drive you insane(and we don't want that because we like you).

Now, for some sleep.(snore)

by ry on April 28, 2008 4:17 AM

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Speaking of education and science I have an OT question:

I recall that SWWBO has a lot of experience in the IT field with considerable expertise with systems interface, networking and Microsoft products and so on (I know she doesn’t like Vista and MS Office 2007 – and I will not be using them).

It would be a shame to let that kind of experience lay fallow. Maybe she can give me some tech pointers on a VPN problem that I have been struggling with (or point me in the right direction).

I am working on a VPN test set-up using W2K3 SP2 Enterprise server(s) and XP Pro SP2 clients. I have gotten the PPTP VPN setup working but I am having difficulty with L2TP/IPSec VPN setup.

I know that Argghhh! is probably not the place to discuss such topics. If SWWBO is interested in aiding me may be we could take the discussion over to her site.

I would deeply appreciate any tech help from SWWBO (or a good web site that can help).

by Ledger on April 28, 2008 7:38 AM

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What seems to matter is the individuals connection to the ideal and the availability of the groups. If economics is a connection yes I get you but I think there are loads more ways to connect than that

Um...I think you missed the part where I said I rejected economics as a common denominator because it is Marxist reductionism and did not reflect human experiences (or reflect emotions, etc, etc, etc). In fact, if it wasn't clear, that was the entire point of that long section: to reject any number, economics, etc as the impetuous to terrorism.

Looking at Abrahamic is really localizing the language. Also, despite the common roots of the Abrahamic religions, there is quite a significant movement from that origin in moral structure.

I admit, I chose to answer your question re: religion by noting the three Abrahamic religions because they stem from the same base and, together, constitute the largest block of religion across the world population. Thus, making their shared values the easiest or simplest to work with in making comparisons. I do believe that other religions do share other similar morals and values and did not exclude them for any other reason than the short cut to my point.

6. I don't really understand where you are going now. We go from moral benchmark of theft to tipping points. I agree with both but how does it relate? and how does it flow into terrorism it's like you missed a chapter or something.

Well, this post was an answer, not a part of the entire theory I was generating, though it should be incorporated. Still, that's why it jumped around. Last week you asked about religion and morality and Ry was dinging me on the math comment.

by kat-missouri on April 28, 2008 9:28 AM

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These are defined as needs: the need for shelter, the need for food, the need for warmth, the need for procreation/other sexual drive. That's it. If you're looking for some unitary idea to describe it all, as a universal 'cause' for events, you're not likely to find it.

First, just because I'm writing on developing a strat comm theory for global comms in a GWOT, it doesn't mean I am trying to find any definitive answer to anthropological questions that have teased scientist minds for centuries. The point is to find the most common way to associate over the largest part of the world's population using some sort of shared concept in community building: ie, building the global community that rejects terrorism.

In the communities that are most likely to produce global terrorists, we have some shared values, stemming from our shared base of religion, our origins in the ME and other causes.

It does not have to be perfect, it just has to be enough. Which leads me to your other comment:

Math's okay, but it does have limits(as does purely qualitative methods). Trying to find the exact tipping point in a human system, before rather than after the fact, is likley to drive you insane(and we don't want that because we like you).

You all remember what you wrote last week? I was the person rejecting math as a "language" in this case.

Still, I'll note, if you've never read Gladwell's "tipping points", you should because, as I never elude to an exact number that create's this tipping point, neither does he. I don't think it can be found, actually.

A tipping point can be created when you add 1+1. That second individual can act as a catalyst. At the same time, You could add three or four people and the tipping point won't be reached because there is no consensus. Everyone pulls in a different direction and no one has more influence than another. That movement would likely die out quickly.

Gladwell's tipping points didn't focus on the number but on group dynamics including three types of personalities that are required to create a trend or "tipping point".

It was in "origins of terrorims" that Crenshaw noted how the addition of members (numbers) might move a group to act when they hadn't previously. She didn't give an exact quantity. I agree with you to try to do so would be foolish because human emotion is tied to and part of the entire scheme.

In short,I agree with you. Next question.

by kat-missouri on April 28, 2008 9:46 AM

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Yes, I 'member what I wrote. I said math can describe human(or other) behavior. It can. YOu can easiy model *some* behaviors quite well mathematically. Predator prey interactions lend quite well. But everything? No. Rejecting it as insufficient is a bad move. IT's the problem of accepting a model as the thing itself. That occurs whether you try to understand a system based on the mores alone or by economics(or other math based models) alone.

You can quite easily say that the Incas(or someone else, my S. American history be spotty) moved northward because the land became less robust, AND predict exactly where they went based on other numbers based things(like rainfall, land fertility, etc), and therefor predict where people will strike archealogical gold. It works. It describes a system very, very well. As potable water becomes a problem you can predict with high certainty where people will go(places with higher water stores). All numbers. No morality. No nothing but cold, hard, unfeeling numbers.

I have not contradicted anything. You can't dismiss math based models because they work. You can't rely on qualitative models because at the exclusion of mathematical ones becase: a) they often fail for relying on acceptance of some axiom, which may or may not be true; b) you wind up, again, mistaking the model for the thing itself. Molecular Orbital theory is a model with which we try to understand bonding between atoms. It isn't the bonds themselves.

What I'm saying is that you're producing your own MO theory and saying it *is* the thing you're modeling. Ixnay. Bad. Wrong.

Look at your Crenshaw example(am I the only one seeing the room for a Heinlein reference or joke based on the name Crenshaw?). she gives peronality archetypes, but also agrees that there's a numerical component involved. One is not more important than the other. What I'm seeing is you slowly drifting to saying one is more important than the other, one has prominence. Synergy is a dirty word, scientifically speaking, but you're hinting that you're going to dis the concept, and thereby mistake a model for the thing itself. Ixnay.

(Hee hee, now Kat's the one getting grilled and graded. ;) I'd be experiencing some Scheadenfreud right now if I didn't know I'd be getting the exact same treatment in a few weeks or days. Sucks being under the microscope, huh? Having things you didn't really consider relevant("look, I want to go over here, why are you guys mucking around over there?") used to point out what others percieve as weaknesses in your line of thought kinda blows, huh? I feelin' 'ya, sister.)

by ry on April 28, 2008 2:30 PM

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So...the real issue here is that I said anything about "numbers" at all when I should have stuck to relationships and spoke about "numbers" in a separate section where, indeed, my focus is on developing some kind of concept for the "tipping point" or left it out totally because it is too abstract and too many variables to define something that is largely about using marketing tools without identifying the market size because the market and its size depends on where you turn the big batman laser beam of the "message". that could be anything from 50 bedouins in the desert to 1 billion chinese. Thus, numbers only make since when you specify the community.

So...if I just went back and re-wrote that to throw out the discussion of "numbers", yet pointed out that economics are a bad way to determine the probability of terrorism because it is a cross spectrum causality and much more related to human psyche, would you get off my @$$?

Or is it forever out there and your robot mind won't let go? LOL

by kat-missouri on April 28, 2008 3:30 PM

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Well finally. You said the real goal in answering Ry. The universal languages was just a red herring. What you really mean are terrorists that are a problem for the US. Now we're getting more specific.

We can attempt to answer this one in a few ways. Starting with a question. How do US citizens associate with a shared concept in community building? Once you answer this... Do you believe there is no potential for terrorism born in the USA?

I'm with you Kat on the tipping point. There could be an average tipping point for a particular subset but each group's dynamics will mean a different number for each er.. cell.

My God Ry I felt like a scowling schoolmarm with a red marker looking at your last post.

Ok you have a point on the MO theory. I was more afraid Kat was drifting into the fit the data to the theory zone.

You won't escape Kat. For one thing Ry adores numbers he's prolly a closet Mathematician. And he will byte and subtract until you are devisable by zero. For another you can't actually escape the numbers because they are there and a very useful tool. Even in marketing. You still have to specify that community before you act.

by Argent on April 29, 2008 7:27 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Math has long been considered the "universal language" that people believe can transcend even the most distant spaces, even across space itself. However, math is cold and unfeeling. It cannot describe or rule real human relations, fraught with emotions and experiences. Our humanity, those things that make us human and govern how we treat other humans, can effect our relations. Those relations are governed by set behaviors or "rules" that can bind us together or set us apart from society. Those rules are most often referred to as "morals".

Since the dawning of the age of man, as he has expanded his physical horizons and, through purpose or providence, sought interaction with other men, certain behaviors or "rules of interaction", have governed his relationships. From the very beginning, consequences were evident if these rules were not followed.

These rules were not codified in law at their origination but were explicitly understood within and between communities. Their purpose was to insure the safety and survival of the community. A caveman who ventured into another's cave and stole his cache of berries and grains or meat from his fire, was sure to suffer retribution if he was caught since he was endangering the survival of that caveman, his family and possibly the entire clan or tribe.

Various other social or moral faux pas, such as killing a member of the tribe or stealing someone's mate, could have equally dire consequences including expulsion from the tribe, being ostracized within the tribe or simply killed. Even expulsion or being ostracized was highly dangerous since a man without the protection of his tribe or clan was very vulnerable to the environment and other humans.

Over time, these rules or morals were developed and expanded to provide for the co-existence of many communities living together within a set geographical area. In order to insure the widest dissemination and continuity of these rules, societies began to incorporate them into stories or "morality tales". These begin as secular examples passed through oral tradition, but, eventually, are expanded into every social construct including religious ideas and practices.

Among the three major religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, several stories are shared explaining the first very basic rules of social interaction. These include the story of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden who suffer the consequences of their decisions and are expelled for several violations. The first of these violations is the act of not following the first rule: to follow the rules. The second is the act of doing the forbidden by eating from "the tree of life". And, so on. Each immoral act leading to the other.

A second story is the story of Cain and Abel. Cain violates several social rules. His first immoral act is to covet the goods, prosperity and favor of his brother Abel. This leads to his second immoral act: killing his brother. His consequences are the most severe a community of that time could hand down without inflicting direct and actual death: he is "branded" on the forehead with the mark of a criminal and expelled from his tribe to another land, left to survive or die on his own.

These themes are shared throughout the religious philosophies and texts of these three religions. All of which were born in "the cradle of civilization", Mesopotamia, in the Middle East. Even these stories are not completely original to these religions as archeology has shown even more ancient societies and religions to have shared similar stories and morals. Some verbally passed down and others actually written in ancient languages.

One such story is the story of the "Great Flood" that, in ancient semitic cultures and religions, was visited upon man as retribution for some sin or trespass against God or the gods. This story is found in ancient Sumeria in Mesopotamia, before the advent of the three major religions. And, in civilizations across the Eur-Asian continent, to the Indian continent, East Asia, across the oceans and seas to small island civilizations and even further to other continents. Archaeological discoveries of ancient civilizations in South America and Mexico show hieroglyphic writings on temples discussing this very event and its reasons: retribution and morality.

These written concepts of morality appear in codified law of ancient societies. The most famous is the Hammoraibi code. They are also ritualized and codified again in religious texts. Judaism and Christianity share the common codification of basic human interactions as the "Ten Commandments". Among these basic and shared laws are "thou shalt not steal", "thou shalt not murder" (or kill depending on language you read), "though shalt not covet thy neighbors goods" and many more.

While these rules of behavior are set in religious texts, they represent the most basic understanding of how man lives in and interacts within a larger community. These are reflected throughout history, reflected in common (unwritten law) and codified secular law of many nations.

Thus, what we share, even among the most remote and ancient societies, is the common bonds that have held men together, provided a common bridge for socializing, trading, communicating, making war and peace, is our common understanding of basic human nature and the rules that govern our relations. Morals.

A universal language, spoken across nations, cultures, languages and time.

[next section: modern philosophies of moral equivalence and multi-culturalism meant to create acceptance and understanding, instead create an unexpected obstacle to discovering, sharing and acting on shared morality - an effective tool in an a war of ideas]

� Secure this line!

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Math has long been considered the "universal language" that people believe can transcend even the most distant spaces, even across space itself. However, math is cold and unfeeling. It cannot describe or rule real human relations, fraught with emotions and experiences.

I don't know, haven't you ever seen the movie Pi. That flick was pretty crazy.

by LT Nixon on April 24, 2008 4:42 AM

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LOL..dude, leave it to you. I'm trying to have a serious conversation and you are talking about pie. ;)

by kat-missouri on April 24, 2008 8:11 AM

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I'm kinda with the good LT. Math's actually very important in defining moral codes, no bs, imo. Very useful. Symbol logic also really useful in groking.

Still, I think the section the good LT quoted is a little off. Malthus did a decent job of describing human relations and behavior below a certain level of economic standing. The rule of 2 is actually pretty well understood to describe human interactions in pre-modern societies.
I think i know where you're trying to go, Kat. Pope Benny 16 has been pushing a similar idea since his elevation to Pope. CS Lewis talked about this 'numinous' thing at times too.

I just don't buy the dissing of math on the grounds that it can't describe human behavior, when I've seen it do that quite well in various disciplines(city planning, etc.).

