"In the current force, a tank can engage everything it can see out to about three kilometers -- if you can see it you can engage it," he said. "With the MCS, you are going to be able to -- through the network -- engage targets beyond line-of-sight."
A feature we're betting the farm on. Because heaven help the FCS unit if it has to stand toe-to-toe and can't trade space for time. Because in that part of the fight - it's good to be in a real tank. The FCS is the Cavalry's equivalent of the Air Force's Strategic Bombing Grail. In the Air Force Bomber community, starting with the Italian aviator Giulio Douhet, the chimera has been "We can win war by bombing! Fast!" And, it hasn't worked as well as advertised, so the answer was simply - "We need new technology! It's really a great idea! It will work! Honest! Just give us more money for more technology!"
FCS is the equivalent of the battlefield mobility aficionados that gave us the light tanks, cruiser tanks and other equivalents during the interwar period of the 20's and 30's. And that we went through in the Pentomic Era after WWII. But every time the war settles down, the tanks get heavier, and the lighter tanks get relegated to reconnaissance and screening roles, or dropped altogether, because, "Lighter! Faster! More maneuverability will make up for that lack of armor! We'll slash through 'em and around 'em so fast they won't be able to keep up!" And it works, until the bad guy comes up with his countermeasures and then suddenly, well, it's good to be able to out-produce the guy, like we did with Shermans vice the Germans.
Clearly, I'm a skeptic, and I'm a skeptic because of work I've done for the Army in the past. Interestingly enough, the same work that keeps some people optimistic - it's all in how you frame and bound the discussion. However, I'm also a military technology junkie, and if we're going to jump on this bandwagon, one wants it to succeed.
Let the Army tell its side of the story now -
ABERDEEN, Md. (Army News Service, Jan. 26, 2009) – The lightweight Future Combat Systems XM-360 120mm cannon -- designed to sit atop the new Mounted Combat System -- was test-fired here Jan. 22.
The XM-1202 Mounted Combat System is one of eight new vehicle types that the Army is developing through its FCS modernization program. The FCS vehicles will be lighter and more mobile than current Army combat vehicles; yet officials promise they will have greater lethality and survivability.
Lighter and more survivable vehicles are required to combat a growing array of new and more sophisticated threats, officials here said. Greater speed and mobility, coupled with better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, can enhance operational effectiveness, while improving survivability, they said.
Composite FCS armor, for instance, which is being developed at Aberdeen, provides better armor protection at significantly less mass and weight.
“This will change the nature of warfare,” said Rick Crozby, an official with the Combined Test Organization for the FCS Brigade Combat Team at Aberdeen. “With these new [FCS] technologies, our Soldiers will have the ability to checkmate their enemies before their enemies even know that they’re there.”
FCS is being developed at dozens of test and development sites nationwide, and some of the significant work is being done at Aberdeen.
Maj. Cliff Calhoun, assistant product manager for the Mounted Combat System, said the test-firing is one of several that would occur over a few days that would bring the total number of firing trials for the cannon to 1,000. The weapon, he said, is significant because it is as powerful as the one mounted on the M1-A2 Abrams tank -- also a 120mm gun -- but comes in with significant savings in weight and provides automation that will help prevent the loss of lives.
"The Mounted Combat System is going to feature an automatic ammunition handling system," Calhoun explained. "Our current force Abrams has a crew of four men -- a gunner, tank commander, driver and loader. On the MCS, there's a crew of three men -- an automated loader takes care of that loading function. So instead of having four Soldiers in harm's way, only three Soldiers are in harm's way with the MCS."
The MCS carries up to 27 shells that are for a mechanized loader to pull into the cannon. The automated system means that Soldiers do not need to hand-load the heavy shells.
Coupled with other FCS technology, the MCS will also bring beyond-line-of-sight capability to the battlefield, Calhoun said.
"In the current force, a tank can engage everything it can see out to about three kilometers -- if you can see it you can engage it," he said. "With the MCS, you are going to be able to -- through the network -- engage targets beyond line-of-sight."
The FCS constellation of equipment includes two unmanned aerial vehicles -- the XM-156 Class I UAV and the XM- 57 Class IV UAV. Either of those could be beyond the line-of-sight of the MCS, spotting potential threats, and then feed targeting information into the FCS network for use by MCS commanders.
"If we have an enemy vehicle on the far side of a terrain feature, for example, the network will be able to send imagery back to the MCS and we can engage and destroy in distances exceeding 10 kilometers," Calhoun said.
The armament on the MCS mission module is also going to be lighter, as a result of carbon-fiber composites and an aluminum frame construction, said Edward Hyland, of Benét Labs.
"Our main goal was that we wanted all the performance of a current gun, but in a lightweight compact package," Hyland said. "To do that we looked at the entire design of the gun, at every part, and asked how can we make it lighter and push it to the edge."
Hyland said the Army, in cooperation with defense contractor General Dynamics, looked at new high-strength gun steels, lightweight alloys, titanium, aluminum, and carbon-fiber composites.
