I Still See Dead People.
The point of what casualty calculations, whether from the Cold War or not, is utterly lost; or insinuated to be irrelevant because Iran is killing people and that wrong apparently outweighs all other considerations. I could go on at length about how Containment, crafted by Keenan for the Truman administration, was decided upon in the absence of nuclear conflict since the USSR did not detonate their first nuclear device until 4 years after the assumption of Containment as national policy, but that would be skipping the point as well. It was the cost of the end desired, namely the defeat of the Soviet Union, and its inherent costs versus other means of acquiring the same end which was the whole and only point. Said costs and calculations were done regardless of nuclear arms in the equation.

The Cold War example is essentially:
1) All actions, choices, and goals with respect to the USSR had associated costs.
2) One needs to understand the costs of each choice, action, or goal.
3) There exists a significant non-zero chance that indirect confrontation attains your goal for you at lower overall cost.

That is a universal in decision making, actually. The example was only to bring it to the fore.

Nor is it merely the weak-kneed snobbery of White Tower intellectuals. B.H. Liddell-Hart’s Strategy is an entire work on this concept of attaining strategic goals via an indirect approach. Toughness, manliness, or announcements of one’s presence ‘with authority’ are only useful if they actually buy you what they want. Liddell-Hart pointed out that in the realm of poli-mil affairs that just as often as not the indirect works better, is cheaper, and doesn’t exhaust a nation the way direct confrontation could.

If it costs me, hypothetically, approximately 9 millions dead in six months of direct conflict and 9 millions dead over 40 years to achieve the same goal using proxy wars how can one say the former is better? Yes, I know all about the integration of misery under a curve analytical tool. But, if one is focusing on the dead as the basis of correctness or stupidity of an action is not paying a higher price for the same item usually considered the worse play?

Let’s apply this same hypothetical (read as the numbers were chosen strictly for illustration only, they are not from actual analysis) to an Iran conflagration. 9 millions represented by 1 million from the actual war, approx 3 million starving in China from lack of fuel to move food within six months, an equal number in India for the same reason, and another 2 millions from the rest of the world, particularly in what we used to call the ‘Third World’, that cannot afford higher costs for a diminished total supply of petroleum passing thru the Persian Gulf. What have I gained in doing that? And how long in comparison to another hypothetical situation with a further hypothetical death rate from Iran’s proxy war-making before I reach that 9 millions? If it is a matter of decades can I truly say I’ve gained anything?

Now, keep in mind, I am not the one who said that deaths were the deciding or most important factor. I am just pointing out that if one holds deaths so important the full accounting of the dead should also weigh on your decision making. If it takes decades to attain the same number of mortalities then can you say, since the policy was predicated on death-toll, that you have actually gained much of anything beneficial?

Repercussions do matter greatly when you accept, as you must, that a confrontation or conflict does not exist detached, does not operate like a duel with only the two fighters affected by the outcome, from everything else.

The repercussions go beyond the US, the EU or the ME and branch out into countries around the world since energy will be diminished, food, medicine, clothing and shelter will rise dramatically. More than they are today.

It’s a true statement, the above. But it is not only true for allowing Iran to be the ‘bully’ by gaining a nuclear weapon. A war to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons carries the exact same repercussions, sooner and more severely, and likely in higher amounts. Those costs need to be considered as per my hypothetical, and, if one is making the decision based on the number of dead, policy adjusted accordingly. In most people’s books, the payoff better be real good if you are going to buy something that expensive.

Why sooner? Iran has the capability to close Hormuz as we speak. That was the significance of the Brecher story a few weeks ago. Mining Hormuz closes it. It is no secret that Lloyd’s of London cancels insurance for vessels passing thru such warzones quicker than snap. Iran has the capability to do exactly what has been stated as the worry over the use of an ‘economic weapon’ right now without a nuclear weapon. They can with the ballistic missiles they currently have shut down the Saudi oil fields, tomorrow. Attacking them does not prevent the economic/oil weapon that has been discussed. It brings it on in a much harder to fix/clean up scenario. Hence, the world’s poor die of hunger and preventable disease in vast numbers while the 1st World economy shudders if not seizes like a car engine without lubricant in summer heat.

Nor does Iran’s proxy war capability depend upon nuclear weapons. Hezbollah is a major nuisance and was formed without nuclear capability as backup. What is the justification for implication that unconventional capabilities are dependent or will become more pronounced with nuclear weapons in Iran’s hands? It does not seem to follow since Soviet SOF and US SOF wax and wane depending upon personnel available and not nuclear weapons backing up said SOF. It does not agree with history as to why these non-conventional forces were created or methods initially studied.

Lack of a nuclear weapon seems not to prevent Iran from partaking of shadow war and slaughter of innocents right now or for the last 20 years. Our having nuclear weapons, and Israel’s long known open secret of nuclear arms, does not seem to have any effect on their actions what so ever right now. Maybe it is not the nuke that makes that dynamic go? After all, such 4th Generation Warfare forces are by their very design and intent to be means to circumvent advantages granted a major industrial power for a weak industrial power. Nukes seem not to be the enabler for proxy war and 4th Generation Warfare methods employed by Iran, or anyone else, at all. More likely it is that the US and Israel are nuclear powers that has pushed Iran to ‘grab the belt’ as Giap tried to (and did) in an attempt to neutralize said technological advantage.

Someone I Know Is Standing In The Trenches
In relation to costs it has been said that because one’s child/friend/loved one is in the Services or in boot they understand the cost. No, that isn’t the point as it is not about personal costs and grief. That one will experience the loss of one’s kin and that said event is painful is not the point. Personal loss is not the point. Not to be a callous jerk, but it is not the point. “People die” is often lesson one for officers in war, and lesson two is often “your rank doesn’t mean you can change that.”

I accept that people will, must, die if any action will be taken; whether said action is a neo-Containment or direct confrontation or Barnett’s ‘Big Boy Pants’ theory. The question is scale and, more importantly, what have we bought with that particular amount of carnage? Are there other pathways we can go down that cost us less in terms of lives---and in other metrics---than a direct military confrontation?

One does not decide policy or strategy based on *who* will be lost. Securing a policy that buys a better peace, using Liddell-Hart’s definition of said peace, and what the cost of that purchase is what matters. Particular losses are rather inconsequential. It is the size and the object I am buying with them that is of prime importance, and, unfortunately, all else is fluff. If the goal is actually worth what I am paying in lives then I will spend it but one should not spend more lives than necessary.

