As we wait to see or hear anything on the motivations of Maj. Hasan for November 5ths rampage at Ft. Hood, early reports and general speculation may indicate that Maj. Hasan had some interaction with 'radical Islamic' websites.
Grumpy asked, if he was radicalized, by whom and is it provable in court?
About an eon ago, I read a very interesting book, The Origins of Terrorism, by Martha Crenshaw, published in 1998. I wrote about it at my old blog, Part I (general review), Part II (development of terrorist groups), and Part III (self selection).
The book is an excellent read and I highly suggest it for anyone interested in understanding how groups are organized and how individuals are drawn to join these groups or even act on their own for similar reasons.
For this discussion, I recommend Part III - Self Selection.
The book concentrated on such groups as Bader-Meinhoff and The Weathermen as examples of western terrorist groups. Based on interviews and psychological analysis, Crenshaw determined that most of those who made up the original group were not 'radicalized' by some other outside group or person, but came to the same conclusion on or about the same time and then sought out others who believed the same.
Later members who joined were largely not recruited by these organizations, but had sought them out in order to find support for their own beliefs and an outlet to express them. Often, violently. These groups didn't "actively" recruit because their existence and avoidance of the authorities depended on secrecy and anonymity.
It is the same trend that we see today. Many young Muslim men who join terrorist organizations or who have attempted to commit terrorist acts on western soil, are not recruited in the traditional manner, nor are they 'radicalized' by an individual or group. They aren't singled out and physically or personally approached. Most already have specific views or questions and seek out places or people where their opinions and ideas are accepted.
The last eight years, one of the most effective tools for disseminating radical Islamic views is the Internet. Several terms for this source have become popular such as Jihad.net or Internet Jihad, etc. Internet websites are relatively passive in the beginning stages of radicalization and recruitment. They can't reach out to individuals because they can't know what user is a candidate. The candidate self selects by seeking out the information.
In the beginning, such searches can be relatively benign although, as Crenshaw suggests, the individual may already have certain beliefs that leads them to the search. They may end up on an open forum that is generally related, such as a forum for Muslims to discuss issues of religion or culture. Once they ask certain questions or express specific views, they may be directed with links to other websites or forums that will provide 'answers' or 'information'.
At each step, the directed links may become more and more radical in their views. At any point, a user can stop reading or choose to not believe the answers or information. Chrenshaw's view would suggest that the person chooses to continue because the information or answers they receive coincide with or support the person's already existing ideas. Self-selection.
A person does not have to join the group physically or congregate with other members to decide to espouse their beliefs or act on them. In fact, Crenshaw suggests that individuals who commit individual terrorist acts may have been rejected by the group the individual sought to join and decided to commit the act to show their loyalty or commitment to the ideology or group. Without express direction or assistance from the group or any of its members.
In short, "I believe as you do, now watch what I can do."
Crenshaw also suggested that the reasons the individual acts are largely in relation to his or her own personal issues. Any ideology they may be attracted to or espouse may simply be the way they reduce inhibitions, seek permission for or justify their actions. It isn't their sole motivation.
Some points of self-selection from this post that may apply to the case in question:
One of the more interesting pieces of information that came out is that Maj. Hasan appeared at some sort of fund raiser or political event for President Obama. There are some strange insinuations regarding this attendance, but it is very likely that Maj. Hasan attended in order to approach Pres. Obama directly regarding his views on the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war. He suggested to colleagues that he would like to ask Pres. Obama to withdraw US troops.
The failure to reach Pres. Obama or speak to anyone of importance may have been a trigger for Maj. Hasan to seek out other venues to have his opinions confirmed or to set his subsequent attack in motion. That doesn't mean that, had he met with Pres. Obama or been able to relay his views, he would have been satisfied since it is likely he would have received an unsatisfactory answer.
This maybe another personal failure that suggested to Maj. Hasan that the society he moved in, particularly, the non-radical Muslim community he associated and worshiped with, did not meet his personal needs and that he did not fit in with his liberal peers either.