(NEver mind, just the Jesuit in me begging to be let out.)

by ry on April 24, 2008 2:06 PM

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Well, one of my favorite TV programs is called "numbers" where the guy uses equations to figure out the odds, possibilities and trajectories of something happening. Of course, he allegedly writes a book that creates human interaction and relationships through mathematics.

I would like to see more on that theory. however, yes, ry is the point that I wasn't necessarily trying to "dis" math as I was trying to show one of the most common aspects of human relationships that bind even the most distant societies together. That we have created these things either through association or through our animus, even when isolated from other societies. We simply and often come to the same conclusion about how best to order society, though sometimes we would consider the consequences that other societies place on those same moral issues a question, we can find common ground.

thus, a common "language" if you will.

In fact, you know I am going to extrapolate into the theory that marxist reductionism of human relations to numbers or, more specifically, economics, is not only unfulfilling on a human level but also damages our ability to communicate our ideas and create better relationsips.

In fact, create a better message that is more resonant at the community and individual level. For reasons which I will explain. I don't want to give away my whole theory in comments. ;)

by kat-missouri on April 24, 2008 2:58 PM

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I think math is indeed on of the languages universal. But as kat suggests it's not well intellectually integrated with our daily lives even if it is there, just hidden.

Morals as a universal language doesn't work. The Christian subset of morals is one thing but there are other subsets, each religion, each culture. We're talking largely incompatible dialects. What you are talking about is really more like humanism which I think would not be your intention at all.

After all in the Christian sense gays are immoral but this is not always a moral set for other groups. Immoral too to eat the pig for some of them. The list goes on and on of immorality for some but not others. ie not universal.

There are other universal languages. One of them IMO is emotion. This one is integrated with each language, English, Japanese, body language even sign language. Maybe this will not ascend human beings and so be useless off planet but who knows.

by Argent on April 24, 2008 11:35 PM

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I am going to answer you in post Argent, et al because I think this is a great place to start a great conversation about how and why we shape any "message" or it has any effect on anyone outside of our own cultural or geographic boundaries.

by kat-missouri on April 25, 2008 12:13 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

I also had the chance to ask LTC Mills about how things have been going in 3ID's AO, which stretches from Iraq's western to eastern borders in a band from southern Baghdad Province to south of Najaf. He reports they didn't experience any of the unrest that was sparked in Baghdad proper by the Iraqi offensive in Basra, and the rates of attack against coalition and Iraqi forces remain very low. However, several of the Iraqi units they train/mentor or assist were sent to Basra and were on their way back the day I spoke to LTC Mills. He seemed to be looking forward to hearing their reports.

In general, LTC Mills was very upbeat and optimistic about 3ID's AO. “We believe we are clearly at a point where security is good in our AO, to the point now that we really focus on capacity-building.” He credits much of the success to counter-insurgency tactics such as Coalition forces living among the Iraqis, and development of the Sons of Iraq (citizen security groups). Conditions are now such that the Iraqi people "realize there is more to life than being scared everyday about unrest and the security environment.” Priorities have been economic development, reconciliation--linking small towns with higher government--and a focus on improving the lives of women through job-training and development of social or advocacy organizations.

LTC Mills seems to believe that the section of Iraq under 3ID's responsibility has hit a tipping point, though he didn't use that phrase. As security improves, “markets pop up everywhere, providing local economy stimulation and security, which creates a Circle of Life in some ways.” Coalition forces are “no longer worrying about the crisis of the day. The Iraqi government and military are stronger each day, exercise their power more each day.” As things get better and better, LTC Mills reports they become self-reinforcing. “Once you get to a certain point there is no going back. Each day government, economy and military get stronger and it’s harder for the terrorists to come back.”

Considering how much the Canadian populace seems opposed to the Iraq war, I asked LTC Mills if he felt that his fellow Canadian soldiers at home understood or shared the perspective he'd developed from being a part of the mission in Iraq. “When I talk to my peers in Canada, I have never got the feeling that what I am doing is not right or proper or appreciated or respected,” he reported. “It’s all part of the global stability and I’m doing my part.” He's a firm believer in finishing the job in Iraq. “You can debate whether or not we should’ve come here in the first place, but we’re long past that... You can’t cut and run. I look to today and the job that we have today.”

He's also adamant about the growth he's seeing in Iraqi capabilities. “I’m here on the ground, so I see the change day-to-day, he reports. I see a government that is standing up.”

Because of his optimism and the upward trajectory of conditions in the AO, LTC Mills almost sounded disappointed when he spoke of GEN Petreaus' Tuesday testimony on Capitol Hill. “I get his comments about ‘guarded optimism,’” he said. And he agreed with GEN Petraeus' message of “let’s not rush,” but LTC Mills is obviously very optimistic and excited about the future. He acknowledged that improvements are uneven across Iraq, “[But] in our area, there has been a lot of progress... it has been quite substantial.”

I suspect it would not surprise many readers that one of the bigger challenges 3ID is facing right now has to do with the homefront. As Deputy Chief of Staff, LTC Mills doesn't usually interact directly with VIPs who visit from the U.S., but he hears about the visits and has definite opinions about them. “We respect [visitors who are informed and] can speak about the before and after... who tend not to come in with an agenda. Not all are like that, sadly.”

So for the last week, LTC Mills has been working on something aimed at VIP visitors who have an agenda based on inadequate information, or who lack the contextual understanding of what is happening in 3ID's AO. They are literally putting together a presentation of “before and after” pictures and info to educate VIPs who think that because it doesn't look like America, it's a disaster. “There is a continuing trajectory of positive developments, LTC Mills explained. "However, we get some people coming out here and they look and go, ‘eww, this is progress?!’”

LTC Mills reports he has been warmly received by the American soldiers he works with (not treated as an outsider or token), and that having spent a number of years in the U.S. with his family, the thought of going back to Canada permanently this summer brings mixed emotions. The exchange program has provided him with a “sense of pride and belonging and understanding of the American people.” The more time he spends, “the more I enjoy it.. and the more I understand it.” Like what he has learned from the U.S. military that he will take home with him, he sees his family taking home a bit of American culture, too: “You can take the best of both worlds. It’s gonna be tough to go home. We’ve made a home in Savannah [home of the 3ID]--and it doesn’t snow there!”

[updated to adjust grammar and punctuation]

� Secure this line!

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Great interview, FbL! By the way, it looks like the next Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (the top officer in the Canadian Forces) is going to be another fellow who has spent some time on exchange with the U.S. Army in Iraq.

Only RUMINT for now, but pretty high-level scuttlebutt.

by Damian on April 11, 2008 10:35 AM

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Thanks, Damian! I'm so glad you liked it.

General Natynczyk sounds impressive. Seems he would be a good friend for America to have in high Canadian places...

by FbL on April 11, 2008 11:18 AM

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Please tell LTC Mills that if he is ever in London i have money and know where to get beer(s).

by matt c on April 11, 2008 4:04 PM

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LGen Natynczyk is not the first senior Cdn. general to serve as deputy CG of III Corps. That honour went to this fellow: http://www.forces.gc.ca/dsa/app_bio/engraph/FSeniorOfficerBiographyView_e.asp?SectChoice=1&mAction=View&mBiographyID=52

So there may well be something to the rumint. Though I would have thought that Leslie was most likely to be the next Army CDS. Given who his grandfather was, that would be interesting...

by Doctor Funk on April 12, 2008 5:42 PM

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Even though his pic seems to have disappeared - Natynczyk's time as DCG, III Corps was noted in this space...

Dr. Funk - long time, no see in comments!

by John of Argghhh! on April 12, 2008 5:53 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

My reply to Mudarris Jughrafiya is that we haven’t killed the innocents, not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, nor in Algeria, nor anywhere else. And if there is any innocent who was killed in the Mujahideen’s operations, then it was either an unintentional error, or out of necessity as in cases of al-Tatarrus [taking of human shields by the enemy]. I explained in detail the ruling concerning al-Tatarrus in the book The Healing of the Believers’ Chests and in the eighth chapter of the book The Exoneration, and the brother Abu Yahya al-Libi has a book called Al-Tatarrus in Contemporary Jihad.

I would like to clarify to the brother questioner that we don’t kill innocents: in fact, we fight those who kill innocents. Those who kill innocents are the Americans, the Jews, the Russians and the French and their agents. Were we insane killers of innocents as the questioner claims, it would be possible for us to kill thousands of them in the crowded markets,

Right about now, you should be choking because that is exactly what these alleged "defenders of the innocent" have done over the last five years. But he justifies this by saying that:

...but we are confronting the enemies of the Muslim Ummah and targeting them, and it may be the case that during this, an innocent might fall unintentionally or unavoidably, and the Mujahideen have warned repeatedly the Muslims in general that they are in a war with the senior criminals – the Americans and Jews and their allies and agents – and that they must keep away from the places where these enemies gather.

As a reminder, no American or Jew or any other "crusader", man, woman or child is an "innocent" because we all take part in this horrendous thing called "democracy". Surprisingly, al Qaida gets that our government acts on behalf of our nation which is a representative government, so we are all responsible for the alleged war against the Muslims. As opposed to those who want to claim that the presence or lack of certain political parties in the white house or voting means they are not responsible;

AQ doesn't buy that and no amount of appeals to that idea will save you from attack. Refreshing your memory: 9/11, 3/11 Spain, 7/7 London and various other attacks. They also believe that we are not "innocent" because we choose to live in a democracy where man made laws are held above and separate from the laws of God (actually, Allah and Sharia, but why get technical). So all those atheist, anti-war folks that thinks some more "separation of church and state" will somehow end our status as "crusaders" should think again. Or, keep hiding their heads in the sand,

Finally, if you haven't been around or listened to any AQ propaganda such as Zawahiri or Bin Laden (or any other extremists), our children are equally not "innocent", regardless of their age or religion because, as noted above, they aren't the right religion, they live under man made laws and, finally, the same excuse that is given to killing Jewish children with Iranian made rockets launched from Gaza, our children will one day grow up to be, well, American "crusaders and Jews". Thus, our children are just little murderers who have to be killed before they can grow up and murder some poor, innocent Wahabi, terrorist.

People, that is not polemics. That is directly paraphrasing the great Zawahiri: justifier of everything atrocious and horrendous in humanity.

Also, apparently, we hang out at the Baghdad pet market at least three times a year along with the Baghdad book market among the various places that are allegedly full of the "enemy", making the attacks legitimate and the deaths of these Muslims "martyrs for Allah". They may indeed be "martyrs", but Al Qaida is hardly the defenders of innocents or the protectors of the Ummah.

The Crusader-Jewish propaganda claims that the Mujahideen kill the innocent, but the Muslim Ummah knows who its enemy is and who defends it.

Which is why support for Al Qaida is down across the ME and the Sunnis in al Anbar want to kill them if they see them. Check out what JD at Outside the Wire was told by the local Iraqis.

While reading Zawhiri's rationalizations I was reminded of what I heard over and over again while filming Iraqi Tribesmen who joined the Anbar Awakening .

All al Qaida offers is death and violence.

JD also noted that Zawahiri has to claim that the Americans are there and taking the Muslims hostage because he has no other defense.

“It is not hidden from you that the enemy intentionally takes up positions in the midst of the Muslims, for them to be human shields for him. And here I emphasize to my brothers the Mujahideen to beware of expanding the issue of al-Tatarrus, and to make sure that their operations targeting the enemies are regulated by the regulations of the Shari’ah and as far as possible from the Muslims.

Two really interesting concepts. Apparently, because we pursue these nasty, murderous S.O.B.s into the population that they hide in, when they decide to attack us from behind these civilians, we are taking the civilians as "human shields". Of course, I do not see Zawahiri condemning any mujihadeen for grabbing up children and old ladies, holding them in front of them or holding them hostage in the houses they are in, hoping to avoid attack. Who is the cowardly criminal in Allah's eyes?

Then Zawahiri vaguely recognizes the possibility that, yes, indeed, the "mujihadeen" might have expanded the definition of "human shields" (al Tattarus) too far. Say, like, every civilian within a 10,000 mile radius of "the Americans and Jews"? He admonishes them to attack us as far away from the Muslims as possible (is this a hidden message for future operations?).

His other justification is that any Muslims living peacefully within or cooperating with the "occupation" are no longer Muslims, but traitors and worthy of death (among the other apparent 900 million Muslims that don't agree with them).

There is a lot more of that at the Jawa Report.

I recall a recent discussion that Al Qaida's movement isn't just about its fight with the US nor even simply with the "apostate rulers" of Muslim nations, but a real argument between the multiple schools of Islamic thought. There are four in Sunni Islam and twelve in Shia Islam. Largely, al Qaida's fight is with the Sunni school's of thought because they already consider Shias heretics and apostates.

Al Qaida wants their sect or rules to be the single, over arching interpretation of Shariah, including the laws under which all Islamic states and people are ruled. They figure that they have a good chance of doing this if they separate the West (the far enemy) from the Middle East and Islamic nations and leaders (the near enemy).