It is not weakness or some bizarre need to be Neville Chamberlin that drives this. No. It is a dicta of Richard “Demo Dick” Marcinko, high priest of high testosterone warrior ethos, to not screw over one’s men. Going ‘hey-diddle-diddle-up-the-middle’ without considering whether or not another course of action is superior or viable is exactly that. Marcinko relates in one of his books the different fates of SEAL teams in Panama wherein one commander forced ahead with his plan regardless of facts on the ground and the other not only evaluated different options he had multiple plans to call upon for each option. The former, SEAL Team Four, got cut to pieces at Hato Airfield while the latter, Seal Team Two, pulled off its mission without a casualty. One guy *knew* evil was afoot, was dragon slaying, was unwavering, went with a one throw of the dice approach, and his men paid for it; the other asked questions, thought about his situation instead of emoting, and his men lived because of it. Sending men to die, asking—or condemning depending on your perspective------ civilians to die, in a furball which was un-necessary in that one could have bought the same end by different and cheaper means is, defacto, screwing one’s men; and worse for said civilians. Whether that is assaulting a meaningless hill or going into an unnecessary confrontation to achieve national goals it still counts as screwing the men… royally.

Kill ‘Da Wabbit, Kill ‘Da Wabbit, Kill Da Wabbit (eh, eh, eh, eh).
The following is rather emblematic of the ‘no questions necessary, just hit ‘em’ school of thought: How many millions have to die for the second Cold War to be considered a complete disaster compared to direct war?

There it is. Shock Battle it must be, our hoplites against the Persian horde for anything less is seemingly failure. Regardless of how many die as a result it must be done because millions will die if we do not. If millions die it is a failure. Just as many millions, from economic collapse brought on by closing Hormuz for months to years, do not apparently count as much because Iran has killed them. We. Must. Have. Shock. Battle. We. Must. Kill. ‘Da. Wabbit.(Eh. Eh. Eh. Eh.)

There is no value to be found in spreading the dying out over time to be found here, is there? No. There could not be any real advantage in not having an acutely high body count. The loss of economic output and other tangibles we will lose via a direct confrontation pathway are irrelevant. It is only the deaths and losses caused by Iran’s nefarious actions we will count.

What Are You Asking Him To Die For?
But for what purpose will we do this? To end evil is unlikely. To forestall an economic threat is our cause? No, not when the threat actually already exists and can be utilized while we speak can it be rightly cited. Will we save millions of lives in the process? Maybe, and it might actually cause more death and mayhem than if we took a different path---and that is not guesswork. What is our reason for taking a directly confrontational pathway?

What would be our aim coming out of said conflict that would make it worth doing? Would we be wanting to integrate them rapidly into the global economy? Are we deconflicting the ME and spreading democracy? What? What would be our purpose for doing this? An ‘anti’ strategy is not good enough.

In the Cold War we did not just deny a country to the Soviets. We did more, far more. We integrated it as much as possible. We supported monsters like Noriega, Pinochet, even Marcos (they should have flogged Imelda with all of her shoes) with a purpose beyond simple denial of Panama, Chile, and the Philippines to the Red Sphere of Influence. Americans died supporting all three. Their lives were worth it because there was more than just a ‘hands off, it is mine’ strategy that called for their lives to be sacrificed in pursuit of it. What would that be vis-à-vis Iran?

Shock battle for the sake of shock battle is screwing your men royal. What do you seek to purchase, how do you intend to shape the world coming out of this to make it all worth it?

Madden 2K1 Is Not Much Better Than Madden 2K, But 2K7 Is a World Apart
Is it also possible that a ‘go slow’ approach is preferred and has inherent advantages over Kill Wabbit? Is it possible that the issue of iteration of choices puts us in a stronger position? Nash’s economic theory seems to support this. So does recent evolutionary biology. A series of sub-optimal, not for the all the marbles choices may actually lead to greater outcomes over the long term.

It is not like Great Captains of the past did not recognize this. Gen Eisenhower saw that the Broad Front idea allowed for change with iterations of choice in ways that simply letting Gens. Patton and Montgomery go buck wild in offensive glory would not. A ‘go slow’ or Barnett’s ‘Big Boy Pants’ approach does not discard future offensive action should it become necessary.

Each logic gate, since I choose to model it that way, has three options: a) Kill ‘Da Wabbit b) Neo-Containment c) Barnett-ian Big Boy Pants. Options b and c give us the option to choose a series, and the concept that it is a series is of prime importance, of moments of choice where we can consecutively choose options that move the pile forward toward a better peace. We would not be deciding such a situation with long lasting ramifications on a single throw of the dice. Iterations of choice give us the opportunity to minimize the death tolls and other associated costs. There are examples of this phenomenon in economics, evolution, and war being used beneficially.

Of course there’s the risk that things go south on any iteration or consecutive iterations of choice. That is always possible. There is no zero risk approach. We have seen this sequence play out on the Korean Peninsula in a mixed bag fashion. Given that DPRK threatens 3 major US trading partners from whence the majority of our electronic supplies come from--- PRC, Japan, ROK--- one cannot say that potential DPRK action via CBW does not already give us an analog of Iran, no microchips no economy, and yet the carnage of 50 years of dealing with DPRK iteratively is still cheaper than the one big gulp approach.

Failure is also possible with a single throw approach such as Kill Wabbit, and recovering from that is far harder than the iterative approach. Destroyed or damaged oil fields will not be quick fixes as the Kuwaiti experience shows. Market Garden was hard to recover from because of the logistical losses such a one-and-done approach incurred.

Kill ‘Da Wabbit is not a panacea. It is a particular policy choice that has its place in the tool box.

Evil, Evil, Evil.
A litany of evil acts have been listed at one time or another regarding Iran. Whether it be actions during the Iran-Iraq war or proxy means to attain Iranian policy or support for terrorists like Hezbollah it is meant to show that Iran is evil and that Iran cannot be a rational, and ergo stable and predictable, actor. Because Iran is evil we must attack.

I do not deny that many of the acts are, truthfully, evil. It is also irrelevant. Robert Mugabe is evil, his regime is evil, and has a body counting numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Burma is a flat out freaking mess. Sudan is still tagged as genocidal warfare by the ruling faction against the non-Moslem factions by the UN. So? Irrelevant. What would invading or other muscular acts in these countries buy the US? Going off like an knight errant to drive all dragons from the kingdom makes for great epic poems and romances, it is not a coherent means of deciding for a nation.

Are we to be governed by the R2P (the right, or responsibility, to protect inherent in the UN charter) then? Will we then find ourselves invading Sudan, Burma, and DPRK then? Wherever we are told there is an evil regime, one that abuses its people, foments trouble for neighbors, or fights proxy wars we will have to attack then? If it is based on the two factors of evil and body counts one would be hard pressed to find a justification for not going into places like Sudan, Burma, and the DPRK (particularly North Korea, the king daddy of proliferation, murder and kidnapping of foreign nationals, and active belligerent threat to its neighbors.).

Evil is a poor ‘gotta’ factor in decision making. There’s so damn much of it around after all. Being consistent in policy would mean we would be tied to policies that lead to many Kosovos, many Somalias, and take downs of every whackadoo dictator like Kim Jong-Il regardless of what it buys the US. Such an ‘Onward Christian Soldier’ sermon works on Sunday but it is not sound policy.