The last point is also an interesting one in regards to our current political situation. Like many supporters of Pres. Obama's election, he may have expected that the president would be able to or want to uphold his promise to have all troops re-deployed from Iraq within 30 days or the war ended forth with. Almost a year later, large numbers of troops remain in Iraq and are still being deployed. Maj. Hasan was personally scheduled to deploy sometime in the near future.
In Afghanistan, far from a de-escalation of the war, a troop 'surge' is under review and a new strategy is being developed. All the while the Pakistan military is pressing in to tribal areas in a tandem operation with US forces on the other side of the border.
Again, that doesn't make Pres. Obama responsible for Hasan's actions. Whatever Hasan's motivation, they stem from his own personal beliefs and issues, not the President.
Other points of disenfranchisement include not just a lack of friendship within his peer group (fellow military officers), but ostracized due to cultural background or political beliefs. To quote one peer who disagreed that Hasan was being discriminated against due to his peers prejudices, he made himself 'a lightening rod' by expressing certain political beliefs. A neighbor said that he was often alone and didn't seem to have any friends.
Hasan may have also felt rejected by fellow Muslims and/or his family because he served in the US military. That may have separated him from his normal social group and even subjected him to outright ridicule for that service. (In an unrelated forum for Muslim Servicemen and women, I read several posts that suggested that these service members felt separated from the outside Muslim community and had actually experienced or perceived insults and ridicule from fellow Muslims for that service.)
The final point for self-selection is "projection":
All of these points could be applied to Mr. Rodriguez who committed mass murder on Nov. 6th. With one significant difference: there is no information that suggests Mr. Rodriguez sought out information or any organization with radical beliefs before committing the heinous crime.
In another discussion, the point was made that Maj. Hasan violated several oaths including his oath as a member of the armed forces to protect the Constitution and the United States from all enemies, his oath as a physician to 'first do no harm' and, lastly, his unspoken oath or point of honor to defend his fellow soldiers. He violated a time honored and deep trust of those he had served with for over ten years.
One reason that 'self-selection' for terrorism remains a very possible motivation in this case is Crenshaw's suggestion that individuals seek out terrorist ideologies and organizations "to reduce inhibitions, seek permission for or justify their actions". Even though those actions are motivated by a whole other slew of personal issues noted above and the individual may not even subscribe to all of the ideology's ideas.
Maj. Hasan may have required more than self-motivation to overcome deeply held beliefs and allow him to disregard important oaths that had defined him for over ten years. He may have sought some sort of "permission" or "justification" to disregard them. He would have easily found that on the Internet.
Some have suggested that Maj. Hasan was a "nut job". As Crenshaw notes in the section of her book titled "Psycho-Logical", most mass murderers, serial killers and terrorists are not clinically insane. Their actions may seem "crazy" to us, but most of them have become what they are through very logical thinking. They know right from wrong. They simply choose to disregard it or find some justification to act as they wish and satisfy their aberrant desires.
Aside from that, the idea that he was "crazy" should be approached with as much caution as the idea that he was a self-selected terrorist, had radical beliefs, or even that he acted alone without outside direction or assistance from another individual or organization.
Hasan appears to have acted very rationally within the weeks, days and minutes leading up to the attack. He cleared out his apartment, gave away his furniture and some personal belongings, said his farewells to friends, paid off his debts, went to prayers early that morning, bought a cup of coffee and conversed briefly with the attendant, put on his uniform, collected his weapons and ammunition, drove to the base without incident, acted calmly and coolly enough to get on base, went about his business for a few hours without alerting anyone to his upcoming actions, probably interacted with a few people before hand without drawing any attention, chose the location of his attack for maximum effect and number of targets, proceeded to "calmly and methodically" shoot his victims, sometimes more than once to insure that they were dead and then attempted to escape when he was confronted, engaging two officers in a shoot out before he was taken down.