"The barrel on the Abrams tank is over 2500 pounds," Hyland said. "Using these high- strength steels and carbon-fiber composites, we've taken off over 800 pounds from that. (The MCS gun) weighs a little over 1,700 pounds -- 800 pounds lighter than the Abrams. That's just the gun barrel. We did the same thing with the breech assembly and the recoil assembly. Overall the net weight savings is well over 2,000 pounds, actually 2,400 to 2,500 pounds lighter than the current gun -- yet it has all the capabilities of that gun."
Hyland said a gun as powerful as the 120mm cannon needed to be modified to reduce recoil, so it would be compatible with the lightweight MCS vehicle.
"What we had to do was drop the recoil forces so we could fire from a lightweight platform," Hyland said. "We did that in two ways. We added a muzzle break to the gun tube and also optimized recoil system -- like a shock absorber on a car. We've optimized it for this lightweight platform."
Hyland said that modifications to the cannon did not make it any less effective or accurate, and that in the last three or four years of testing, they have demonstrated the gun has met accuracy, recoil and weight requirements for FCS.
The recent series of test-firings of the XM-360 120mm cannon will bring the system to technology readiness level 6, which means the system has been demonstrated in a "relevant environment" and represents a "major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness."
A feature we're betting the farm on. Because heaven help the FCS unit if it has to stand toe-to-toe and can't trade space for time. Because in that part of the fight - it's good to be in a real tank. The FCS is the Cavalry's equivalent of the Air Force's Strategic Bombing Grail. In the Air Force Bomber community, starting with the Italian aviator Giulio Douhet, the chimera has been "We can win war by bombing! Fast!" And, it hasn't worked as well as advertised, so the answer was simply - "We need new technology! It's really a great idea! It will work! Honest! Just give us more money for more technology!"
FCS is the equivalent of the battlefield mobility aficionados that gave us the light tanks, cruiser tanks and other equivalents during the interwar period of the 20's and 30's. And that we went through in the Pentomic Era after WWII. But every time the war settles down, the tanks get heavier, and the lighter tanks get relegated to reconnaissance and screening roles, or dropped altogether, because, "Lighter! Faster! More maneuverability will make up for that lack of armor! We'll slash through 'em and around 'em so fast they won't be able to keep up!" And it works, until the bad guy comes up with his countermeasures and then suddenly, well, it's good to be able to out-produce the guy, like we did with Shermans vice the Germans.
Clearly, I'm a skeptic, and I'm a skeptic because of work I've done for the Army in the past. Interestingly enough, the same work that keeps some people optimistic - it's all in how you frame and bound the discussion. However, I'm also a military technology junkie, and if we're going to jump on this bandwagon, one wants it to succeed.
Let the Army tell its side of the story now -
ABERDEEN, Md. (Army News Service, Jan. 26, 2009) – The lightweight Future Combat Systems XM-360 120mm cannon -- designed to sit atop the new Mounted Combat System -- was test-fired here Jan. 22.
The XM-1202 Mounted Combat System is one of eight new vehicle types that the Army is developing through its FCS modernization program. The FCS vehicles will be lighter and more mobile than current Army combat vehicles; yet officials promise they will have greater lethality and survivability.
Lighter and more survivable vehicles are required to combat a growing array of new and more sophisticated threats, officials here said. Greater speed and mobility, coupled with better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, can enhance operational effectiveness, while improving survivability, they said.
Composite FCS armor, for instance, which is being developed at Aberdeen, provides better armor protection at significantly less mass and weight.
“This will change the nature of warfare,” said Rick Crozby, an official with the Combined Test Organization for the FCS Brigade Combat Team at Aberdeen. “With these new [FCS] technologies, our Soldiers will have the ability to checkmate their enemies before their enemies even know that they’re there.”
FCS is being developed at dozens of test and development sites nationwide, and some of the significant work is being done at Aberdeen.
Maj. Cliff Calhoun, assistant product manager for the Mounted Combat System, said the test-firing is one of several that would occur over a few days that would bring the total number of firing trials for the cannon to 1,000. The weapon, he said, is significant because it is as powerful as the one mounted on the M1-A2 Abrams tank -- also a 120mm gun -- but comes in with significant savings in weight and provides automation that will help prevent the loss of lives.
"The Mounted Combat System is going to feature an automatic ammunition handling system," Calhoun explained. "Our current force Abrams has a crew of four men -- a gunner, tank commander, driver and loader. On the MCS, there's a crew of three men -- an automated loader takes care of that loading function. So instead of having four Soldiers in harm's way, only three Soldiers are in harm's way with the MCS."
The MCS carries up to 27 shells that are for a mechanized loader to pull into the cannon. The automated system means that Soldiers do not need to hand-load the heavy shells.
Coupled with other FCS technology, the MCS will also bring beyond-line-of-sight capability to the battlefield, Calhoun said.
"In the current force, a tank can engage everything it can see out to about three kilometers -- if you can see it you can engage it," he said. "With the MCS, you are going to be able to -- through the network -- engage targets beyond line-of-sight."
