The conference started out with a bang, and a presentation that I was surprised to find I could wrap my brain around pretty easily, a discussion by General Cartwright about the recently-released Quadrennial Defense Review and the associated challenges for the military.
General James E. Cartwright is the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a Marine and began his 39-year career as a fighter pilot. He spoke very fast and without notes as he walked across the platform, covering a wide range of issues with obvious depth and intelligence. Rather than offering many specific solutions, he discussed what he saw as the four most pressing issues for the U.S. military as it looks ahead, though he buried some thoughts on privacy and security at the end of his speech that left at least us bloggers rather exercised. Overall, he seemed genuinely excited to be there, and was humorous and insightful. I wrote in the margin of my notes, "irreverent," and "thoroughly Marine."
The general began his presentation with a great deal of humility and humor*, exclaiming after the vice-admiral introducing him read his bio,"You listen to a bio like that and check if that's really you!"
"We are a nation at war," GEN Cartwright said in preface to the meat of his speech, "And it is killing our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines...and that must be the center of our budget planning decisions." He also framed his discussions with the observation that the 2010 budget was presented just 1.5 weeks after the Obama administration took over, thus it's essentially a Bush budget; the impact of Obama military budgets won't really begin to be felt until 2014. He said that the transition to new budgets and new policies was going very well, adding that "The ace in the hole this time around" was keeping Gates as the Secretary of Defense. It "avoided a lack of focus" and was "hugely beneficial."
Despite all that, GEN Cartwright (who was also a holdover from the Bush administration) pointed out that with a new administration and new people working in and with the Department of Defense, it takes "a year to build that team... to believe you're all on the same side," with the same desire to protect the country even if everyone has different ideas of how to accomplish that.
In GEN Cartwright's opinion, the major point of the Quadrennial Defense Review is a "distinct" shift from the idea of maintaining the ability to fight two full-scale regional wars of large-scale maneuver at the same time, to instead deal with wars on the "entity level," such as a failed state or a terrorist organization.
According to GEN Cartwright, there are four big challenges for military planning and development:
1. Balance
2. Economics
3. Deterrence
4. Cyber warfare/defense
Planning has to be a balance between the known present and the unknown future, GEN Cartwright said. We need to "address the wars we are in," he emphasized in an implied to nod to former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "not the wars we hope we'll be in." Yet at the same time we must be "hedging bets" for the next war. "Whoever we think we'll be fighting next, we'll be wrong."
Economic concerns loomed large for GEN Cartwright. He expressed a great deal of worry and called the level of U.S. debt "massive," pointing out that eight years of war have also put a strain on equipment that requires money to maintain/replace. "Economics is a big part of warfare," he said. "Ignore it to your detriment," he warned. He was also very concerned about the need to recapitalize equipment, while recognizing it would be done "on the [financial] backs of U.S. citizens." He gave the impression of genuine concern about how Americans' money will be used, and to hear his obvious worry about the economic future of the country was unsettling (particularly in light of the proposed budget president Obama released that very day).
A big challenge to using citizens' money appropriately is that the economy (and thus the military as well) is moving from a 30-year patent cycle (which has long driven military planning and procurement) to an 18-month cycle along the lines of Moore's Law. GEN Cartwright said the military is "not yet reconciled" to that shift because the question is, "how to build aircraft lasting 50 years on an 18-month cycle...what makes platforms valuable for 50 years?"
As an example of this challenge, GEN Cartwright pointed out that the development and adaption cycle of an IED is about 30 days--from an insurgent developing/building and deploying an IED, to the military developing a countermeasure (technological or physical disruption), to the insurgent coming back with a successful adaption to the countermeasure. In that kind of 30-day context, how in the world can industry develop a platform or device that is worth anything by the time it's ready?
"Our fights have a 30-day cycle," GEN Cartwright said. "Right now it's on the back of the soldiers [for example, it's the guys on the ground that are coming up with countermeasures/counter-techniques for IEDs]. It needs to be on the back of the system, instead." The technological solutions need to be looking to the future so that warfighters can have in their hands things that will meet the evolving challenges they encounter. "Equipment and training must be more agile," he concluded, "inside our opponent's OODA Loop."
