A subject of some contention around here, the use of WP. Over at Armchair Generalist, too. Since he's a Chem Warfare geek, he's usually worth reading on the subject, and has the further advantage of being a readable lefty!
CJTF-101 is continuing the dueling info ops on the subject, with this press release about the Taliban using WP on Coalition Forces. They are a little disingenuous at the end, however, regarding use and purpose.
Complete with pictures of 82mm (Warsaw Pact caliber, we use 81mm mortars) WP rounds.
Seven 82 mm mortar rounds, five of which are white phosphorus, were discovered as part of a larger cache by International Security Assistance Force troops in Bamiyan Province May 16. The rounds were collected for destruction. (U.S. Army courtesy photo)
The Coalition, trying to find a way to fight the "Hearts and Minds" fight regarding civilian casualties has just published this interim report below on the fight in Farah province where there were competing claims about who died, how many, and how they died.
The handicap the Coalition fights under of course is that the Taliban and their supporters can pretty much say what they want, when they want - and the Coalition has to be careful to have their ducks in order - because unlike the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Coalition is going to get fact-checked out the wazoo. Which always means they are playing catch-up. But: Catch-up is better than just ceding the field to the enemy.
But even this report begs the question of whether or not airpower was the best answer to this particular problem. Nothing's easy in war and certainly the greatest blame lays with the Taliban for their use of human shields. But as that is a seeming given, and with the political costs that attach to the Coalition for the civlian casualties - this goes back to a question we hashed over during the discussion on WP - are the trade-offs worth it? Was killing the 60 or so Taliban fighters and regaining the village worth the 30 civilian casualties?
When looked at in isolation, reaching an answer of "Probably not" isn't too hard to do depending on your start point for the analysis... but nothing in war happens in isolation, and the commanders on-scene and overall, including the political leadership, have to consider the branches and sequels - which are usually muddy and intertwined, and only obvious after the fact. And by after the fact, I don't just mean a specific fight, but years from now. So what seems like a simple call in isolation - isn't a simple call at all. And mutliple occurences the same set of localized incident specific circumstances can call for a different answer each time, when larger issues of context come into play.
CJTF-101 is continuing the dueling info ops on the subject, with this press release about the Taliban using WP on Coalition Forces. They are a little disingenuous at the end, however, regarding use and purpose.
Insurgents continue white phosphorus attacks
BAGRAM, Afghanistan (May 19, 2009) - Today, militants continued to attack International Security Assistance Force personnel using white phosphorus munitions. In Gayan District, Paktika province, insurgents mortared an ISAF combat outpost with white phosphorus and high explosive rounds. No injuries or damage were reported.
This past week, two other cases of enemy white phosphorus use have been recorded in Regional Command-East, following the 11 May release of 38 declassified instances of insurgent white phosphorus access and misuse against personnel.
On May 16, ISAF troops in Bamiyan discovered a large cache of various ordnance, including nine 82mm white phosphorus mortar rounds. The rounds, which were photographed as evidence, were collected for destruction.
Also on May 16, an ISAF unit located a white phosphorus 107mm rocket emplaced in the vicinity of an ISAF forward operating base in Kama District, Nangahar province. The rocket, which had been aimed in the direction of the base, was later safely disarmed.
White phosphorus is appropriately employed for screening of troop movements, marking targets, illumination, as well as destruction of unoccupied bunkers, buildings and weapons systems, and the demolition of otherwise flammable materials such as ammo and petroleum products.
WP is used as a smoke-producing agent common to the arsenals of many nations, and is classified as conventional ordnance. It is not designed for use against personnel.
ISAF employs white phosphorus in accordance with theatre rules of engagement and international law.
Complete with pictures of 82mm (Warsaw Pact caliber, we use 81mm mortars) WP rounds.
Seven 82 mm mortar rounds, five of which are white phosphorus, were discovered as part of a larger cache by International Security Assistance Force troops in Bamiyan Province May 16. The rounds were collected for destruction. (U.S. Army courtesy photo)
The Coalition, trying to find a way to fight the "Hearts and Minds" fight regarding civilian casualties has just published this interim report below on the fight in Farah province where there were competing claims about who died, how many, and how they died.
The handicap the Coalition fights under of course is that the Taliban and their supporters can pretty much say what they want, when they want - and the Coalition has to be careful to have their ducks in order - because unlike the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Coalition is going to get fact-checked out the wazoo. Which always means they are playing catch-up. But: Catch-up is better than just ceding the field to the enemy.
But even this report begs the question of whether or not airpower was the best answer to this particular problem. Nothing's easy in war and certainly the greatest blame lays with the Taliban for their use of human shields. But as that is a seeming given, and with the political costs that attach to the Coalition for the civlian casualties - this goes back to a question we hashed over during the discussion on WP - are the trade-offs worth it? Was killing the 60 or so Taliban fighters and regaining the village worth the 30 civilian casualties?
When looked at in isolation, reaching an answer of "Probably not" isn't too hard to do depending on your start point for the analysis... but nothing in war happens in isolation, and the commanders on-scene and overall, including the political leadership, have to consider the branches and sequels - which are usually muddy and intertwined, and only obvious after the fact. And by after the fact, I don't just mean a specific fight, but years from now. So what seems like a simple call in isolation - isn't a simple call at all. And mutliple occurences the same set of localized incident specific circumstances can call for a different answer each time, when larger issues of context come into play.
CENTCOM investigation team interim results on Farah”
KABUL, Afghanistan –An ongoing US Central Command investigation team briefed interim findings after reviewing information on recent events in Farah Province associated with alleged civilian casualties.