These are not the actions of a "crazy" person any more than Ted Bundy, when he hunted, raped and killed his victims, was crazy or any of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 who, I might add, showed similar pre-attack logical steps. Including one interesting fact that one or more of the men who were single made arranged marriages just prior to the attack. A not uncommon practice among young Muslim men who are about to join the 'jihad' or seek some form of 'martyrdom'.
Actually, it isn't uncommon to see US service members become engaged or married right before they deploy so Hasan's actions looking for a bride don't necessarily point to an earlier plan to commit a terrorist attack. Just a thought to keep in mind while we wait for information.
Finally, regardless of the findings in the Ft. Hood case, the problem of self-selection in terrorism will remain a serious problem in the years to come as it has in the decades past. Crenshaw wrote that groups like Bader-Meinhoff and the Weathermen were not necessarily destroyed by the actions of authorities. Neither did their recruitment abilities diminish because they did not have media attention or could not afford the money or man hours to recruit or develop propaganda.
Members seeking to join the organization diminished and disappeared because society changed, because their actions became so reprehensible that it was no longer even tacitly accepted, because sympathy for their cause diminished or their cause became unpopular and because world events changed people's expectations.
In the end, many of these organizations disintegrated and members went their own way. Once group cohesiveness was damaged and they could not find much support within society, their security was compromised and members were arrested. Some went on to try to establish new groups to keep their ideology going and failed repeatedly.
However, individuals who meet the criteria of failure, disenchantment, disenfranchisement and projection, still seek out organizations today. Some notable examples include Tim McVeigh, Jon Walker-Lindh and numerous others.
Stopping individuals is an impossible task. Every individual comes to the table with their own set of psycho-social issues leading them to seek wider organizations. Stopping organizations or destroying an ideology isn't much easier. Our main goal has to be to push society away from even tacitly supporting these organizations or accepting any part of their actions. In a war torn region like the Middle East or Southwest Asia, that is a very tall order.
That will not end self selected terrorism. Those who would have or will self select in the future do so for their own reasons. They will simply search to find another group to belong to, another ideology that supports their views and gives them "permission" to act.
Then there is the problem of terrorism for the sake of terrorism. There is no cure for sociopathic tendencies. We may have to accept that terrorism is here to stay and our only recourse is to be prepared to mitigate the effects, repair the damage and go on with our lives.
Grumpy asked, if he was radicalized, by whom and is it provable in court?
About an eon ago, I read a very interesting book, The Origins of Terrorism, by Martha Crenshaw, published in 1998. I wrote about it at my old blog, Part I (general review), Part II (development of terrorist groups), and Part III (self selection).
The book is an excellent read and I highly suggest it for anyone interested in understanding how groups are organized and how individuals are drawn to join these groups or even act on their own for similar reasons.
For this discussion, I recommend Part III - Self Selection.
The book concentrated on such groups as Bader-Meinhoff and The Weathermen as examples of western terrorist groups. Based on interviews and psychological analysis, Crenshaw determined that most of those who made up the original group were not 'radicalized' by some other outside group or person, but came to the same conclusion on or about the same time and then sought out others who believed the same.
Later members who joined were largely not recruited by these organizations, but had sought them out in order to find support for their own beliefs and an outlet to express them. Often, violently. These groups didn't "actively" recruit because their existence and avoidance of the authorities depended on secrecy and anonymity.
It is the same trend that we see today. Many young Muslim men who join terrorist organizations or who have attempted to commit terrorist acts on western soil, are not recruited in the traditional manner, nor are they 'radicalized' by an individual or group. They aren't singled out and physically or personally approached. Most already have specific views or questions and seek out places or people where their opinions and ideas are accepted.
The last eight years, one of the most effective tools for disseminating radical Islamic views is the Internet. Several terms for this source have become popular such as Jihad.net or Internet Jihad, etc. Internet websites are relatively passive in the beginning stages of radicalization and recruitment. They can't reach out to individuals because they can't know what user is a candidate. The candidate self selects by seeking out the information.