The FCS constellation of equipment includes two unmanned aerial vehicles -- the XM-156 Class I UAV and the XM- 57 Class IV UAV. Either of those could be beyond the line-of-sight of the MCS, spotting potential threats, and then feed targeting information into the FCS network for use by MCS commanders.
"If we have an enemy vehicle on the far side of a terrain feature, for example, the network will be able to send imagery back to the MCS and we can engage and destroy in distances exceeding 10 kilometers," Calhoun said.
The armament on the MCS mission module is also going to be lighter, as a result of carbon-fiber composites and an aluminum frame construction, said Edward Hyland, of Benét Labs.
"Our main goal was that we wanted all the performance of a current gun, but in a lightweight compact package," Hyland said. "To do that we looked at the entire design of the gun, at every part, and asked how can we make it lighter and push it to the edge."
Hyland said the Army, in cooperation with defense contractor General Dynamics, looked at new high-strength gun steels, lightweight alloys, titanium, aluminum, and carbon-fiber composites.
"The barrel on the Abrams tank is over 2500 pounds," Hyland said. "Using these high- strength steels and carbon-fiber composites, we've taken off over 800 pounds from that. (The MCS gun) weighs a little over 1,700 pounds -- 800 pounds lighter than the Abrams. That's just the gun barrel. We did the same thing with the breech assembly and the recoil assembly. Overall the net weight savings is well over 2,000 pounds, actually 2,400 to 2,500 pounds lighter than the current gun -- yet it has all the capabilities of that gun."
Hyland said a gun as powerful as the 120mm cannon needed to be modified to reduce recoil, so it would be compatible with the lightweight MCS vehicle.
"What we had to do was drop the recoil forces so we could fire from a lightweight platform," Hyland said. "We did that in two ways. We added a muzzle break to the gun tube and also optimized recoil system -- like a shock absorber on a car. We've optimized it for this lightweight platform."
Hyland said that modifications to the cannon did not make it any less effective or accurate, and that in the last three or four years of testing, they have demonstrated the gun has met accuracy, recoil and weight requirements for FCS.
The recent series of test-firings of the XM-360 120mm cannon will bring the system to technology readiness level 6, which means the system has been demonstrated in a "relevant environment" and represents a "major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness."
i was drooling right up until i got as far as the word "auto-loader"; then started screaming.
Hmmmmmm. Same PR team the Stryker PM used...
but.... if they're getting "smaller interior space" by replacing one each multi-purpose crewman (the loader), that also means one less crewman manning an automatic weapon for air guard, scanning for targets, pulling radio watch, doing maintenance, etc.... three man crews are tough to run extended 24 hour ops with....
as for an auto-loader itself... yikes! combustible cartridge rounds plus machinery capable of wrestling it from stowage into the breech potentially equals an interesting exercise in "how to un-ass the turret in a hurry"...
The idea that an armored vehicle can reduce the requirement for armor through "maneuverability" is ludicrous because you need the same amount of armor until you can entirely avoid being shot by a given weapon. Simply reducing a vehicle's weight by 10% or increasing speed by 10% doesn't affect the need for armor at all because the same weapons systems are still going to be able to hit it, even if it's a little more difficult or takes longer.
Anybody ever see the episode of Top Gear where Jeremy Clarkson tries to evade a Challenger II with a supercharged Range Rover Sport? That's about as fast and light as you can get (okay, maybe a Porsche Cayenne would have done better with its superior AWD and suspension, but it's still an order of magnitude faster and more nimble than ANY armored vehicle). It took them a long time to catch him, but in the end, they still made the shot, so unless you can make an armored vehicle even more maneuverable than a 5700 pound 155 mph truck, it had better be able to take a direct hit just as well as any MBT.
Sooner or later, we have to pull our heads out of our Fulda Gap.
I know that the Stryker was supposed to be an “Interim” vehicle – one that we would use until we figured what we really needed. I recall people gave the Stryker one look and said: “Gasp! It’s a BTR!” because, you know, that platform worked *so* well for the Soviets
But ask Alex of http://armyofdude.blogspot.com what he thinks of the Stryker. Now, granted, he wasn’t on an MGS, but he has positive things to say.
I understand that the best loader is a highly motivated 19 year old kid with a strong arm, but there are fewer and fewer of them willing to do it these days. The surge in recruitment will sputter away when the economy recovers and we have to think 10 or 20 years down the line.
I personally like the idea of FCS.
Consider that up until the advent of FBCB2, Caesar, Napoleon, or Robert E. Lee probably could have walked into a TOC and after a little explanation of the fancy radios in the corner, sat down at a map table and planned a battle. Think about this. The TOC hasn’t changed much in 2000 years.
A lot of people think that you can equate war to chess, but that is not entirely true. Up until recently, war was chess played where you could only see the enemy’s pieces of they were adjacent to yours. But what if you played chess and could see all of the enemy’s pieces on the board, but the enemy could only see pieces adjacent to himself?
The whole idea behind FCS is that we can win conflicts with more information and less troops because your troops are placed where they are needed, not waiting around in case they are needed someplace else. Granted this is little comfort to the Stryker MGS gunner who suddenly encounters an enemy tank platoon in action, but the whole idea behind FCS is that we should already know that enemy tank platoon is coming and we will be ready.
