Supporting John's commentary on "Good Journalism v. Dangerous Journalism": Terror Commands Came from Narriman House "Kill Them"-
Steve Schippert at Threats Watch noted the same report that I did outlining the "hi-jacked" terror plan. Two things Schippert indicates: 1) Shahzad (the writer) is usually accurate; 2) the shake up at Pakistan's ISI was instigated by the US insisting on Musharef and clan stepping aside that led to Gen. Kiyani coming to power. The last means that sometimes ideological purity (ie, insisting on democratic processes instead of control) has consequences. He goes on to say:
India Demands Pakistan Turn Over Top 20 Wanted - Long War Journal
I've read about five or six similar reports. What I find interesting is what is missing. Everyone talks about Pakistan not wanting to turn these folks over because the militants represent "strategic depth" for Paksitan in case of war with India and that it will cause "unrest" with the Islamic extremists that are threaded throughout the country, society, government and military forces.
What's missing? The part where any one or more of these "most wanted" would most likely implicate the Pakistan government in terror networks and attacks on any number of countries, particularly, India. It's one thing for some low level, captured foot soldier to say it; that can be somewhat dismissed as propaganda with "plausible deniability". Some high level guy talking his face off? That would either speed the collapse of the Paki government, speed a civil war in Pakistan and/or speed war with India. No one seems to want to mention that. Nukes, I suspect.
Two interesting facts about the Mumbai terrorists -
1) Kasab (Qasam, Kasav) the captured terrorists says he's just a poor farm boy sold to the LeT by his father. We've heard of that in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, one of the interrogators says, "Hold up a second." Apparently, our victimized farm boy speaks very good English, speaks some Hindi, can apparently read maps and text message, among other skills. He suspects the "poor farm boy" is really a well educated chap from a middle class Punjabi family. Not to mention that it seems incongruous for the LeT or any other group to use somebody who could compromise the operation. Then again, Uncle Jimbo from Blackfive says he could train 20 monkeys to do the same attack.
Can't say I agree exactly. Though, we have seen both the use of morons (sometimes literally), usually in simple "point to destination and blow up" suicide attacks, and highly educated and skilled terrorists. I tend to lean towards "educated, middle or upper class" because that is usually who AQ and LeT like to use for high grade, complex activities, like 9/11, 7/7 London bombings, etc. A lot less spin up time and less possibility of failure. A list of LeT, AQ, etc intersecting events.
2) The terrorists were hopped up on cocaine, LSD and steroids to keep themselves awake. Not surprising actually. But, the report, after siting this interesting fact, goes on to relate it to something incongruous:
My first thoughts did not turn to "truck drivers and security guards". My first thoughts were actually, "Somalia and Fallujah". Particularly after reading Bellavia's, House to House. Of course, I also remember some morons insisting that the drug use claim was propaganda. Guess not.
Our intel agency says that they warned Pakistan in October that this attack was in the works. Now the Indian agencies play "pass the buck". RAW (Research and Analysis Wing; Indian Intel) says they passed the info on to the Navy. The Navy says they never received "actionable intel". However, there are two problems. First, previous attackers apparently used a similar route (via the sea) and safe houses for a suicide attack. Second, India's intel agency is apparently not nearly as focused on certain threats as it should be.
Actually, this entire report should be read and maybe commented on separately because it points to multiple problems that in some ways echo our own. Poor prioritization of threats. Too much focus on techint instead of Humint. Difficulty infiltrating Islamist organizations. To quote, "a dumping ground" for retired military officers and possibly government stooges without focus on actual expertise. Lots of data collected, but an inability to swiftly sort and collate to develop "actionable intel".
In short, all the bad things you could hope not to have wrong with your intel.
These were some of the instructions being sent out by cellular phone from one of the terrorists — killed by the National Security Guard on Friday night at the Jewish residential complex of Nariman House in south Mumbai — to his comrades, according to telephone intercepts available with the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
This man, as yet unidentified, allegedly the “operations controller” of the 10-man Lashkar-e-Tayyeba fidayeen unit that went on a 62-hour killing spree on 26/11, issued many of those instructions after watching live television coverage of the siege at all three locations, a senior IB officer tasked with monitoring these conversations told HT, requesting anonymity as he is not authorised to speak to the media.
Steve Schippert at Threats Watch noted the same report that I did outlining the "hi-jacked" terror plan. Two things Schippert indicates: 1) Shahzad (the writer) is usually accurate; 2) the shake up at Pakistan's ISI was instigated by the US insisting on Musharef and clan stepping aside that led to Gen. Kiyani coming to power. The last means that sometimes ideological purity (ie, insisting on democratic processes instead of control) has consequences. He goes on to say:
General Kiyani may have intended a minor operation for Kashmir and was almost certainly in the dark about the metamorphosis of the operation into a Mumbai massacre, but the law of unintended consequences holds little acquittal when leaders play with the fire of terrorism.
