Michael O'Hanlon has an interesting piece in the Wall Street Journal titled, "How to Win in Afghanistan". He joins a rising chorus of people that includes Michael Yon insisting that the two things most needed in Afghanistan are troops and money.
As the recent attack on a convoy carrying supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan shows, there is a significant part of the current logistical routes that are relatively unsecured. This cannot simply be secured by providing additional US forces for security or significantly increasing the amount or number of convoys going in with extra supplies in order to aggregate any losses as was done in Iraq. The US certainly had control of all ingress and egress routes for Iraq which allowed the US greater latitude and more direct ability to effect security and supplies.
Pakistan is a sovereign nation and it is not going to allow US forces to take up residence in any large contingent or to run convoys through their territory. Not to mention that it would immediately become an even greater target for Taliban and al Qaeda attacks as well as the necessity to place an equal amount or more of troops in this position in order to support any surge in Afghanistan. Plus, these routes are not exactly paved four lane highways as was the case in Iraq. They are sometimes no more than goat tracks and little dirt roads.
The number of troops that are being considered for a "surge" today is likely based on the practical issues of being able to support them as well as any political issues of Afghan sovereignty
That is not to say that a very large number of troops to secure Afghanistan is not necessary or entirely unfeasible. However, the DoD is going to have to come up with some sort of plan to provide for resupplying these forces. Because, the big white elephant in the room that nobody is talking about is that the easiest weay for AQ et al to shut down US activities is to simply interdict supplies. A larger number of troops having to share the same or less in ammunition, food, clothing and medicine would be an army in dire straits.
It is a basic principle of warfare as old as time. Why this never seems to enter into these conversations is beyond me.
The little detail missing? No one is talking about logistics. From this point of view, it seems that the boots on the ground are the most important aspect and someone will just have to come up with a way to supply these troops. It all gets airily brushed away like a fly interrupting afternoon tea.The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and the critical problem is the same one that dogged our efforts in Iraq for years: grossly inadequate troop levels. Western troop totals there have just inched over 60,000, while Afghan security forces total some 140,000. Let's put this into perspective: We are trying to do with 200,000 personnel what it took 700,000 soldiers and police (plus 100,000 "volunteers") to accomplish in Iraq. But Afghanistan is even larger than Iraq, and more populous.
President-elect Barack Obama has wisely promised an increase in U.S. forces for Afghanistan. But his proposed minisurge of perhaps 15,000 more troops, on top of the 30,000 Americans and 30,000 NATO personnel now there, will not suffice as a strategy. More is needed.[snip]
Afghanistan's GDP is only $11 billion and its annual federal budget is just $4 billion (more than half from foreign aid). It clearly cannot sustain a large army and police. So why build a large Afghan security force?
The answer is simple: because the alternatives are worse. One possibility is to increase the number of NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, pushing the combined cost of the operation well above the current $4 billion a month. The other possibility is most likely to lose the war.[snip]
The United States has been spending nearly $3 billion a year to fund the Afghanistan security forces of late. This is a great deal of money but far less than our own military costs in that country. We should be willing to double that $3 billion a year if need be.
As the recent attack on a convoy carrying supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan shows, there is a significant part of the current logistical routes that are relatively unsecured. This cannot simply be secured by providing additional US forces for security or significantly increasing the amount or number of convoys going in with extra supplies in order to aggregate any losses as was done in Iraq. The US certainly had control of all ingress and egress routes for Iraq which allowed the US greater latitude and more direct ability to effect security and supplies.
Pakistan is a sovereign nation and it is not going to allow US forces to take up residence in any large contingent or to run convoys through their territory. Not to mention that it would immediately become an even greater target for Taliban and al Qaeda attacks as well as the necessity to place an equal amount or more of troops in this position in order to support any surge in Afghanistan. Plus, these routes are not exactly paved four lane highways as was the case in Iraq. They are sometimes no more than goat tracks and little dirt roads.
The number of troops that are being considered for a "surge" today is likely based on the practical issues of being able to support them as well as any political issues of Afghan sovereignty
That is not to say that a very large number of troops to secure Afghanistan is not necessary or entirely unfeasible. However, the DoD is going to have to come up with some sort of plan to provide for resupplying these forces. Because, the big white elephant in the room that nobody is talking about is that the easiest weay for AQ et al to shut down US activities is to simply interdict supplies. A larger number of troops having to share the same or less in ammunition, food, clothing and medicine would be an army in dire straits.
It is a basic principle of warfare as old as time. Why this never seems to enter into these conversations is beyond me.
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There aren't any, and that is one of the factors which keep it poor. There is no infrastructure. If it was done right--from the bottom up--the people would have a great deal of investment in peace there. When goods can move easily and quickly through a country, it builds wealth and binds the country together.
I may not be all that fond of Ike, but the roads were what made this country rich (that, and the GI bill.) Roads are what brought the rural areas out of the depression. They broke the monopoly of the train, and created tremendous numbers of jobs (an exponential number beyond that of the road-building itself.)
The military has, in the past, come up with some very imaginative uses for ordinance in order to widen mountain passes and trails for the purpose of moving men and materials. Some of those "instant roads" from WW--II are still being used today.
They need roads, cell towers, and electricity. They need pipelines for water, gasoline/diesel, and natural gas. Blast the road beds wide enough and deep enough, and you can share the space for all of the needed infrastructure. Pre-stressed concrete can be made using come-alongs and wooden forms. Sufficient ingenuity will enable people to cast pre-stress in place.
The people of Afghanistan (on the whole) are not educated, but that does not mean that they are stupid, or unskilled. They have a capacity for peace, and an almost infinite capacity for war.
If you create an economic and political environment on their terms--they will defend it as individuals. Given adequate weapons and training, they will hunt down those responsible for bombings and terror in their country. They will follow the perpetrators, no matter how far--and they will kill them.
The few Afghanis I know, if given a proper drawl, would be most appropriately West Texan.
I like them.