Two useful documents.

The primary concern I have with the concept, much less application, of pop-centric COIN as described here and elsewhere is that it seems to depend on the enemies and the general populace being mostly-separate entities. In Iraq, our opponents were largely foreign fighters and less-than-popular Baathist remnants, and proving that we (as well as the Iraqi forces) could protect the citizens from those elements, letting life regain some degree of normalcy, turned the tide in our favor in terms of denying the enemy civilian support (garnered through fear), gaining us access to vital intelligence channels, and destroying support for local resistance groups.

However, the Taliban in Afghanistan is, as I understand it (and I’d appreciate input from anyone with more direct knowledge than my readings), vitally connected to the populace. Coming into an area and killing insurgents is going to destroy any chance of gaining the trust and support of the local populace when many of the insurgents are fathers, brothers, and sons of the locals. Likewise, even with enemies routinely disregarding the lives of the local people, the “I help them because father is fighting the foreign invaders in the name of Allah” mentality of those protecting the insurgents is vastly more difficult to overcome than the simple “I help them because they’ll kill me if I don’t” one. Refusing protection to or giving up information on people with whom you share tribal/family bonds, no matter what atrocities they’ve committed, seems highly unlikely in the predominant Afghan culture.

Ironically, the influx of Al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters from their failing situation in Iraq may just give us the leverage needed to make pop-centric COIN work in Afghanistan. If we focus on driving a wedge between the locals and foreigners, even between local and foreign combatants, turning it into a three-part relationship of locals, foreign fighters, and us, we might be able to exploit by shifting some of the animus away from our forces. Regardless, the Iraq-style COIN isn’t going to work without some considerable changes to accommodate the social integration of the Taliban, and, in some cases, it may be simply impossible to use pop-centric COIN at all (those so thoroughly invested in the Taliban as to essentially function as its non-combat arm), necessitating a different approach. My thinking is that a two-tiered system with proper prefacing actions will give the best results.

Before directly engaging any campaign to weaken, defeat, or alter (ie. inducing a shift from a militant to an exclusively social organization) the Taliban, we need examples of our ability, in-country, to provide protection from any reprisal prior to engaging an area with any Taliban activity of note. To this end, tribal areas, preferably of varying ethnic and tribal connections, that are fairly remote (so as to allay concerns that our sustained projection of power is limited to more developed regions) but lack considerable Taliban control should be approached and agreements made for their protection. At the same time, begin a propaganda campaign identifying the foreign combatants as invaders seeking to usurp the traditional Afghan structure and our troops as fighting to protect it.

Using those areas as examples, make overtures to the leadership of increasingly Taliban-controlled areas by offering a combination of protection and infrastructure improvements while also offering the forgiveness, sanctuary, support, and a return to their homes for tribal members affiliated with the Taliban, so long as they renounce support for it. Proving that we can protect former members from reprisal for such an action will be of utmost importance to securing a large-scale decrease in Taliban power, and having proved our intent and ability to protect other areas from less personal Taliban attacks will have established the foundation to build that de-militarization. If at all possible, it should also be maintained that the Taliban’s social support functions may be kept, even augmented, as long as the attacks stop, in line with the alteration mentioned above.

At the same time (the second tier), we need to make absolutely clear that being in and/or supporting the Taliban’s attacks is nothing more than a good way to die. If overtures are firmly refused (subject to interpretation; ie. “We’re not sure you can protect us well enough yet” should not be conflated with “Sod off; we support the Taliban”), they should understand that, though overkill will not be used, we will not restrict our force while engaging Taliban combatants. While pop-centric COIN can work in many places, some will only respond to a harsh reality in which associating with Taliban fighters and foreign combatants is a death wish. In addition to the possibility of some groups accepting us which otherwise would not, our troops are not tied down in the enemy sights with no reason.

In most of the document, I agree with the plans and structure, but I think greater consideration needs to be given to extricating the populace from the Taliban’s military arm and demonstrating the use of overwhelming force against those who continue to fight against us or we’ll simply see villages pretending to support us while Taliban operations continue behind our backs.  Of course, certain... circumstances... probably preclude any effective strategy and sufficient application of force to protect anyone, so my two cents is just talking into the wind.  I'll keep hoping to the contrary.