In the beginning, such searches can be relatively benign although, as Crenshaw suggests, the individual may already have certain beliefs that leads them to the search. They may end up on an open forum that is generally related, such as a forum for Muslims to discuss issues of religion or culture. Once they ask certain questions or express specific views, they may be directed with links to other websites or forums that will provide 'answers' or 'information'.
At each step, the directed links may become more and more radical in their views. At any point, a user can stop reading or choose to not believe the answers or information. Chrenshaw's view would suggest that the person chooses to continue because the information or answers they receive coincide with or support the person's already existing ideas. Self-selection.
A person does not have to join the group physically or congregate with other members to decide to espouse their beliefs or act on them. In fact, Crenshaw suggests that individuals who commit individual terrorist acts may have been rejected by the group the individual sought to join and decided to commit the act to show their loyalty or commitment to the ideology or group. Without express direction or assistance from the group or any of its members.
In short, "I believe as you do, now watch what I can do."
Crenshaw also suggested that the reasons the individual acts are largely in relation to his or her own personal issues. Any ideology they may be attracted to or espouse may simply be the way they reduce inhibitions, seek permission for or justify their actions. It isn't their sole motivation.
Some points of self-selection from this post that may apply to the case in question:
Maj. Hasan may have been demoted or seen his transfer from Walter Reed to a deploying unit as a demotion. There are suggestions that he was given a bad or indifferent review that criticized his performance.Failure, Personal or Political, Real or Perceived
Failure at work including being fired, passed over for advancement or taking a job outside of their learned or expected professional or technical ability even if they were successful in school.
May have run for an office and failed or attempted to change government policy unsuccessfully through direct lobbying or even protesting
May have been rejected personally by a politician, by the government or by a political group they wished to join or requested assistance from.
One of the more interesting pieces of information that came out is that Maj. Hasan appeared at some sort of fund raiser or political event for President Obama. There are some strange insinuations regarding this attendance, but it is very likely that Maj. Hasan attended in order to approach Pres. Obama directly regarding his views on the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war. He suggested to colleagues that he would like to ask Pres. Obama to withdraw US troops.
The failure to reach Pres. Obama or speak to anyone of importance may have been a trigger for Maj. Hasan to seek out other venues to have his opinions confirmed or to set his subsequent attack in motion. That doesn't mean that, had he met with Pres. Obama or been able to relay his views, he would have been satisfied since it is likely he would have received an unsatisfactory answer.
It seems apparent that Maj. Hasan didn't have any aberrant habits as we would classify them. However, it was reported that he attempted and failed to find a wife through an Islamic organization. Sex outside of marriage is a religious and cultural taboo for Muslims. As an officer, he was likely surrounded by peers that were already married. As an officer in the military of a liberal society, his lack of outside romantic relationships set him apart.Personal failure including involved in petty crimes, drug habit, alternate lifestyles (such as underground club scenes, sex, etc), drinking habit, etc
This maybe another personal failure that suggested to Maj. Hasan that the society he moved in, particularly, the non-radical Muslim community he associated and worshiped with, did not meet his personal needs and that he did not fit in with his liberal peers either.
Disenchantment, Social, Economical and Political;
Cultural Schizophrenia: parents come from other culture or socially traditional background, children exposed to, live in or grow up in liberal culture or society.
Find themselves torn between two cultures, may even be re-enforced by parental demands for conformity to some, if not all, traditional norms.
Traditional culture or religious requirements may separate them from their more liberal peers such as interruptions from other social activities for prayer, fasting, tight curfews, clothing, etc
Political or ideological views keep them from full friendship with more liberal peers.
May believe they are socially or economically unable to move up due to their cultural, social or economical background
May have experienced bigotry or other prejudice directly or believe that bigotry and prejudices have affected them or their family.
May have expected a political, economic or social change to have alleviated some of their expectations and found that the order remains the same.
The last point is also an interesting one in regards to our current political situation. Like many supporters of Pres. Obama's election, he may have expected that the president would be able to or want to uphold his promise to have all troops re-deployed from Iraq within 30 days or the war ended forth with. Almost a year later, large numbers of troops remain in Iraq and are still being deployed. Maj. Hasan was personally scheduled to deploy sometime in the near future.