Even while the ISI political wing was disbanded just days before the Mumbai attack, the shakeup atop the ISI is irrelevant without a trickle-down impact. And so long as ‘mid-level’ men such as Major Zakiur Rahman man posts and sign off on al-Qaeda affiliates’ massacres, there is little hope for Pakistan’s emergence from the tinderbox of terrorism without itself being consumed by the very fires it tolerates.
Westerners call it a ‘come to Jesus’ moment. Whatever the South Asian equivalent, Pakistan has yet to have its own. When it does, the fighting inside Pakistan, among Pakistanis (and assorted imported radical travelers) will be fierce and bloody. May the jihadiyun not be the only ones armed and willing to fight.
India Demands Pakistan Turn Over Top 20 Wanted - Long War Journal
I've read about five or six similar reports. What I find interesting is what is missing. Everyone talks about Pakistan not wanting to turn these folks over because the militants represent "strategic depth" for Paksitan in case of war with India and that it will cause "unrest" with the Islamic extremists that are threaded throughout the country, society, government and military forces.
What's missing? The part where any one or more of these "most wanted" would most likely implicate the Pakistan government in terror networks and attacks on any number of countries, particularly, India. It's one thing for some low level, captured foot soldier to say it; that can be somewhat dismissed as propaganda with "plausible deniability". Some high level guy talking his face off? That would either speed the collapse of the Paki government, speed a civil war in Pakistan and/or speed war with India. No one seems to want to mention that. Nukes, I suspect.
Two interesting facts about the Mumbai terrorists -
1) Kasab (Qasam, Kasav) the captured terrorists says he's just a poor farm boy sold to the LeT by his father. We've heard of that in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, one of the interrogators says, "Hold up a second." Apparently, our victimized farm boy speaks very good English, speaks some Hindi, can apparently read maps and text message, among other skills. He suspects the "poor farm boy" is really a well educated chap from a middle class Punjabi family. Not to mention that it seems incongruous for the LeT or any other group to use somebody who could compromise the operation. Then again, Uncle Jimbo from Blackfive says he could train 20 monkeys to do the same attack.
Can't say I agree exactly. Though, we have seen both the use of morons (sometimes literally), usually in simple "point to destination and blow up" suicide attacks, and highly educated and skilled terrorists. I tend to lean towards "educated, middle or upper class" because that is usually who AQ and LeT like to use for high grade, complex activities, like 9/11, 7/7 London bombings, etc. A lot less spin up time and less possibility of failure. A list of LeT, AQ, etc intersecting events.
2) The terrorists were hopped up on cocaine, LSD and steroids to keep themselves awake. Not surprising actually. But, the report, after siting this interesting fact, goes on to relate it to something incongruous:
Drugs are commonly used in India by workers in jobs where a lack of sleep is demanded, such as truck drivers and security guards.
My first thoughts did not turn to "truck drivers and security guards". My first thoughts were actually, "Somalia and Fallujah". Particularly after reading Bellavia's, House to House. Of course, I also remember some morons insisting that the drug use claim was propaganda. Guess not.
Our intel agency says that they warned Pakistan in October that this attack was in the works. Now the Indian agencies play "pass the buck". RAW (Research and Analysis Wing; Indian Intel) says they passed the info on to the Navy. The Navy says they never received "actionable intel". However, there are two problems. First, previous attackers apparently used a similar route (via the sea) and safe houses for a suicide attack. Second, India's intel agency is apparently not nearly as focused on certain threats as it should be.
The rot is sometimes traced back to 1967, when a nervous Indira Gandhi decided to use the Intelligence Bureau to glean information for political purposes. Among the tasks assigned to the agency was to compile a weekly report on commodity prices throughout the country. Her successors continued this thirst for political intelligence to the point, said one serving IB officer, “that just 20 per cent of the organisation’s focus was on hard intelligence like infiltrating insurgencies and terrorist groups and organised gangs like D-company.”
Actually, this entire report should be read and maybe commented on separately because it points to multiple problems that in some ways echo our own. Poor prioritization of threats. Too much focus on techint instead of Humint. Difficulty infiltrating Islamist organizations. To quote, "a dumping ground" for retired military officers and possibly government stooges without focus on actual expertise. Lots of data collected, but an inability to swiftly sort and collate to develop "actionable intel".