Not Bowing Down To Darth Sidius
Which brings me back to the central thrust of the initial piece: can we get to a defanged/irrelevant Iran/Iran we can live with via another route? Are there iterative pathways that get us to the same place for far lower costs? Do not all other options than direct confrontation amount to bowing down to Emperor Ahmenidijad ne Palpatine (a.k.a. Darth Sidius)?

Is it possible to give nuclear weapons to UAE and other ME nations to counter Iran and end the problem via a MAD theory soft kill? Actually yes it is, and it is standing these nations in Iran’s way instead of capitulation.

Can we extend our nuclear umbrella, meaning saying to Iran ‘any use by you means your nation turns into a glass parking lot’, and then providing neighbors with military aide to combat irregular forces get us there? Yes, it is possible to counter in just this way and then ‘buff up’ a nation’s forces to meet the unconventional threat. We have seen this sequence play out on the Korean Peninsula. Given that DPRK threatens 3 major US trading partners from whence the majority of our electronic supplies come from--- PRC, Japan, ROK--- one cannot say that potential DPRK action via CBW does not already give us an analog of Iran. No microchips no economy. And that is being handled in an iterative fashion that does not amount to capitulation.

There is a host of possible, viable pathways that can be considered or enacted that come well short of the beloved one throw of the dice shock battle for all the marbles to buy us what we want--- an Iran we can live with and a secure stream of petroleum for the world economy. They must all be considered and the ‘Iran is evil’ mantra does not dismiss them. It is the rare cure that is worse than the disease---chemo-therapy for example--- but I do not dismiss the possibility. Few amount to kneeling at Darth Sidius’ feet. Quite the contrary, many are standing up to the Sith but not in a winner takes all fashion.

Coda
Obsessions with slaying evil dragons or numbers of dead or with looking tough do not coherent policy make. Obsessions do not purchase the nation its goals for responsibly considered costs.
--ry

� Secure this line!

When I read this, I just get the sense from you, Ry, that we all ought to just sit by and do nothing. Why, there's nothing to get worried about at all. Everything will be okay as long as we don't do anything stupid or unnecessary, and just wait and let matters take care of themselves in the long run, eventually. Because, God forbid, if we do something, we'll just make them angry at us and this will just make things worse.

Why, the Cold War would have NEVER HAPPENED if we had not over-reacted when Japan attacked us on 12/07/1941, and went to war with Germany. The Cold War was all our fault, because we were the ones who helped defeat Hitler, and created the conditions that removed an important check on an expansionist USSR.

Oh, and never mind the fact that millions of Jews were dying in Nazi concentration camps. We would not have known about these anyway, since we woould never have liberated them or known about them with Hitler and his fellow Nazis still in control of the continent. Besides, that whole "Holocaust" accusation is nothing but a big LIE anyway, promoted by those pesky Jooos and the victorious Allies who needed to justify their "war of aggression" and "war of choice".

And if Truman hadn't done something stupid like issue that "Truman Doctrine" - you know, an over-reactive and aggressive policy that threatened the USSR which caused them to react in kind - we would have never needed to keep troops in Germany or Europe for 60+ years nor would we have fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere.

How could we have been so misguided and naive? How could we have let ourselves be MISLED so much by Truman, JFK, and LBJ - who lied about that Tonkin incident? Because Lord knows, if we hadn't gone to war in Vietnam, we would never have angered the North Vietnamese, and they would not have had reason to seek vengeance and retribution on those traitorous South Vietnamese who aided us when we withdrew from Vietnam, which caused that whole refugee and boat people problem. Oh, and that whole Cambodian mess, either. Those Khmer Rouge guys were not evil, after all. They just wanted to enlighten those misguided people who wanted a different society.

Etc etc etc.

PS - Did you change email addresses recently? I tried to thank you for you kind comments on one of your previous posts. I was out of town on business at the time, was too busy to post much.

I think you're being a bit unfair, Frank, and over-reading what Ry is saying.

As I read it - Ry's thesis is, Containment and the indirect conflict inherent in that approach gained what we were after (the collapse of the Soviet system) with fewer overall deaths than would have resulted from direct conflict (as he see's is advocated by Kat), and that approach should get as serious a consideration as the more robust approach advocated by Kat.

And Ry doesn't like the invocation of "evil" and "people are dying" as the rationale for going all kinetic.

Let's face it - as OIF shows, once started, wars develop a character all their own, and usually don't follow the path the initators were seeking. Ry also suggests that Iran is already capable of doing 90% of the mischief we fear without using nukes.

Ry is also positing that Kat may in fact kill more people than would die over the protracted approach he suggests - all in order to save them.

Kat's counter is that the Iranian government doesn't constitute a rational state actor and the issues of self-preservation extant in the Cold War don't apply, so the better to kill the threat abornin' than find out it's actually a psychopath.

Both arguments have merit - though I admit, I'm in favor, at least right now, of Ry's approach. I don't think we've got the ground combat power to deal with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

John,

I didn't mean to be unfair or flip. However, I did want to convey 2 things:

1) Everything is interconnected, and whatever policies, strategies, or tactics we adopt and pursue will inevitably lead to "equal but opposite" reactions from the other side, and consequences that are both foreseen and unforeseen, as well as positive and negative.

At every point in the decision tree, you're basing your actions on the reality as it currently exists, trying to solve the most immediate crisis first, even though you may be trying to plan ahead as much as possible. But Murphy's Law and the Law of Unintended Consequences always reign.

2) If we had adopted Ry's "containment" strategy with regard to Hitler and Nazi Germany, we might have prevented the larger war in Europe, preventing the continent wide destruction and millions of combat-related deaths that ensued.

But would the world have been better off?

Personally, I think the "containment" strategy pursued by the US, Britain, France, and USSR led directly to the horrors of WW2, when they failed to take adequate action at Germany's rearmament, Hitler's move into the Rhineland, Hitler's Anschluss of Austria, and their failure yet again at Munich over the Sudetenland.

Their "containment" strategy at these points may have prevented a "smaller" war in 1935, 1936, or 1938. But might this smaller war have prevented the much larger war that followed?

Heh. Mostly I used your comment as an excuse to show Ry how much you could condense his argument...

And to throw some props to Ry for his side.

I know, I know, Ry - brevity is for wimps!

I agree with John that I'm being largely misread here.

Itterative approach is not 'do nothing'. It is more like turning a car without flipping it or even better turning a semi without jackknifing. It's nudging things along in a positive manner, and just because I'm using the word positive doesn't mean holding hands and singing koomayah. Iran-Contra was a 'positive manner' in an iterative fashion.

The Nazi Germany example is being abused, me thinks. Teh Triple Alliance does not qualify as 'Containment'. That was simply defensive alliance making("Don't attack us becasue the other two will be in at your sides.") and none of the troika had the capacity to intervene. None could arm the Poles or the Romanians with the methods and means to stand against the Wehrmacht, as we did during the CW.