In the subject of deterence, GEN Cartwright said the Obama administration has decided as a matter of policy that we must reduce nuclear stockpiles and find a replacement for the deterrence impact of mutually-assured destruction (MAD). He pointed out that MAD is not a deterrent to current threats, but said that nuclear weapons do have a place for the foreseeable future. However, they must be "safe, state of the art/world-class, reliable and secure," a phrase he strongly emphasized several times.
"Missile defense is more capable than 10 years ago," GEN Cartwright said, but to be truly effective and replace MAD, it must be "a sum of nations," a network of sensors and command & control with delivery systems that are integrated across countries and brands. He envisioned a "netted system" that shares awareness even with non-allies. It must be scalable, with "burden-sharing," he said. He pointed to the Israeli Arrow missile system as an example. "Shared burden, shared awareness, shared defense," he said. This kind of construct is more adaptable he said, and allows for integration of allies in "new and unexpected places," such as the Pacific (Galrahn has further discussion of MAD replacement, and he has some concerns).
On the subject of deterrence and space, GEN Cartwright acknowledged that it's a "tough area," pointing out that 20 years ago the number of satellites could be numbered in the 10s. Now it's in the 10,000s. "It's a contested and competitive environment," he reported, and American industry is having to compete with the rest of the world. "Secrecy is way out of control," GEN Cartwright added in addressing what hampers competitiveness in space-related technologies. "Got to stop that." If not, in his opinion, the U.S. will be the only nation not competitive in space. GEN Cartwright seemed to be saying that the American government/military shouldn't be so paranoid about space secrets and instead allow American industry to sell proprietary technologies to other countries. "A non-isolationist stance is wanted," he concluded.
It was in the discussion of cyber matters that GEN Cartwright said a few jaw-dropping things. This subject is a hot topic and all the latest rage in military thinking. A new joint cyber command is being stood up (a commander was named only six months ago). The challenge is how to protect both the military and civilian infrastructure while maintaining privacy and other rights.
GEN Cartwright acknowledged that "debates are raging," but insisted a cyber command was absolutely necessary. Most-importantly to him, it "aligns the Services to provide training and options to commanders." Without the command and the clarity that comes from having a mandated mission, there is no basis in law to create and operate cyber capabilities/defense. The intention for the new joint command is to "keep it aligned with the warfighter," he said, avoiding secrecy and territorialism such as that found in the space commands. In other words, the US government's cyber capabilities would be supportive of military needs first and foremost.
This is where it all gets very sticky, which GEN Cartwright acknowledged. According to current law and policies, the military only has authority over what runs on/through .mil sites/networks. There is no authority over .gov areas, but the military still operates within .gov areas --and even .com etc., as well. The big concern is that any response to a massive cyber attack would be too late, likely destroying both private and government technological infrastructure on which we are so dependent these days. There currently exists the technical ability to defend the government and civilian cyber infrastructure, but there is no legal basis for acting--the U.S. Constitution didn't envision the current situation of interconnected and interdependent government, military and private networks, so we must tread very carefully in determining how rights are judged and protected in this new realm.
We often hear in general terms that cyber "probes" or attacks occur regularly on government networks/agencies, and cyber protection is a huge concern for any company dealing with networked technology. But in GEN Cartwright's view, citizens are unaware of the level of threat to the country and this obviously alarmed him (he's probably right, I fear). As a military man he's used to seeing a threat, developing a way to counter it, and then implementing that counter-measure. The problem is that in the area of cyber protection, many of those counter-measures run into concerns about privacy and Constitutionally-protected rights.
It was a bit disconcerting to hear such a senior military leader sworn to protect and uphold the Constitution talk about it as an impediment (which, technically speaking, it intentionally is). But that analysis could be forgiven when discussing things strictly from a theoretical "what are the issues here?" point of view, and he certainly didn't advocate it be changed.
The real bombshell was one his suggestions for resolving that tension between safety and the Constitution. GEN Cartwright suggested that the solution was for voluntary cooperation between civilian entities/companies (such as banks) and the military. He literally suggested that certain companies might be willing to reduce the level of privacy they have on in order to receive greater financial and physical security.
