This is in no way to imply that al Qaeda was behind the attacks on Mumbai. It is to explore more completely how al Qaeda's ideas and ideology have influenced the operations of other Islamic terrorist organizations and how their influence is seen in the Mumbai attack.
Received wisdom has already placed the blame on Lashkar-e-Taiba; a Pakistani Islamic organization that has had close ties with Al Qaeda for over two decades. As Bill Roggio has pointed out, a long and complicated association.
Aside from the strategic impact as noted here and the general concept of "vex and exhaust", the over all strategy of the attack had three main goals:
1) To stall or reverse rapprochement between India and Pakistan
2) To take pressure off of the insurgents by forcing Pakistan to redirect military assets from the tribal areas to the Paki-Indian borders
3) To stall or reverse US-Pakistan relationships by creating tension and suspicion over ISI involvement in attacks, not only on a nominal political, military and economic ally, but by attacks on US and other western citizens. They may hope to retard cooperation between US and Pakistani ISI and military which has been increasingly successful in targeting terrorists in Waziristan as well as improved interdiction of fighters crossing the borders.
A fourth goal, which should not go unnoticed, is to inflame fault lines within the Indian populace between the Muslim population and the remaining population. We've seen all of these in AQ operations throughout the last seven years starting with 9/11.
The lone captured terrorist has made multiple claims including that the group is in reality a part of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani terror network, even though the group originally tried to give themselves an Indian background by calling themselves Deccan Mujahideen. "Deccan" loosely translates to the southern plain of India. He has also claimed that they received training from the Pakistani Navy in marine warfare and possibly provided arms and explosives. Further, he claimed that Indian citizens, more precisely, citizens of Mumbai, provided logistical and reconnaissance assistance for the attack.
All or some of it may be true. In the past, captured terrorists have both been extremely talkative or extremely mum on over all plans and relationships. However, it is not necessarily good to accept everything that the prisoner says as gospel truth. Primarily because he may have an imperative to lie or, more likely, may have even been provided false information during the spin up of the attack in case of capture in order to further whatever over all goals.
The aspects that are most likely correct are his general knowledge of the actual attack and his belief that he is a member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Anything above that should be taken with a grain of salt as he notes that they were kept isolated, not allowed to associate with one another and went by false names. Also, he appears to be nothing more than a foot soldier and not the leader or organizer of the cell spun up for the attack. As previous attacks have shown, information is typically limited to a "need to know" basis.
On September 11, it appeared that Al Qaeda had deliberately chosen nine of the fifteen terrorists for the operation as Saudi Arabian. Most speculate that the purpose had two imperatives. First, to place a wedge between the Saudi government and the United States. Second, within the inflammation, they expected to force the Muslim ummah to chose sides or, at least, bring a large number of followers to their side. Either by the success of their attack or by implication of a greater Muslim-Western war.
In the early aftermath of 9/11, as decisions were being made on how to respond, US relationship with Saudi Arabia was severely strained. As with the relationship between the Pakistani ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba, since the Russo-Afghan war, it was known that Saudi Arabia had provided assistance to the Mujahideen. Further, that Saudi Arabia had continued to provide money and even intelligence assistance to several organizations that were either related to or later absorbed into the Al Qaeda network.
The difference between the Saudi and Pakistan situation is that Saudi Arabia is considerably more stable politically and economically. Pakistan, not so much. India, only slightly better. In this light, the selection of an all Pakistani team, when it is likely that there are considerable numbers of other nationalities represented in Lashkar-e-Taiba and the general Islamic insurgency in Kashmir, seems to also have a deliberate flavor.
We've also seen this attempt at taking advantage of known fault lines in the population in Al Qaeda's operations in Iraq. One of Zarqawi's first letters implied the strategy to pit Sunnis against Shias within Iraq. His over all strategy was to attack both Sunni and Shia in different guises to sow a civil war. Which was largely successful.
Again, this is not to imply that this operation was an Al Qaeda owned operation. Certainly, LeT and various separatist groups have been attacking the Indian population for sometime and their appearance on Indian soil must imply some sort of potential logistical and material support within India. It has also inflamed existing fault lines within the population. Largely between Hindu and Muslims.
It is simply that this attack has a slightly different flavor with what seems to be much larger goals than previous attacks within India.
One of the slow, but continuing metamorphosis of ideology is the concept of the "near and far enemy". Fawas Gerges wrote about the dichotomy in Islamist ideology in "The Far Enemy". The Far Enemy concept of Islamist terrorism depicts a strategy of weakening nations such as the United States, "the far enemy", in order to reduce support for "apostate" governments of Muslim nations such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the Pakistan "democracy" and the Saudi government. All considered "the near enemy".
However, not all Islamist movements have been open to the idea of changing the focus of their strategies and tactics. Ayman Zawahiri lamented this fact in two separate books, The Bitter Harvest and Knights Under the Prophet's Banner.
In fact, one of the early dissensions between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Qaeda was a question of the appropriate strategy and focus of attacks. Is it the near enemy or the far enemy? For the most part, most of the Islamist organizations have remained focused on their regional or national struggles. However, many organizations have provided assistance to Al Qaeda, sharing networks, and occasionally cooperating or coordinating attacks to meet Al Qaeda's over all strategic goals.
The attack on Mumbai is not necessarily an al Qaeda owned and operated event. But it likely is a cooperative operation that strategically benefits both Lashkar-e-Taiba's determination to re-ignite the Kashmiri offensive and al Qaeda's need for relief in the Afghan-Pakistan border region.
