First up, a caveat:
Followed by proofs of the theorem:
So, what brought all that up? An email, that CAPT H sent along, that links to a blog post over at The Torch on some advice the Canadians have for us over in Afghanistan, since they've been fighting in the area we're surging to. From an article in the Toronto Sun:
Bring tanks. We're sending a Stryker Brigade. There is a tank-like Stryker... the Mobile Gun System.
Oops, wait. No, the Canadians have Stryker-equivalents, too. They mean tanks.
Heh. Well, it's not like it's a new idea or anything, Secretary Rumsfeld notwithstanding in his aversion to heavy armor.
The infantry tank was a concept developed by the British and French in the years leading up to World War II. This was the logical progression from the "breakthrough" and "exploitation" tanks of WWI. The big ones were built to punch through the trenches on their own, after which the smaller, faster tanks would exploit the gap, while the infantry did the mop-up work of trench-clearing. The change was that Infantry tanks were tanks designed to directly support the infantry in the attack, and thus, like the 'land battleships" of WWI were very heavily armored, and oft times had a mix of armament, with heavy howitzer-like guns in the hulls, and smaller, faster-firing guns and machine guns in the turrets.. But one of the key pieces was a telephone on the outside of the tank, so the infantry commander could coordinate with the tank commander.
That was the plan, anyway.
It's tough to do, getting the tankers and grunts working together as a team. It's hard now, and we're organized to do it. This excerpt from Combat Lessons No. 9, (thoughtfully presented by Lone Sentry), printed just after V-E day during WWII, ghosts comments that will reverberate in Army training evaluations for decades after... through to today.
Of course, this Stryker brigade was training for a mission in Iraq. Good thing this is a professional, vice draftee Army. Flexing like this may cause extra casualties anyway - but the two-year enlistment limits of a draftee Army would make a decision like that have to be made with a much different calculus than was applied this time.
Nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great, but dead, General. - Barbara Tuchman
Followed by proofs of the theorem:
Nothing remains static in war or in military weapons, and it is consequently often dangerous to rely on courses suggested by apparent similarities in the past. - Admiral Ernest J. King
The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out. - Captain B.H. Liddel-Hart
To inquire in and where we made mistakes is not to apologize. War is replete with mistakes because it is full of improvisations. In war we are always doing something for the first time. It would be a miracle if what we improvised under the stress of war should be perfect. -Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover.
So, what brought all that up? An email, that CAPT H sent along, that links to a blog post over at The Torch on some advice the Canadians have for us over in Afghanistan, since they've been fighting in the area we're surging to. From an article in the Toronto Sun:
PANJWAII DISTRICT, Afghanistan — Three years of fighting in the dust-choked lanes and tangled grape fields of Panjwaii district have taught Canadian soldiers some hard, bloody lessons.
As the U.S. prepares this spring to surge 17,000 fresh troops into Afghanistan, they have two words of advice for their American colleagues: Bring tanks.
Bring tanks. We're sending a Stryker Brigade. There is a tank-like Stryker... the Mobile Gun System.
Oops, wait. No, the Canadians have Stryker-equivalents, too. They mean tanks.
As fighting raged in the summer and fall of 2006, Canadian commanders discovered to their horror that the light armoured vehicles could not roll through the rippled grape fields and often became stuck.
Troops with Canada’s only tank regiment, the Lord Strathcona’s Horse, currently deployed in Kandahar said they’ve been called on many times to haul wheeled vehicles out of tough spots.
One such operation in western Zhari district in December saw the Leopards spend 14 of 16 hours pulling wheeled vehicles out of the muck on a dried up riverbed.
“We were a big tow truck with a gun on it,” declared Warrant Officer Richard Delaney, who is originally from St. John’s, NL.
Heh. Well, it's not like it's a new idea or anything, Secretary Rumsfeld notwithstanding in his aversion to heavy armor.
The infantry tank was a concept developed by the British and French in the years leading up to World War II. This was the logical progression from the "breakthrough" and "exploitation" tanks of WWI. The big ones were built to punch through the trenches on their own, after which the smaller, faster tanks would exploit the gap, while the infantry did the mop-up work of trench-clearing. The change was that Infantry tanks were tanks designed to directly support the infantry in the attack, and thus, like the 'land battleships" of WWI were very heavily armored, and oft times had a mix of armament, with heavy howitzer-like guns in the hulls, and smaller, faster-firing guns and machine guns in the turrets.. But one of the key pieces was a telephone on the outside of the tank, so the infantry commander could coordinate with the tank commander.