At that point, we bloggers just about fell out of our chairs. It was a straight-up suggestion that we give up privacy (liberty) for security. We looked across the table at each other with eyes wide, then scrambled for paper to record what we'd just heard. But GEN Cartwright continued blithely on, seemingly unaware of the echoes of what he'd just said, adding that this (theoretical) defensive capability should be run under existing government/military organizations, such as the NSA.
General Cartwright then wrapped things up, pointing out that none of the above issues (balance, economics, deterrence and cyber challenges) can be thought of alone--they are all connected. He concluded where he had started, pointing out that we must always keep the warfighter in mind. "That's the focus," he said.
During the Q&A time after his speech, GEN Cartwright returned again to issues of development cycles and cyber attack/defense. On the subject of military transformation and bringing the 30 or 50-year cycle closer to the tactical cycle on the ground, he said there was some progress but insisted, "We can move faster than people claim." According to him, what he called "calls to law" (on subjects of how bids, reviews, planning and development are conducted) "are from people who don't know law." He pointed out that supplemental budgets allow for more flexibility, but the main issue is that the zero-risk mentality of bureaucracy runs up against what is truly needed on the ground. He said the military must "institutionalize" the idea that 80% solutions delivered on time are better than supposedly perfected solutions delivered late.
According to GEN Cartwright, the enduring value of any weapons system/platform is its role as a foundation with adaptability on top of it so that it can be perfected as the mission requires. In example he referred to the Predator drone, which can be quickly reconfigured to meet the mission at hand. He also mentioned the military's recent conversion to completely digital video, pointing out that it was done at the cost of less than one typical weapons platform, but has a profound impact on information gathering and processing in a battle environment. "Weapons platforms are not the leverage anymore," he concluded.
On the subject of deterrence in cyberspace, GEN Cartwright displayed a great deal of detailed knowledge about the high-tech field. He said that cyber defense must be aggressive. Right now it's primarily firewalls--all defense, no aggression, "no layered construct or offensive construct." Defense is at the personal and server farm level, but GEN Cartwright seems to envision a national-level defense and protective (offensive) capability. He didn't get into details, but acknowledged that there needs to be discussion about "what will not be tolerated and what will be done in response" to an attack, and said it must be "appropriate and proportional."
The policies that will address this defense/offense are not yet in place. GEN Cartwright emphasized that the government is "working at network speed," but not across agencies (space, intel, etc) where there are major blocks, and both legal and territorial reasons to not share. "But to make policy, we must be working together," he said. He again raised the issue of the Constitution. The question is, "How close do we let [agencies] get together?" The issues according to GEN Cartwright are how to protect rights, versus how to fight/defend most effectively, versus how to find criminals (this tension is obviously front-and-center in counter-terrorism). "That's the challenge."
General Cartwright said that 3/4 of military bandwidth comes from commercial sources, which he called "a great thing," but there are places where the military need exceed commercial availability. This will be an even greater issue as the military moves to rely even more on technology and networked systems. The issue of bandwidth "worries me," he said. And it's not just technical bandwidth, he pointed out. There's the human bandwidth issue as well--it takes 29 analysts to support a Predator with a single target to record/bomb. From there, it explodes exponentially to the point of as many as 1800 analysts to handle an event. The military needs a way to process data without so many human eyes on it. We are "drowning" in info, he said, a theme repeated throughout the conference.
Overall I was extremely impressed with GEN Cartwright's obvious intelligence and grasp of the issues, and left with the feeling that we were in good hands. I actually said to Boston Maggie, "I could handle having him as the next CJCS." But his apparent obliviousness about privacy vs. security was worrying. As Salamander said, "General Cartwright, meet Ben Franklin."
*General Cartwright also shared a great story about the man who presided over the morning presentations, retired General Wilkerson, USMC, Chairman of USNI. Back when the general was a mere captain in the Marines, his squadron had apparently thrown quite the party in Las Vegas. As part of their punishment and discipline, the squadron XO announced there would be a full uniform inspection in just a few hours. With an impish smile, GEN Cartwright reported that despite the threat of a demanding inspection, he and his fellow pilots were "much less worried about our uniforms" than they were those of their squadron leadership.