What would Napoleon have done if he knew where the Prussians had retreated to at Ligny? What if General Montgomery would have done if he had real time UAV data of the tanks at Arnhem? What would have happened at Fredericksburg if John Gibbon could have seen through the fog?
I’ll lose the 19 year old loader if I can get up-to-the-second information.
BT
Cheers
BT - ya wanna talk FCS as a complementary system, fine. As a replacement for the heavy force, sorry.
I've studied this. A lot.
You've certainly imbibed the Kool-Aid of the concept designers.
I've read it all, and helped conduct some of the studies.
Color me not interested in the Kool-Aid. I'll stick to tequila.
The system relies on the network to be always there, and always work.
Since when is that a basis on which to plan a war?
That is certainly a valid point. However, it is, to some extent, a contrived one.
I agree that combat situations can arise where we want armor on the ground in a place far away from any established staging points, with 24-hour notice. However, those situations SHOULD BE few and far between. For the majority of situations, we should either have armor in place near by, on standby, if it looks like we could need it momentarily over the mid or long term, OR we should have armor on a boat headed towards the area if it looks like we could need it momentarily over the short term. Air-dropping your armor has valid uses, but it's also a great excuse for poor planning.
Also, the gun is heavy, but I think the armor is the more important issue here, both in terms of functionality and weight. I'm pretty sure we could run a projectile through a 105mm gun that would defeat any non-Chobham-equipped vehicle out there, but mounting it on the same "heavy" tank would STILL result in a vehicle that wouldn't have enough extra mobility to change the game any, so the real issue here is armor/crew complement.
So is a "light tank" that we can drop on anybody's head by the end of the day better than a "heavy tank" that has to be floated across the pond for two weeks? That depends on what the "light tank" is going to achieve in those two weeks. As I see it...not much gets finished in two weeks, so it's unlikely that any situation would be resolved by "light tanks" too fast for "heavy tanks" to even get there...so if we have enough time ANYWAY for "heavy tanks" to get there, why not just wait and/or [preferably] use air power to pin down the enemy until proper armor shows up to deal with them properly?
That is certainly a valid point. However, it is, to some extent, a contrived one.
Nope. It's a real one. Say China decides to throw down with Taiwan(some people think it's more likely now that economic recession has hit China, and the main pillar of keeping the people off the CCP's back has been the promise of economic greatness), and say that The One decides to intervene. Having someting on the main island of the archipeligo(can't spell, who cares) would go a long way to winning that battle, wouldn't it? Pearl Harbor is 2 weeks sail time away. Sandy Eggo is even longer, as is the state of Washington. If the PLA gets on-land that fight can be over in 5 days much less 14.
It ain't contrived, homes. IT's a real problem, and if one's not treating it like it is, well, there's a flaw that proll'y might want to correct. There's a lot of potential hot spots where we MIGHT have to go. S. Asia looks to be a $itch(Pakv India, Iran v whomever, Israel v everyone else, etc). E ASia is a potential place(ROCv PRC; IND v. PRC(which John doesn't believe in, RUS vs former satellites). So is S. America. Where's all this stuff gonna be set up so it can get there in 24 hours? Where's these bases? It's not a contrived problem. It's a real situation and one that keeps some people up late at night. TIME does matter, and, no, there does not exist the numbers or the BASING to do this "For the majority of situations, we should either have armor in place near by, on standby, if it looks like we could need it momentarily over the mid or long term, OR we should have armor on a boat headed towards the area if it looks like we could need it momentarily over the short term." That's why people are looking at Gold/Blue teaming destroyers/cruisers and the whole 'Sea Basing' concept. It isn't a hackneyed argument, it's bloody real.
THe reality is that getting all of those bases in the potential hot spots are very hard of late.
THere's also another problem not looking at. Being heavy isn't the end all be all. Fine, you're armored up the wazzooo. Great. What's your ground pressure look like? Oh, too heavy to work just about anywhere? Too bad. Can't get across a bridge because you're too big or too heavy? Too bad. You're so big your accoustical wake makes you stick out like a 15 year old's boner? Too bad. There's a lot of factors that go into this, and there's no perfect answer. Little can have advantages and big can have advantages, but they both can suck @55 heavily if taken too far.
Getting inside the enemy's OODA loop? Now that's an advantage. Though, is it a war winner in and of itself? no. Info-overload can cripple an army(see WW1). And who cares if you think faster than an enemy if you can't imflict damage? But, if you can be really dangerous to him and really fast? Well, there's a reason why people always want the initiative, right?
Though, why one simply can't implant much of this tech in existing platforms is something I don't understand. WOuld a slightly larger turret on M-1/M-2/LAV really be a deal breaker?
I'd rather than go whole hog to FCS see a bit of specialization. FCS becomes the bulk of what we use, but we've still got a core section we can build around if it comes to Old School grudge matches.
And, hey, let's not forget that we also have to compete against enemy doctrines. Being big and heavy might matter if it comes to slugfest, but what if the enemy decides a nibble and hold strategy is the way they're gonna go(for 50 years)? A dude with a rapier can kill a dude with a claymore if the conditions are to his advantage, after all; and doctrine's as much a blue print about setting conditions as it is a common verbage.