Al Qaida itself continues to suffer an internal struggle over multiple aspects of their own war including whether they should fight the "far enemy" or the "near enemy" first. Zawahiri is in favor of the "far enemy" in so far as he perceives the Egyptian government only standing because of our continued support. Yet, wherever al Qaida goes and attempts to set up shop, integrating the local problems and complaints of the people into their over all mission to take over the Islamic world, they are exorbitantly drawn into the fight with the "near enemy" as in Pakistan, the struggle in Lebanon, attacks in Saudi Arabia.

Another argument that they have between themselves is what the strategic targets should be and in what order. Zawahiri, being from Egypt and a member of the Al Qaida co-opted "Islamic Jihad in Egypt", has continuously advocated for the take down of the Egyptian government and setting up the first "Islamic State" in Egypt. He stated that in his "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", "Bitter Harvest", multiple other tracks and speeches and does so even in this statement at the end:

First: yes, I undertook reviews which I mentioned in the first printing of Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) as well as in the second printing, which I ask Allah to help me to release soon, but my reviews were not in the context of the investigation department’s reviews, but were in the context of developing and activating the Jihadi work in Egypt and all over the Muslim Ummah.

Second: yes, I continue to hold to my stance towards the Brothers, although I went back on some of the terms I used about them in the second printing of The Bitter Harvest. And the strongest force opposing the regime in Egypt is the Islamic movement in general and the Jihad movement in particular upon which the regime imposes the severest types of constriction and repression, while it allows others expansive freedoms because they don’t represent the biggest threat to it, and moreover, it uses them to give vent to popular Islamic pressure.

The "brothers" that he is referring to is the Muslim Brotherhood which he believes turned traitors to the cause by accepting a truce with the Egyptian government and joining in the political process. He did relent somewhat, but that is largely tactical because the Brotherhood is the biggest Islamic movement in Egypt and they have connections everywhere. They would know if Al Qaida came and started setting up shop. If Zawahiri continued to be harsh on them, they would consider him and al Qaida a threat, probably moving to interdict them and turn them into the Egyptian government. Which brings us to his attempt to mollify the brothers and those that follow them that likely asked the question:

Third: the issue of bequeathal in Egypt is under way by American decree, and the alternative is the setting up of the Islamic state. What is important isn’t to ask about stopping the bequeathal or not stopping it, but rather, is to liberate the countries from the America

Well, now it doesn't matter who or why, only that Egypt is "liberated". At least, until Al Qaida can claim responsibility, set up shop and take over the effort. See the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq and AQ's take over of that movement before subsequently being ejected.

There is much more, that's just a taste.

I might have to start agreeing with the Jawa that Adnan Gadahn is dead. Lately, all of the video releases have been extremely poor and rarely translated with subtitles while this is not even a video, but an audio recording. Zawahiri says that his security detail refuses anything else and kept him from responding more quickly. Probably because he was running around Pakistan trying to get away from the intel and tracking equipment that has helped take down so many of their leaders with pinpoint precision over the last year.

The only other complaint I have about this is how it will be reported. Frankly, Zawahiri gets a good deal from the media because he can simply release statements and never have to answer questions about them directly. Rumsfield would never have been afforded the same protections. Neither is Petraeus. Does make you go, "hmmmm."

� Secure this line!

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If you're Wahabi, you're innocent -- by Wahabi definition.

If you're *not* Wahabi, you're *not* innocent -- by Wahabi definition.

Soooo, since the Wahabi only kill those of us in the remaining 99.9999999999999+% of the world who are *not* Wahabi, the Wahabi *don't* kill innocents -- by Wahabi definition.

If you hijack the definition, you control the argume-- oooooh, then it follows that the Wahabi aren't religious ultra-*conservatives*, they're actually religious ultra-*progressives*...

by BillT on April 4, 2008 7:11 AM

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Heh. yeah bill. that about sums it up. Of course, the wahabi sometimes don't even want to claim these a** holes.

by kat-missouri on April 4, 2008 8:01 AM

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Oooooh, luvvitt -- kat's trademark Twist of the Barbed Skewer...

by BillT on April 4, 2008 8:51 AM

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Great stuff, Kat. Thanks for taking the time share it!

by FbL on April 4, 2008 8:53 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

The first segment, Danger Close showed a combat out post (COP) under attack. This segment was the heart stopping "battle" against suicide bombers and multiple elements of Al Qaida trying to over run the COP and take out a small patrol outside of the base.

JD asks one soldier there, "What do you tell your wife about being over here?" The response was interesting. I couldn't tell if he believed she didn't know, based on the media coverage, or, if he just did not want to think about what she might know because his life there was separate. In another section, as they were under attack, some soldiers are trading quips, alternately relishing the fight and deriding the fact that they are there when they could be at home with their wives. It's the real dichotomy of war. You are left somewhat wondering which they favor most at that moment: being in the fight or being at home?

What was really interesting was the difference in how the battle was reported by the media and what JD recorded while he was there and then documented from information and interviews. The press played the event as a near defeat for the Americans. An attempt to over run the base a la Khe Sahn. The advantage was to the insurgents. In the film and the later information, you realize that there was an element, a moment when the follow on second suicide bomber could have taken out most of the base. Except, he couldn't because the defenders took him out immediately as he sped up. After that and a few more tense moments of fire fighting, the "bad guys" faded away. The day went to the Americans. The media gave it to the insurgents and painted the men as "sitting ducks" when they were bristling with arms and defenses though taking an aggressive, offensive approach to patrolling and controlling the area.

The second and third segments of this film are just as good, if not better, though focused on the Anbar Awakening and the Baghdad Surge.

The Awakening was great because it gave you a first hand account of what exactly caused Al Anbar to turn from the Iraqis who were there, who formed the CLC (concerned local citizens) and who had an extremely malovent view of Al Qaida. In context, a local shiehk had basically been trying to stay outside of the conflict. He did not support the American occupation, but he did not want the "insurgents" to bring attention to his town. He had also heard that Al Qaida had been taking over towns, destroying property and killing people. So he had decided to keep them out. Al Qaida was not happy about that and sent an envoy to speak with the Shiehk. When the shiehk still refused, Al Qaida sent back a message saying they were going to destroy the entire village, behead the local police, kill their families, kill the shiehk and his family, too.

That is when the shiehk came to the Americans. They might have feared our military and political power, but they never feared us as a people.

Again, this is a first hand account from the shiehk who was speaking through an interpreter. Other Iraqis in the area also told their part of the story that confirmed the events and other events surrounding that which turned the local population. Al Qaida had made a new enemy.

The Baghdad Surge is a first hand look at "counter-insurgency" on the ground, in the soldiers' boots. It shows how a US commanding officer spends his day trying to tamp down the flames of sectarianism, get services to a local area, get the locals to work together, stomp out insurgents, protect the population, teach basic governance and basic "rule of law" and, in general, make Iraq work. JD followed this commander around to the different situations that occured. This final segment was the best for me. It really made the concept of "counter-insurgency" (COIN) come alive for me. As military history and the various theories at work here are a serious interest, this segment pulled it all together.

At one point, the commander is hearing a complaint from the head of a sunni neighborhood in West Rashid (bad side of town in Baghdad). Iraqi police had shot up the houses of the people. When the commander catches up with the IP, they are trying to clean up the blood from the bed of their vehicles because someone in that neighborhood threw a grenade into the truck, killing or wounding several police officers. That attack came because the Jaish al Mahdi had mortared the Sunni neighborhood the day before. The people think that the police are complicit (some might be).

The US commander tries to reason with the IP who are very angry about the attack, telling them that he was sorry for their loss, but trying to remind them that not everyone in that neighborhood is "Al Qaida" just like not everyone in the IP is Jaish al Mahdi (JAM). Later, a man in the neighborhood is found shot to death by a 9mm. The US commander said they were going to use forensics to track down the weapons' system it belonged to and go from there.

This is, as JD says several times, a blood vendetta and it is very strong in Iraq.

That is just one event. During another, the commander uses the Iraqi's fear of American satellites to convince some men that he already knows something that he doesn't in order to get them to cooperate. He calls a meeting and expresses his concerns that the city councils from the north and south cannot make an accomodation for moving food and other goods. Then he says he knows that some people have been interfering and possibly hi-jacking the goods. Suddenly, it is all about cooperation.

This entire segment is much longer and shows a very wide array of situations confronting commanders in Iraq as they attempt to put together a nation. I highly recommend this documentary to civilians who want to know what our soldiers are doing and what the war is all about, military theoriticians who want to see COIN in action and any officer, NCO or soldier who might be getting ready for his/her first deployment to Iraq or under the new "surge/COIN" doctrine.

Over all, I thought Outside the Wire was one of the best films I've seen about Iraq to date. It puts you there and goes well past the "black and white" of "sectarian violence" or "suicide bombings" or the daily attacks.

You can buy the DVD on line at Outside the Wire: buy the movie

As a side note, if for no other reason, you should buy this video to make sure that it beats the sales of the rest of the extremely poor, angst ridden and insulting films about Iraq and that JD makes exactly what he wants from it: the cost, so he can return to tell the stories of our men and women in uniform.

� Secure this line!

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Perhaps if the WaPo spent less time sympathizing with militia thugs and more time fact checking they wouldn't make such egregious journalistic errors.

by LT Nixon on April 3, 2008 1:41 AM

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I'd agree. They did ask the military about it and a Major there told them that it never happened, his forces did not attack the bus. Most importantly because they would not have used a "rocket" (RPG?) to do it (as Toby Nunn points out). I think this needs to get more play from folks because this goes on and on since the media wants to take everything the military says with a giant grain of salt (but the militias apparently, not so much) and they don't have the budget or desire to have someone with military experience fact check or add information.

Most of the time I think the media just cuts and pastes various press releases from any group to get a story out.

by kat-missouri on April 3, 2008 11:25 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

So, I was standing outside the auditorium waiting for the event to start when the woman with the man setting up the book seller's table approached me. I was wearing a business suit since I arrived from work near by. She asked me if I could arrange another table for Bellavia to sit at and sign books. I told her that I could not, but knew who she should talk to; the event manager was standing in the hall.

After directing her to the right person, I went back and continued to wait. The book seller noted that I was holding Bellavia's book and he asked if I had read it. After a few shared comments on the book, which told me he had not actually read it, he said, "These young men go to war, go through so much, and come back terribly wounded physically and mentally."

Well, what was there to say to that? "Yes," I replied, "sometimes they do." I was thinking about the young men who I had met who had, indeed, come back from war, wounded physically and mentally. I thought how different, though, my perspective was from his. I was willing to bet that he had never actually met or spoke to, for any length of time, a young man returning from war. He felt pity. I felt respect.

The young men I had met, even those whose lives had changed profoundly, were, for the most part, filled with determination. If they had moments of self-pity, it did not define them or their service. They would rather be spit on than to be offered pity. Pity only re-enforced their "otherness". These men struggle to bring the three worlds that they live in into alignment. They are injured and/or psychically wounded which places them in that world, a world of uncertainty, when, not long ago, they had been confident and capable. They are torn from the life of service that they had dedicated many years to and the family they had made with the men and women they served with. The third world, our world, they are the furthest from because we do not know what they know. We have never been where they have been. But, they are coming back to our world.

That was not the end of our conversation. The worst I could say about this gentleman was that he was well meaning though disconnected. A conscious and purposeful decision, to distance himself from violence. The world needs men like him to keep it from sliding into the Hobbesian wilderness, but he will never understand that the world needs men like Bellavia, too, to keep back the jungle.

He could not know, a few moments later, I would feel utter revulsion, rejection, for him and his words. He said that he was too young for Viet Nam (I placed him in his very early fifties), but his brothers were old enough. His father was in the military and did not want them to go so he arranged for one son to go into the navy while the other, as he said, was lucky to be stationed state side as an adjutant in the army. As if it was something to feel pride in or relief. I felt a hot rush of something go to my face. It was anger, but more akin to contempt for something vile. How could he know?

I looked away for a moment. I wondered what I had said or done that made this man believe I was like him. "My uncle served a tour, '70-'71. He enlisted so my dad would have his draft number pushed back. My mom was pregnant with me. He died two years ago from diseases related to exposure to agent orange." I ground my teeth together to say nothing else. Later, I thought how his story of his brothers avoiding combat somehow dishonored that service.

"Oh," he looked down at the floor somewhat sheepishly, not knowing what to reply or searching for the words. "Men did many brave things then." I felt sure that he included evading the draft as one of these "brave acts".

I wanted to walk away then, but not seem rude. I looked towards the doors to the auditorium for escape. I felt that my next words would be angry words. I was not there for that. I was there to listen to the veterans, their experiences and what information was available.

Then I went from anger to bemusement. In the pause, he had obviously thought that we still had something in common. That my words were a lament for his service as well as his death. The tears I felt behind my eyes were for neither. They were for the man I missed who taught me to ride a motorcycle and shared my interest in history during long talks over a coke and bologna sandwiches.

Out of the blue, "We have war because people make money off of it." Again, that's true, but to leave it there as the only cause or effect is not really the truth nor any real, mature evaluation of the human experience: the capacity to love or hate or desire something so much that men are willing to kill or die for it.

