I was watching a very interesting piece by PBS called "War Briefing". In part 3, Counter-Insurgency, there are interesting discussions about the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan and then there is the usual discussion about the need for more troops. That discussion leads to the problems with the "economy of force" in Afghanistan and the use of air power that is more substantial than our use of air power during the counter-insurgency in Iraq. Or, so it implies. In fact, the entire short conversation centers around increasing boots on the ground in Afghanistan will decrease the use of air power.
I found it interesting for several reasons. First, the idea that in Iraq was that more boots on the ground reduced the use of air power and that it was necessary because air strikes were less discriminate than soldiers on the ground. Further, that such air strikes invariably led to civilian deaths that were leading to extremely effective propaganda for the insurgents. Even in the cases where it might not have led to civilian deaths, just the sight of household goods, clothes and, particularly, childrens toys at the site of an air strike was just as good as dead bodies for propaganda purposes because it implied civilian deaths, regardless of the truth.
Of course, Iraq had much more urban, densely populated areas where the insurgency lived and operated. And, in the beginning of the surge, as troops went out and implemented COPs and JSSs, they had greater enemy contact and air power, at least in the form of attack helicopters, was used, if somewhat more circumspect. Its use was obviously effective as later, just the appearance of helicopters, A-10's or low flying F18s were enough to cause the enemy to break off attack or break up a congregation for fear of an attack.
The issue in Iraq really wasn't about too much air power or where it was used, but how it was used. Boots on the ground did not necessarily immediately reduce the need for or use of air power. Particularly, since troops were in more contact in the beginning. The difference was in target selection and precision, using much smaller munitions like hellfire missiles that limited collateral damage. In urban terrain, not only was it necessary, it was more effective.
In Afghanistan, air power is not being used in "urban" areas. There is the potential that more boots on the ground in rural flatlands may eventually lead to less use of air power as in Iraq. However, it is more likely in the beginning, as in Iraq, there will be more contact and more use of air power, if not more precise, before it will decrease. Further, the distances that patrols would have to make, even in flat rural areas likely means that air power will still remain the most effective, quick and overwhelming force to protect these patrols.
One issue that none of the commenters seemed to note that at least half of the terrain in Afghanistan is mountainous. That while the entire first part of the series was being filmed from a remote outpost at the top of a mountain in the Korengal Valley. More boots on the ground seems to be the anti-dote that everyone is looking for. Even in this piece in the NY times, the troops talk about getting more re-enforcements that will allow them to push out more and leave their defensive posture.
Will that reduce the use of air power in the valley? Or, more precisely, in the mountains? The answer is, "probably not". The terrain alone negates the idea that more troops and additional patrols will limit air power. In Iraq, tandem patrols could mirror each other and lend re-enforcement when necessary. Helicopters could spin up in 15 minutes from a number of bases and be on site in less time while constant overhead flight of larger air craft could put the fear of the air force and marine air assets into attacking insurgents. Motorized patrols and re-enforcements could likewise make a relatively quick appearance in a fire fight from near by bases that were linked by a fairly comprehensive road system.
In the mountains of Afghanistan, a patrol on a far ranging mission in the mountains will not have the luxury of immediate back up of ground forces. The terrain and lack of roads in the mountains makes any movements slow and dangerous. Whatever patrols go out will continue to be ambushed by the guerrilla forces of the Taliban and Al Qaeda using the best tactics that they have: using the terrain as screening; effective knowledge of the terrain for defense, ingress and egress. The only way to provide effective and immediate relief of any patrols under attack will remain air power.
What will be the most important aspect of "boots on the ground" will not be the reduction of air power in theater or a correlating reduction in civilian deaths from air raids. What will be important will be higher concentration of forces in farther reaching out posts and more effective COIN operations may push the Taliban back out of populated areas, even remote villages, so that when attacks occur and air power is required, the possibilities of collateral damage will be reduced.
But, don't count on it. The Taliban and AQ elements are not going to give up intimidating villagers nor using them for cover.
I found it interesting for several reasons. First, the idea that in Iraq was that more boots on the ground reduced the use of air power and that it was necessary because air strikes were less discriminate than soldiers on the ground. Further, that such air strikes invariably led to civilian deaths that were leading to extremely effective propaganda for the insurgents. Even in the cases where it might not have led to civilian deaths, just the sight of household goods, clothes and, particularly, childrens toys at the site of an air strike was just as good as dead bodies for propaganda purposes because it implied civilian deaths, regardless of the truth.
Of course, Iraq had much more urban, densely populated areas where the insurgency lived and operated. And, in the beginning of the surge, as troops went out and implemented COPs and JSSs, they had greater enemy contact and air power, at least in the form of attack helicopters, was used, if somewhat more circumspect. Its use was obviously effective as later, just the appearance of helicopters, A-10's or low flying F18s were enough to cause the enemy to break off attack or break up a congregation for fear of an attack.
The issue in Iraq really wasn't about too much air power or where it was used, but how it was used. Boots on the ground did not necessarily immediately reduce the need for or use of air power. Particularly, since troops were in more contact in the beginning. The difference was in target selection and precision, using much smaller munitions like hellfire missiles that limited collateral damage. In urban terrain, not only was it necessary, it was more effective.
In Afghanistan, air power is not being used in "urban" areas. There is the potential that more boots on the ground in rural flatlands may eventually lead to less use of air power as in Iraq. However, it is more likely in the beginning, as in Iraq, there will be more contact and more use of air power, if not more precise, before it will decrease. Further, the distances that patrols would have to make, even in flat rural areas likely means that air power will still remain the most effective, quick and overwhelming force to protect these patrols.
