India and various others are already looking at where India failed. As Argent noted in comments on a previous post, India is having their own "post 9/11" including review of their intelligence gathering, assets and prioritization as well as a review of their actual response. Such as this report that outlines why it took 9 hours for the National Security Guard to arrive and take over the event.
While that is reviewed ad naseum along with the parts of the attack that were successful in order to prepare a better defense, the other thing that we should be looking at are the failures of the attack. Because, as Stratfor noted, the terrorists like to use previously successful attacks as well as re-invent previous failed attacks with better ops.
And, you can bet that somewhere in a "cave", after some celebratory ululating, the planners are having their own AAR (After Action Report) to determine how to do it better next time. That means, we must be prepared to thwart "next time" at every stage.
Some may question whether there was actually any "failure" in this attack since the over all goals of political discord, financial impact and general terror and death were achieved.
The first failure we can recognize is at the train station. As the terrorists attempted to make it to their final destination in the upscale neighborhood, they were confronted by several police officers. Possibly lightly armed and some not armed at all. Though they succeeded in killing three officers, one terrorist was killed and the second captured. He was captured when unarmed officers and bystanders dragged him from the vehicle and beat him. What this represents is that the officers and the crowd failed to act as the terrorists expected.
The second failure occured at the hotels. While the terrorists did kill many people in the hotel, many more were saved when the staff at the hotel acted contrary to the terrorists expectations. Many reports indicate that the staff shepharded guests out of doors, into safe areas, physically shielded them with their bodies and refused to give up their location, even on pain of death.
The terrorists had expected to use the ploy of killing some and allowing others to live, separating the groups, to provide a type of incentive to cooperate. By acting contrary to the terrorists expectations, the staff may have saved hundreds of the guests' lives and thwarted the terrorists final plans for mass casualties.
Third, the terrorists were unable to take as many hostages as they had expected. In fact, they did not actually hold hostages in the end so much as some people were simply trapped in the building during the stand off and fighting. Some did ultimately die at the hotel over the 72 hour period the event occurred. However, the ultimate plan, the "spectacular end" that the terrorists may have invisioned, did not come to fruition.
The attacks seem "spectacular" enough without any addition. Yet, most terrorist attacks instigated by certain organizations typically have a "signature". The terrorists, as members of the LeT, followed to some extent the basic pattern of previous LeT events including attacks using small arms, grenades and explosive devices. These attacks have typically been limited to one or two simultaneous sites. Often with either stand off explosives or suicide bombings.
It was reported that the attackers came ashore with explosives, that explosives had been laid in up to eight taxis (two going off) and that more explosives were found at the entrances, exits and various other locations throughout the hotels. Some exploded, some did not and some were exploded in place or defused by the Indian security forces. To date, the investigators have only indicated that the explosives were set on timers. There have been no reports of remote or manual detonation capabilities.
Further, with the locations chosen as the "final targets", the expectations of taking hostages and the unexploded bombs seem to suggest that the expected final play of the event was not a running battle with commandos through the hotels while shooting "hostages" randomly. Certainly, the beginning of the hotel attacks where the first act was to shoot anyone in the hotel bars and restraunts and then catching 17 attempting to flee, only to let three go and execute the other 14 (three survived), might give a different impression. However, the locations of the bombs and the discussion with the suspected "controller" at the Nariman House seems to imply something slightly different.
The first killings may have simply been similar to the random attacks at other sites prior to the hotels: to instill terror and fear. It is likely that the expectation may not have been to round up the hostages all in one place, but to at least keep them in the hotels for fear of attempting to leave would get them shot.
Further, after expending ammunition on the various other attacks, with the placement of bombs throughout the hotel and with the possible time constraints, it seems unlikely that the terrorists had planned to walk through the hotel and physically shoot every "hostage" they came across. That seems inefficient when compared to the rest of the attack where first attacks took place simultaneously at an appointed time (9:30) and where the attackers seemed to have spent a specific amount of time before leaving for the next target. As an eyewitness at one of the hotels indicated, two pairs of gunmen seemed to arrive simultaneously form different directions and enter the hotel.
Finally, if the attack was a blue print of an Al Qaeda attack (such as the New York Landmarks plot), the plan usually ends with a "big bang" killing all of the hostages at once in an unforgettable conflageration, creating mass casualties and the "spectacular end" orchestrated for maximum media coverage. Al Qaeda does nothing simple and would want to distinguish the attack from all others in order to let the world know they are a "player" and the organization responsible. Otherwise, the attacks simply appear to be an old LeT version on steroids.