In Afghanistan, far from a de-escalation of the war, a troop 'surge' is under review and a new strategy is being developed. All the while the Pakistan military is pressing in to tribal areas in a tandem operation with US forces on the other side of the border.
Again, that doesn't make Pres. Obama responsible for Hasan's actions. Whatever Hasan's motivation, they stem from his own personal beliefs and issues, not the President.
Other points of disenfranchisement include not just a lack of friendship within his peer group (fellow military officers), but ostracized due to cultural background or political beliefs. To quote one peer who disagreed that Hasan was being discriminated against due to his peers prejudices, he made himself 'a lightening rod' by expressing certain political beliefs. A neighbor said that he was often alone and didn't seem to have any friends.
Hasan may have also felt rejected by fellow Muslims and/or his family because he served in the US military. That may have separated him from his normal social group and even subjected him to outright ridicule for that service. (In an unrelated forum for Muslim Servicemen and women, I read several posts that suggested that these service members felt separated from the outside Muslim community and had actually experienced or perceived insults and ridicule from fellow Muslims for that service.)
The final point for self-selection is "projection":
Most of these points are very similar to those that psychologists have developed for personalities that have committed mass murder or become serial killers. In fact, until the investigation is completed and, if possible, Maj. Hasan is interviewed, his motivations remain obscured and subject to supposition.Personal, social, political and economic failures are "not their fault" but some outside entity including peers, social, cultural, political or economic structure, other groups not of their ethnic or cultural identity, the government, some other government or other forces outside of their control, real or perceived.
All of these points could be applied to Mr. Rodriguez who committed mass murder on Nov. 6th. With one significant difference: there is no information that suggests Mr. Rodriguez sought out information or any organization with radical beliefs before committing the heinous crime.
In another discussion, the point was made that Maj. Hasan violated several oaths including his oath as a member of the armed forces to protect the Constitution and the United States from all enemies, his oath as a physician to 'first do no harm' and, lastly, his unspoken oath or point of honor to defend his fellow soldiers. He violated a time honored and deep trust of those he had served with for over ten years.
One reason that 'self-selection' for terrorism remains a very possible motivation in this case is Crenshaw's suggestion that individuals seek out terrorist ideologies and organizations "to reduce inhibitions, seek permission for or justify their actions". Even though those actions are motivated by a whole other slew of personal issues noted above and the individual may not even subscribe to all of the ideology's ideas.
Maj. Hasan may have required more than self-motivation to overcome deeply held beliefs and allow him to disregard important oaths that had defined him for over ten years. He may have sought some sort of "permission" or "justification" to disregard them. He would have easily found that on the Internet.
Some have suggested that Maj. Hasan was a "nut job". As Crenshaw notes in the section of her book titled "Psycho-Logical", most mass murderers, serial killers and terrorists are not clinically insane. Their actions may seem "crazy" to us, but most of them have become what they are through very logical thinking. They know right from wrong. They simply choose to disregard it or find some justification to act as they wish and satisfy their aberrant desires.
Aside from that, the idea that he was "crazy" should be approached with as much caution as the idea that he was a self-selected terrorist, had radical beliefs, or even that he acted alone without outside direction or assistance from another individual or organization.
Hasan appears to have acted very rationally within the weeks, days and minutes leading up to the attack. He cleared out his apartment, gave away his furniture and some personal belongings, said his farewells to friends, paid off his debts, went to prayers early that morning, bought a cup of coffee and conversed briefly with the attendant, put on his uniform, collected his weapons and ammunition, drove to the base without incident, acted calmly and coolly enough to get on base, went about his business for a few hours without alerting anyone to his upcoming actions, probably interacted with a few people before hand without drawing any attention, chose the location of his attack for maximum effect and number of targets, proceeded to "calmly and methodically" shoot his victims, sometimes more than once to insure that they were dead and then attempted to escape when he was confronted, engaging two officers in a shoot out before he was taken down.