I was surprised by that even more than his original comment. "We have war because people decide that is the way they will settle their problems. When one side wants war, you either give them what they want or you fight for it." Profiteering is a symptom, not the cause, of war.

Still, he didn't buy that. "Eisenhower warned us about the dangers of the military-industrial complex."

I know, some must be thinking as I did at that moment. Nobody ever says that anymore, do they? Apparently, they do. I know, at this point, he took my stunned, silent bemusement as a prompt to continue his erstwhile, yet friendly, discussion, "If we stopped making weapons, the world would be much more peaceful."

Those were not angry words, only very earnest. As I searched for words that would bring a polite close to the conversation, I realized I was experiencing my first, true moment of no longer being "one of them." We live in two different worlds. I can't say which of us lives in the better world.

The one where I accept that violence is a part of the nature of man, but we hold it back as best as we can; holding it back, occasionally living in peace, while we watch the jungle outside our windows. The other, where peace is possible if we but try harder, work harder, accept that violence is the nature of others, but not necessarily our end condition. He sees soldiers and war as a symptom or victim of our worse nature. I see soldiers as an honorable and necessary occupation, keeping the violence of others away from us, they are the best of us.

It was strange that in the beginning he had expressed pity for our soldiers, then I had been angry for a moment and, now, it was I who felt pity for him. He would never understand that these men and women are us; the best of us, not the least or worst, not a victim.

Finally, I realized I was holding Bellavia's book in my hand. One of the many reasons I was there to hear these men and hear what they had to say was because I disagreed with the notion of soldiers as victims of anything, any "machine", other than our needs as a nation to defend and their need to prove something, to become something else than what they were. Even if they thought it was a good way to get college money or get out of a bad economic situation or develop skills for future work. Even if these things, it showed a particular drive that served them well in serving our nation and did not bring dishonor on them or the idea of national service.

If we did not produce another weapon..."Well, sir, if we didn't do it, someone else would. And, they do."

He was silent for a moment, then agreed, nodding his head, "That's true." Then, silence. He might be thinking now.

"I've read a lot of history." I continued, "As far as I can tell, men have been at war for more centuries than we could write about it. I believe that, if no one made another gun, plane or bomb, men would pick up rocks and sharpen sticks to either get what they want or defend what they had." I'm also sure, somewhere along the way, someone would figure out how to make money supplying the rocks and sharpening the sticks. A symptom, not the cause.

I wonder if anyone ever considered the armorers and fletchers of ancient and medieval warfare "war profiteers"? I wonder if a pacifist bookseller had ever read about the medieval "military-industrial complex" that is often looked back upon as both the height of brutality and the creator of such ideas as honor and chivalry? Or, ever imagined that the "military industrial complex" was present at large and small communities throughout history: Rome, Greece, viking settlements on Iceland, the American Revolution, the Civil War, the entire 19th century long before Eisenhower was even a twinkle in someone's eye?

Right then, a young man came out and announced we would be going to another location in the building for the conference. I thanked the bookseller politely and walked to the conference room where I spent two hours listening and asking questions.

For several days I pondered the irony of meeting a pacifist at a "pro-mission" (ie, support the war) event, hawking a book about war, written by a man who believes that war is necessary. More irony that he had somehow pegged me as a potential fellow pacifist.

Then again, we weren't that far off in what we wanted for the world: peace. We just have different ideas on how we're going to get there.

� Secure this line!

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Then again, we weren't that far off in what we wanted for the world: peace. We just have different ideas on how we're going to get there.

Indeed.

We believe in the concept that "Peace Through Strength" will deter those who wish us harm or will allow us to end the conflict if deterrence fails.

They believe that we can always talk through our problems if only we understood each other better, never grasping that conflict often occurs when we do, in fact, understand the other side's intent to harm us all too well.

by fdcol63 on April 2, 2008 7:14 AM

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sounds to me as if this book seller will be profiting quite well from this war...

mayhap he should stop selling books..

by MajMike on April 2, 2008 7:39 AM

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Maj Mike. hahaha. You know, I didn't even think about it until you wrote that comment. So true. I'm sure he doesn't see himself as part of the "military-industrial complex", but how ironic that he actually was, at least, "profiting".

by kat-missouri on April 2, 2008 7:53 AM

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I'm sure that when this guy, and others like him, say "Military-Industrial Complex", they're specifically talking about large contractors who make weapons systems like Raytheon, General Dynamics, Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Hughes, Sikorsky, etc. etc.

They never think about all the other smaller, often "Mom & Pop" businesses that are subcontracted by these larger corporations: the farmers, textile workers, metalsmiths, mill workers, factory employees, etc etc etc, and the impact they have on the economy as a whole and to our tax base.

by fdcol63 on April 2, 2008 8:53 AM

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don't forget food, construction, etc

by kat-missouri on April 2, 2008 9:07 AM

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And don't forget me. I'm one of those mercenary bastids, too.

by John of Argghhh! on April 2, 2008 10:08 AM

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Yes. My favorite mercenary. ;)

by kat-missouri on April 2, 2008 11:26 AM

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I have a couple of clients who are military contractors. Business has been VERY good these past few years...

by AFSister on April 2, 2008 12:20 PM

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Yes, Kat, the Left is still all about the valiant struggle of the people against the vile "military-industrial complex." They love that term, and "progressive" as they are, they'll never give it up. Never!

I don't really have a big problem with people being pacifists. That's their prerogative, and I think true pacifists are rare. Problem is, too many self-proclaimed pacifists are really just itching for a violent anti-war protest. I think they really don't see themselves for what they are.

by April on April 2, 2008 12:36 PM

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Interesting post.

The uncle and the father should have opened your eyes a little. You saw there some who don't fit 'hero' for you yet were in the military. While more are of the kind you appreciate not all are.

I think disconnection is one of the things that makes it hard for the soldier to return to civilian life and also one of the things spawning these anti war movements. The US seems more connected but here the disconnect is near absolute. It's also mostly driven not by citizens but by the military. The few physical locations (which most don't even know about) are off limits. The official word form the military is rare curt press releases and personal contact is rare because there are few in the military here and they don't talk to civilians. And how many civilians would bother to hear them anyway?

So it's hardly surprising no one has a clue about them. Indeed my father was in the military but I've learnt more about what goes on from this blog than my sum total in Australia. So what do you have then? A bunch of men with guns that are apparently trained to kill people because the government said so. You know of the ones who i identified as having been in the military here my whole life it is a sum total of 4 people and every single one was a dubious character. If i hadn't braved this blog world I've prolly still think as shallowly and negatively as I used to about the soldier, much like many over here do if they think about them at all.

It's not hard to see where the mistrust comes from. Nor is it hard to see why the appreciation isn't there. You can't appreciate things you don't know.

Maybe the disconnect is good. After all we here don't really get very excited when one of our Soldiers die. Sadly it's because few care. But politically it might be a winner hmm?

There is a lot of talk of military partners being family. I can understand the closeness that can result from living together esp under high stress and keeping each other alive would make for strong bonds.

But I don't feel comfortable with the family word. I admit I'm not real keen on mine for reasons one should use one's brains for but to me a family that isn't there when you need them isn't worth very much. And really these wounded how many of them have had this kind of family there for them? And if family left their brother/son etc to a support system like yours? Well not a very nice family if you ask me.

I could be wrong there of course. I sure hope so but it doesn't appear to gel. Perhaps you all help each other and visit etc. I just hear of too many of them adrift to feel comfortable with this 'family' concept.

Your kind of 'pacifists' are better read to mean anti-war not anti-violence. And most aren't even that, they are more reasonably said to be anti establishment. Which means anti-war because the establishment wants the war. Given the right circumstances violence and war will pop right out of them. Of course real pacifists do exist too. personally I think they are closer to apathists. or however you would spell it.

Ok I will shuddup now.

by Trias on April 2, 2008 3:24 PM

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Actually, Trias, I think you did it rather well.

by John of Argghhh! on April 2, 2008 3:31 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

One of the debates that continues to resonate around Iraq is that most people think this is a new phenomenon or is a small fraction of the fighters in Iraq therefore are not leading the fight. Ergo, its an Iraqi civil war and we should get out. Kind of like how people were ignoring the small, but important Chinese and Russian presence in North Viet Nam in favor of the narrative that Viet Nam was a civil war not a grand American fight to stop the spread of the "Red Menace" and a threat to our freedom. Communism was on the march and it took us another twenty years to push it back and defeat it. During that time, millions of people were killed, imprisoned, suffered persecutions, famine, political and economic instability. Those were rough years.

In Iraq, the common theme now to accept is that the Islamist Jihadists like Al Qaida were not in Iraq before we went there and that Saddam's ties to terrorism did not really threaten the United States. Thus, according to this narrative, the Iraq invasion was unnecessary and the inclusion of al Qaida and other terrorists was not the onous or impetuous for the terrible fighting we saw in Fallujah in 2004 or the later "civil war" in 2006 after the Samarra bombing.

What is difficult for most people to understand is that Al Qaida was in Iraq before the invasion, it simply was not organized nor called "Al Qaida in Iraq". In 2003, the Kurds took down Ansar al-Islam (Army of Islam) in the north. This group had been harassing the Kurds for many years. It occupied a "no man's land" between the Kurdish north and Saddam's Iraq. Saddam had no love for this organization, but he was not adverse to using it to his advantage when it suited him; alternately pushing them back with the military and offering them truces that included monetary and material support (ie, weapons) and training. If they would re-focus their efforts on the Kurdish, he left them to their small enclave.

During the lead up to the invasion of Afghanistan and after, Al Qaida and Taliban operatives would travel across Iran to Ansar al Islam's enclave and recruit fighters to return to Afghanistan to fight US forces. It was these connections that led to Zarqawi arriving in Iraq in 2002 to be treated for an injury he received in battle in Afghanistan. It was Ansar al Islam's connections with the regime that allowed Zarqawi to be admitted to and treated at the Ba'ath's premier hospital in Baghdad that routinely treated high ranking or important members of Saddam's Ba'athist regime.

It was probably during his time of recovery in Baghdad that allowed Zarqawi to make critical contacts with Sunni Ba'athists who would create the future insurgency. These contacts included people with money inside Iraq and outside in countries like Syria who financed the insurgency and helped create the "rat lines" through these areas to funnel foreign fighters into the country. Through these contacts he built the network that would later become "Al Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers", still later "Al Qaida in Iraq" and finally, "The Islamic State of Iraq".

In 1998, Bin Laden had sought common cause with Iraq by making the sanctions against Iraq one of the focal points and causes of his global Islamic declaration of war against "crusaders and Jews". In the lead up to the actual invasion of Iraq in 2002 and, specifically, February 2003, Zawahiri and Bin Laden had made crucial statements about the potential attack against Iraq. In 2003, just prior to the invasion, Bin Laden called on foreign fighters to take up the call of "holy war" in Iraq. He stated that there was nothing wrong with assisting the Ba'athists in defending Iraq. The Ba'athist's time was over, according to Bin Laden, so making common cause with them would not injure or destroy the Islamic Jihadist movement.

Many fighters had already been streaming into Iraq. Some joined Saddam's Fedeyeen (faithful or loyalists). Others found small enclaves or groups to hunker down with and try to organize. Some of the first men to later form "Al Qaida in Iraq" were already there, they just hadn't been firmly established or organized into anything resembling "Al Qaida" as most people see it or think about AQI (Al Qaida in Iraq) today.

Tom Parks, CWO (retired) from Veterans for Freedom, was on the march to Baghdad in 2003. He spoke about the three types of armed resistance he met: Saddam's army, Saddam's fedeyeen and "insurgents". Saddam's army and fedeyeen wore some type of uniform. The fedeyeen were organized with black shirts and provided Iraqi ordinance and weapons. Insurgents had no uniforms and used civilians to hide behind. Later, the army and fedeyeen disposed of their uniforms all together. Some to live and run away. Others to become "insurgents".

Among these "insurgents" already existed "foreign fighters" that had come, not for Saddam, but for jihad against America. The Americans encountered Somalis, Libyans, Palestinians and many others along with the Iraqi forces without uniforms on the march to Baghdad. They were no match against American tanks and close air support or the capabilities of a well trained American soldier. Yet, they did not simply fade away or return to their home nations once the United States reached Baghdad.

The Iraqis had their cities and towns, but where did these foreign fighters go? Some simply sought refuge among the people searching for connections to the insurgency to link up with and continue the fight. Others returned to al Anbar and stayed with the rural Arab tribes who believed in offering hospitality, food and shelter, to travelers, but particularly Arab men on their way to holy war. Here, they also found common cause with Sunni who rejected the "occupation" and their fall from power. Still others went to the cities such as Fallujah, Baghdad and Mosul where they had traveled through on their way to the first battles and knew of connections there that could help them with shelter and money to be able to continue the fight.

During that time, Zarqawi and others had also been strengthening their connections, establishing "rat routes" to filter fighters into Iraq, getting funding, weapons and general support. They still had not called themselves Al Qaida. In fact, that was the American word for these groups. They called themselves by various other names that each cadre had created for itself such as the Knights of the Sunna, Suna al Islam and many more. These groups were fairly autonomous, decentralized and capable of planning and carrying out their own attacks. Yet, they were not organized with any more strategic directive than to drive the Americans out of Iraq.