When the time came for the inspection, no leader showed up to inspect the squadron. Apparently each senior officer was missing a part of his uniform such as pins, ribbons, belt buckle, etc. GEN Cartwright couldn't keep the triumphant grin off his face as he reported that then-Major Wilkerson managed to cobble together only enough of the proper uniform to appear before his men and report that the inspection had been canceled. The crowd loved it, and later GEN Wilkerson lamented with an ironic smile that of all the things he had attempted to teach the general, apparently only the memory of an inspection gone awry had stuck.
General James E. Cartwright is the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a Marine and began his 39-year career as a fighter pilot. He spoke very fast and without notes as he walked across the platform, covering a wide range of issues with obvious depth and intelligence. Rather than offering many specific solutions, he discussed what he saw as the four most pressing issues for the U.S. military as it looks ahead, though he buried some thoughts on privacy and security at the end of his speech that left at least us bloggers rather exercised. Overall, he seemed genuinely excited to be there, and was humorous and insightful. I wrote in the margin of my notes, "irreverent," and "thoroughly Marine."
The general began his presentation with a great deal of humility and humor*, exclaiming after the vice-admiral introducing him read his bio,"You listen to a bio like that and check if that's really you!"
"We are a nation at war," GEN Cartwright said in preface to the meat of his speech, "And it is killing our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines...and that must be the center of our budget planning decisions." He also framed his discussions with the observation that the 2010 budget was presented just 1.5 weeks after the Obama administration took over, thus it's essentially a Bush budget; the impact of Obama military budgets won't really begin to be felt until 2014. He said that the transition to new budgets and new policies was going very well, adding that "The ace in the hole this time around" was keeping Gates as the Secretary of Defense. It "avoided a lack of focus" and was "hugely beneficial."
Despite all that, GEN Cartwright (who was also a holdover from the Bush administration) pointed out that with a new administration and new people working in and with the Department of Defense, it takes "a year to build that team... to believe you're all on the same side," with the same desire to protect the country even if everyone has different ideas of how to accomplish that.
In GEN Cartwright's opinion, the major point of the Quadrennial Defense Review is a "distinct" shift from the idea of maintaining the ability to fight two full-scale regional wars of large-scale maneuver at the same time, to instead deal with wars on the "entity level," such as a failed state or a terrorist organization.
According to GEN Cartwright, there are four big challenges for military planning and development:
1. Balance
2. Economics
3. Deterrence
4. Cyber warfare/defense
Planning has to be a balance between the known present and the unknown future, GEN Cartwright said. We need to "address the wars we are in," he emphasized in an implied to nod to former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "not the wars we hope we'll be in." Yet at the same time we must be "hedging bets" for the next war. "Whoever we think we'll be fighting next, we'll be wrong."
Economic concerns loomed large for GEN Cartwright. He expressed a great deal of worry and called the level of U.S. debt "massive," pointing out that eight years of war have also put a strain on equipment that requires money to maintain/replace. "Economics is a big part of warfare," he said. "Ignore it to your detriment," he warned. He was also very concerned about the need to recapitalize equipment, while recognizing it would be done "on the [financial] backs of U.S. citizens." He gave the impression of genuine concern about how Americans' money will be used, and to hear his obvious worry about the economic future of the country was unsettling (particularly in light of the proposed budget president Obama released that very day).
A big challenge to using citizens' money appropriately is that the economy (and thus the military as well) is moving from a 30-year patent cycle (which has long driven military planning and procurement) to an 18-month cycle along the lines of Moore's Law. GEN Cartwright said the military is "not yet reconciled" to that shift because the question is, "how to build aircraft lasting 50 years on an 18-month cycle...what makes platforms valuable for 50 years?"
As an example of this challenge, GEN Cartwright pointed out that the development and adaption cycle of an IED is about 30 days--from an insurgent developing/building and deploying an IED, to the military developing a countermeasure (technological or physical disruption), to the insurgent coming back with a successful adaption to the countermeasure. In that kind of 30-day context, how in the world can industry develop a platform or device that is worth anything by the time it's ready?