The current ISR network allows us to take 'Never Again' seriously while having the R2P protocol as legal @55cover for intervention, and one could say that the ability to intervene and see what Iran is doing is why we're not seeing ghettos and gas chambers for homosexuals. None of the big three had that capability at any point before 1939. The Triple Alliance does not count as Containment.

Containment is being abused. The Truman Doctrine is part and parcel to it. Korea was part of Containment; as was supporting folks like the slew of corrupt Philippine presidents, not denouncing S. Africa, and the support for the Contras. That was all part of Containment. Some of it was muy macho and some of it not. It was entirely iterative.

Fd, except for the 'worst crisis' as an absolute I'd agree with your #1 in the scond comment you made. Only when it moves strategy forward or halt dire threats does it make sense. Patton didn't worry about flank attacks because his threat to the enemy was great enough that the enemy quit flank attacks.(His famous, 'I don't worry about my flanks' comments). Same logic here. If and only if it gets me where I want to go or is about to kill my plans dead do I worry about a given crisis.

People are seeing what they want to see: any arguement that does not end with '...and then we kick their @55' is capitulation. That is far from the truth.

I knew morality was going to get tossed up. I predicted it inthe first rebuttal. Sure, it is a factor to consider. But, as I pointed out above, abuse of the Nazi example is not a proof for doing Iran. You haven't shown that they *are* as depraved as the NAzis and that not doing them leads to as horrible a world as not standing up to the Nazis would have. You've assumed it and not shown your supporting work as for why. Dangerous assumption, imo.

That doesn't rule out that they can be or are. Just sayin' that assuming it is a bad way of making up your mind or trying to win a debate on it.

John, I don't suggest. The capability is there. It is fact. the two Kilo class subs can lay 15+ nautical mines each per sortie, and mines they have aplenty(look at Galrahn's post over at InfoDissem on it). Mining Hormuz ends commercial traffic within it. That's just application of Formosa reality to an analogous situation. Someone else worked that one out. It isn't just a claim, some other analyst(guy who gets paid to do it) I know worked that out and I'm cribbing from him.

The BM attack is suggestion but the mines are not. But it would seem to be a decent educated guess given ranges.

And it's 'Brevity is for the weak.' Wimps are people who have the capability but not the will. THe weak simply don't have the capability. (Hyaa! Hyaa! Flog them electrons! Hyaa!)

see what Iran is doing is why we're not seeing ghettos and gas chambers for homosexuals.

Nope, they just hang them. After a "fair" trial of course.

But, on a different note, when we talk about "morality" as if it has no place in decision making, I believe it leaves us considerably blinded by cold numbers. When a country does things that are explicitly immoral (and I don't mean some namby pamby multi-cult outlook of "this is their culture" BS I mean political prisoners, absolute repression, and executions or imprisonment based on ideological concepts that have little to do with good ordering of society...homosexuality, changing religion, opposing government policies, etc), I believe it indicates the over all nature of the government and what we can expect from it on an intra- and inter-national scale.

For instance, besides Iran, there is Sudan. Certainly, Bashir was smart enough to ask Osama to leave and, at least, give an outward appearance of rejecting international Islamist terrorism, but, his internal activities of promoting Islamist ideologies and promoting genocidal assaults is representative of his actual international behavior.

Sudanese are some of the top "foreigners" found on battlefields we operate on. There are likely international Islamist terrorists receiving training, participating (training) against the internal citizens and Bashir is basically posturing his national government and organizing his citizenry in such a manner that, should the Islamists actually gain a foot hold or "legitimate" government in other states, he can easily align and reflect that ideology and alliance.

On the other hand, he is also positioning himself under the umbrella of the chinese, to hold power indefinitely. One could say that he is a pragmatist that needs to be watched.

I can see some of that in the Iranian movements, but John is correct that I am concerned that they have not quite settled over whether they are a rational state or a revolution. In otherwords, they aren't all that rational yet.

Part of that is due to their internal struggle to continue to maintain control of the government and keep it functioning under the "Islamic Revolution".

However, recognizing that doesn't mean that we should give them extra breaks since it means they also have the tendency and capacity to do just as you argue they are not doing. Extremist ideologies are considered extreme for those reasons. Largely, they have a tendency to be extremely reactionary in order to survive. An extremely reactionary government with nuclear weapons does not sound particularly safe to me.

While I can appreciate the idea of containment and believe that it has a possibility to work, I also believe that Iran's instability along with their move towards nuclear technology and probably weapons, makes them more dangerous at this moment than any other time. I also believe that the window for implementing successful containment is very narrow for the reasons I stated above.

Another issue that weighs heavily on my mind is "never again." I have a very strong feeling about those who routinely call for the destruction of others and hold Nazi like forums for conducting a defamation drive against people of any sort. Most particularly the 7 million Jews (of the 20 million left in this world) who reside in Israel. I believe that there is only one reason that this occurs and that is because Iran is trying to whip up support for a much bigger war with Israel since they know that Israel sees their nuclear activities as a threat.

I believe Iran wants this because they believe that they can consolidate their power over the region by advancing their leadership in the "fight" against Israel. That is the reason that they had their proxies in Hezbollah attack Israel in 2006. Not because it gained anyone anything physically, but because it increased their stature in the region.

Since I believe they have not reached rational stage of post revolution, since they have regional and global ambitions, since they have nuclear ambitions and since they are in fact exporting that revolution in order to meet their stated goals AND since I believe that, upon reaching those stated goals, they will create an even more horrific crisis, not just regionally, but internationally with oil and gas from the region under their auspices....

I believe that, yes, that would end up killing many more people directly and indirectly (through famines, raging energy prices and housing crisis, etc) than a direct war would.

In short, I would kill 200,000 Iranians today if it meant that 7 million would not have to fear death ten years from now either through nuclear attack or conventional warfare that these states might feel they can now perpetuate under the umbrella of nuclear weapons.

I would accept 1 million Iranian casualties if I thought that 10 million or more people around the world would be saved from a future with Iranian power firmly in control of the ME, its resources and exporting its proxies to kill and terrorize nations.

But, you know, I never wrote that war should be tomorrow. I simply believe that the window is much shorter than those who propose talking believe it to be. In fact, after thirty years of hearing the same comments from people about how the time is never right it does seem that those who advocate talking have never and will never accept any other action. So, yes, I feel the need to advocate a more hawkish stance so that we do not forget that we do have that option, we are responsible and able to assist in securing our allies survival (and securing ours) and that people and nations should know there is a line that we will not accept being crossed without a significant response.

And, no, I do not mean more sanctions.

Finally, John did surmise my point neatly. This isn't 1947. Iran is not the USSR. What we could or should accept as behavior from them should not be equal to anything we accepted from the USSR under those conditions. To do so and allow people to die under the acceptance of a new "cold war" and an unequal comparison of The Cold War until now seems, indeed, immoral and decidedly cheapening.