That was the plan, anyway.
It's tough to do, getting the tankers and grunts working together as a team. It's hard now, and we're organized to do it. This excerpt from Combat Lessons No. 9, (thoughtfully presented by Lone Sentry), printed just after V-E day during WWII, ghosts comments that will reverberate in Army training evaluations for decades after... through to today.
Current operations point to the increasing employment of the small infantry-tank team in a role requiring the closest cooperation and the ultimate in mutual support. Recent reports stress the need for the sound training of each individual in his own and his unit's share of the job and for better understanding of the cooperating unit's responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations. Joint training which will develop team unity must supplement technical training if missions are to be efficiently accomplished at minimum cost in lives and time.
Of course, this Stryker brigade was training for a mission in Iraq. Good thing this is a professional, vice draftee Army. Flexing like this may cause extra casualties anyway - but the two-year enlistment limits of a draftee Army would make a decision like that have to be made with a much different calculus than was applied this time.
[I did it once. Like one solitary lonely time. I know guys who have done it hundreds of times, so take what I'm saying for what it's worth (not super much).]
But when I went into an Afghan village with troops from the Kandahar PRT on a CIMIC needs assessment, I only had one moment of hesitation, and that's when we were walking in between these family compounds in the middle of the village. You're walking down this - road, alleyway, whatever, it's about a dozen feet wide - and the mud walls rise on either side of you a good ten feet. You don't know what's on the other side of them. You do know that you're walking along a corridor that looks tailor-made for an ambush. And while you're happy to have the LAV's and their 25mm gun, they're a few hundred yards away - and you have no idea how thick the mud walls are, and how many 25mm rounds it would take to punch through them.
Artillery's good. CAS is good. But direct fire from the Leos has been one hell of a fine arrow to have in the quiver over there, from what I've been told: powerful and precise. And the road-clearance and vehicle recovery aspect can't be overstated either.
I sent you a note on the high side. But you already noted the 105mm difference between what (at least some) of our 8 wheelers have and the Canadian LAVs. Note that the brigade AT company can launch wire-guided bunker-busters as well.
Marine grunt companies have an inherent sapper capability built into them. The weapons platoon of each rifle company has a demolition assault/ light anti tank section. The weapons used by that section are very capable in both bunker busting and light/medium armor killing. The Marines in that section are also trained up in assault demolitions. The MOS is 0351
At battalion level, there's also the weapons company. That company has an anti tank platoon that has heavier, longer ranged anti armor/bunker busting rocketry. The Marines in that platoon are first trained as demolition assault anti tankers, then trained up as wire guided rocketmen. The MOS in such platoons is supposed to be O352 but are often 0351 with OJT in the heavy rockets. It was the process in the long ago that an 0352 could only come up from 0351. Donno if that's changed.
The munitions available to the sapper/anti tank elements have gone through some fairly amazing upgrades since the battles in Iraq started. There's now light anti tank rockets specifically designed to deal with bunkers. SMAW-NE has a thermobaric warhead that is designed to act as an advanced form of FAE that defeats bunkers or hardened targets by not penetrating them and sucking the air out of them and flash frying the occupants or by penetration and over pressure/flash frying them.
The SMAW also has an HEDP munition available to it. That warhead is designed to penetrate hardened targets and explode inside of them. There is also a SMAW D.
Tougher targets get the Javelin which is available at btn level org. And when things get really ugly, there's not many walls or bunkers that will stand up to a 20lbs satchel charge of C4 placed against it.
Also, USMC Expeditionary units, be they battalion or regiment in ground force size are created as task specific organizations and are easily refitted to address needs as they develop on site. An Expeditionary unit is made up from the tripod of USMC force organizations. The divisions provide the ground combat element. The Wings provide the air element, both fixed and rotor. The FSSG provides the logistics support and sustainment element. Since all those elements are USMC property and answerable to the Commandant, it is much easier to get additional assets attached as needs show them to be required. Also, all three legs of the tripod work from the same doctrine so there's much less lost in translation than with organizations put together from different branches of the armed forces.