Last week,I had a post up that was loosely about the circular nature of innovation in war. It's really more about the circular nature of innovation in human society, when you get down to it, but that's a different post.
In last week's post the core of it was an article in the Toronto Sun that opened thusly:
The post generated some supportive comments and some cautionary ones. In the interest of hearing multiple views, let's go with a mildly contrarian view this morning. Mildly in that it argues a downside to tanks and notes that the US forces have a different force structure, which may well make a difference in the need for tanks. From email:
That all sounds good to me - but there is one point raised in the Sun's article left unanswered - the LAVs getting bogged and having to be recovered by the tanks. There are some other glitches with the MGS, as this article by Christian Lowe observes over at Military.Com.
There's a "supports whatever viewpoint you want to argue from" article over at Defense Industry Daily, which is almost amusing in the lengths it goes to for balance. It looks like something I would write...
H/t to CAPT H (a Canadian tanker) and The Torch for the initial pointer to the article.
In last week's post the core of it was an article in the Toronto Sun that opened thusly:
PANJWAII DISTRICT, Afghanistan — Three years of fighting in the dust-choked lanes and tangled grape fields of Panjwaii district have taught Canadian soldiers some hard, bloody lessons.
As the U.S. prepares this spring to surge 17,000 fresh troops into Afghanistan, they have two words of advice for their American colleagues: Bring tanks.
The post generated some supportive comments and some cautionary ones. In the interest of hearing multiple views, let's go with a mildly contrarian view this morning. Mildly in that it argues a downside to tanks and notes that the US forces have a different force structure, which may well make a difference in the need for tanks. From email:
My new boss just came out of commanding a helo battalion here in the Double A [82nd Airborne Division, the "All Americans" -the Armorer]. He and his battalion spent a year operating out of Khandahar.
He’s got some opinions on the Canucks and their tanks. It starts with “Ploughing through vineyards and orchards with tanks is not the way to win the support of the locals” Keep in mind that those trees and vines take 3-5 YEARS to grow replacements... [I can attest to that, we're establishing various berry vines here at Castle Argghhh! - commercial fruit bearing plants take some time to get established. -The Armorer]
And what ‘s the key terrain in a COIN fight ? THE PEOPLE .
Also, the Canadian LAV-IIIs only have 25mm guns. While these are great weapons, they’re not tank guns. The SBCTs have the MGS, with 105mm guns, plus the TOW vehicles, which now feature “bunker buster” type missiles (much more useful in a COIN fight that the TOW-IIB top-attack anti-armor version.) .
The Amertican. forces going in will also be bringing something else the Canucks don’t have: helicopters, an entire aviation brigade worth (actually, our very own 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade) plus whatever the Marine Air-Ground Task Force brings. Which means two things: increased tactical mobility for the infantry, and gunships. The Taliban (and it is mostly TB down there, not HiG or HQN) don’t like to play when there are Apaches or Cobras overhead, either. . . .
That all sounds good to me - but there is one point raised in the Sun's article left unanswered - the LAVs getting bogged and having to be recovered by the tanks. There are some other glitches with the MGS, as this article by Christian Lowe observes over at Military.Com.
There's a "supports whatever viewpoint you want to argue from" article over at Defense Industry Daily, which is almost amusing in the lengths it goes to for balance. It looks like something I would write...
H/t to CAPT H (a Canadian tanker) and The Torch for the initial pointer to the article.
Not true by any stretch. 24 MEU returned from Helmund province not so long ago, for example, and US Army forces have been operating in the south as well as north for some time, iirc. The terrain issues will be known and the force adjusted for its peculiarities and needs.
Also, no offense meant to the Canadian forces, but US forces have much more available to choose from in force structure and equipment/logistics.
There's lots of ways to punch holes in walls and the US forces will have access to a wide array of wall punching gizmos that can be man packed. Tanks are fine and dandy in specific instances, but as a wide ranging, one size fits all sort of deal, not so much.
I do think it rather condescending for anyone to assume that US ground forces (Army or Marine) wont bring tanks to the fight when appropriate, but its also not saying much to suggest that they'd need to become tank dependent either.
Also, it might we a good thing to remember that Afghanistan, now more than ever, is a very constrained logistics AO and tanks are very logistics heavy.
Our guys will also have access to a decent array of recovery vehicles designed to pull other vehicles out of mud pits. Some of them are even armored.
Mark
Ottawa
Undoubtedly, U.S. forces have more to choose from in terms of TOE for a particular mission. Our guys were just letting your guys know what's worked for us. One team, one fight.
My original correspondent added in a follow-up to this post - when it comes to sending M1s, remember that they suck JP-8 like an homeless alcoholic upending a bottle of cough syrup, vice the more restrained appetites of the Canadian Leos, and the ground supply routes are already under plenty of stress.
He adds that there are M113s deployed with US forces in Afstan that could fulfill the recovery role.
I was out of line with the remark about condesendingness. I spend quite a bit of time reading foreign news/blogs/forums and with many, if not most, such folk, the "Americans are so stupid..." meme is so constant that I can get a bit jumpy.
Sorry about that. Passing on knowledge is always a good thing between brothers in arms.
The Leos have been a bit of a Swiss Army knife for the CF: part intimidator of insurgent forces, part road clearance tool, part direct fire support to infantry, part vehicle recovery tool, etc. We don't have the resources you guys do, so we make do with what we have, and the Leos have proved quite useful. Saved a bunch of lives.
They're a lot lighter and bring a much smaller logistical footprint than M1s.
There used to be a big tank park/bone yard at Camp Sherzai next to KAF. I used to think it would have been cheaper to fix the tanks already in country than to fly them in on chartered Ilyushin Il-76's.
http://www.casr.ca/ft-leopard-2a5-denmark-2.htm
I imagine the first constraint would be response time. The other issue is that the Air Force has now fallen in love with the Small Diameter Bomb, and at 250 lbs it might not be strong enough to punch through those walls.
Can anyone comment on how well air support might work in that context?
Also, dont forget that the USMC part of the force is a MEB. An expeditionary brigade. That's a regiment or so of infantry plus whatever attachments in engineering and armor are deemed appropriate, plus expeditionary oriented logistics support contingent, plus air wing contingent of both fixed and rotor wing.
Neither the Army or the Marine side of the mix will be missing much of any possible thing in the bang em up dept.
So having some sort of direct-fire breaching/blasting capability is very nice. It's also easier to put the hole exactly where the ground commander wants it, since it's much easier for him to grab the gunner by the shoulder and point, vice having to figure out the 10 digit grid and then get that grid to the orbiting bomb dispenser.
Y'know, if the Mobile Gun System doesn't work, maybe they could dig out a few Ontos systems instead.
I keed, I keed! ...