Further, to allow ourselves to be placed in a position of potentially diminishing survival due to Iran's control of the region and resources does feel unnecessarily suicidal. In the end, my entire premis is based on that being the primary concern, followed closely by our allies and then the rest of the world.

We no longer have grand enemies like the USSR, but that does not mean that we are not in danger. Even giants can be pulled down by a million little rabble rousers.

Dude, that was longer than anything I ever wrote except a historical review of the bombers of wwii.

But, to refer to another note or two, I'll be addressing your post later this week because I believe that you willfully misrepresented some of my points or choose to ignore them at your own peril and ours.

I guess the best way of saying this is: don't assume the casualties you fear so are inevitable because they are not. YEs, the full span of national power and means should be on the table and a containment-like policy would use some of that hammer(like the Libya raid) to further goals. But it is about costs, not fears.

Fear does not override the need to evaluate costs and means available(look at how the US pop reacts to deaths for esoteric reasons, and how that effects the ability to comitt the force necessary for a full takedown).

A 4th Gen approach can buy the same thing, the 10 million not dead and not oppressed, without the 1 million dead or the economic costs associated to making those 1million dead.

It should not be about how Iran relates in some historical spectrum of threats. IT should always be about are we securing the better peace. If it is 'insulting' to 'elevate' Iran to do so I don't give a damn and consider the idea that we shouldn't because it is emberassing to be silly to even consider. If it gets me where I want to be fine. If not fine. BUt because it is emberassing or ruins some categorization of threats historically as a reason not to consider is just flat out boneheaded.

It is not game over once they've fitted a nuc to a missile either. THEL and the ABL research programs in conjunction with the SM-3ER program for AEGIS means that having a nuc means a whole lot less in 2009 than it did in 1999.

That leaves their non-conventionals. The de Atkine and FARC experiences should speak to that. We train and equip nations to deal with it. We buy the same damn goal for a hell of a lot less.

It just means we've got to get over being scared to achieve it.(That short enough for you, John? I got distracted once or twice so it got a bit wordier than intended)

8^)

Gad Ry my eyeballs hurt. Well for what it's worth I'm more on your side with this one if we're talking sides which is a bit limited. I want to see careful considered thoughts and plans in the now context. We have time to do this cleverly. If it shows Kat's way is better though auf Wiedersehen. At this point in time I see US and other political will not being there and there being no good case for intervention. Is there a good third option?

What I would vastly prefer is Iran to grow up real-soon-now. That is the fairytale. sigh.

Hey, when did folk reach the point where they can only handle 500 words? Eh? Slackers. (yipe!)

There is a third option Argent. That's largely my point. Kat's way sounds like very muscular engagement with a preponderance toward breaking their stuff and rebuilding the country. There's the peace, love and harmony pipe dream. Then there's neo-containment with 4th Gen elements option which has low buy in, low stay in, and low closing costs. Building an ABM system is a lot cheaper than repairing Iran. Helping Lebanon fight its own battles is a lot cheaper(in cash and in bodies) than fighting it for them by taking on Iran. Building a mini-NATO to deal with bad actors in the ME is a lot cheaper than just deciding we've got to take someone down.

There's three options. All have strengths and weaknesses. But being ruled by fear on this is tremendously stupid. Go to War Historian's site and read his three part series Images of Enemy and Self. Then tell me this is not a situation where fears aren't calling the shots instead of reason.

A FIGHT WITH A CANNON
Victor Hugo

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Overton, Grand, ed. The World's One Hundred Best Short Stories in Ten Volumes, Vol. One: Adventure. New York & London: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1927, pages 240-252.
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La Vieuville was suddenly cut short by a cry of despair, and at the same time a noise was heard wholly unlike any other sound. The cry and sounds came from within the vessel. The captain and lieutenant rushed toward the deck, but could not get down. All the gunners were pouring up in dismay.

Something terrible had just happened.

One of the carronades of the battery, a twenty-four pounder, had broken loose.

This is the most dangerous accident that can possibly take place on shipboard. Nothing more terrible can happen to a sloop of war in open sea and under full sail.

A cannon that breaks its moorings suddenly becomes some strange, supernatural beast. It is a machine transformed, into- a monster. That short mass on wheels moves like a billiard-ball, rolls with the rolling of the ship, plunges with the pitching, goes, comes, stops, seems to meditate, starts on its course again, shoots like an arrow from one end of the vessel to the other, whirls around, slips away, dodges, rears, bangs, crashes, kills, exterminates. It is a battering ram capriciously assaulting wall. Add to this the fact that the ram is of metal, the wall of wood.

It is matter set free; one might say, this eternal slave was avenging itself; it seems as if the total depravity concealed in what we call inanimate things has escaped, and burst forth all of a sudden; it appears to lose patience, and to take a strange mysterious revenge; nothing more relentless than this wrath of the inanimate. This enraged lump leaps like a panther, it has the clumsiness of an elephant, the nimbleness of a mouse, the obstinacy of an ox, the uncertainty of the billows, the zigzag of the lightning, the deafness of the grave. It weighs ten thousand pounds, and it rebounds like a child's ball. It spins and then abruptly darts off at right angles.

And what is to be done? How put an end to it? A tempest ceases, a cyclone passes over, a wind dies down, a broken mast can be replaced, a leak can be stopped, a fire extinguished, but what will become of this enormous brute of bronze. How can it be captured? You can reason with a bulldog, astonish a bull, fascinate a boa, frighten a tiger, tame a lion; but you have no resource against this monster, a loose cannon. Yon can not kill it, it is dead; and at the same time it lives. It lives with a sinister life which comes to it from the infinite. The deck beneath it gives it full swing. It is moved by the ship, which is moved by the sea, which is moved by the wind. This destroyer is a toy. The ship, the waves, the winds, all play with it, hence its frightful animation. What is to be done with this apparatus? How fetter this stupendous engine of destruction? How anticipate its comings and goings, its returns, its stops, its shocks? Any one of its blows on the side of the ship may stave it in. How foretell its frightful meanderings? It is dealing with a projectile, which alters its mind, which seems to have ideas, and changes its direction every instant. How check the course of what must be avoided? The horrible cannon struggles, advances, backs, strikes right, strikes left, retreats, passes by, disconcerts expectation, grinds up obstacles, crushes men like flies. All the terror of the situation is in the fluctuations of the flooring. How fight an inclined plane subject to caprices? The ship has, so to speak, in its belly, an imprisoned thunder, storm, striving to escape; something like a thunderbolt rumbling above an earthquake.

In an instant the whole crew was on foot. It was the fault of the gun captain, who had neglected to fasten the screw-nut of the mooring-chain, and had insecurely clogged the four wheels of the gun carriage; this gave play to the sole and the framework, separated the two platforms, and the breeching. The tackle had given way, so that the cannon was no longer firm on its carriage. The stationary breeching, which prevents recoil, was not in use at this time. A heavy sea struck the port, the carronade, insecurely fastened, had recoiled and broken its chain, and began its terrible course over the deck.