It is more likely that the few gunmen had planned on keeping as many people inside the hotel as possible and setting bombs on timers to cause a simultaneous and grand explosion for maximum effect.
Aside from the staff sheltering and assisting the guests in leaving the hotels, other problems obviously cropped up that the terrorists were unprepared to deal with and were forced to improvise. For instance, instead of the police setting up a hostage situation complete with negotiators and a controlled security situation, the Marine Commandos and other security forces seemed simply to prepare and execute an assault on the buildings. This appears to have changed the final episode of the event, speeding up the time and drastically reducing the time and space the terrorists needed to enact the final "spectacular" culminating act.
Is this common with Indian counter-terror operations? Are there no expectations of hostage negotiations from a government policy point of view? Were they simply acting on the expectation that the terrorists had no expectation of releasing the hostages alive? The terrorists had made at least one call to a local station, listing their grievances and making a vague demand for "all mujihadeen held by the Indian government" to be released. In many terrorist attacks with hostages in the last seven years, such vague and unobtainable demands are typically "justification" for whatever acts the terrorists have or are about to perform including hostage execution.
A further report indicates that the terrorists were watching the current situation and obtaining intelligence reports from cable and local news. When it was discovered that commandos were ready to breach one of the sites, the "controller" issued a command to "kill them" (the police? the hostages?). While the explosives at the entrances and exits could have simply been a form of "anti-personnel" deterrance or defense, the fact that they were on delayed timers and did not explode throughout the event either indicates the terrorists believed they had more time to set up their defenses or that they were not originally intended for "defense" at all, but for some other final, explosive purpose.
Also, at the Nariman House, the hostages were tied up. Some were shot as soon as the terrorists entered the building, but others were not executed until the end. If the terrorists had not had another plan in mind, there would have been no reason to tie up the hostages or keep them alive except as bargaining chips for time. Although, there are some reports that several of the hostages showed signs of "torture", it doesn't necessarily mean that was the reason for the hostages being bound. It seems more like a side show to the main event.
The Israelis criticisized the Indian handling of the hostage situation, but it may be that the storming of the hotels, disorganized and deadly as they were, probably forced the terrorists to go to plan B or simply to improvise as they went resulting in a running gun battle and hit or miss attempts in between to locate trapped guests and execute them in order to obtain as high a body count as possible under the circumstances.
In the end, that seems to be the final failure of the attack. The security forces may have acted more quickly on the hostage situation than the terrorists expected, even if it took the NSG 9 hours to arrive.
One other item that has to be taken into account is that it is possible that the main commander or leader was killed early on and left the terrorists without final direction on how, when and where to set the bombs or carry out any final act. While there is speculation that the terrorist at the Nariman House was the "controller" because he issued final commands to "kill them", it doesn't necessarily mean that he was the original cell leader or that the other terrorists had the expertise to set up the final act.
Such cells are typically set up where there are a few foot soldiers or "muscle" who have limited knowledge of the overall plans, with a cell leader who has most of the knowledge, particularly of the final act and possibly one or more people with "technical" expertise. Take for instance 9/11. While these men expected some form of "suicide" ending, there was speculation that not all of the foot soldiers knew the final act was to actually fly the planes into buildings. In some respects, this jives with the typical "opsec" that these cells would maintain in order to insure that the terrorists and their plans were not compromised should one or more be captured.
The captured terrorist Kasab indicated that the team was given a month's leave prior to the attacks to go home. With so many involved, it seems inconceivable that the planners would have provided all of the final details to each man with the potential for the attack to be compromised.
In any event, the end of the attack seems disjointed, chaotic, improvised and anti-climactic compared to the rest of the planned, timed and executed event. Whatever the terrorists achieved, even their over arching goal of political and economic fallout, they seemed unable to achieve their final act of the event because the staff, some guests and the security forces acted outside of the terrorists expectations.
For any who expect to learn from the event and any others in the past or future, that is the primary lesson. Do not act as the terrorist expect. Do not be terrified into inaction. Expect no mercy and shrink their window of opportunity to act at every turn.
While that is reviewed ad naseum along with the parts of the attack that were successful in order to prepare a better defense, the other thing that we should be looking at are the failures of the attack. Because, as Stratfor noted, the terrorists like to use previously successful attacks as well as re-invent previous failed attacks with better ops.