"Our fights have a 30-day cycle," GEN Cartwright said. "Right now it's on the back of the soldiers [for example, it's the guys on the ground that are coming up with countermeasures/counter-techniques for IEDs]. It needs to be on the back of the system, instead." The technological solutions need to be looking to the future so that warfighters can have in their hands things that will meet the evolving challenges they encounter. "Equipment and training must be more agile," he concluded, "inside our opponent's OODA Loop."
In the subject of deterence, GEN Cartwright said the Obama administration has decided as a matter of policy that we must reduce nuclear stockpiles and find a replacement for the deterrence impact of mutually-assured destruction (MAD). He pointed out that MAD is not a deterrent to current threats, but said that nuclear weapons do have a place for the foreseeable future. However, they must be "safe, state of the art/world-class, reliable and secure," a phrase he strongly emphasized several times.
"Missile defense is more capable than 10 years ago," GEN Cartwright said, but to be truly effective and replace MAD, it must be "a sum of nations," a network of sensors and command & control with delivery systems that are integrated across countries and brands. He envisioned a "netted system" that shares awareness even with non-allies. It must be scalable, with "burden-sharing," he said. He pointed to the Israeli Arrow missile system as an example. "Shared burden, shared awareness, shared defense," he said. This kind of construct is more adaptable he said, and allows for integration of allies in "new and unexpected places," such as the Pacific (Galrahn has further discussion of MAD replacement, and he has some concerns).
On the subject of deterrence and space, GEN Cartwright acknowledged that it's a "tough area," pointing out that 20 years ago the number of satellites could be numbered in the 10s. Now it's in the 10,000s. "It's a contested and competitive environment," he reported, and American industry is having to compete with the rest of the world. "Secrecy is way out of control," GEN Cartwright added in addressing what hampers competitiveness in space-related technologies. "Got to stop that." If not, in his opinion, the U.S. will be the only nation not competitive in space. GEN Cartwright seemed to be saying that the American government/military shouldn't be so paranoid about space secrets and instead allow American industry to sell proprietary technologies to other countries. "A non-isolationist stance is wanted," he concluded.
It was in the discussion of cyber matters that GEN Cartwright said a few jaw-dropping things. This subject is a hot topic and all the latest rage in military thinking. A new joint cyber command is being stood up (a commander was named only six months ago). The challenge is how to protect both the military and civilian infrastructure while maintaining privacy and other rights.
GEN Cartwright acknowledged that "debates are raging," but insisted a cyber command was absolutely necessary. Most-importantly to him, it "aligns the Services to provide training and options to commanders." Without the command and the clarity that comes from having a mandated mission, there is no basis in law to create and operate cyber capabilities/defense. The intention for the new joint command is to "keep it aligned with the warfighter," he said, avoiding secrecy and territorialism such as that found in the space commands. In other words, the US government's cyber capabilities would be supportive of military needs first and foremost.
This is where it all gets very sticky, which GEN Cartwright acknowledged. According to current law and policies, the military only has authority over what runs on/through .mil sites/networks. There is no authority over .gov areas, but the military still operates within .gov areas --and even .com etc., as well. The big concern is that any response to a massive cyber attack would be too late, likely destroying both private and government technological infrastructure on which we are so dependent these days. There currently exists the technical ability to defend the government and civilian cyber infrastructure, but there is no legal basis for acting--the U.S. Constitution didn't envision the current situation of interconnected and interdependent government, military and private networks, so we must tread very carefully in determining how rights are judged and protected in this new realm.
We often hear in general terms that cyber "probes" or attacks occur regularly on government networks/agencies, and cyber protection is a huge concern for any company dealing with networked technology. But in GEN Cartwright's view, citizens are unaware of the level of threat to the country and this obviously alarmed him (he's probably right, I fear). As a military man he's used to seeing a threat, developing a way to counter it, and then implementing that counter-measure. The problem is that in the area of cyber protection, many of those counter-measures run into concerns about privacy and Constitutionally-protected rights.