To form an idea of this strange sliding, let one imagine a drop of water running over a glass.

At the moment when the fastenings gave way, gunners were in the battery, some in scattered about, busied with the customary work sailors getting ready for a signal for action. The carronade, hurled forward by the pitching of the made a gap in this crowd of men and the first blow; then sliding back and shot out again as the ship rolled, it cut in two a fifth unfortunate, and knocked a piece of the battery against the larboard side with such force as to unship it. This caused the cry of distress just heard. All the men rushed to the companion-way. The gun-deck was vacated in a twinkling.

The enormous gun was left alone. It was given up to itself, It was its own master and master of the ship. It could do what it pleased. This whole crew, accustomed to laugh in time of battle, now trembled. To describe the terror is impossible.

Captain Boisberthelot and Lieutenant la Vieuville, altho both dauntless men, stopped at the head of the companion-way and, dumb, pale, and hesitating, looked down on the deck below. Some one elbowed past and went down.

It was their passenger, the peasant, the man of whom they had just been speaking a moment before...Reaching the foot of the companion-way, he stopped.

The cannon was rushing back and forth on the deck. One might have supposed-it to be the living chariot of the Apocalypse. The marine lantern swinging overhead added a dizzy shifting of light and shade to the picture. The form of the cannon disappeared in the violence of its course, and it looked now black in the light, now mysteriously white in the darkness.

It went on in its destructive work. It had already shattered four other guns and made two gaps in the side of the ship, fortunately above the water-line, but where the water would come in, in case of heavy weather, It rushed frantically against the framework; the strong timbers withstood the shock; the curved shape of the wood gave them great power of resistance; but they creaked beneath the blows of this huge dub, beating on all sides at once, with a strange sort of ubiquity. The percussions of a grain of shot shaken in a bottle are not swifter or more senseless. The four wheels passed back and forth over the dead men, cutting them, carving them, slashing them, till the five corpses were a score of stumps rolling across the deck; the heads of the dead men seemed to cry out; streams of blood curled over the deck with the rolling of the vessel; the planks, damaged in several places, began to gape open. The whole ship was fired with the horrid noise and confusion.

The captain promptly recovered his presence of mind and ordered everything that could check and impede the cannon's mad course to be thrown through the hatchway down on the gun-deck--mattresses, hammocks, spare sails, rolls of cordage; bags belonging to the crew, and bales of counterfeit assignats, of which the corvet carried a large quantity--a characteristic piece of English villainy regarded as legitimate warfare.

But what could these rags do? As nobody dared to go below to dispose of them properly, they were reduced to lint in a few minutes.

There was just sea enough to make the accident as bad as possible. A tempest would have been desirable, for it might have upset the cannon, and with its four wheels once in the air there would be some hope of getting it under control. Meanwhile, the havoc increased.

There were splits and fractures in the masts, which are set into framework of the keel and rose above the deck of ships like great, round pillars. The convessel were increasing, and the corvet was beginning mast, and had cut into the mainmast.

The battery was being ruined. Ten pieces out thirty were disabled; the breaches in the side of the vessel were increasing, and the corvet was beginning to leak.

The old passenger having gone down to the gun-deck stood like a man of stone at the foot of the steps. He cast a stern glance over this scene of devastation. He did not move. It seemed impossible to take a step forward. Every movement of the loose carronade threatened the ship's destruction. A few moments more and shipwreck would be inevitable.

They must perish or put a speedy end to the disaster; some course must be decided on; but what? What an opponent was this carronade? Something must be done to stop this terrible madness--to capture this lightning--to overthrow this thunderbolt.

Boisherthelot said to La Vieuville:

"Do .you believe in God, chevalier?" La Vieuville replied: "Yes.--no. Sometimes."

During a tempest?"

"Yes, and in moments like this."

"God alone can save us from this," said Boisberthelot.

Everybody was silent, letting the carronade continue its horrible din.

Outside, the waves beating against the ship responded with their blows to the shocks of the cannon. It was like two hammers alternating.

Suddenly, in the midst of this inaccessible ring, where the escaped cannon was leaping, a man was seen to appear, with an iron bar in his hand. He was the author of the catastrophe, the captain of the gun, guilty of criminal carelessness, and the cause of the accident, the master of the carronade. Having done the mischief, he was anxious to repair it. He had seized the iron bar in one hand, a tiller-rope with a slip-noose in the other, and jumped down the hatchway to the gun-deck.

Then began an awful sight; a Titanic scene; the contest between gun and gunner; the battle of matter and intelligence; the duel between man and the inanimate.

The man stationed himself in a corner, and with bar and rope in his two hands, he leaned against one of the riders, braced himself on his legs, which seemed two steel posts, and livid, calm, tragic, as if rooted to the deck, he waited.

He waited for the cannon to pass by him.

The gunner knew his gun, and it seemed to him as if the gun ought to know him. He had lived long with it. How many times he had thrust his hand into its mouth! It was his own familiar monster. He began to speak to it as if it were his dog.

"Come!" he said. Perhaps he loved it.

He seemed to wish it to come to him.

But to come to him was to come upon him. And then he would be lost. How could he avoid being crushed? That was the question. All looked on in terror.

Not a breast breathed freely, unless perhaps that of the old man, who was alone in the battery with the two contestants, a stern witness.

He might be crushed himself by the cannon. He did not stir.

Beneath them the sea blindly directed the contest.

At the moment when the gunner, accepting this frightful hand-to-hand conflict, challenged the cannon, some chance rocking of the sea caused the carronade to remain tor an instant motionless and as if stupified.

"Come, now!" said the man.

It seemed to listen.

Suddenly it leaped toward him. The man dodged the blow.

The battle began. Battle unprecedented. Frailty struggling against the invulnerable. The gladiator of the flesh attacking the beast of brass. On one side, brute force; on the other, a human soul.

All was taking place in semi-darkness; It was like the shadowy vision of a miracle.

A soul--strange to say, one would have thought the cannon also had a soul; but a soul full of hatred and rage. This sightless thing seemed to have eyes. The monster appeared to lie in wait for the man. One would have at least believed that there was craft in this mass. It also chose its time. It was a strange, gigantic insect of metal, having or seeming to have the will of a demon. For a moment this colossal locust would beat against the low ceiling overhead, then it would come down on its four wheels like a tiger on its four paws, and begin to run at the man. He, supple, nimble, expert, writhed away like an adder from all these lightning movements. He avoided a collision, but the blows which he parried fell against the vessel, and continued their work of destruction.

An end of broken, chain was left hanging to the carronade. This chain had in some strange way become twisted about the screw of the cascabel. One end of the chain was fastened to the gun-carriage. The other, left loose, whirled desperately about making all its blows more dangerous.

The screw held it in a firm grip, adding a thong to a battering-ram, making a terrible whirlwind around the cannon, an iron lash in a brazen hand. This chain complicated the contest.