The Ba'athist ex-military had units that were tactically more capable than the newly organized jihadists. These groups had fire teams with discipline and manuevering skills. The jihadists were much better at spectacular and gruesome bombings or full frontal, suicidal attacks on bases meant to overcome with their pure shock factor.

These groups had not yet become fully integrated with each other in the early days. For the most part, they distrusted each other immensely. In 2003 and early 2004, the early signs of the fissure that would lead to Al Qaida's destruction in Anbar appeared on the streets of Baghdad when rival organizations such as the Ba'athist 1920's Brigade and the Suna al Islam would exchange fire as each tried to establish their control of an area. Yet, as each group began to consolidate power in certain areas and under specific leaders, they were able to gain more control of the disparate cells and begin to look for ways to cooperate in their one over-arching goal: to drive Americans out of Iraq.

One of the cities where these groups coalesced was Fallujah, about forty miles west of Baghdad. It's proximity to Baghdad made it an excellent strategic, centralized location. It also had highly protected routes that went from Baghdad to Fallujah and from cities like Haditha, Hit, Al Rutbah, Al Wasit and Al Qaim into Syria from where men, weapons and money could be quickly transported, protected by agreements from the local tribes who began to make considerable money from the smuggling.

In early 2004, four contract security personnel were ambushed, killed and their bodies burned. They were then hung from a bridge leading out of Fallujah. The spectacle caused a backlash in the United States. It looked like Somalia, where US helicopter pilots were shot down and their bodies desecrated and drug through the streets. It was Somalia where Al Qaida had first worked with locals, training them to use anti-aircraft weapons like MAN-PADS and RPGs to bring down the helicopters.

It was the subsequent withdrawal of US forces from Somalia, along with the images of "the last helicopter out of Saigon", that prompted bin Laden to claim the US was a "paper tiger" that could be defeated if engaged in guerrilla warfare. And, that, along with a weak response to attacks against US forces in Saudi Arabia at Khobar Towers, US embassies in Nairobi and Kenya and eventually the attack on the USS Cole that had convinced bin Laden to attack the US directly. Leading to September 11, 2001.

That knowledge and those images had the US spoiling for a fight in Fallujah. Many more foreign fighters began to pour into Fallujah and surrounding areas, building fortifications and tunnels to defend against a counter-attack and possibly defeat the American army in a large scale urban battle that had been feared, but had not occurred during the 2003 incursion in Baghdad.

The first attempt to pacify the city came with the Iraqi army. A local unit was quickly put together and marched into the city, only to fall apart with barely a shot fired. The insurgents, both Iraqi and foreign, owned the city. The men either left or joined the rebel forces inside. Prime Minister Alawi was trying to negotiate a deal to surrender the city and avoid a potential blood bath. That soon came to an end and the angry Alawi gave permission to take the city by force.

In the meantime, the horror that was inside Fallujah had been spilling out daily. First a trickle of bodies here and there that eventually grew to dozens daily as the Islamic Jihadists began to form a large and controlling influence in Fallujah. Men, women and children's bodies were found everyday on the roads, in the canals and floating in the rivers tortured, burned, cut to pieces, shot, drowned, hung and decapitated.

A marine captain, stationed outside of Fallujah, reported the daily horrors and noted that the insurgents were so brazen as to drive right to the outskirts of the city, within sight of their post, to dump the bodies in broad daylight. Citizens of Fallujah would escape the city, sometimes going to the marines and asking them to rescue their people, their families, from the horrific slaughter and oppression within. The marines were not allowed to do anything, but basic patrolling outside the city while the political process continued between the national government and Fallujan leaders to surrender the city.

When Alawi gave the go ahead to go in by force, a relatively small marine unit was tasked to recon and approach the city. They were quickly surrounded and pushed back, fighting every step of the way to get back out of the city without a massacre. The marines had discovered that the insurgents, foreign and domestic, inside the city were well entrenched and prepared. They had fortified the city during that time in a way that Baghdad had never been. The architecture of Fallujah, as noted by Bellavia in "House to House" were like miniature fortified compounds that lent to the overall capability of resisting an incursion.

Taking Fallujah was going to require many more troops, much more equipment and large scale planning. Most of all, it was going to take time. Time also worked for the insurgents and rebels inside of Fallujah. It gave them more time to booby trap houses and streets, knock out power poles, fortify houses, dig tunnels, barricade roads and bring in even more men and weapons: the "global jihadist all star team" that Bellavia confronts in his book. In short, they planned for and worked towards delivering "hell" to the Americans when they came.

Over in Najaf, Sadr was kicking up his own surprise. In an apparent coordination with or attempt to leverage the Fallujah uprising, the Sadr Mahdi Army had come into Najaf and took over the famous Imam Ali Mosque. The Mahdi Army began to confront US forces wherever they met. The start of "House to House" has Bellavia in Muqdadiya outside of Najaf in 2004, battling the Mahdi militia. It is there that his friend Fritts is shot three times and Bellavia is confronted with a close up view of their mortality.

In August 2004, the Mahdi Army is all but destroyed in Najaf, surrounded in the Imam Ali Mosque. Ali Sistani, grand Ayatollah of Iraq, fearing the destruction of the mosque and the Sadr movement might lead to a general Shia uprising, negotiated a deal to bring Sadr out. Thousands of Shia joined Sistani on a march to Najaf where they led Sadr's militia out, surrounded and protected by their own "civilian" forces.

The Battle for Fallujah was well on the way to being operationally ready for implementation. Bellavia's unit is pulled for the attack. Defensive berms are built around the city to control the flow of people into and out of Fallujah. Hundreds of thousands of Fallujah citizens stream out of the city to designated checkpoints and on into refugee camps where they waited the outcome of the battle.

That's where Bellavia finds the biggest test of his ideas, his strengths and his love for his men. This is where the book begins.

House to House
Veterans for Freedom

� Secure this line!

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they may well be the All Star Team, but they sure do have a lot of turn-over in their "on court" roster..

by MajMike on April 1, 2008 3:29 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

The crowd was about twenty or thirty people. Some were veterans, families of serving members, a Gold Star family and a few interested parties. The media coverage here was not very good for the lead up, though I spoke to several people attending and they heard about the conference through various means. One gentleman, about 70 years old, is an avid reader of conservative blogs and named off an impressive list of blogs that he regularly reads including Powerline, Hugh Hewitt and the Belmont Club. Of course, I recommended the Castle and Blackfive for additional reading.

Another gentleman had heard about the event from KCCN Christian radio and still another Gulf War vet, a member of the Veterans of Modern Warfare, said he'd heard about the shenanigans up in Minnesota and decided that he had to come and support these vets. He didn't know everything about them or what they were going to say, but he believed that veterans should have the chance to speak and be heard. He believed that the Forest Lake HS incident was a "heinous failure" of our educational system and the high school specifically to not allow the students to hear this real history and what it means to serve our nation.

Bellavia later echoed that sentiment noting that we were sitting in the World War I museum and there were only two WWI veterans remaining (actually, David, I think we are down to one). Their stories, if not written down, are now forever lost to us. Our WWII veterans are also passing at a high rate daily and we will soon lose those voices, too. Who then is going to carry the story of the American Veteran when our Viet Nam veterans were shut out and shut up when they came home? We are just now really starting to appreciate their service. Bellavia, as he has done throughout the tour, continued to thank these veterans for paving the way for his generation and giving them the drive to make sure that their voices were heard.

A Viet Nam veteran, Martin Oelklaus, was kind enough to share some of his own experiences with me while we waited. I have two great T.I.N.S for the blog which I'll post tomorrow. Suffice it to say that somethings never change. One thing that he talked about and also echoed by Bellavia was "brotherhood". Thirty five years after he came back from Viet Nam, he searched the internet for the name of his friend who had come from Kentucky. By shear luck, there was only one such man in the area by that name and when he called him up, he had found his friend. He said they began talking and it was as if those thirty five years had never passed.

Our speakers Wednesday evening were Pete Hegseth, Tom Parks (of Overland Park) and David Bellavia, author of "House to House". We started out in the main auditorium, but moved to a more intimate setting around the conference table in the education room in the museum. While I was waiting, I finally saw what was under the glass roof below the tower: a field of poppies.

I've watched many of the videos of the speaking engagements and interviews, but it is even more impressive to meet and speak with these men in person. What comes across is their utter sincerity and the desire to get the truth out. Just as importantly, what you get is an immediate sense that these men are leaders and comfortable in that role.

Their approach to this conversation (and that's what it was, sitting around a big table) was three parts: information about Iraq/getting the information out; the service and the care of our veterans and honoring the service of our Iraq and Afghanistan veterans with completing the mission.

Hegseth focused on the progress that had been made, the general situation before and the need to continue the mission to make Iraq successful. He included many details about his time in Samarra during the bombing of the Golden Mosque that sparked the most heated battles between the Sunni and Shia in 2006 and almost gave Al Qaida its sought after victory. He emphasized, repeatedly, that the "civil war" was over.

"the markets (in Doura) aren't just open, they are booming."

He empathized with the people that thought the war was a lost cause, noting when he came home he was convinced that we were using the wrong strategy. Hegseth had written several op-eds and emails home urging people to support their efforts and speaking about the need to change strategies in Iraq. Hegseth noted that, though he and some other units had been doing a version of COIN (counter insurgency), the effort had not been cohesive or spread across the entire nation. That meant that it could not be a success until the effort was made overall in every area.

It echoes, to some degree, Col. Gian Gentile's complaint that the pundits' idea that COIN was not occurring while his troops were sacrificing was simply wrong. But, opposite of Gentile, who disagrees that progress was based on this new strategy or the surge, Hegseth insists that it was the new cohesive nature of the approach as well as the US and Iraqi surge that turned the tide. He quoted figures that over 200,000 Iraqis had joined either the police and military or the concerned local citizens, now referred to as Sons of Iraq (SoI) in the last fifteen months.

Al Qaida was not protecting them, but was exploiting them.

Hegseth believes that there is a serious failure within the media to report what is really happening in Iraq, either in the past or today, that is harmfully coloring the opinion of the American people about our efforts there. He says that the VFF is advocating a new conversation about the war because it is imperative that we stay there and see Iraq secure and prosperous. Iraq and Iraqis are not "the enemy", but the enemy (al Qaida and various terrorist organizations) is there. They have invested much in winning the battle there and we need to put paid to their aspirations.

"No one is doing touch down dances, here, but we have changed the dynamic on the ground."

He asks that the American people join with Vets for Freedom to stand "shoulder to shoulder" and bring the war to the finish line.

Tom Parks, Chief Warrant Officer (ret) USMC, was on the drive to Baghdad in 2003 and talked about his experiences there as well as returning home as both a physically and mentally wounded veteran. He served two tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. He spent some time talking about the drive to Baghdad, being attacked in "Ambush Alley", not by uniformed military or even the black clad "Fedeyeen Saddam", but by "insurgents" who had either taken off their uniform or never wore one. In one incident, these "insurgents" had taken a family hostage and one had the four year old daughter held in front of him with a gun to her head.

Parks said, all he could think about was his own daughter and, somehow, he was able to shoot that insurgent without harming the little girl. The second one gave up. His point was that these fighters did not stand and fight in the open, but hid behind civilians even then. The same tactic they have been using throughout the battle for Iraq these many years.

During the same attack in Ambush Alley, Parks dismounted, grabbing an anti-tank rocket and took out a T-55 Iraqi army tank. They were taking fire from all sides, from buildings along the route. He then ran between multiple tanks, using their outside (GI) "Joe" phones to coordinate a tank barrage against enemy positions. One tank did not have a phone so he had to run back to another to get them to radio the fourth tank to move as they were directed. The entire time, Parks was under fire from AK-47s, RPGs and various other weapons. For his actions, he received the Silver Star.

Parks said that he was no hero. His hero was his wife, a marine officer and the XO (executive officer) Mobile Command Marine Reserves at Richard Gabauer (where the 24th Marines are out of). She waited for him to come home and has been there for him this entire time as he transitioned from infantry to civilian. He said that his care at the KC VA medical center has been great. Its not the rat infested, wreck that made national headlines. However, it can't do everything and we have tasked the VA with many jobs to serve our returning veterans.

There are many things that we need to do to take care of these men and women who are returning. Parks emphasized that this is not the war of our fathers and grandfathers, but a 360 degree war where men and women must be ever vigilant, the enemy does not wear a uniform and the constant stress of battle can cause lasting damage if we do not address it early on. He admits that he has his own struggles with severe PTSD and the wounds he suffered. Yet, our veterans can come home to lead productive lives with the right motivation and assistance. Parks is now the Director of Operations for APU in Overland Park, KS.