I mean, has anyone looked at PLA doctrine lately? To fight less than 21 days in high tech conditions BEFORE the US can intervene? Nah. THere's no reason to believe that anyone would go for such a thing(except for all those monograms and white papers that come out of China every year on how they intend to do exactly that).
I like the idea of FCS. Let's see what it does in serious testing and wargames. Then we'll know whether it was worth it or not. I know money's tight, and has been for almost twenty years now, but you need the ability to experiment too. Even negative results lead to further understanding, y'know.
And plenty of the tech *has* flowed into the force in the spiral process.
D'you *really* think airlifting a brigade of FCS to Taiwan is going to make a huge difference?
Taiwan is going to be an Air/Naval fight for the US, should it occur. Tossing a brigade of FCS platforms into an environment that is about the definition of "maximize the weakness" would be a criminal waste of the asset.
The guy who is quoted probably knows that, but whoever transcribed his quote apparently doesn't. And I'm done picking fly crap now!
Yup. And vice-versa, too. But if the dude with the rapier is wearing leathers and a tin hat while the dude with the claymore is in full plate and a great helm, that changes the odds considerably.
...and doctrine's as much a blue print about setting conditions as it is a common verbage.
And if the Enemy makes an end run around the conditions, then what?
Worse yet, suppose your new toys are designed to be air-transportable by tactical airlift and will only fit into a strategic lifter? Stryker was *supposed* to be air transportable as-is over intercontinental distances by C-130 -- and it *ain't*. Bradleys were designed to squeeze into a C-141, and the C-141 went out of the inventory.
Sigh. Getting double teamed by Chief and John......again.
Would moving a brigade of FCS to Taiwan matter? Yes. Why? Dude's when's the last time the AF has done anti-surface warfare training in earnest? What's the stockpiles look like that way? Unless the USN can get there in under 4 days ITS OVER unless there's a ground presence. Yeah, the transports are the smart targets, but which carrier battle group are you willing to see go to the bottom to get it, oh, and the only one able to get there in time is the stuff homeported in Japan(with a very predictable path). Would a brigade matter? Yeah. Not on the tactical level so much as the grand strategic. Bolster the ROCs with something that can kill those T-85s coming of the Ro-Ro. Buy time for that Japanese airfield that sits on the CADIZ line to be haggled for and if gotten permission to use to actually move the stuff into position to be used in an optemp to matter.
It would matter. It'd be buying time. That brigade would die buying 24-48 hours, but a lot could be done in that two days. Like, buy the CBG time to get into range to DO something, maybe? 'Cause, y'know one of the scenarios is for an airborne move while the roro cross the straight. With the preponderance of airpower PLAAF would have(Kadena's a long way off) even that force could smash the ROC forces given the level of infiltration by PLA specials ROC will have to deal with(the most likely airbases to survive are on the east side of the island built in to the side of mountains, and those are going to get tons of attention once the others are taken or neutralized). Gotta have something to extend the fight long enough for us to get involved, right? Otherwise this is purely academic because we've already lost given what PRC can throw.
Chief. Okay, fine it all sucks then. What's the solution then, Big Guy? SHould we then just write off all foreign entanglements because, golly, some idjit banker could do something that undermines strategy? So we should just sit here and wait for a big brawl where we wouldn't have to move it all anywhere? 'Cause relying on The Heavy in two weeks is exactly that end run on conditions I'm talking about.
The end run is what I'm saying China's already done, Unk. Without a deployable in high speed formation China's doctrine wins---and there goes anyone who decided to stand against them(ROC, ROK, Japan(in a decade or so, when the PLAN is modern enough and large enough to make a landing on Honshu likely), VNM, and a host of other E Asia and Western pacific nations). They get to nibble and then hold, that's their doctrine. Take a bite, sue for peace(with new borders), and then repeat. They've decided to make it hard for anyone outside the BS to get in(like all those subs coming out of bases all over Asia(that Pak base for instance)) to harrass and delay anyone deciding to come play by sea), and move fast in the BS(that whole 'friction' deal). So, having nothing means we're just ceeding conditions to them. And worrying about some idjit banker making something critical to the plan go away just reduces us to sitting on our thumbs. Or do you have some other solution in mind, eh?
It's easy to poke fun when you defend nothing, Chief. (Dont think I haven't noticed you like using that against me, a lot.) So, what's the solution then, Unk? They've set the table for themselves and so how do we ruin the first course?
Me? I'm liking the pre-po this stuff on Guam, which means we NEED ABMD by the way, and move it quickly to anywhere in East Asia, with F-22 protection as it transits, in under 24 hours idea, alot. It might not be that this stuff wins on the battlefield but in the Staff Meeting cause it so complicates the battleplan(what're the kwazy American's going to do and in what numbers?). Y'know, that whole strategic deterence rationale.
Assuming they *build* a Ro-Ro, the solution is to prevent it from reaching the dock in the first place. Torpedoes work well for that. So do mines. So does a 50' length of steel 5/8" cable snarled around the screws, for that matter.