However, the man went on fighting. Occasionally, it was the man who attacked the cannon; he would creep along the side of the vessel, bar and, rope in hand; and the cannon, as if it understood, and as though suspecting some snare, would flee away. The man, bent on victory, pursued it.

Such things can not long continue. The cannon seemed to say to itself, all of a sudden, "Come, now! Make an end of it!" and it stopped. One felt that the crisis was at hand. The cannon, as if in suspense, seemed to have, or really had--for to all it was a living being--a ferocious malice prepense. It made a sudden, quick dash at the gunner. The gunner sprang out of the way, let it pass by, and cried out to it with a laugh, "Try it again!" The cannon, as if enraged, smashed a carronade on the port side; then, again seized by the invisible sling which controlled it, it was hurled to the starboard side at the man, who made his escape. Three carronades gave way under the blows of the cannon; then, as if blind and not knowing what more to do, it turned its back on the man, rolled from stern to bow, injured the stern and made a breach in the planking of the prow. The man took refuge at the foot of the steps, not far from the old man who was looking on. The gunner held his iron bar in rest. The cannon seemed to notice it, and without taking the trouble to turn around, slid back on the man, swift as the blow of an axe. The man, driven against the side of the ship, was lost. The whole crew cried, out with horror.

But the old passenger, till this moment motionless, darted forth more quickly than any of this wildly swift rapidity. He seized a package of counterfeit assignates, and, at the risk of being crushed, succeeded in throwing it between the wheels of the carronade. This decisive and perilous movement could not have been made with more exactness and precision by a man trained in all the exercises described in Durosel's "Manual of Gun Practise at Sea."

The package had the effect of a clog. A pebble may stop a log, the branch of a tree turn aside an avalanche. The carronade stumbled. The gunner, taking advantage of this critical opportunity, plunged his iron bar between the spokes of one of the hind wheels. It leaned forward. The man, using the bar as a lever, held it in equilibrium. The heavy mass was overthrown, with the crash of a falling bell, and the man, rushing with all his might, dripping with perspiration, passed the slipnoose around the bronze neck of the subdued monster.

It was ended. The man had conquered. The had has control over the mastedon; the pygmy had taken the thunderbolt prisoner.

The mariners and sailors clapped their hands.

The gunner saluted the passenger.

"Sir," he said, you have saved my life."

The old man had resumed his impassive attitude, and made no reply.

The man had conquered, but the cannon might be said to have conquered as well. Immediate shipwreck had been avoided, but the corvet was not saved. The damage to the vessel seemed beyond repair. There were five breaches in her sides, one, very large, in the bow; twenty of the thirty carronades lay useless in their frames. The one which had just been captured and chained again was disabled; the screw of the cascabel was sprung, and consequently leveling the gun made impossible. The battery was reduced to nine pieces. The ship was leaking. It was necessary to repair the damages at once, and to work the pumps.

The gun-deck, now that one could look over it, was frightful to behold. The inside of an infuriated elephant's cage would not be more completely demolished.

However great might be the necessity of escaping observation, the necessity of immediate safety was still more imperative to the corvet. They had been obliged to light up the deck with lanterns hung here there on the sides.

However, all the while this tragic play was going on, the crew were absorbed by a question of life and death, and they were wholly ignorant of what was outside the vessel. The fog had grown thicker: the weather had changed; the wind had worked its pleasure with the ship; they were out of their course, with Jersey and Guernsey close at hand, further to the south than they ought to have been, and in the midst of a heavy sea. Great billows kissed the gaping wounds of the vessel--kisses full of danger. The rocking of the sea threatened destruction. The breeze had become a gale. A squall, a tempest, perhaps, was brewing. It was impossible to see four waves ahead.

While the crew were hastily repairing the damages to the gun-deck, stopping the leaks, and putting in place the guns which had been uninjured in the disaster, the old passenger had gone on deck again.

He stood with his back against the mainmast.

He had not noticed a proceeding which had taken place on the vessel. The Chevalier de la Vieuville had drawn up the marines in line on both sides of the mainmast, and at the sound of the boatswain's whistle the sailors formed in line, standing on the yards.

The Count de Boisberthelot approached the passenger.

Behind the captain walked a man, haggard, out of breath, his dress disordered, but still with a look of satisfaction on his face.

It was the gunner who had just shown himself so skilful in subduing monsters, and who had gained the mastery over the cannon.

The count gave the military salute to the old man in peasant's dress, and said to him:

"General, there is the man."

The gunner remained standing, with downcast eyes, in military attitude.

The Count de Boisberthelot continued:

"General, in consideration of what this man has done, do you not think there is something due him from his commander?"

"I think so," said the old man.

"Please give your orders," replied Boisberthelot.

"It is for you to give them, you are the captain."

"But you are the general," replied Boisberthelot.

The old man looked at the gunner.

"Come forward," he said. The gunner approached.

The old man turned toward the Count de Boisberthelot, took off the cross of Saint-Louis from the captain's coat and fastened it on the gunner's jacket.

"Hurrah!" cried the sailors.

The mariners presented arms.

And the old passenger, pointing to the dazzled gunner, added:

"Now, have this man shot."

Dismay succeeded the cheering.

Then in the midst of the death-like stillness, the old man raised his voice and said:

"Carelessness has compromised this vessel. At this very hour it is perhaps lost. To be at sea is to be in front of the enemy. A ship making a voyage is an army waging war. The tempest is concealed, but it is at hand. The whole sea is an ambuscade. Death the penalty of any misdemeanor committed in the face of the enemy. No fault is reparable. Courage should be rewarded, and negligence punished."

These words fell one after another, slowly, solemnly, in a sort of inexorable meter, like the blows of an upon an oak.

And the man, looking at the soldiers, added:

"Let it be done."

The man on whose jacket hung the shining cross Saint-Louis bowed his head.

At a signal from Count de Boisberthelot two sailors went below and came back bringing the hammock-shroud; the chaplain, who since they sailed had been at prayer in the officers' quarters, accompanied the two sailors; a sergeant detached twelve marines from the line and arranged them in two files, six by six; the gunner, without uttering a word, placed himself between the two files. The chaplain, crucifix in hand, advanced and stood beside him. "March," said the sergeant. The platoon marched with slow steps to the bow of the vessel. The two sailors, carrying the shroud, followed. A gloomy silence fell over the vessel. A hurricane howled in the distance.

A few moments later, a light flashed, a report sounded through the darkness, then all the sound of a body falling into the sea. was heard.

The old passenger, still leaning against the, mainmast, had crossed his arms, and was buried in thought.

Boisberthelot pointed to him with the forefinger of his left hand, and said to La Vieuville in a low voice:

"La Vend�e has a head."

� Secure this line!

Old Vic was truly a great writter. Back in the '80's, I came across one of his accounts in a dusty library stack.