David Bellavia, SSgt US Army (ret), spoke about the need to honor the sacrifices of the men and women who have fought in Iraq. His book is now #1. While Hegseth introduced him, spoke about his fight in the house of Fallujah and Bellavia Silver and Bronze Star (with the additional potential that Bellavia will receive the Medal of Honor as the first "living" recipient of this war), Bellavia did not dwell on his own story. Instead, he wanted to talk about the people that he served and sacrificed with, some of whom have returned to Iraq even today.

His message, "Let them win."

Without a doubt, Bellavia wears his passion for his cause unapologetically on his sleeve. He delivered his part of the presentation as his want: with humor and drive. The same love for his fellow service members and the need to honor them and their sacrifice.

Some words from Bellavia:

The thing that really touched me, that really changed my life, was the embrace we got when we came home.

We have to be accountable stewards. We have to carry the message.

These are the stories we need to tell. For far to long you (Viet Nam Vets) were stifled because you were told your war was unpopular or that your service isn't appreciated. We're burning down the house.

Our whole purpose is not only to say "thank you", but "we love you."

The only thing that can keep you alive is love. ...That is what keeps you alive on the battle field and keeps the memory alive of those who we buried.

Bellavia continues to re-iterate several themes. First, that this is not "partisan" or "politics". In fact, his main demand is that Republicans and Democrats get their politics "out of our war." He continues to thank Viet Nam Veterans for welcoming them home and for paving the way for his generation. He is insistent, though, that his generation is not going to suffer the same fate as the Viet Nam veterans. They are going to speak out and speak up. They will not allow their brothers and sisters to be demonized, patronized, victimized or left to slink quietly away. He asks these vets and the American people to join them in making sure that their voices are heard.

He believes that winning in Iraq is necessary. He says that he has met the enemy face to face, smelled his breath and felt his hate. In Fallujah, he fought the "all star team" for jihad and they came to Iraq to kill Americans. He insists that there is nothing that Pelosi, Clinton or President Bush can do to keep us safe from that hatred except to fight them and defeat them wherever we meet them. It is why we must stay in Iraq.

At the end of the day, though, he believes they can be defeated. The very fact that the enemy thrives on hate and death is the key to their defeat. Such hatred cannot be sustained, cannot provide any longterm meaning to life and must either whither away or be destroyed. The thing that will defeat them is love: love for freedom, love for our country and the love of a brotherhood, "fraternity", of warriors for each other and everything they deem important.

Warriors aren't just the men carrying rifles, they are the families, the people back home who help to support their effort. He thanked those who have been supporting them and those veterans who came before them.

I asked Bellavia about his run for Congress, he didn't want to make much of it at the time, but he went back to his original point that they needed to get the word out.

I did have the opportunity to ask several more questions that I will outline in the next post along with actual recordings from the event. Actually, I can't lie, with so few present and some not sure what to ask, yours truly monopolized a good part of these gentlemen's time which I wish to thank them for and apologize at the same time. I think that they were very tired after a long day , but they stayed to answer questions when they might have gotten another hour of down time. I don't feel bad about essentially holding the rest of the audience hostage with the questions. Hopefully, they got a little bit more information from the discussion.

Those who missed it, missed a great opportunity to meet some fantastic people with great stories and a really important message.

David Bellavia signed my book after the conference. During the conference, I mentioned that I was with a milblog (not wanting to give the idea that I was a covert operative for the meda). Bellavia and Hegseth thanked the milblog community for letting their voices be heard. I wanted to share what David wrote in my book with our readers and the rest of the milblogging community because the message was not for me alone, but for all of you:

Thank you for all you do for your nation at war. All the heroes of this war DON'T carry rifles - You are one of them.

Not me. You. I came after the many who paved the way and made the community important, who really gave the milblog community its start. Frankly, I'm just a punctuation mark in the greater milblog community, thankful to be able to post on this blog and meet such great people here as well as men like those at Vets For Freedom.

E Pluribus, Unum
Out of many, one

[PS...I met Uncle Jimbo with Blackfive and have some video to post of the inside of the bus, which was sweet.]

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Heh. Brevity, thy name is not Kat...

;^ )

by John of Argghhh! on March 27, 2008 9:24 AM

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Bandwidth... smandwidth!
Nice job, Kat- and nice picture too!

by AFSister on March 27, 2008 9:52 AM

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I was able to meet these heroes at the Officers Club in Minneapolis. What an absolute privilege! (Well worth the 6 hour drive to get there.) I'm sorry the high school students in Forest Lake were denied the opportunity to interact with them. I find it hard to believe that they don't have the critical listening skills to learn from the experiences of these men. My grandchildren (aged 10, 7, and 6) certainly found value in hearing their stories.

(David also signed my copy of House to House - "Thank you for your steadfast support of our nation at war. Your patriotism speaks volumes about your character." He certainly has a gift with words.)

by Sandi on March 27, 2008 11:35 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Many other electricity capacity building and sustainment projects are continuing and have picked up speed since the down turn of violence late 2007. However, many of these plants continue to be built with gas or diesel fuel burning turbines. This presents several additional problems including the continued lack of sufficient fuel to drive these turbines. Fuel is also costly with oil at $108/bbl. Even though Iraq is an oil rich nation, it still lacks the refining capacity to produce sufficient fuel with the necessary purity to keep these plants operating without costly damage.

Another problem is that burning fuel creates high corrosives and forces almost weekly maintenance on the turbine props and internal engine systems, taking these power plants off the grid. The decision to build fossil fuel plants was based on several factors, namely: time, money and expertise.

Compared to a hydro-electric or thermal plant that takes between two and five years to build, fuel burning plants can be built in as little as six months to a year. Iraqi engineers are more familiar with these plants since they have been the main electrical producers for over five decades. That means more available expertise to manage and maintain these plants. They are also less costly for initial build and set up (though more costly in maintenance). Since September 2007, the US has cut funding to these programs to hundreds of millions, barely a drop in the bucket compared to the estimated needs.

The Minister of Electricity recently gave a presentation that indicated the MoE would require $25 billion between 2008-2016 to rehabilitate, build and generally bring electrical production up to meet demand. The 2008 budget for the MoE is $1.5 Billion. However, he indicated that 2008 would be the year that many MoE projects would propel Iraq much closer to meeting its demands. These projects include:

"2008 will be the year of gatherers for the Ministry of Electricity in the projects that are currently implemented, such as the stations of: Samawah with a 90 Mega Watts, South of Baghdad steam station which is of two units each one with 50 Mega Watts, South of Baghdad gas station with a production capacity of 400 Mega Watts, North of Baghdad station with 60 Mega Watts, Al-Quds station with 250 Mega Watts and Al-Musayyib station with a production capacity of 400 Mega Watts.

The minister predicts that, with sustained investment and reconstruction, the electrical grid could be producing 14,408 MW by 2009.

(click here for a larger image)

Based on previous predictions and outcomes, this prediction may be too aggressive. However, one of the ways that this may be accomplished is by taking advantage of one of the other natural resources that Iraq has in abundance: natural gas. Besides stand alone natural gas pockets, there is an abundance of natural gas available from oil production and refinement. Most of this natural gas is "flared off" or burned into the atmosphere to reduce internal pressure from drilling. According to a report from the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), Iraqi oil production is flaring off enough natural gas to power all of Iraq's electrical plants and then some, decreasing its dependency on oil, gasoline and diesel fuels to power the country.

Most of Iraq's fossil fueled plants could be converted simply to burning natural gas. It would require installing pressurizing and delivery equipment at these oil production sites as well as developing delivery infrastructure. Some delivery infrastructure already exists along with pressurizing machinery, but has laid dormant and incomplete since the invasion. Iraqi engineers do not have the expertise to handle this project. It is one of the many projects, along with building privately owned electrical plants, that Waheed has called on foreign companies to tender for or invest in the development.

...all that we need is the existence of companies with materials and expertise because we have the money and fuel."

The development of this system will also require the assistance and cooperation of the Ministry of Oil. This ability and cooperation will depend on the future of the Iraq Hydro-Carbon Law that will layout the legal structure and protections for foreign investment to reconstruct and develop iraq's oil infrastructure.

There is a light at the end of the tunnel for Iraq and Iraqis. It's coming faster every day as security continues to improve and stabilize. What Iraq needs now are people and companies who are willing to invest in that future for this generation and the generations to come.

[I suggest reading this equally long, but highly informative report (Re-engineering Iraq) from the IEEE completed in November 2007 (based on the price of oil quoted and several projects noted). It gives a very good ground view of the challenges and improvements to Iraq's electrical production. The writer visits several electrical plants and substations throughout Iraq, including in Sadr City, speaking with engineers, army officers and many others about security, economics and engineering. There is a surprising (or not) section about a power plant with four GE turbines that were bought erroneously by the MoE with USAID money. The Iraqi engineers from the MoE misunderstood the phrase "duel fuel" and did not realize that it did not burn diesel fuel like the other existing turbines in the plant. Now, $350 million worth of equipment sits idle and in disrepair since 2004. These turbines could burn natural gas. Right across the street is the East Baghdad oil plant that has three stacks "flaring off" natural gas. According to the reporter/engineer, one stack could fuel the four turbines and double the production of the electric plant. The equipment for this was being installed prior to the invasion and now sits running to ruin. Right across the street.]

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Baghdad receives approximately 6.5 hours (often less) of electricity per day while surrounding areas are receiving between 12 and 16 hours. Taking a page out of Saddam's political and economic use of the electrical power, many provinces have taken their power plants off the grid and reserved that energy for their own use. This has led to an increase in reconstruction in many of these areas, as well as a surge in political power for local leaders in the provinces. It has also allowed these provinces to use electrical power for political leverage against the Maliki government.

Today, average electrical output is meeting or beating the pre-war production, though 2007 was still under pre-war average generation by approximately 700 mega watts. Meanwhile average and peak demand has increased by over 1000MW.

The goal was to have average production exceed pre-war generation by 1500 MW up to 6,000 MW by the end of 2007. Production topped out at appx 4,800 MW. Over 2,000 MW are currently provided by owner/operators of private generators.

To meet these demands the USACE, the Ministry of Electricity, and various government and private sector organizations have been working to refurbish many of Iraq's existing plants, as well as seeking partnerships to build new plants to meet the demands.

Recently Minister Kareem Waheed told Aswat al-Iraq, the Ministry of Electricity has called for foreign investors to begin building private electrical plants in Iraq.. He cited the slowness of private investment from ongoing security fears. He believes that security is strong enough in many provinces to begin these projects. He states:

"Iraqi companies are only rehabilitating the power grid, but not rebuilding it,"

Many engineers have left the country, and new technology has not been taught or managed by existing companies and engineers. They do have expertise in managing some of the existing plants. But, even in these plants, USACE and other organizations have been teaching the engineers how to manage the plant, do regular maintenance, and schedule outages that are less damaging to the overall performance of the systems.

The Minister of Iraq went on to announce that Iraq will be tendering six new projects in 2008 to improve electricity. Five in Baghdad and one in al-Maseeb, Babel province. This will allow better electrical output to Baghdad. Other projects include connecting Baghdad to external power grids from Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

(click here for larger image)

In a savvy political and economic move, the Iranians are planning to build a thermal electricity plant in Najaf, one of Iraq's Shia holy cities where hundreds of thousands of Shia's travel for yearly festivals and holy days. That includes many Iranian Shia. The project is estimated at 150 million Euros and will provide electricity to Najaf and Karbala, though it won't alleviate the 400 MW deficit in the entire Najaf province. It will provide 320 MW for those two cities. The ground is prepared, but the MoE, Waheed, went to Iran last week to resolve disputes between Iran and Iraq over the project details.

According to the latest reports from USACE, they have overseen almost 2,000 projects for electrical capacity building in Iraq. Most have been accomplished by Iraqi contractors and engineers with the USACE providing assistance, guidance and funds. The EIA indicates that the United States has invested over $4.4 billion in the development of electrical production in Iraq. The responsibility for further development was handed to the Iraqi government and ministries in September 2007, though the USACE continued to manage several projects to completion and works in conjunction with the MoE to contract for repairs, training and other development.

The USACE, with cooperation of the MoE, completed a substation in Maysan province that will provide 400 kilovolts of electricity. It was connected to the main grid on March 1. The project was a joint venture between ABB Sweden and a local Iraqi contractor. It employed over 500 local workers for over a year.

The USACE is working in conjunction with the Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Water Resources to improve communications and develop a plan to improve electrical generation from the Haditha Dam. The current emphasis at the dam has been on irrigation and water management. The electrical management team has had difficulty getting attention to their problems and requirements for improving electrical production. The USACE has been facilitating talks between the groups and working towards budget allocations that will bring more stable electricity to over 160,000 people in al Anbar. The electrical management team also meets every two weeks with the Governor's Electricity Committee.

On January 29, 2008, construction began on an 11 kV electrical distribution network in Diwaniyah, the capital of Qadisiyah province. The project will cost 3.5 million and infuse approximately $500,000 into the local economy during the course of the project.

Work includes replacing the existing network, laying a new underground cable, and installing new indoor 630 Amp transformers, she said.

The USACE was also awarded a "$1.54 million project to build, supply, install, test and commission a double 33kV electrical feeder line of the Al Nasiriyah powerline, according to Taha Jabber, an Iraqi engineer with USACE Gulf Region South district."