It was a bit disconcerting to hear such a senior military leader sworn to protect and uphold the Constitution talk about it as an impediment (which, technically speaking, it intentionally is). But that analysis could be forgiven when discussing things strictly from a theoretical "what are the issues here?" point of view, and he certainly didn't advocate it be changed.
The real bombshell was one his suggestions for resolving that tension between safety and the Constitution. GEN Cartwright suggested that the solution was for voluntary cooperation between civilian entities/companies (such as banks) and the military. He literally suggested that certain companies might be willing to reduce the level of privacy they have on in order to receive greater financial and physical security.
At that point, we bloggers just about fell out of our chairs. It was a straight-up suggestion that we give up privacy (liberty) for security. We looked across the table at each other with eyes wide, then scrambled for paper to record what we'd just heard. But GEN Cartwright continued blithely on, seemingly unaware of the echoes of what he'd just said, adding that this (theoretical) defensive capability should be run under existing government/military organizations, such as the NSA.
General Cartwright then wrapped things up, pointing out that none of the above issues (balance, economics, deterrence and cyber challenges) can be thought of alone--they are all connected. He concluded where he had started, pointing out that we must always keep the warfighter in mind. "That's the focus," he said.
During the Q&A time after his speech, GEN Cartwright returned again to issues of development cycles and cyber attack/defense. On the subject of military transformation and bringing the 30 or 50-year cycle closer to the tactical cycle on the ground, he said there was some progress but insisted, "We can move faster than people claim." According to him, what he called "calls to law" (on subjects of how bids, reviews, planning and development are conducted) "are from people who don't know law." He pointed out that supplemental budgets allow for more flexibility, but the main issue is that the zero-risk mentality of bureaucracy runs up against what is truly needed on the ground. He said the military must "institutionalize" the idea that 80% solutions delivered on time are better than supposedly perfected solutions delivered late.
According to GEN Cartwright, the enduring value of any weapons system/platform is its role as a foundation with adaptability on top of it so that it can be perfected as the mission requires. In example he referred to the Predator drone, which can be quickly reconfigured to meet the mission at hand. He also mentioned the military's recent conversion to completely digital video, pointing out that it was done at the cost of less than one typical weapons platform, but has a profound impact on information gathering and processing in a battle environment. "Weapons platforms are not the leverage anymore," he concluded.
On the subject of deterrence in cyberspace, GEN Cartwright displayed a great deal of detailed knowledge about the high-tech field. He said that cyber defense must be aggressive. Right now it's primarily firewalls--all defense, no aggression, "no layered construct or offensive construct." Defense is at the personal and server farm level, but GEN Cartwright seems to envision a national-level defense and protective (offensive) capability. He didn't get into details, but acknowledged that there needs to be discussion about "what will not be tolerated and what will be done in response" to an attack, and said it must be "appropriate and proportional."
The policies that will address this defense/offense are not yet in place. GEN Cartwright emphasized that the government is "working at network speed," but not across agencies (space, intel, etc) where there are major blocks, and both legal and territorial reasons to not share. "But to make policy, we must be working together," he said. He again raised the issue of the Constitution. The question is, "How close do we let [agencies] get together?" The issues according to GEN Cartwright are how to protect rights, versus how to fight/defend most effectively, versus how to find criminals (this tension is obviously front-and-center in counter-terrorism). "That's the challenge."
General Cartwright said that 3/4 of military bandwidth comes from commercial sources, which he called "a great thing," but there are places where the military need exceed commercial availability. This will be an even greater issue as the military moves to rely even more on technology and networked systems. The issue of bandwidth "worries me," he said. And it's not just technical bandwidth, he pointed out. There's the human bandwidth issue as well--it takes 29 analysts to support a Predator with a single target to record/bomb. From there, it explodes exponentially to the point of as many as 1800 analysts to handle an event. The military needs a way to process data without so many human eyes on it. We are "drowning" in info, he said, a theme repeated throughout the conference.
Overall I was extremely impressed with GEN Cartwright's obvious intelligence and grasp of the issues, and left with the feeling that we were in good hands. I actually said to Boston Maggie, "I could handle having him as the next CJCS." But his apparent obliviousness about privacy vs. security was worrying. As Salamander said, "General Cartwright, meet Ben Franklin."