During the 1840's, while he was in one of his many exiles in Brussels, he made a side trip to Waterloo. There, he interviewed anyone who bore witness to the events of 1815. The result, was a rivetting first hand account of what transpired.

He surely had a gift for faithfully putting thoughts, visualisations and emotions into paper.

Woot Hoot Toot! Calloo Callay, Oh Frabjous Day! Thank you Sir, you have posted the original of, and my favorite of, ALL "loose cannon" stories!

I am reminded of Admiral Ernie King: Before the Second World War he was most famous (IMHO) for ruining the career of somebody who had something bad (really an Act of God) happen to his ship while being her Captain. IIRC, the Skipper there was being very prudent and cautious and any rational human would have counted him blameless.

P.S. I think it was Admiral King's daughter who described him as "The most even-tempered man in the Navy- always in a rage."

My boss said it best, I think: "The Navy cannot afford to keep unlucky skippers." The one thing this incident had in common with the USS Greeneville tragedy is that they both involve extremely bad luck; despite all of the differences, they share this trait.

Based on what little I know (from what we've all read here, mostly), I feel for the skipper. It sounded like he was doing all the things he should have been doing, short of getting out and leading the ship.

Even so, I remember getting out and ground-guiding my tank, jeep, or truck driver whenever I wasn't sure what was in front of us. I KNOW it isn't the same, but going real fast at levels deeper than normal in poorly charted waters seems a slight bit careless. Like everyone else here, I easily defer to superior knowledge and experience in these matters, but it just seems like they were flying blind with unreliable instruments and no updated NOTAMs. Would simple orders to do that have been enough to make me do it? I don't know. I have been known to modify my actions based on "ground truth," but I guess it's just not for a landlubber like me to judge a sailor.

(though a man did die, and that changes things somewhat, I think).

What a way to end a career, huh? Just THUMP!

-SangerM

While many submariners may disagree with Steamer's characterization of the Greeneville collision as simply bad luck, I will agree that both COs, at the most basic level, came up on the wrong side of the odds under the "big ocean, little ship" theory that many submarine commanders operate(d) under. While I think I admit to myself deep down that for no other reason than tradition, CDR Mooney had to be fired, I would like to see some official acknowledgement of his skill in returning his ship to port. Like in the story, a medal along with the headsman (figurative, in the modern case, rather than literal). I've heard there's going to be an awards ceremony for the San Francisco very soon -- let the Navy break its tradition, and give the skipper the recognition for the good that he's done as well. It's a truism that one "aw sh*t" cancels out 100 attaboys, but let's give the man his due, both good and bad...

You know, I had a question and declined to post it, hoping Bubblehead would show up. He did. And he answered my question.

Thanks.

And some traditions suck.

It's a tough one. My Dad was a Navigator for an aircraft carrier. If that ship ran ashore, the Skipper's career AND the Gator's career was over. Period. End of story. You KNOW that going in. It's the cold hard facts of life.

Yeah, I feel for him. The whole situation sucks. But honestly, it is not my place to judge. The Navy has a chain of command and will do what needs to be done.

Heh, John, how's that for never commenting?

Well, pretty decent Boudi - except I had to entice you over with links and snarks!

Over.
The Skipper pays for the errors (or non-errors) of his crew. Commander Mooney is another in the long line of Navy casualties by happenstance. A command at sea is like none other. The Skipper is a god unto himself. But gods with only human ankles to support them can topple quickly. I am sure that Commander Mooney knew this condition upon accepting command...but is there any higher calling than that of commanding a fighting vessel of the United States Navy? How could he possibly resist?

My condolences and best wishes to Commander Mooney, and to the proud family of the dedicated submariner who lost his life because the goddamn charts were wrong. Both are victims of a cruel and mysterious sea.

Why then, if the skipper is a law unto himself and if the charts were incorrect, that that isn't taken into considertion? Like Bubblehead said, he got the sub back to shore and drydock (is that correct) for repairs without further loss of life, and that is no mean feat of sailing or leadership.

Just upset, is all. the Army captain who took a wrong turn that resulted in death and capture of ten of his people...what happened with him? He made an error of judgment, wasn't he relieved or did they give him another command? And isn't it kind of the same thing?

I am just asking, so please don't bite my head off.

Army Capt wasn't an O-5 or O-6 and I bet he doesn't make it there either.

It sucks, it really does, but this is how the Navy works. He isn't the first that this has happened to and he damn well won't be the last.

It wasn't the links, John! Maybe the snarkines... just a little... *grin* Hey, am I even on your blogroll???

Well, you were... then you changed (I thought) to a mu.nuvian... so I took off blogspot and replaced it with mu.nu... then I realized that you aren't over to mu.nu yet, so I took that off.

You can see where this is going, right?

The Navy Times published a short article about the grounding 2 weeks ago in which it was stated that the mound was not on any current, up to date charts.
It went on to say that a USGS (I believe) satallite had detected and flagged that very same mound back in the 70s as a "suspicious object" but no follow up was done.
The same article noted that the route the USS San Francisco is commonly used by all subs and navy ships but apparently no one noticed this mountain.
I don`t subscribe to Navy Times Online so I couldn`t do a follow up or supply a link.
If that info is true however, the skipper is being made into a scapegoat to cover up the fact that the Navy should have known that "object" was there in the first place.

Ah, Joatmoaf, I kinda agree with Ernie King here, as much as the idea of ever meeting him in some parallel universe frightens me. The captain of a warship is, even if not required to be, better at his job if he is effin' *psychic*!

Did somebody say "Fingerspitzengefuehl" here a while back?

In most cases I would agree, but not when there is no indication of negligence.

Simple fact of the matter was CDR Mooney was in command. End of story!

There was an old saying when I was floating around trying not to hit stuff and it was, "Let the damn boat hit something and you'd best go down with the her!"

And then there's Lex's philosphy on the "Three Kiss" rule (although it was called the double kiss when I was around, the last kiss being of recent vintage); "three kiss" rule on being relieved of command, without a band: kiss the ground, kiss another ship, kiss a shipmate."

When I was a lowly J.O. I was on a coastal freighter on the backside of the Malaaca Straits somewhere when we absolutely destroyed the wheel, struts, shaft, and even stuffing box on the starboard side when we ripped into an outcropping. I was fifteen minutes away from my wheelhouse duty hanging in the wheelhouse watching the run in and checked the navigation of the other J.O. on duty. He was dead in the middle of a tiny channel according to the charts. Perfect navigation. The Skipper was an old Dutch Captain with 40 years experience (one of my idols btw) and he, along with the XO, was relieved the minute we hit the dock. Nobody did anything wrong. The chart did not show any outcropping what-so-ever but that's what happens when you're in command.

I know I would've served with that Skipper anywhere and anytime but that's just simply the way it works. It is something that is understood before you ever get your first command. And this was just civilian stuff. I can imagine the ramifications of doing something like that on a warship!

Sh*t happens! And then you die!