Investigators reviewed weapon sight video from the aircraft supporting the Coalition rescue of Afghan National Security Forces in Bala Baluk on May 4 which clearly depicts insurgents entering the buildings which were then targeted in the final strikes of the fight. Combined with audio recordings of the ground commander and air crew conversations the investigators were able to confirm that the insurgents fleeing from the firefight were regrouping in several small rural buildings which were then subsequently destroyed. A review of the physical evidence is inconclusive in determining the exact number of civilian and insurgent casualties. In all, the investigation team estimates that 60-65 Taliban extremists were killed in these engagements, while at least 20-30 civilians may have been killed during the fighting. The investigators continue to attempt to better confirm casualty numbers.
A large number of Taliban fighters, to include non-Afghans, consolidated on Ganj Abad and Grani villages May 3, and demanded payments from villagers. Afghan and Coalition troops reported observing at least 300 villagers evacuating the area prior to the fighting. Reports from Afghan officials indicated that the Taliban had executed three former Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials. In a joint operation the Afghan National Police supported by the Afghan National Army went to the village to drive out the Taliban. As the ANP approached the village of Garani they were ambushed by 200-300 Taliban. During the initial ambush two ANP were killed. A total of five ANP officers were killed during the battle. Outmanned and outgunned the Provincial Governor request the Coalition Quick Reaction Force.
Once the Coalition force arrived, they along with an ANA unit attempted to help the ANP. At this point, the Taliban launched another attack, firing on the ANA and Coalition forces. One US Navy Corpsman was shot in the shoulder while attempting to rescue a wounded Afghan soldier and an ANA soldier was shot in the chest as he attempted to charge a Taliban position. In order to rescue the fallen ANA 1st Sergeant who was trapped by heavy Taliban machine gun and RPG fire, the Coalition force used close air support by F-18s to suppress the enemy fire from buildings nearby. The Coalition Forces and ANA then rushed forward, placed the fallen ANA 1st Sgt. on a stretcher and carried him to safety. The 1st Sgt. was later transported from the battle by medical evacuation helicopter, and due to the bravery of the ANA and Coalition soldiers he is expected to make a full recovery. Following this, one B-1 provided fires in coordination with the ground commander on buildings and a tree grove insurgents were firing from or massing in. ANSF and US Forces remained in the area until the next morning and observed the villagers returning after the fighting had ceased.
“We regret the loss of any civilian life,” said Col. Greg Julian, “and express our condolences to the families who lost loved ones in this fighting with insurgents firing from and regrouping in villagers’ homes. We continue to work closely with the Afghan National Security Forces to bring security and progress to Afghanistan, and to do everything we can to avoid civilian casualties. We strongly condemn the Taliban for their brutality in deliberately targeting and using civilians as human shields.
Found that in a Tweet from gregjulian, USF-A PAO.
It is easy to scam Americans. "Civilian casualties" are more than an IO, they're a business.
It is particularly galling to hear Karzai pontificate on the subject.
Time to put some indig fingers on the pickle switches and let them take the rap.
Some loitering UAS footage might not be a bad idea, too.
THough, I like the idea of persistent overhead surv. I'm not sure it wins....decisively. There'll always be calls that we faked it. The folks in the middle seem to want to believe any old thing about us(it's safer in the short term if'n they do). I like it, but in the IO realm I'm not sure it wins.
That's a result of 30 years of stuff(like, supporting the Shah and SAVAK) and requires, pulling numbers out of the air, some long period of time, say, 2x as long, to redevelop a 'good name'. It's not just a mil thing either. It's a phenomenon we see with things like the effects of the Peace Corps. Sure, as long as they're on the ground the locals love them. PC leaves, and then the locals go back because of some other action. Same with missionaries. Mormonism sees this a lot. Get thick on the ground and foriegners love 'em. Get thin on the ground and the hatred and calls of cult pop up.
So, what wins? Persistance. 20 years is too short a time to win anything, imo. Persistnece and the willingness to foot the cost of doing it the right way. Which is bloody and filled with heart ache. But haste makes waste. We gotta get thick on the ground in realms other than Grunts in Injun Country. That's gotta be persistent(thanks a lot, SD hosers). We gotta put a sock in the mouths of the 'we can do whatever/it ain't torture' crowd-----they ain't helping, either, 'cause, as you say loud and often, perception is reality.
Ultimately, a rebranding. Which means some of us gotta get thicker skins as we own up to what we've done wrong over the last 200 years or so. Be bigger people mostly would go a long way. Context matters, and the interplay of various factors matters too. (there ain't no such thing as a vacuum in social constructs) So, if I had to sum up(fat chance o' that) I'd say we win by:a) accepting the long (and very bloody to us) view, b) developing a persistent soft power side to match our Leviathan(stares at the Int'l relations hosers who opt out of going over seas) c) get thicker skins and bigger consciences, not in the touchy feely way, so we don't keep screwing things up(Casey should've been hung after My Lai, kinda thing, since he was guilty as sin) since interplay is so hard to predict so you ALWAYS, ALWAYS, ALWAYS walk the straight and narrow.
Yeah, I know, C is kinda hard. I feel for the Patano's. But what's more important? Winning the war or the good name and career of one man? Tough call. But from where I sit, if tossing Patanos under the bus ends the war faster, well, sorry dude(and your family, and his kids). Life ain't fair. (And, no, I ain't proud I can be so callous. It makes me worry that I can be, actually .)
ANything short of that is cutting too many corners. Some jobs are just too big for one lifetime to accomplish. Hard for a man to accept that all he is doing is adding one drop to the deluge that will wash it all clean, but that's how it is.
Persistence. Honor. BEING the good guys instead of simply ASSERTING it. That's the way forward. No slick moves. No 5 year media strategy. We simply become what we claim we are top to bottom, stem to stern. Do THAT long enough and opinion will change. It's just littered with a lot of bodies along the way.