The Taiwanese already *have* things that will kill T-85s. They're called "attack helicopters." And they have a *lot* of them. And here's a dirty little secret the Navy doesn't want you to know -- ATGMs work just as well against *ships* as they do against tanks.
What's the solution then, Big Guy? SHould we then just write off all foreign entanglements because, golly, some idjit banker could do something that undermines strategy?
Apples and oranges. Thot you wanted my ideas on how to turn the Taiwan Straits into Ironbottom Sound North.
What this would mean is that the armor weight would be roughly half of what it is now. So the trade off now becomes longer range, higher payload, much better protection, or a mix of the three..
Groan. Yeah, I know that. But, dominance at sea or in the air is not trully analogous of that on land. (I'm not going for the way I initially tried to make my point since it got et when I tried to insert links). Look at WW2, for an easy example. Battle of Britain, where the Brits had Air Superiority and yet still had to contend with being attacked. The air campain for the industrial heartland of Germany, where the Luftwaffe held airsuperiority. The Brits held naval superiority in the Atlantic, and yet cruisers, battleships, and submarines were a major problem. It isn't a question of degree so much as being totally different.
We can generate a small regional and small time level of air dominance to get this brigade in. It'll take far longer to generate 'global' air dominance because of the 'tyranny of distance' and the political malarkey to deal with(like will Japan allow us to fly missions from their territory since the PRC's policy is 'if you can attack from there we can attack you there', meaning Japanese territory is now facing the knife if Nihon allows us to fly from their territory.). I don't care how nifty the F-15/F-16/F-22/F-35/Jim Lovell flying a washingmachine is, if it can't stay in the air over the region or go up fast enough to contest round the clock it doesn't amount to air superiority in Big Terms. But we CAN for a window. Whether that be to allow a brigade to land or to allow ac to attack transports. I'm just not kidding myself at how easy it is for BVR stuff to hit ships(spoofing is a problem, much less the other inherent probs) or how successful it'll be given how much there's to hit(PLA/PLAN can move 2 full divisions---according to JANES and China-Defense---and that's a butt load of targets without adding in all the dhows, merchant ships pressed into service, and AD/ASW escorts that'll go into that. That's a mother huge target set to attack with the minimal number of aircraft we'd have on hand to do so(AFNG B-1s, not sure about whether the B-2 can, AFNG and AF B-52 which are going to have one HELL of a long turn around time(bupkiss optemp) and whatever the Navy can get into range, which might not be anything for a few days depending on conditions.). It'll take approx five days for this invasion force to transit from port to Taiwan. That's a lot of time to attack, but there's also one hell of a lot to attack about twice a day. (And, hey, AF buddies, when was the last time you guys did a seriuos amount of ASuW training?)
But, mostly, it comes down to the diff between dominance on land and dominance for sea/air. Because of that we can generate the conditions to land a brigade.
Chief. Sigh. So, when you do it is a teaching moment, but when I do it it's apples to oranges? Okey-dokey, then. I mean, if it's stupid to do it because some bean counter can make it crumble how does the action/potential repercussion cycle not apply to my example then? (Take action A, someone else takes action B, leads to result C, which is the heart of your 'well, we better not 'cause some bean counter will do what the did with the C-141 thing.)
Dude, they HAVE roro(look, even pictures of them in use even(second link)! http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan.htm , http://www.china-defense.com/naval/plaas/plaas_2.html).
Mine warfare. Fine. I like mines. Where do you mine? And, keep in mind, ROC is utterly dependent upon trade---things like FOOD--- for their survival. So, where do you mine, how do you do it? 'Cause I'm saying mining the approaches to Taiwan looks damn stupid from where I'm sitting. Mining Chinese ports? Fine. How far ahead, with what assets, and with what ramifications? The Straight? Well, okay, that works, but look at the first problem---not to mention that it makes you a global pariah since that's a widely used bit of ocean(and I would think THe One, being all multi-lateralist, might cut off arms deals over that, so bye-bye long term survival.). Okay, explain to the Idjit here how this is done.
You do realize that the most likely scenario of the PRC invading Taiwan starts with a major ballistic missile and artillery preperation that'll flatten most of their air bases and highways(since those'll be used as secondaries), right? So, how are these flingwing suckers gonna SURVIVE to deliver their loads? ANGCOM gonna get involved? If that happens PLAAF/PLANAF gets dominance of the air, homes, and I don't imagine fling wing is gonna survive real long in numbers to matter. Again, 'splain to the Idjit how this is going to happen 'cause I don't get how all this stuff is going to survive the pasting(I didn't know helos were nigh invulnerable).
The ROCN is in the same position. That's not a whole lot of sea to hide in. Subs, ROCN are diesels!, are going to get a lot of attention---not to mention the historical folly of using subs on the strategic defensive. Everything else will see lots of air attacks. How are these torpedoes going to be around to be delivered in numbers to matter given the superiority in numbers and capability the PLA has, please?