*General Cartwright also shared a great story about the man who presided over the morning presentations, retired General Wilkerson, USMC, Chairman of USNI. Back when the general was a mere captain in the Marines, his squadron had apparently thrown quite the party in Las Vegas. As part of their punishment and discipline, the squadron XO announced there would be a full uniform inspection in just a few hours. With an impish smile, GEN Cartwright reported that despite the threat of a demanding inspection, he and his fellow pilots were "much less worried about our uniforms" than they were those of their squadron leadership.
When the time came for the inspection, no leader showed up to inspect the squadron. Apparently each senior officer was missing a part of his uniform such as pins, ribbons, belt buckle, etc. GEN Cartwright couldn't keep the triumphant grin off his face as he reported that then-Major Wilkerson managed to cobble together only enough of the proper uniform to appear before his men and report that the inspection had been canceled. The crowd loved it, and later GEN Wilkerson lamented with an ironic smile that of all the things he had attempted to teach the general, apparently only the memory of an inspection gone awry had stuck.
Capo
Organizational inertia, cumbersome policy and personnel structures, turf battles between agencies, multi-year development and procurement cycles, etc etc, will inhibit our ability to get inside that 30-day OODA loop that GEN Cartwright speaks about.
I'm not sure how we can do it and provide adequate oversight and funding, but we need to come up with an organizational, procurement, and implementation structure that is more fragmented, de-centralized, and flexible like the threats we face.
He didn't talk about industry actually operating within that 30-day cycle, but about it creating something flexible enough keep up with the changes. Obviously there's nothing truly revolutionary that can be created and distributed in 30 days from industry to front lines. But if that hardware starts out with a great deal of flexibility, it would seem there's hope that the guys on the ground can adapt it to their needs. Classic American Ingenuity has always been a hallmark of GI Joe, but of course it was much simpler when everything was low-tech...
Certainly not an easy task. LOL
At what level does liberty trump dealing effectively with a threat to our existence? That's something that needs to be worked up in full by everyone. There's lots of debate to be had in there. Absolutism on either extreme isn't much good, but I'd have zero clue where to draw the line. We also have to take into account the reality that the threat potential is as much domestic as it is foreign these days.
As to the small nimbles, the USMC has been working up a doctrine that will do some of that. Distributed Operations concept is pushing initiative to an ever lower level of command and with the improvements in field communications, operational units are getting smaller and managing larger battle areas, often in interconnected mutually supporting type actions.
There's also such units as the SEALs, Rangers, Mar-Soc, Green Beanies, Force Recon and elements of our airborne units that have the men/mindset/skill sets needful for such things, and they've (most of them) have been used for such things all during this current war and in unpublished battles prior to this war.
Such teams are good for going after small terrorist command elements, but rather under gunned for the larger bodies of jihadiscum field forces. There you still need the conventional troops and all that goes with them.
I think we need to remember that we don't see or hear about all that is going on. The news only shows us so much, and what they show us tends to be shown either incomplete, inaccurate or spun for ideological reasons.
As to the industrial side of the quicker development, I would like remind everyone on how the thermoberic munitions got developed. A lady scientist with a small team saw the news coverage prior to going into Afghanistan and listened to what was said about the cave complexes our soldiers might have to fight into, so she decided to do something about it. And she did. Quickly.
That sort of thing does still happen. More often than what we are told.
Grimmy I really reckon we don't really know where to draw such lines and that they are actually drawn by the way the dominoes fall given the guidelines of things like our morality, the Constitution and concern for legal action and/or another attack.
That is why I believe the discussion that the Gen was either initiating or calling for is necessary and necessary now.
We either work it out, discuss and debate the issues, as a nation, or suffer the consequences, whichever way the ball breaks.
If we did have this discussion at a national level, the potential risks could be weighted, the assumed protections could be reviewed, and then the decisions made. As it is, we're going about it ad hoc and random, reactive, and all discussion or debate on the issue is being done by TV talking heads who are either completely clueless or driven by, what is often hostile, ideology. What we're doing now is known as "the way of the victim". We are behaving as sheep just sitting by waiting to see which pen we'll be placed into.