These are not the actions of a "crazy" person any more than Ted Bundy, when he hunted, raped and killed his victims, was crazy or any of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 who, I might add, showed similar pre-attack logical steps. Including one interesting fact that one or more of the men who were single made arranged marriages just prior to the attack. A not uncommon practice among young Muslim men who are about to join the 'jihad' or seek some form of 'martyrdom'.
Actually, it isn't uncommon to see US service members become engaged or married right before they deploy so Hasan's actions looking for a bride don't necessarily point to an earlier plan to commit a terrorist attack. Just a thought to keep in mind while we wait for information.
Finally, regardless of the findings in the Ft. Hood case, the problem of self-selection in terrorism will remain a serious problem in the years to come as it has in the decades past. Crenshaw wrote that groups like Bader-Meinhoff and the Weathermen were not necessarily destroyed by the actions of authorities. Neither did their recruitment abilities diminish because they did not have media attention or could not afford the money or man hours to recruit or develop propaganda.
Members seeking to join the organization diminished and disappeared because society changed, because their actions became so reprehensible that it was no longer even tacitly accepted, because sympathy for their cause diminished or their cause became unpopular and because world events changed people's expectations.
In the end, many of these organizations disintegrated and members went their own way. Once group cohesiveness was damaged and they could not find much support within society, their security was compromised and members were arrested. Some went on to try to establish new groups to keep their ideology going and failed repeatedly.
However, individuals who meet the criteria of failure, disenchantment, disenfranchisement and projection, still seek out organizations today. Some notable examples include Tim McVeigh, Jon Walker-Lindh and numerous others.
Stopping individuals is an impossible task. Every individual comes to the table with their own set of psycho-social issues leading them to seek wider organizations. Stopping organizations or destroying an ideology isn't much easier. Our main goal has to be to push society away from even tacitly supporting these organizations or accepting any part of their actions. In a war torn region like the Middle East or Southwest Asia, that is a very tall order.
That will not end self selected terrorism. Those who would have or will self select in the future do so for their own reasons. They will simply search to find another group to belong to, another ideology that supports their views and gives them "permission" to act.
Then there is the problem of terrorism for the sake of terrorism. There is no cure for sociopathic tendencies. We may have to accept that terrorism is here to stay and our only recourse is to be prepared to mitigate the effects, repair the damage and go on with our lives.
Assume nothing, always ask! "Was he radicalized?" Does this question, in any way, limit the individual's right or ability to make choices, therefore make themselves accountable? *NO!*
As per the original comment, "If so, how? By whom?" It may be "self-selection", but again, it should never ever be assumed! Do your investigation! Find the evidence from all sources. Prove that it was self-selection, with Federal Court Approved Evidence. Failure to do so, especially on Military Bases within CONUS, put's us in a pre 9/11/01 status. We have no dots to connect. We, as humans tend to follow the path of least resistance.
Your concept is so easy and yet, so deadly.
Also, even though self-selection may produce a candidate for terrorism, I wonder how many of them go all the way, or try, without direct contact with other "radical sources. Regarding Hasan, links 1 and 2. Given the availability of "radical" preachers taking advantage of the 1st Amendment and our PC-induced blindness to their actions, it might make more sense to look at self-selection and conventional recruiting as more of a spectrum than discrete states. For example, Hasan's apparent case: Initial self-selection leading to direct association and further "radicalization" or reinforcement of "radical" beliefs prior to the attack. In cases where a self-selected candidate becomes involved with a center for more conventional recruiting, strategies devised to inhibit recruiting should still be effective. In nearly stand-alone cases, I'm not sure what means could be taken to anticipate and prevent attacks without massively-invasive data-mining efforts to catch "radical" statements online (that being the easiest means of accessing more information and expressing one's views without significant interaction). Regardless, I certainly agree that self-selection needs greater consideration and study in counter-terrorism efforts, particularly at home.