One of the many problems maintaining the steady supply of electricity and managing its delivery has been the inability of the MoE to monitor and control the operations of so many electrical plants on the grid. When a plant goes down due to maintenance or lack of fuel or sabotage, it automatically puts a strain on the rest of the system and major unscheduled blackouts occur. The USACE has worked with the MoE and private contractors to install a remote monitoring system (RMS). The system will also allow the ministry to better analyze performance and insure maintenance is done timely to prevent critical failures.

The Baghdad power grid is currently the weakest link in the power system. Not only have various provincial power plants gone off the national grid, but insurgent attacks have and continue to keep regular power supply from reaching the nation's capital. To improve the situation, the MoE has instituted a program to harden and strengthen power stations and towers, as well as place some power lines under ground to reduce the chances of damage.

(click here for larger image)

In August 2007, the MoE reported that there were 17 high tension power lines going into Baghdad, but only two were operational. The MoE and contractors, with US forces and Iraqi police providing security, have been working to bring Baghdad back on line.

Arab Jabour power lines are nearly complete

BAGHDAD (March 10, 2008) – Reconstruction of three 132-kilovolt high-tension power line towers in the region of Arab Jabour are near completion.

Iraqi Ministry of Electricity employees began work on the towers March 1. Once complete, another link of the southern Baghdad power belt will be fixed.[snip]

Sgt. Rod Elrifai, a power generation specialist with 2-3 Brigade Troop Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, said the belt is a series of 400-132 kv power lines and electrical stations which provide power to and encircle the capital city.

Iraqis rebuild power line towers in Sayafiyah

FOB KALSU, Iraq (Feb. 20, 2008) — With assistance from coalition troops and Iraqi security forces, ministry of electricity workers are rapidly reconstructing three high-tension power line towers in Sayafiyah, 25 kilometers south of Baghdad.

Soldiers of Troop A, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, and members of an Iraqi police security detail are providing security for 130 workers from the MoE rebuilding the structures, which form part of Baghdad’s ‘power belt.’

“There is a 400 kilovolt distribution ring that goes around Baghdad and this (section) is the southern part of it,” said 1st Lt. Matthew Shoop, electrical projects engineer, 2-3 Brigade Troop Battalion, 2nd BCT, 3rd Inf. Div. [snip]

Hussein Lefta Mansoor, construction site manager for the MoE, initially told 2nd BCT leaders he and his workers could have the towers up in as few as 10 days. On day four of the operation, he cut the estimated completion time down to one week.

Shoop said once the towers are reconstructed and power lines put into place, the region could see a boost in their share of the power ration, which is metered out by the MoE

.

The surge in reconstruction was made possible by the troop surge in 2007. Since then, the MoE has been re-doubling its efforts to rehabilitate, reconnect and build anew Iraq's electrical grid that will help fuel private industry and, eventually, be a cornerstone for a peaceful, developing and resurgent economy.

[This is a three part series on electricity in Iraq based on information gathered for research to facilitate FbL's interview with Ambassador Reis from the US Embassy Baghdad. Additional Economic series may appear regarding Iraq's Oil Infrastructure, Water, Sewage and Banking. Also look for additional posts on other economy and reconstruction stories. To quote an unknown source in Glenn Zapotte's IEEE report (Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers): "Never before has so vast a reconstruction program been attempted in the face of enemy fire or managed in the shadow of geopolitics."]

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Good analysis! The only piece missing is that a lot of the power plants don't have an adequate supply of fuel (I understand that it's strange considering Iraq has vast oil reserve), because the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Electricity have some disagreements.

by LT Nixon on March 20, 2008 1:57 AM

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That's discussed in part one a bit, but a lot in part three of this analysis.

by kat-missouri on March 20, 2008 7:46 AM

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Haditha Dam is ably guarded by our allies, the Azerbaijani Army.

http://northshorejournal.org/index.php/2005/05/allies-for-the-marines

by Chuck Simmins on March 20, 2008 9:52 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

In the United States, coal is the number one fuel for thermal electrical plants. Iraq is not a coal producing nation. It's main resources are oil and natural gas. A majority of Iraq's electrical plants are run on fossil fuels including gas, diesel and oil. Most of these plants date back to the 1950's, and the turbines (the engines that drive electrical production) are old Soviet models that were no longer in production at the time of invasion. Most were out of production long before the invasion.

Prior to the invasion, Iraqi engineers spent a lot of energy and money to have parts manufactured piecemeal from existing parts or old specs. Otherwise, they were forced to use parts that were close approximations that they then re-engineered to fit their needs. These electrical plants were already highly inefficient, and the "make do" engineering simply added to the problem. Most of this was due to the age of the equipment. Some of it was due to the sanctions that made obtaining certain equipment difficult, if not impossible, as it was on the list of "dual use" banned items.

Other issues included highly inefficient electrical transformers, and wiring that had also been in place for many decades and did not come close to most modern specs. All of this meant that, all along the production to delivery of electricity, power was being lost from the system before it ever made it to an end user. Even the end users contributed to the problem because there were little, if any, engineering and electrical regulations that required houses or buildings to be energy efficient or electrical wiring to meet defined specifications, causing an additional loss of wattage along the delivery line.

To combat these problems and keep the electricity on in Baghdad, Saddam had instituted a program that forced most of the power production to be delivered to Baghdad and cities where he held the most political and personal sway. That made these areas the economic centers of Iraq, as well as helped maintain his political power and alliances. The rest of the country was literally dark most of the time, meaning that they were also without any ability to develop an economy. That, in turn, kept them politically and economically dependent on Saddam's good will and hand outs, which were highly limited.

This is the condition of electricity that the United States Army Corps of Engineers inherited after the invasion. The insurgency and looting, leading to the destruction of electrical plants, transformers and electrical lines, simply made the existing terrible electrical problem worse. The EIA estimates that up to 1000 MW of power haave been lost from sabotage of the electrical grid around Baghdad, including 80 transmission towers from Baiji to Baghdad, interrupting power delivery to Baghdad. An additional 1500 MW are lost due to the lack of water and fuel for the hydro-electrical plants.

Insurgent attacks on oil and natural gas pipelines severely damaged the ability to deliver fuel to these generation plants. Smugglers and militia routinely tap into these pipelines to drain oil and gas for sale on the black market.

Add the current problems of people tapping into the electrical system with a hodgepodge of wiring and machinery (also not up to spec and highly inefficient), with new homes being built with little central planning or control of specs. The drain on power is tremendous, and the production and delivery ends are having to perform miraculous and heroic deeds to offset the losses and meet demands.

[This is a three part series on electricity in Iraq based on information gathered for research to facilitate FbL's interview with Ambassador Reis from the US Embassy Baghdad. Additional Economic series may appear regarding Iraq's oil Infrastructure, water, sewage andbanking. Also look for additional posts on other economy and reconstruction stories. To quote an unknown source in Glenn Zapotte's IEEE report (Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers): "Never before has so vast a reconstruction program been attempted in the face of enemy fire or managed in the shadow of geopolitics."]

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Awesome work, Kat! There was so much more I wanted to say about this stuff when I wrote about the interview, but it was such a gigantic mound of info. Thanks for tackling this; it needs to be out there!

by FbL on March 18, 2008 2:19 PM

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Kat,

The hydro-electric dam north and west of the city was reported to be close to breaching. Emergency repairs are trying to save it. That would be a huge loss. Do you have an update on repairs? My info via Fox News is a couple months old. I think they have a battalion size unit protecting it.

Fishmugger

by Fishmugger on March 18, 2008 3:43 PM

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What I know right now is that the USACE is working with the both the ministry of electricity, the ministry of water resources and the dam's management team. Apparently, the focus at the dam has been in spending money and resources to develop its irrigation potential. Something that is very important to the economic survival of farms in the area.

Apparently, little resources or attention or even cooperation has occured on developing its electricity output. These three groups with the USACE are meeting with the provincial governor to come up with a plan to increase its output. It is supposed to be able to serve upwards of 160,000 homes on a sustained basis if it is in full operation.

In regards to any breach, that report, dated february of this year, did not mention any other technical or physical issues with the dam. I'll look for some additional information from the USACE and other resources to see what else is going on.

by kat-missouri on March 18, 2008 4:44 PM

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OK Roger - Thanks

by Fishmugger on March 18, 2008 7:15 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

September 2007, there were reports about Fallon and Petraeus exchanging not very nice words right before Petraeus and Crocker went to DC in March. Fallon allegedly dissing Petraeus directly as a sycophant (paraphrasing), saying that he (Fallon) "hates people like that". Later, Fallon denied that it was anything more than sharp arguments, in the best spirit, over important matters.

According to the Army times, Petraeus got the go ahead from the Chiefs of Staff on the surge (the source of Fallon's "sycophant" comment? kissing up to Fallon's superior could only be a few choices; among them the JCS). Fallon later said he supported it fully, but he didn't have much choice. It was either support the operation approved by JCS or resign then and there.

Barnett goes on to portray the disagreement over Iran as between Fallon and the White House, but Fallon's appearances on Al Jazeera and interviews in other media didn't just appear counterpoint to White House or DoD remarks on Iranian support for terrorists. They also often appeared directly after reports from Odierno about the appearance of Iranian ordinance such as EFPs, the announcements of IRGC Qods arrests and various other MNF-I reports implicating Iran.

Those first appearances of Fallon's words on Iran (as well as his anti-surge stance), were often followed up by Fallon either "explaining" his remarks or retracting them in some manner. It seems likely that Fallon's comment on Iran were a direct counter to what he might have considered was the Petraeus-Odierno drum beat to war with Iran.

Fallon also resisted placing third Naval Carrier group in the Persian Gulf, right after the 15 British Sailors were kidnapped last year, while simultaneously exhorting other Gulf states to unite against Iranian hegemony in the region. Other Naval commanders were echoing some of Fallon's fears that a build up of naval ships in the gulf might lead to even greater risk of confrontation and a potential incident that would lead to war. While Fallon won that round, many felt that Iran was already committing some form of proxy war againt the United States and its allies, that it needed some additional show of strength to remind it to keep its nose clean.

The final straw might have been the Esquire article which Fallon now calls "poison pen", but it's hard to say that Barnett would write "poison pen" about Fallon whose apparent strategies closely resemble Barnett's opinions on making nice with China amongst other ideas. This has all the characteristics of Fallon catching the "morning after" regrets. Again.

However, I might point out another two or three recent lead up features to this resignation. On the recommendations of Petraeus, again, the DoD and White House announced in February a freeze on troop withdrawals from Iraq, leaving the same pre-surge numbers in place throughout the summer and not restarting withdrawal again until fall. Fallon was pressing, once again, to reduce troops even further, closely resembling major Democrat policy projections to have forces down again by half or less by 2009 and minimum force by 2010. DoD and White House also announced that there would be a significant and long term presence of US forces in Iraq. Finally, on the same day that Fallon announces his resignation, President Bush gave a speech in Tennessee:

"I want to assure you -- just like I assure military families and the troops -- the politics of 2008 is not going to enter into my calculation, it is the peace of years to come that will enter into my calculation," he pledged to a Christian broadcasters association.

Bush made no mention of just-begun talks in Baghdad aimed at forging a long-term security partnership deal between the United States and Iraq by July, well before the US president's term ends in January 2009.

Fallon was in charge of CentCom, but he wasn't the one making strategic decisions. Fallon wasn't shaping his area and kept running a-fowl of greater policy. He may have resigned in protest, a la Shinseki, however, it doesn't mean that Gates wasn't telling the truth and there was no direct pressure from the Pentagon or White House. It also doesn't mean that he was protesting a possible war with Iran so much as the situation in the whole command, including Iraq.

Is Fallon the "good guy" "speaking truth to power", even resigning in protest, because he felt he wasn't allowed to run his command, the wrong strategy was continuing to be pushed, feared for the future of the military and his ability to secure the region? Or, is Fallon the "bad guy", constantly bucking DoD and White House policy for his own ideas, causing policy headaches, unable and unwilling to taking a subordinate roll to anyone else or any other plan, talking above his pay grade and talking poorly about subordinates and his superiors?

Fallon's motivations may seem unclear, but it's an interesting coincidence that he sent his resignation in the middle of a tour of Iraq, not only right after the Esquire article came out, but on the same day that Bush makes a speech on the future of forces in Iraq. If nothing else, it's a pretty savvy political move that definitely over took and led most national news casts, above and beyond even the politics.

Who's pushing the Iran-Esquire connection? A good publicist. Whose publicist? is the question.

Will Fallon appear at the Democrat Convention or hook up with Obama or Clinton? That's definitely a "wait and see."

All the while, the "surge" is considered a success, with cautions, even by usually conservative generals on the ground. As the press falls all over Fallon, Fallon's resignation got more press than the success in the surge has for months.

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Kat, I personally believe the best way to approach this, is as the Armorer might say, "Keep your powder dry and your eye on the horizon." There is nothing here that is real, it all appears to be an illusion. Just one thought, Thomas P.M. Barnett, the writer of the article is a product of the Pentagon, itself.