Okay, so fine, cable works. So the secret to defending against amphib invasion is lots and lots of cable. You devious man, Chief. Why'd you hold out for so long on that?
Risking a carrrier task group (which has more people and costs a lot more than an FCS brigade) is a pretty good sign of commitment, methinks.
And I hope those sattellites are all still up giving you the comms you need to make your network work, and that the Chinese forgot to bring their GPS jammers, and that they don't finally just get peeved and pop a small airburst nuke and fry your circuits.
You do realize that the most likely scenario of the PRC invading Taiwan starts with a major ballistic missile and artillery preperation that'll flatten most of their air bases and highways(since those'll be used as secondaries), right? So, how are these flingwing suckers gonna SURVIVE to deliver their loads? ANGCOM gonna get involved? If that happens PLAAF/PLANAF gets dominance of the air, homes, and I don't imagine fling wing is gonna survive real long in numbers to matter. Again, 'splain to the Idjit how this is going to happen 'cause I don't get how all this stuff is going to survive the pasting(I didn't know helos were nigh invulnerable).
Um, where are you landing those C17s then, boyo? And ramp space *matters* if you intend to turn them around and reuse them. Might be a bit of a strategic goof to treat them as Horsas.
The problem with your Bastogne scenario here is where is the 4th Armored coming from and how fast are they going to get there?
Gotta *hit* 'em to kill 'em, and they won't be parked in bunches and they won't even be parked on many airfields. But if the PRC pastes Taiwan as badly as you think will happen prior to launching an invasion, it'll won't even be necessary for us to ride to the rescue -- there won't be anything or anybody left to rescue. The ChiComs will be landing on rock and rubble, and the Taiwanese will be underneath it all. Thing is, you're talking about stopping them on the beaches. John's talking about stopping them before they even get halfway there. I figure it's easiest to stop them where the survivors can wade back to their bases.
Where would I put mines? In the PRC's ports. All of 'em, civil and naval.
With surprises waiting for the minesweepers.
How are these torpedoes going to be around to be delivered in numbers to matter given the superiority in numbers and capability the PLA has, please?
They've gotta find you before they can kill you. And a sub or two launching torpedoes against a fleet caught in the middle of an antiship missile storm won't be the TF commander's number one priority, yanno?
Nice thing about subs is that they can also lay a hasty minefield in the path of advancing ships...
That's cuz they didn't *have* air superiority. They massed their fighters using radar vectors to intercept the largest raids, but the smaller sideshows went unchallenged, and there were portions of Britain that only saw Luftwaffe overhead. The RAF's concern wasn't *winning* the battle -- it was hanging on so it wouldn't *lose* it. It only achieved true air superiority when Goering halted the big raids, which is what ended the battle -- and if Goering had *pushed* another month, the RAF would have folded for lack of pilots. "The Few" wasn't just a catchy phrase.
The air campain for the industrial heartland of Germany, where the Luftwaffe held airsuperiority.
Again, nope. Allied bomber streams got the living daylights shot out of them, but they kept flying day and night. If the Luftwaffe had had true air superiority, we would have been out of the air war over Europe within two months.
You achieve true air superiority when you control the airspace tightly enough that the opposition can't hurt you too badly on the *ground* from the air, and you can fly in it with a reasonable expectation that your flight won't run into more of the opposition than you can reasonably handle.
You do realize that the most likely scenario of the PRC invading Taiwan starts with a major ballistic missile and artillery preperation that'll flatten most of their air bases and highways(since those'll be used as secondaries), right?
So, you're saying we should put a brigade of FCS on the ground so the PRC will be able to examine the wreckage after they land?
So, how are these flingwing suckers gonna SURVIVE to deliver their loads?
You're assuming -- rashly -- that helicopters won't be dispersed? Don' need no runway, don' need no highway, don' need nothin' but a clearing 75' in diameter.
So the secret to defending against amphib invasion is lots and lots of cable.
You're so totally stuck on stopping the PRC on the beaches that you don't see that John's talking about stopping them before they even get to the halfway point and *I'm* talking about stopping them before they can even leave port.
Nobody leaves port because of fouled screws or they're bumping into mines or attack helicopters with extended-range fuel tanks begin popping up and launching ATGMs at ships' bridges and waterlines.
Well, Chief, so you're saying that Taiwan's defense is predicated on being able to go onto the offensive. Which sucks for them. Sure, they stand up every time PRC does some manuevers, but to enact your tactics they'd have to know which of the manuevers is actually a prelude. You're saying, essentially, that you're going to rely on intelligence to guide you. Fine. Bolt from the blue undoes most of that. China's BM sit in firing positions right now. They can paste Taiwan and then do Air Ops to whittle away at naval, ground, and air assets(including those fling wings). How you gonna lay all those mines and string all that cable and get all those helos over there in that scenario? (I'm looking at the plethora of things China has the ability and stated plans to do.)
Chief, I focus on the beachead because the likeihood of sinking a large portion of the transports is small. The only way your tactics work is if you go over to the offensive, pre-emptively, and that's just not going to happen. ROC is too dependent upon other nation's good will to make sucha move viable. And if the US does it(if we get wind of it early enough), well, it's starting a much broader conflict, isn't it? That's not going to be popular even with the most hawkish of Presidents. And your tactics sure don't deal with the bolt from the blue scenarios open to the PRC.
