Via Blackfive, Opinio Juris offers a suggestion of how the Obama administration can approach the piracy situation in the Gulf of Aden.
He suggests decoy operations with civilian ships having a contingent of marines or other navy personnel to stave off an attack. Thus, increasing the risk to benefit factor for pirates who will have to begin wondering which ship is or is not a protected ship.
He also suggests a second necessity of "multilateral action" which, given all history and current policies of other nations, is a likely non-starter.
The US has used decoys against pirates and other enemy action against shipping. Schooners and other light cruise ships would often have light cannon on one lower deck, with several light swivel guns on deck. Pirates would approach these lone vessels and would either use their light weight and quickness to out run any attackers or, in some cases, deliberately slowed and then used their manueverability to out flank the ship and open fire on the rear of the pirate vessel. Sometimes resulting in sinking, but, most often, disabling the tiller and masts.
During World War I and World War II, allied shipping was constantly harrassed by German destroyers and battleships. Ships would be disguised as cargo ships and armed with weapons such as torpedoes. Winston Churchill, Lord of the Admirality during WWI, developed a plan to use decoy ships, "Q Ships", to lure German submarines and sink them. As noted in the book, the actual success rate in such duels was about 1 in 3. However, the psychological impact was much greater. Even in cases where the Q Ships lost the duel, they often damaged German U boats and forced them to cut short their tours for repairs.
Eventually, the deception lost its effectiveness when Germany opted for unrestricted warfare, doing away with previous laws of sea warfare that required submarines to surface and give ships an opportunity to surrender or its sailors to abandon ship before the ship was sunk. Unrestricted submarine warfare meant submarines did not have to surface before sinking a ship. Thus, the allies returned to convoys of ships escorted by submarine hunter killer groups. A tactic used effectively in WWII as well once the US was brought into the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's reciprocal declaration of war. The US provided even greater numbers of American ships for supplies, escort duties and interdiction of enemy naval forces. Eventually destroying German naval capabilities in the Atlantic.
Pirates, of course, are not exactly an enemy navy whose sole purpose is to destroy supply lines. They are in it for the money. Sinking a ship without attempting to take it and its cargo would have no good purpose. Thus, decoy ships might have a greater and longer effectiveness against pirates.
One other historical point of reference would be the Barbary Pirates. For instance, during the height of piracy in the Mediterranean, the British had determined to simply pay the ransom and go on about their business. They considered it cheaper than actually trying to fight or destroy the pirates. The newly independent United States originally took the same path. The US had no real navy in the beginning to protect its commerce. Eventually Adams convinced congress to authorize a small naval force comprising his vision of "wooden walls" that would protect the US from invasion and possibly its shipping.
However, the US, being a newly created nation with multtiple problems and very little money in the treasury was finding it more and more onerous to pay the expected tribute and ransom. Thomas Jefferson attempted to negotiate with the British and French to create an allied naval force that would finally put an end to the pirates, but neither the British nor the French, both involved in their own war, were interested in participating. As Jefferson also noted, continued payment of tribute and ransom would result in continued and increased demands.
Eventually, the US under Jefferson took the unilateral approach and attacked the Barbary states, eventually pealing them off and threatening Tripoli with "regime change". Thus ended US tributes to Barbary pirates.
The US finds itself in a similar situation. The British, as Opinio Juris notes, are determined to ignore pirates, particularly the Somoli variety, because, if they are taken prisoner to be charged, they might be able to claim asylum in England, along with all of its benefits. The French recently mounted a commando raid against pirates and the Indian navy sank a pirate ship.
Taking a page out of Jefferson and going directly after the "state" is unlikely since the last time US forces were in Somolia, it was a complete disaster that no one in the US is likely to be interested in repeating. However, that is not to say that limited punitive action against known pirate enclaves could not have some impact. The problem, as usual, is the potential for "collateral damage" or for international outcry against attacks on a "weaker state".
The effort may remain simply interdiction until the "risk" factor out weighs the current "benefits".
Forbes notes the main issue isn't necessarily "political will", but coordination of effort. Particular the need to have the best and most effective geographic coverage to interdict. Which means that maybe the real first test for the new administration, that is all about "multi-lateralism", is some immediate diplomacy for joint action against pirates.