Grumpy

by Grumpy on March 12, 2008 2:07 PM

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Exactly. that was my point. as they say "who does the controversy benefit?"

by kat-missouri on March 12, 2008 3:27 PM

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never mind. I'm an idiot. Iraq and Iran. (sounds like a song, don't it?)

by kat-missouri on March 12, 2008 4:13 PM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

In preparation for the interview, I had scoured the major media for reports from 3rd ID's area of operations over the last two weeks and had come up mostly empty. I opened the interview by mentioning that problem, and BG Huggins confimed that indeed, no news is good news in 3rd ID's case. However, he showed the cautious enthusiasm that is typical for 3rd ID's leadership: "Things are progressing well. I don’t want to give everyone a false impression… [there's] still a lot of hard work to do, but in terms of security things are progressing pretty well."

The facts BG Huggins supplied support his evaluation. For the month of February, 3ID averaged two attacks per day, and with the exception of a single large-scale terrorist act (which I'll cover below), an average of one civilian per day died from violence. Those numbers are less than fifty percent of the already-low numbers reported in the end of January when I began interviewing 3ID leadership.

Right now 3ID's kinetic activity centers around Operation Marne Grand Slam, conducted along the eastern edge of the Tigris River. This is a counterpart to Operation Marne Thunderbolt, which consolidated gains along the western edge of the river in an effort to reduce the flow of "accelerants" of violence into Baghdad. BG Huggins reports that operations are close to wrapping up, and will culminate with the building of another patrol base southeast of Salman Pak. The patrol base will help consolidate Iraqi and Coalition control of the the Tigris river valley from Baghdad to about 50 km south. According to BG Huggins, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have been integrally involved in Operation Marne Grand Slam.

The big event in 3ID's AO in recent weeks was Arbaeen, the end of the yearly ritual mourning for a 7th-century Shiite imam. In the course of a week, six million pilgrims from all over the Middle East arrived in Karbala on foot. According to BG Huggins, "Things went incredibly well." As during Ashura, ISF again took the lead with coalition forces providing aerial overwatch and standing by as ground backup. In an echo of the flood of people for Arbaeen, two million pilgrims are now continuing into Najaf, under the protection of ISF.

BG Huggins exclaimed over the tremendous volume of Arbaeen pilgrims he had seen from his helicopter flyovers conducted to check force positioning, and how well the Iraqi checkpoints handled them. In an effort inspired by the Sisters of Fallujah, the Iraqis planned for and hired women to inspect female pilgrims at each checkpoint, setting up tents to ensure privacy (similar systems exist at the border checkpoints in 3rd ID's AO). All in all, BG Huggins seemed extremely pleased with the Arbaeen holiday, pointing out that the sheer volume of pilgrims was a "strong statement" of Iraqi and regional faith in Iraq's newfound security.

The only major security breach in the AO during Arbaeen was a suicide bomber who attacked near an Iraqi checkpoint in Iskandariyah where many pilgrims were gathered during their trek. According to BG Huggins, the bomber had concealed his explosives vest under his clothing and nobody suspected anything before he blew up, killing over 50 soldiers and pilgrims.

Something that hasn't been greatly publicized is 3ID's detainee-release program. When people are arrested on suspicion of involvement with terrorist or insurgency activities, the brigades screen them and the worst are placed in a "high-risk" category that will not be released under any kind of amnesty. But in an additional process, other detainees are screened to find individuals who might be eligible to re-integrate. Each detainee must have a "guarantor," a sponsor such as a sheik or Sons of Iraq participant, who will accept responsibility for the detainee's actions if he does something wrong. Sponsors then sign Arabic documents making them liable for the detainee's behavior, and the detainee is released into their protection and guidance.

BG Huggins reports that there are no set standards for release, but things are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Evaluations are made all the way up the chain of command, beginning with records of their educational activities and behavior while at Camp Bucca, the coalition prison. Often this process begins when somebody approaches a coalition soldier and says, "This guy is my cousin, he really isn’t that bad a guy. If he comes back, I’ll take care of him--and it’ll help his family." BG Huggins openly acknowledges that there is a risk factor to this, but in practice it has been a mechanism for strengthening communities by returning breadwinners, and giving a second chance to people who may have done paid jobs for the insurgents simply out of desperation. "[They are] folks we can take a little risk with," he says.

I asked BG Huggins about Sunni and Shia interaction and integration within the ISF he works with. He said that successful integration is dependent very much on leadership, pointing to what he called "the best of the ISF," the Iraqi Army's 4th Brigade of the 6th Division. It is about 75% Shia, operating in an area in which cities are largely Shia and rural areas are 99% Sunni. According to BG Higgins, leadership trumps sectarianism: 4th Brigade's commader is a Shia married to a Sunni, with two sons--one carries a Shia name, the other a Sunni one. "The brigade is received well everywhere," he says.

There have been reports of a great deal of resistance at the national level to bringing the Sons of Iraq (local citizen security groups sponsored by the coalition) and Awakening participants into the national government. BG Huggins says, "It's still a little bit slow. We'd like to see it move faster."

One area that has been successful in bringing citizens into the national government is the Iraq police academy. Under a special "test" agreement, selected SOI members are now given two weeks of training at the academy (rather than the typical eight), then hired as provisional police for a 3-month contract at half-pay. "It's a step in the right direction, but we'd like to see a little more effort to go faster at the national government level," BG Huggins says. So far, 1,000 former SOI members are participating in the program, but many Iraqis are very frustrated at the slow pace of the national government's efforts. A lot of coalition effort has been put into establishing relationships between SOI or Awakening leaders and national leadership, and into encouraging them to be patient. Dialogue and meetings are occurring," reports BG Huggins. "If we can continue that drumbeat [of a request to reconcile], then it should improve."

Part of the problem is that many Sunnis and some Shiites refused to participate in the 2006 elections, and so now do not have the representation at the national level that would help them in their efforts. So, the "dialog" is part of an effort to make sure nationally-disenfranchised Iraqis "stay engaged until provincial elections make more opportunities for them."

In fact, BG Huggins describes successful elections as even more important than economic concerns to the Iraqis he talks with. "Sunnis that I deal with (SOI, etc.) are very conscious of the fact that they missed the vote." They're anxious to get themselves back into a position to have a voice. “Iraqis I talk to want to see provincial elections sooner rather than later.” Elections will lead to more opportunity and fair representation in sectors where they don’t have it now, and the pressure is to have elections so that they can take control of things and fix problems they face. BG Huggins allowed that the farmer may be more focused on his own local needs, but there is a great desire to be allowed a voice. Iraqis and coalition forces seem to be putting a lot of hope in having elections this October, but the national government has still not finalized the laws that would make that possible.

Iran has been a somewhat touchy subject in my interviews with 3rd ID's leadership. They have reported no "direct evidence" of Iranian involvement in their AO, but acknowledge uncovering caches of EFPs that are "assumed to be of Iranian provenance." Acknowledging the delicacy of the issue, I pointed to General Odierno's direct comments on the subject, and asked BG Huggins, "Are you seeing direct evidence of Iranian involvement beyond EFPs, and would you tell me if you did?" He laughed, but after pausing a moment, went on to be more open on the subject than his fellow officers so far. He mentioned the checkpoints along the Iranian border in his AO, and other efforts to watch out for Iranian involvement, but "all of that has revealed nothing—and I tell you that honestly. We have intelligence reports of movement through the area, but no engagement--moving through the British area, particularly." He said they are finding a great deal of munitions specifically marked as Iranian, and getting reports of people moving both northward and southward within their AO, but they haven't caught anyone they've been able to directly connect to Iran.

Part II of this interview will be posted on Monday and will focus on 3ID's intensive rebuilding efforts, including "embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams," agriculture redevelopment, and what BG Huggins told me he has learned about fish hatcheries. Update: Part II.

Other 3rd ID interviews in this series: COL McKnight, CSM Andrews, and BG Cardon. Related: Ambassador Charles Ries.

� Secure this line!

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FbL, Great roundup, thanks for putting this together. Vice President Mahdi vetoed the Provincial Elections law, but once the parliament resumes session it should get hashed out in short order. Provincial Elections are supposed to be on October 1st.

by LT Nixon on March 7, 2008 1:06 AM

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Yes, that's certainly what everyone's hoping. I've seen some supposed experts say that it's starting to look unlikely that they will be able to have the elections without delaying past October. Let's keep hoping they're wrong! When I asked BG Huggins if he felt there was a limited window of opportunity that the security gains had created and if so, how long he thought it was, it was the elections he pointed to as being something that the people were holding their breath for.

by FbL on March 7, 2008 7:23 AM

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Mmm...I keep trying to figure out what was wrong with the provincial law they were trying to pass. It must have given some guarantees of power or seating in the central government that Maliki did not like.

But, wow, isn't democracy from the ground up interesting?

by kat-missouri on March 7, 2008 9:25 AM

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Yup. Fascinating. From what I've read about it, the biggest problem had something to do with how much power the national government would have over provincial leaders, but I'm not entirely clear on the subject.

But what is exciting to see about the clamor for provincial elections is that after having sat out the 2006 elections, the Sunnis realize how much they erred and are apparently now invested in the idea of representative government. It's another great reason to hope in Iraq's future.

by FbL on March 7, 2008 9:38 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

Post Script: I'd always heard "It's a small world Army," but as my interview with CSM Andrews wound down, I experienced that truism for the first time. "May I ask you a question, Ma'am" he said, as I started to close the interview. He had received a short briefing/bio about me that included mention of Valour-IT (I didn't write it), and a name had caught his eye... "Ma'am, do you know Chuck Z well?" he asked, "Are you still in contact with him?"

"Yes, I'm in touch with him."

He quickly rattled off a dizzying string of Battalion/Company/Unit and "attached to" designations, asking "is it that Chuck Z? He was here for OIF3?"

"Yes, I believe so."

"Ma'am, I was Battalion CSM then. He was one of my captains!!!" He sounded so joyous that I inquired if he'd heard anything about Chuck since he'd been wounded and nearly died. The answer was no, and he enthusiastically accepted my offer of a report on Chuck's current condition. I swear I could hear his grin through the phone. He asked if I had a way to contact Chuck, excitedly wrote down the information I gave him, and asked me to tell Chuck he would be hearing from "Hammer 7" soon. It was an absolute joy to be able to make him feel so good; I don't think I stopped smiling for the rest of the day.

� Secure this line!

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General Cardon bragged to me that they'll meet their reenlistment goal by April 1, 11 months into a 15 month deployment.

by Chuck Simmins on February 6, 2008 3:59 PM

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I'm not surprised, since CSM Andrews mentioned that they're going to have another mass re-enlistment ceremony on 11 FEB.

by FbL on February 6, 2008 4:04 PM

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Good report.

by Ledger on February 7, 2008 6:19 AM

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� Dismissed, Soldier!

In important respects, the great struggles of the 20th century – World War I and World War II and the Cold War – covered over conflicts that had boiled and seethed and provoked wars and instability for centuries before 1914: ethnic strife, religious wars, independence movements, and, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, terrorism. The First World War was, itself, sparked by a terrorist assassination motivated by an ethnic group seeking independence. These old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive during and after the Great War. But, like monsters in science fiction, they have returned from the grave to threaten peace and stability around the world. Think of the slaughter in the Balkans as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. Even now, we worry about the implications of Kosovo’s independence in the next few weeks for Europe, Serbia, and Russia. That cast of characters sounds disturbingly familiar even at a century’s remove. The long years of religious warfare in Europe between Protestant and Catholic Christians find eerie contemporary echoes in the growing Sunni versus Shia contest for Islamic hearts and minds in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia. We also have forgotten that between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, two American presidents and one presidential candidate were assassinated or attacked by terrorists – as were various tsars, empresses, princes, and, on a fateful day in June 1914, an archduke. Other acts of terrorism were commonplace in Europe and Russia in the latter part of the 19th century. So, history was not dead at the end of the Cold War. Instead, it was reawakening with a vengeance. And, the revived monsters of the past have returned far stronger and more dangerous than before because of modern technology – both for communication and for destruction – and to a world that is far more closely connected and interdependent than the world of 1914. Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict, among them: · A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism; · New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world; · The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; · Failed and failing states; · States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and · Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and internal peace – but also with implications for regional and global security. Worldwide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear. One of my favorite lines is that experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the United States has come to the end of a war, concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security – in the process, giving ourselves a so-called “peace” dividend. Four times we chose to forget history. Isaac Barrow once wrote, “How like a paradise the world would be, flourishing in joy and rest, if men would cheerfully conspire in affection and helpfully contribute to each other’s content: and how like a savage wilderness now it is, when, like wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and devour each other.” He wrote that in the late 1600s. Or, listen to the words of Sir William Stephenson, author of A Man Called Intrepid and a key figure in the Allied victory in World War II. He wrote, “Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee.” After September 11th, the United States re-armed and again strengthened our intelligence capabilities. It will be critically important to sustain those capabilities in the future – it will be important not to make the same mistake a fifth time. But, my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the d