And, you can bet that somewhere in a "cave", after some celebratory ululating, the planners are having their own AAR (After Action Report) to determine how to do it better next time. That means, we must be prepared to thwart "next time" at every stage.
Some may question whether there was actually any "failure" in this attack since the over all goals of political discord, financial impact and general terror and death were achieved.
The first failure we can recognize is at the train station. As the terrorists attempted to make it to their final destination in the upscale neighborhood, they were confronted by several police officers. Possibly lightly armed and some not armed at all. Though they succeeded in killing three officers, one terrorist was killed and the second captured. He was captured when unarmed officers and bystanders dragged him from the vehicle and beat him. What this represents is that the officers and the crowd failed to act as the terrorists expected.
The second failure occured at the hotels. While the terrorists did kill many people in the hotel, many more were saved when the staff at the hotel acted contrary to the terrorists expectations. Many reports indicate that the staff shepharded guests out of doors, into safe areas, physically shielded them with their bodies and refused to give up their location, even on pain of death.
The terrorists had expected to use the ploy of killing some and allowing others to live, separating the groups, to provide a type of incentive to cooperate. By acting contrary to the terrorists expectations, the staff may have saved hundreds of the guests' lives and thwarted the terrorists final plans for mass casualties.
Third, the terrorists were unable to take as many hostages as they had expected. In fact, they did not actually hold hostages in the end so much as some people were simply trapped in the building during the stand off and fighting. Some did ultimately die at the hotel over the 72 hour period the event occurred. However, the ultimate plan, the "spectacular end" that the terrorists may have invisioned, did not come to fruition.
The attacks seem "spectacular" enough without any addition. Yet, most terrorist attacks instigated by certain organizations typically have a "signature". The terrorists, as members of the LeT, followed to some extent the basic pattern of previous LeT events including attacks using small arms, grenades and explosive devices. These attacks have typically been limited to one or two simultaneous sites. Often with either stand off explosives or suicide bombings.
It was reported that the attackers came ashore with explosives, that explosives had been laid in up to eight taxis (two going off) and that more explosives were found at the entrances, exits and various other locations throughout the hotels. Some exploded, some did not and some were exploded in place or defused by the Indian security forces. To date, the investigators have only indicated that the explosives were set on timers. There have been no reports of remote or manual detonation capabilities.
Further, with the locations chosen as the "final targets", the expectations of taking hostages and the unexploded bombs seem to suggest that the expected final play of the event was not a running battle with commandos through the hotels while shooting "hostages" randomly. Certainly, the beginning of the hotel attacks where the first act was to shoot anyone in the hotel bars and restraunts and then catching 17 attempting to flee, only to let three go and execute the other 14 (three survived), might give a different impression. However, the locations of the bombs and the discussion with the suspected "controller" at the Nariman House seems to imply something slightly different.
The first killings may have simply been similar to the random attacks at other sites prior to the hotels: to instill terror and fear. It is likely that the expectation may not have been to round up the hostages all in one place, but to at least keep them in the hotels for fear of attempting to leave would get them shot.
Further, after expending ammunition on the various other attacks, with the placement of bombs throughout the hotel and with the possible time constraints, it seems unlikely that the terrorists had planned to walk through the hotel and physically shoot every "hostage" they came across. That seems inefficient when compared to the rest of the attack where first attacks took place simultaneously at an appointed time (9:30) and where the attackers seemed to have spent a specific amount of time before leaving for the next target. As an eyewitness at one of the hotels indicated, two pairs of gunmen seemed to arrive simultaneously form different directions and enter the hotel.
Finally, if the attack was a blue print of an Al Qaeda attack (such as the New York Landmarks plot), the plan usually ends with a "big bang" killing all of the hostages at once in an unforgettable conflageration, creating mass casualties and the "spectacular end" orchestrated for maximum media coverage. Al Qaeda does nothing simple and would want to distinguish the attack from all others in order to let the world know they are a "player" and the organization responsible. Otherwise, the attacks simply appear to be an old LeT version on steroids.
It is more likely that the few gunmen had planned on keeping as many people inside the hotel as possible and setting bombs on timers to cause a simultaneous and grand explosion for maximum effect.
Aside from the staff sheltering and assisting the guests in leaving the hotels, other problems obviously cropped up that the terrorists were unprepared to deal with and were forced to improvise. For instance, instead of the police setting up a hostage situation complete with negotiators and a controlled security situation, the Marine Commandos and other security forces seemed simply to prepare and execute an assault on the buildings. This appears to have changed the final episode of the event, speeding up the time and drastically reducing the time and space the terrorists needed to enact the final "spectacular" culminating act.