Received wisdom has already placed the blame on Lashkar-e-Taiba; a Pakistani Islamic organization that has had close ties with Al Qaeda for over two decades. As Bill Roggio has pointed out, a long and complicated association.
Aside from the strategic impact as noted here and the general concept of "vex and exhaust", the over all strategy of the attack had three main goals:
1) To stall or reverse rapprochement between India and Pakistan
2) To take pressure off of the insurgents by forcing Pakistan to redirect military assets from the tribal areas to the Paki-Indian borders
3) To stall or reverse US-Pakistan relationships by creating tension and suspicion over ISI involvement in attacks, not only on a nominal political, military and economic ally, but by attacks on US and other western citizens. They may hope to retard cooperation between US and Pakistani ISI and military which has been increasingly successful in targeting terrorists in Waziristan as well as improved interdiction of fighters crossing the borders.
A fourth goal, which should not go unnoticed, is to inflame fault lines within the Indian populace between the Muslim population and the remaining population. We've seen all of these in AQ operations throughout the last seven years starting with 9/11.
The lone captured terrorist has made multiple claims including that the group is in reality a part of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani terror network, even though the group originally tried to give themselves an Indian background by calling themselves Deccan Mujahideen. "Deccan" loosely translates to the southern plain of India. He has also claimed that they received training from the Pakistani Navy in marine warfare and possibly provided arms and explosives. Further, he claimed that Indian citizens, more precisely, citizens of Mumbai, provided logistical and reconnaissance assistance for the attack.
All or some of it may be true. In the past, captured terrorists have both been extremely talkative or extremely mum on over all plans and relationships. However, it is not necessarily good to accept everything that the prisoner says as gospel truth. Primarily because he may have an imperative to lie or, more likely, may have even been provided false information during the spin up of the attack in case of capture in order to further whatever over all goals.
The aspects that are most likely correct are his general knowledge of the actual attack and his belief that he is a member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Anything above that should be taken with a grain of salt as he notes that they were kept isolated, not allowed to associate with one another and went by false names. Also, he appears to be nothing more than a foot soldier and not the leader or organizer of the cell spun up for the attack. As previous attacks have shown, information is typically limited to a "need to know" basis.
On September 11, it appeared that Al Qaeda had deliberately chosen nine of the fifteen terrorists for the operation as Saudi Arabian. Most speculate that the purpose had two imperatives. First, to place a wedge between the Saudi government and the United States. Second, within the inflammation, they expected to force the Muslim ummah to chose sides or, at least, bring a large number of followers to their side. Either by the success of their attack or by implication of a greater Muslim-Western war.
In the early aftermath of 9/11, as decisions were being made on how to respond, US relationship with Saudi Arabia was severely strained. As with the relationship between the Pakistani ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba, since the Russo-Afghan war, it was known that Saudi Arabia had provided assistance to the Mujahideen. Further, that Saudi Arabia had continued to provide money and even intelligence assistance to several organizations that were either related to or later absorbed into the Al Qaeda network.
The difference between the Saudi and Pakistan situation is that Saudi Arabia is considerably more stable politically and economically. Pakistan, not so much. India, only slightly better. In this light, the selection of an all Pakistani team, when it is likely that there are considerable numbers of other nationalities represented in Lashkar-e-Taiba and the general Islamic insurgency in Kashmir, seems to also have a deliberate flavor.
We've also seen this attempt at taking advantage of known fault lines in the population in Al Qaeda's operations in Iraq. One of Zarqawi's first letters implied the strategy to pit Sunnis against Shias within Iraq. His over all strategy was to attack both Sunni and Shia in different guises to sow a civil war. Which was largely successful.
Again, this is not to imply that this operation was an Al Qaeda owned operation. Certainly, LeT and various separatist groups have been attacking the Indian population for sometime and their appearance on Indian soil must imply some sort of potential logistical and material support within India. It has also inflamed existing fault lines within the population. Largely between Hindu and Muslims.
It is simply that this attack has a slightly different flavor with what seems to be much larger goals than previous attacks within India.
One of the slow, but continuing metamorphosis of ideology is the concept of the "near and far enemy". Fawas Gerges wrote about the dichotomy in Islamist ideology in "The Far Enemy". The Far Enemy concept of Islamist terrorism depicts a strategy of weakening nations such as the United States, "the far enemy", in order to reduce support for "apostate" governments of Muslim nations such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the Pakistan "democracy" and the Saudi government. All considered "the near enemy".
However, not all Islamist movements have been open to the idea of changing the focus of their strategies and tactics. Ayman Zawahiri lamented this fact in two separate books, The Bitter Harvest and Knights Under the Prophet's Banner.
"The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global hostility towards us."
In fact, one of the early dissensions between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Qaeda was a question of the appropriate strategy and focus of attacks. Is it the near enemy or the far enemy? For the most part, most of the Islamist organizations have remained focused on their regional or national struggles. However, many organizations have provided assistance to Al Qaeda, sharing networks, and occasionally cooperating or coordinating attacks to meet Al Qaeda's over all strategic goals.
The attack on Mumbai is not necessarily an al Qaeda owned and operated event. But it likely is a cooperative operation that strategically benefits both Lashkar-e-Taiba's determination to re-ignite the Kashmiri offensive and al Qaeda's need for relief in the Afghan-Pakistan border region.
Spanky