Continuing a conversation about pirates, the true cost of piracy and whether we should make extra efforts to stop piracy with our military or other force, or if we should just absorb it...
Information Dissemination has maps of the active piracy going on in the Gulf of Aden. It is much more than the few well publicized events. Long War Journal reports that the Mumbai attackers came in on one or two ships that were previously reported as pirated. This includes the MV Alpha and the Kuber that were both reported hi-jacked from Karachi, Pakistan.
Two ships that have been boarded are strongly suspected of being involved in the attacks: the Kuber, an Indian fishing boat, and the MV Alpha, a Vietnamese cargo ship. Both ships appear to have been directly involved. The Kuber was hijacked on Nov. 13, and its captain was found murdered. Four crewmen are reported to still be missing.
Which leads to another discussion yesterday about the Lashkar-e-Toiba involved with the Deccan Mujihadeen that took credit for the Mumbai attacks and whether there is possible relations with AQ or ISI Pakistan. Apparently, at least three captured terrorists were of Pakistani nationality and claimed to be members of the LeT. There are also reports that two were actually British nationals of Pakistani descent. Whether these are the same men is questionable.
In the long run, the cost of piracy is much more than the price of fuel and goods or even insurance rates, though those are very damaging over the long run. This obviously points to the ability and desire to use large, common transportation vehicles to attack targets (planes, trains, ships, cars, buses and motorcycles to date). It's reported that the ships were laden with explosives. Possibly to sink the ship, cause damage to the port and ships in the port and maybe kill any potential port security, navy or coast guard boarders.
While most discussions about port security in the US discusses cargo container screening for potential explosives or even dirty bomb materials or chemical weapons, the real danger to our ports does not necessarily require the cargo containers to come ashore or ships to even be tied up at the docks. The danger lies in any ship coming into the port or bay area and exploding or sinking. Or, even where terrorists can use these ports to come ashore and cause havoc in the port city as seen in Mumbai.
Had one or more ships exploded or sank in Mumbai's port, it would have long term effects on the shipping that goes in and out, the rate of insurance of ships making port there and the over all economy of India. (See, Strategic Convergence) It would have had world economic impact since many inexpenisve goods come from India including food, textiles, clothing, chemicals and computer parts, to name a few. Not to exclude the amount of shipping that goes into India.
As discussed in this 2005 post, Al Qaeda's War for Oil and Other Things, terrorism, specifically, Islamist terrorist seeking a wider war against non-Islamic nations, does not require these groups to actually take over any one country or become its government to threaten nations. The initial plans, as set out by Al Qaeda in their call for global war, is to cause enough damage physically, psychologically and financially ("vex and exhaust" or "death by a thousand cuts").
In the short term, reviewing the contested areas, maritime routes, materials and production, the strategy to "vex and exhaust" the United States, its allies and other target states, does not require the actual take over of any one state and does include a wider economic strategy beyond "military" or "political" cost. Generally, these movements only require that the area or country stays in turmoil, thus increasing the cost of production, exporting, importing and transporting goods as well as securing ports. For instance, 18 of 20 highest volume container ports are in South East Asia. Basically, the strategy of "a thousand cuts".
This strategy is meant to cause these nations to retract from their support or interaction with these states, weaken them to the point of collapse and then over take those states or regions within with little or no comparative military, personnel, financial or material cost. The last is part of the long term strategy to move these states back into the Islamic sphere. Or, as the long term goal states, to recreate the Islamic Caliphate.
Many dismiss this over all goal as "a bridge too far" because all of these groups are disparate organizations with some competing regional or territorial goals as well as competing leadership and competition for finance. However, each of these Islamist organizations have stated in their manifestos the over all intent to establish the hemispheric or global Caliphate.
It has been established that these organizations can and will work together tactically and strategically when it benefits them or, as noted, meets their "strategic convergence" of both forwarding the local/regional efforts as well as the international goals. International and regional terrorist organizations hosted a conference in Kuala Lumpur in 2000 that was the planning base for the attack on the USS Cole and 9/11. Earlier, leaders of multiple organizations signed tAl Qaeda's 1998 agreement to global jihad (Crusade Against Christians and Jews). Similarly, an Islamist conference, billed as "Defend Kashmir" (possibly "Defend Pakistan", considered on in same by some movements) was held with 14 different organizations in Lahore, Pakistan on September, 2008.
In early September 2008, leaders of 14 jihadist groups attended a conference in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir. The meeting was billed as the Defend Kashmir Conference. Syed Salahuddin told the conference that India is settling Hindus in Indian Kashmir in order to reduce the Muslim population there. Syed Salahuddin also asked the government of Pakistan to call for an emergency meeting of international institutions to discuss the matter. He said that jihad would continue until Kashmir is liberated from India. [35] He had even warned the new civilian government in Pakistan that his group will, if necessary, fight in Islamabad. He said that if Pakistan changed its policy of supporting Kashmiri movements and "if the jihad in Kashmir failed, the fighting will start in Islamabad and Muzaffarabad." [36]
In late August 2008, the militant leader went to the extent of warning of expanding his group's activities beyond the Indian Kashmir to the other states of India. [37] On September 16, 2008, Syed Salahuddin attended a meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami, where he articulated a global agenda for jihad, stating: "So long [as] a piece of land is under the occupation of Kuffar [infidels], jihad is compulsory for all Muslims." [38] Syed Salahuddin is the key person behind the jihad in Indian Kashmir. .
These attackson Mumbai were too extensive to have been planned, trained for and financed only within the last two months since the conference. However, as with the 2000 conference prior to the attack on the USS Cole and 9/11, these attacks were conceived and generally organized prior any conference. Discussions at the 2000 conference were to solidify support for the planned operations and joint efforts thereafter. Similarly, it is likely that there the Lahore conference had a similar purpose and likely included representatives from the global networks or who acts as a liaison with these organizations.
As Mark Steyn points out, treating these events as local or regional problems with no international impact is a false choice:
The Jerusalem Post's headline writer poses the question:
Homegrown Terror Or International Jihad?
False choice. The answer is: Homegrown terror in the service of international jihad. Clearly, India has had a Muslim problem to one degree or another in the 60 years since partition, but increasingly those locally driven grievances have been absorbed within the global pan-Islamic ideology. What strikes you, as the dust clears in Bombay, is that one assault provided an umbrella for manifestations of almost every strain of Muslim grievance.
]]>