How are they going to string that cable? With what assets? Lay those mines? With diesels, essentialy having to surface twice to even get at the most likely/closest ports, under intense PRC surveillance?
When? You do realize that doing them pro-actively gives China a political win, right? It's an act of war that legitimizes China's invasion. Everyone but the US , and we kinda do too, recognize ROC as a renegade province of PRC and mining those ports pre-emptively dries up all their political support. This isn't just a game of tactics and operations, y'know.
Sure, I'd love to see someone mine Chinese ports, but if the ROC do it they better be right about timing, and if WE do it, well, damn, welcome to the Escalation Ladder---fight between two nuclear powers(yeah, I know their boomers have never done a deterent cruise, but they do exist along with the missiles.)
Dispersion won't likely save fling wing. Why? PLAAF will own the air except for a region over the east of the main island(where an air base built into the side of a mountain, shielding it from BM thereby, exists and will be able to contest AS). Good luck trying to get out to sea with extended range tanks with MIG and Sukhoi all over the place with AEW birds up. You still gotta get thru all that other stuff, yknow, and without decent fighter protection you're hosed. Yeah, hiding out in cities where the manufacturing is keeps you pretty safe, but then you've gotta leave to get at the enemy. There's not a whole lot of ports on the east side of the island, and all that food has to come in from the west, you've gotta push the PRC off or they siege you into capitulation.
So you're back to 'how do I toss them back from the beach'? Or more likley the three major ports on the west side. US is in a bad position until GUam gets built up to handle the necessary sea and air assets---no political string with a more managable distance. Flying fighters out of Alaska or Hawaii is really damn far and taxing. The optempo is bad for getting at theose transports. The stright isn't a happy place for our big nuclear subs, even if they're ina position to insert themselves there at the start of hosltilities.
Okay, and what do you do about the PRC adopting an airborne attack only followed up by the heavies? They've got the lift capability to do it and sustain it. With the control of air that the PLAAF is likely to have they can do this. Take airports near Taipei or elsewhere and conscript all commercial air to support existing military lift.
The first three days are going to be critical, and if Taiwan can easily fold in the first 72 hours. Which is why a ground force to stiffen or even help in the repulse is there makes that less likely. A carrier might not be in position to get there in 3 days. This ground force would be.
The BM strikes arn't going to be a 'dump' so much as targeted. There's stuff that's critical to hit, like air bases, long freeways, naval bases, etc, which given 5-15k missiles(depending on whose estimates you believe) can do so with minimal harm to everyone else. They want the factories and they want the people to work in them. They aren't stupid and going to employ scorched earth. Give them, and me, wome credit.
And if you realy want to talk about strategic deterence, well, then we should be talking about things like a) helping Taiwan with their LACM program so they can hit Three Gorges(kill us and we kill you back, MAD kinda stuff) b) selling Taiwan the stuff it needs to be a serious threat(none of these 50 year old Kidd destroyers and block 2 F-16s, give them the good stuff and the AD equipment to lessen the effect of a BM strike strategy) c) building up Guam to handle a regional RRF composed of all three elements(air, sea, land) that can impose its will quickly(what PNAC was all for back in the early days of Bush 43).
John, yeah, that's come up before. look at the eastern mountain airfield, okay, it's not officially there, but it's there.. That's a place to land, a nice place to defend, and a place likely to remain in operation since it'll take planes to hit whic the ROCAF can contest from the earliest moments. THe ROC needs something IF this goes off to even remain in the fight. Taipei will likely go the first day. Teh gov't needs some reason to stay in the fight until major US assets can get on the seen(maybe a day but probaly closer to five, and that's only one carrier with more coming online closer to a week to ten days.) So, iv'e given you an airfield. FCS could be used to keep that hardpoint operational(while enjoying persistent air cover), and that's what I'd recommend since that keeps some forces alive and a secure place for the ROC gov't to hole up in. Otherwise, well, the gov't surrenders.
Sure, PRC can use EMP. And become a parraih in doing so. Who's going to mind if JPN ditches its pacifism clause in response to that and builds up hard core? Taiwan isn't an end in itself for PRC, but a stepping stone in a larger strategy called 'String of Pearls'. They've gotta take it in a way to keep the rest of the 'Pearls' in play or it ws a useless move.
No, you asked how *I* would do it.
but to enact your tactics they'd have to know which of the manuevers is actually a prelude.
I'd say loading a couple of divisions, with armor, into transport ships might give you a hint that something was afoot. Then have a look at what else has been going on.
Sure, PRC can use EMP. And become a parraih in doing so.
The PRC was a pariah when it shelled Qemoy and Matsu in the fifties, then again when it had the border war with India, then again when it invaded Tibet, then again when it conducted "riot control" in Tienanmen Square.
If the PRC pops an EMP generator, it'll be the target of worldwide opprobrium for about four months. Then somebody will spot Elvis working in a 7-11 in Knoxville...