In short, all the bad things you could hope not to have wrong with your intel.
Probably, only reason why I feel some pity for any Pakistan government official who may want to actually work for the good of their country.
Yes, very simply, to both. That is the point of Pakistan calling them their "strategic depth". they threaten Pakistan's sovreignty but at the same time, to quote one fellow, the entire reason for Paksitan's existense is that they hate India (did not want to be part of a hindu controlled nation).
More importantly, is this a status or a strategy for actually winning the real Global War on Terror?
Both, again. Bizarre? yes. But, there was a good and a bad to it. First, it had AQ stuck in Pakistan along with the rest of the jihadists. That was good. Target rich environment. While they are somewhat "protected" there, we don't have to go everywhere to find them. Unfortunately, it is the reason that these groups went together after India. They need to broaden the front and give themselves some room. Which, interesting, gives a good clue that we were making some serious attrition against them.
One thing that people don't always realize is that, sometimes, when the battle picks up, it is actually a good sign.
Obviously, on the other hand, as the India attacks represent, it gives them some protection to train and plan other attacks. We have to brace for that. I'm not sure our government understands that or can convey that in a way that would get public support. We prefer, as a nation, full frontal war with a definitive front and a definitive victory. We are not programmed to look at attacks as signs of progress. It is too much of a dichotomy for our national psyche.
If the Pakistani Military keep it just bad enough that it's so expensive to do anything in the Region, what does it say to us? But even more so, how will such actions affect our deployed troops globally?
Well, if we went in to Paksitan and did what would actually be more definitive (ie, all out war), the entire world would freak out. Witness Iraq. It will be "big bad technological advance nation killing people who are already poor, uneducated, hungry and technologically decrepit". It was bad enough when everyone recognizes that the government is bad and still won't support it's take down for reasons of preferring stability (the point of my original comment) of any variety to all out anarchy. It is obviously costly. It means, of course, that we will take slow but mounting casualties in Afghanistan as in Iraq.
At the same time, our national psyche also tends to reject the "slow but mounting" concept. Not just because we are casualty adverse, but because we have an idea that we are some how omnipotent. We buy into the propaganda of the enemy that the inability to track down some scraggly goat herders with simple weapons represents a failure.
We have no real comprehension of guerrilla warfare and are utterly adverse because of the reality and the mythology of Viet Nam.
The real question isn't just the cost of lives of our troops in this situation, but the material cost of a long war and the slow, but mounting casualty rate of civilians.
I guess, in the long run, I'm saying we as a nation and as a global community, are simply too split on philosophy and not angry enough to do anything else.
So, what will it mean for Pakistan? Slow, ugly, bloody war until, as in Iraq, some part of Pakistan gets disgusted and rejects it. don't count on that as fast as in Iraq (I know, that is nearly oxymoronic). Jihad is embedded in Pakistan much more than it ever was in Iraq.
You write, "We have no real comprehension of guerrilla warfare and are utterly adverse because of the reality and the mythology of Viet Nam." This is really important, you start that sentence with the word "WE", are you saying this of yourself, specific and singular? Be honest and look in the mirror and answer it! Viet Nam has nothing to do with it, except as a learning tool. I can not get into the rest of it.
Now everybody in the region has this idea, "We've got 'Uncle Sam' by the ass." The Pakistanis are doing whatever they feel like doing, the Americans will pay for it. The same is true for Iraq and Afghanistan. I really don't think these people "get it." I would then "summon" the tribal leaders and assist them with transportation to Mecca, not Riyadh nor Jeddah. Take somebody like GEN David Petraeus, a soft spoken man with a great deal of power. The message, it is in everybody's best interest to work together. This would be true for the target Nation, but also to its neighbor. Since you have proven your inability to establish, we will establish them for you with completion dates. We will assist you in completing the different tasks by the specified date. During this whole process, we should have been siphoning off troops, not far, but a safe distance. We should be looking at all civilian and civilian contractors agreeably or my force, REMOVE THEM. Last I heard, Saudi Arabia would be a real problem, no Americans actually working in the American Embassy, only Royal Family members and passports turned over to the Kingdom. We want to get our people plus those of our allies. WHY ALL OF THE PREP WORK? The reason is this, what happens if they refuse our gracious offer? We would assist them with their "landscaping", we would remove the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. HOW WOULD WE DO IT? We would do it with a fleet of fully loaded Trident Submarines. Just maybe we could get the idea across to them, that attacking the US was not on the smart list. Just maybe, tho whole purpose of this exercise is not to actually do it, but more to create that most difficult of all questions. It is the same question my Father was always asking me, "What if?"