One issue that none of the commenters seemed to note that at least half of the terrain in Afghanistan is mountainous. That while the entire first part of the series was being filmed from a remote outpost at the top of a mountain in the Korengal Valley. More boots on the ground seems to be the anti-dote that everyone is looking for. Even in this piece in the NY times, the troops talk about getting more re-enforcements that will allow them to push out more and leave their defensive posture.
Will that reduce the use of air power in the valley? Or, more precisely, in the mountains? The answer is, "probably not". The terrain alone negates the idea that more troops and additional patrols will limit air power. In Iraq, tandem patrols could mirror each other and lend re-enforcement when necessary. Helicopters could spin up in 15 minutes from a number of bases and be on site in less time while constant overhead flight of larger air craft could put the fear of the air force and marine air assets into attacking insurgents. Motorized patrols and re-enforcements could likewise make a relatively quick appearance in a fire fight from near by bases that were linked by a fairly comprehensive road system.
In the mountains of Afghanistan, a patrol on a far ranging mission in the mountains will not have the luxury of immediate back up of ground forces. The terrain and lack of roads in the mountains makes any movements slow and dangerous. Whatever patrols go out will continue to be ambushed by the guerrilla forces of the Taliban and Al Qaeda using the best tactics that they have: using the terrain as screening; effective knowledge of the terrain for defense, ingress and egress. The only way to provide effective and immediate relief of any patrols under attack will remain air power.
What will be the most important aspect of "boots on the ground" will not be the reduction of air power in theater or a correlating reduction in civilian deaths from air raids. What will be important will be higher concentration of forces in farther reaching out posts and more effective COIN operations may push the Taliban back out of populated areas, even remote villages, so that when attacks occur and air power is required, the possibilities of collateral damage will be reduced.
But, don't count on it. The Taliban and AQ elements are not going to give up intimidating villagers nor using them for cover.
PBS, for the most part you don't need to go any further to understand why their analysis might be a little off or slanted.
Ehhhhhhhh -- yes and no.
(Gads, I'm turning into a squish, too)
Actually, the terrain *itself* is a limiting factor.
For us rotorheads, mountain flying is tough work, especially at altitudes low enough to be tactically useful, and the Army's decision to forego skid-type landing gear in favor of wheels (*haaaack* *p-tooo!*) places severe restrictions on utility and cargo aircraft. I can put one skid of a Huey II on a ledge at 12,000 MSL and stick the other one over a 5,000-foot dropoff while the troops pile in (or out) or the crewchief offloads food, water and ammo, or, if need be, helps load litter patients, and in ten seconds, I'm *gone* and not a target for indirect fire anymore -- a Black Hawk or Chinook *can't* put one wheel on a ledge and remain stable while the center of gravity is moving fore-aft-left-right from rapid movement. Everything must be done at a slower pace, which increases the vulnerability of everyone involved.
UAVs (armed or unarmed) need *lots* of standoff from higher terrain just to keep the sensors steady. Show me a stabilized sight that can accurately compensate for being bounced ten feet in three different dimensions every half-second and I'll show you a lovely bridge I've got for sale over the East River in NYC.
Personally, I see an increased need for fast-movers and attack helicopters, because an increasing number of troops patrolling aggressively will result in an increasing number of contacts, and the TaliQaeda will initiate a good percentage of them if they're feeling particularly blessed on any given day -- in other words, during crappy weather coupled with lousy visibility...
Personally I expect an increase. More chance to find a nice hit and air is one way of doing so. Probably more need simply due to integrated nature of warfighting too. ie more infantry invites more airpower.
Well, Bill, we're talking about blasting things, not necessarily rescue or resupply, but I suppose that we should consider that equally important since additional patrols means more injured and more men means more supplies.
Part of that I think goes towards another discussion about infrastructure, though.
In Afghanistan, you have the opposite situation, population-wise - 70% of the population is rural. Coupled with the much lower overall number of troops in Afghanistan, the bases, especially with ones with Excalibur (GPS) capable 155mm howitzers (they don't work in the M198, but do in the M777. The US doesn't have any Paladins in Afghanistan) are quite spread out, and a large amount of the fighting takes place in areas that John brethren can't reach, either because of simple range or because intervening mountains get in the way. The greater dispersion means troops in contact are also usually further away from Army attack helos, and the first thing that can get in range to help is a jet flying racetracks at 30,000 feet.
I've also heard it noted by at least one US flag officer with Afghanistan experience that troops making contact have gotten into the habit often times of backing off and calling in an airstrike on the source of the contact, a practice which often results in civilian casualties. There are reports that the Tangos have started using this habit as part of their info ops against us, by initiating contact from buildings with civilians inside, hidden from coalition forces, with the intent that the civilians will be killed by the ensuing airstrike.
Put yourself into our troops place, I bet you would think it is better to have more "backup" than "less backup"!
@Heartless Liberterian, it appears to this Grumpy old Vet, you are talking about a couple of goals. Considering the "assistance" the Pakistanis gave us with our logistical trucking issues, we will not need to worry about hemorrhoids. It also appears you are suggesting SIGNIFICANT LANDSCAPING in AFGHANISTAN. Because of this, you will be assisting the "Tangos" with their aging in place issues, PERMANENTLY. JUST MAKE SURE, YOU KNOW THE LOCATION OF OUR TROOPS. If the area claimed by Pakistan were to be "LANDSCAPED", we just send them a bill for services rendered. Now, they'll know what it feels like to be "serviced".
@Kat, please wait until after the "LANDSCAPING" is complete.