Is this common with Indian counter-terror operations? Are there no expectations of hostage negotiations from a government policy point of view? Were they simply acting on the expectation that the terrorists had no expectation of releasing the hostages alive? The terrorists had made at least one call to a local station, listing their grievances and making a vague demand for "all mujihadeen held by the Indian government" to be released. In many terrorist attacks with hostages in the last seven years, such vague and unobtainable demands are typically "justification" for whatever acts the terrorists have or are about to perform including hostage execution.
A further report indicates that the terrorists were watching the current situation and obtaining intelligence reports from cable and local news. When it was discovered that commandos were ready to breach one of the sites, the "controller" issued a command to "kill them" (the police? the hostages?). While the explosives at the entrances and exits could have simply been a form of "anti-personnel" deterrance or defense, the fact that they were on delayed timers and did not explode throughout the event either indicates the terrorists believed they had more time to set up their defenses or that they were not originally intended for "defense" at all, but for some other final, explosive purpose.
Also, at the Nariman House, the hostages were tied up. Some were shot as soon as the terrorists entered the building, but others were not executed until the end. If the terrorists had not had another plan in mind, there would have been no reason to tie up the hostages or keep them alive except as bargaining chips for time. Although, there are some reports that several of the hostages showed signs of "torture", it doesn't necessarily mean that was the reason for the hostages being bound. It seems more like a side show to the main event.
The Israelis criticisized the Indian handling of the hostage situation, but it may be that the storming of the hotels, disorganized and deadly as they were, probably forced the terrorists to go to plan B or simply to improvise as they went resulting in a running gun battle and hit or miss attempts in between to locate trapped guests and execute them in order to obtain as high a body count as possible under the circumstances.
In the end, that seems to be the final failure of the attack. The security forces may have acted more quickly on the hostage situation than the terrorists expected, even if it took the NSG 9 hours to arrive.
One other item that has to be taken into account is that it is possible that the main commander or leader was killed early on and left the terrorists without final direction on how, when and where to set the bombs or carry out any final act. While there is speculation that the terrorist at the Nariman House was the "controller" because he issued final commands to "kill them", it doesn't necessarily mean that he was the original cell leader or that the other terrorists had the expertise to set up the final act.
Such cells are typically set up where there are a few foot soldiers or "muscle" who have limited knowledge of the overall plans, with a cell leader who has most of the knowledge, particularly of the final act and possibly one or more people with "technical" expertise. Take for instance 9/11. While these men expected some form of "suicide" ending, there was speculation that not all of the foot soldiers knew the final act was to actually fly the planes into buildings. In some respects, this jives with the typical "opsec" that these cells would maintain in order to insure that the terrorists and their plans were not compromised should one or more be captured.
The captured terrorist Kasab indicated that the team was given a month's leave prior to the attacks to go home. With so many involved, it seems inconceivable that the planners would have provided all of the final details to each man with the potential for the attack to be compromised.
In any event, the end of the attack seems disjointed, chaotic, improvised and anti-climactic compared to the rest of the planned, timed and executed event. Whatever the terrorists achieved, even their over arching goal of political and economic fallout, they seemed unable to achieve their final act of the event because the staff, some guests and the security forces acted outside of the terrorists expectations.
For any who expect to learn from the event and any others in the past or future, that is the primary lesson. Do not act as the terrorist expect. Do not be terrified into inaction. Expect no mercy and shrink their window of opportunity to act at every turn.
A good lesson, and one that the folks on United flight 91 taught us as well. Refuse to be the victim.
I do not believe 10 people did this. I worry that a number of "locals" were involved and may have escaped. I also believe that many if not all the reports we have seen are questionable. There are too many Indians making contradictory statements, and it is awfully convienient that an anonymous US source reports that we warned them.
I alos think that a similar attack in nearly any US city would be far more successful. We do not have the ability to use military forces in such a situation like the Indians did. And few cities has 800 plus SWAT guys, if you believe that SWAT could handle it.
Wouldn't that send shivers down the back of the Brady Bunch and lawyers would be licking their chops all over.
It is the people immediately on scene, the would be "victims", who change the dynamic first.
Yes - the amount and type of tools available (guns, box cutters, knives, teeth,etc.) really don't matter if there is no will to use them, and no determination to live. Without the will, the rest is moot.
So the answer is, yes. The militia will muster on the town green with evil black rifles, crutches & canes.