As Jefferson found out and might provide as comment: Good luck with that.
He suggests decoy operations with civilian ships having a contingent of marines or other navy personnel to stave off an attack. Thus, increasing the risk to benefit factor for pirates who will have to begin wondering which ship is or is not a protected ship.
He also suggests a second necessity of "multilateral action" which, given all history and current policies of other nations, is a likely non-starter.
The US has used decoys against pirates and other enemy action against shipping. Schooners and other light cruise ships would often have light cannon on one lower deck, with several light swivel guns on deck. Pirates would approach these lone vessels and would either use their light weight and quickness to out run any attackers or, in some cases, deliberately slowed and then used their manueverability to out flank the ship and open fire on the rear of the pirate vessel. Sometimes resulting in sinking, but, most often, disabling the tiller and masts.
During World War I and World War II, allied shipping was constantly harrassed by German destroyers and battleships. Ships would be disguised as cargo ships and armed with weapons such as torpedoes. Winston Churchill, Lord of the Admirality during WWI, developed a plan to use decoy ships, "Q Ships", to lure German submarines and sink them. As noted in the book, the actual success rate in such duels was about 1 in 3. However, the psychological impact was much greater. Even in cases where the Q Ships lost the duel, they often damaged German U boats and forced them to cut short their tours for repairs.
Eventually, the deception lost its effectiveness when Germany opted for unrestricted warfare, doing away with previous laws of sea warfare that required submarines to surface and give ships an opportunity to surrender or its sailors to abandon ship before the ship was sunk. Unrestricted submarine warfare meant submarines did not have to surface before sinking a ship. Thus, the allies returned to convoys of ships escorted by submarine hunter killer groups. A tactic used effectively in WWII as well once the US was brought into the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's reciprocal declaration of war. The US provided even greater numbers of American ships for supplies, escort duties and interdiction of enemy naval forces. Eventually destroying German naval capabilities in the Atlantic.
Pirates, of course, are not exactly an enemy navy whose sole purpose is to destroy supply lines. They are in it for the money. Sinking a ship without attempting to take it and its cargo would have no good purpose. Thus, decoy ships might have a greater and longer effectiveness against pirates.
One other historical point of reference would be the Barbary Pirates. For instance, during the height of piracy in the Mediterranean, the British had determined to simply pay the ransom and go on about their business. They considered it cheaper than actually trying to fight or destroy the pirates. The newly independent United States originally took the same path. The US had no real navy in the beginning to protect its commerce. Eventually Adams convinced congress to authorize a small naval force comprising his vision of "wooden walls" that would protect the US from invasion and possibly its shipping.
However, the US, being a newly created nation with multtiple problems and very little money in the treasury was finding it more and more onerous to pay the expected tribute and ransom. Thomas Jefferson attempted to negotiate with the British and French to create an allied naval force that would finally put an end to the pirates, but neither the British nor the French, both involved in their own war, were interested in participating. As Jefferson also noted, continued payment of tribute and ransom would result in continued and increased demands.
Eventually, the US under Jefferson took the unilateral approach and attacked the Barbary states, eventually pealing them off and threatening Tripoli with "regime change". Thus ended US tributes to Barbary pirates.
The US finds itself in a similar situation. The British, as Opinio Juris notes, are determined to ignore pirates, particularly the Somoli variety, because, if they are taken prisoner to be charged, they might be able to claim asylum in England, along with all of its benefits. The French recently mounted a commando raid against pirates and the Indian navy sank a pirate ship.
Taking a page out of Jefferson and going directly after the "state" is unlikely since the last time US forces were in Somolia, it was a complete disaster that no one in the US is likely to be interested in repeating. However, that is not to say that limited punitive action against known pirate enclaves could not have some impact. The problem, as usual, is the potential for "collateral damage" or for international outcry against attacks on a "weaker state".
The effort may remain simply interdiction until the "risk" factor out weighs the current "benefits".
Forbes notes the main issue isn't necessarily "political will", but coordination of effort. Particular the need to have the best and most effective geographic coverage to interdict. Which means that maybe the real first test for the new administration, that is all about "multi-lateralism", is some immediate diplomacy for joint action against pirates.
As Jefferson found out and might provide as comment: Good luck with that.
