Someone put this up a couple of days ago, intending it to be an H&I Fires post - but clearly it's a touch too focused for that. I'm thinking it's not quite finished, but perhaps whoever tossed it up into the hopper will come in and finish it - and all y'all can start chatting about it, anyway. - the Armorer
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Wow. We are all obviously a little too stuffed from yesterday to have put anything up.
Well, let's start with continuing a conversation about pirates, the true cost of piracy and whether we should make extra efforts to stop piracy with our military or other force, or if we should just absorb it.
Information Dissemination has maps of the active piracy going on in the Gulf of Aden. It is much more than the few well publicized events. Long War Journal reports that the Mumbai attackers came in on one or two ships that were previously reported as pirated. This includes the MV Alpha and the Kuber that were both reported hi-jacked from Karachi, Pakistan.
Which leads to another discussion yesterday about the Lashkar-e-Toiba involved with the Deccan Mujihadeen that took credit for the Mumbai attacks. Apparently, at least three captured terrorists were of Pakistani nationality and claimed to be members of the LeT. There are also reports that two were actually British nationals of Pakistani descent. Whether these are the same men is questionable.
In the long run, the cost of piracy is much more than the price of fuel and goods or even insurance rates, though those are very damaging over the long run. This obviously points to the ability and desire to use large, common transportation vehicles to attack targets (planes, trains, ships, cars, buses and motorcycles to date). It's reported that the ships were laden with explosives. Possibly to sink the ship, cause damage to the port and ships in the port and maybe kill any potential port security, navy or coast guard boarders.
While most discussions about port security in the US discusses cargo container screening for potential explosives or even dirty bomb materials or chemical weapons, the real danger to our ports does not necessarily require the cargo containers to come ashore or ships to even be tied up at the docks. The danger lies in any ship coming into the port or bay area and exploding or sinking. Or, even where terrorists can use these ports to come ashore and cause havoc in the port city as seen in Mumbai.
Had one or more ships exploded or sank in Mumbai's port, it would have long term effects on the shipping that goes in and out, the rate of insurance of ships making port there and the over all economy of India. (See, Strategic Convergence) It would have had world economic impact since many inexpenisve goods come from India including food, textiles, clothing, chemicals and computer parts, to name a few. Not to exclude the amount of shipping that goes into India.
As discussed in this 2005 post, Al Qaeda's War for Oil and Other Things, terrorism, specifically, Islamist terrorist seeking a wider war against non-Islamic nations, does not require these groups to actually take over any one country or become its government to threaten nations. The initial plans, as set out by Al Qaeda in their call for global war, is to cause enough damage physically, psychologically and financially ("vex and exhaust" or "death by a thousand cuts").
This strategy is meant to cause these nations to retract from their support or interaction with these states, weaken them to the point of collapse and then over take those states with little or know military or material cost. The last is part of the long term strategy to move these states back into the Islamic sphere. Or, as the long term goal states, to recreate the Islamic Caliphate.
Many dismiss this over all goal as "a bridge too far" because all of these groups are disparate organizations with some competing regional or territorial goals as well as competing leadership and competition for finance. However, each of these Islamist organizations have stated in their manifestos the over all intent to establish the hemispheric or global Caliphate.
This is following the classic Maoist guerrilla tactics with the final goal being global in respect and not limited to nationalist agendas. As Mark Steyn points out, treating these events as local or regional problems with no international impact is a false choice:
Wow. We are all obviously a little too stuffed from yesterday to have put anything up.
Well, let's start with continuing a conversation about pirates, the true cost of piracy and whether we should make extra efforts to stop piracy with our military or other force, or if we should just absorb it.
Information Dissemination has maps of the active piracy going on in the Gulf of Aden. It is much more than the few well publicized events. Long War Journal reports that the Mumbai attackers came in on one or two ships that were previously reported as pirated. This includes the MV Alpha and the Kuber that were both reported hi-jacked from Karachi, Pakistan.
Two ships that have been boarded are strongly suspected of being involved in the attacks: the Kuber, an Indian fishing boat, and the MV Alpha, a Vietnamese cargo ship. Both ships appear to have been directly involved. The Kuber was hijacked on Nov. 13, and its captain was found murdered. Four crewmen are reported to still be missing.
Which leads to another discussion yesterday about the Lashkar-e-Toiba involved with the Deccan Mujihadeen that took credit for the Mumbai attacks. Apparently, at least three captured terrorists were of Pakistani nationality and claimed to be members of the LeT. There are also reports that two were actually British nationals of Pakistani descent. Whether these are the same men is questionable.
In the long run, the cost of piracy is much more than the price of fuel and goods or even insurance rates, though those are very damaging over the long run. This obviously points to the ability and desire to use large, common transportation vehicles to attack targets (planes, trains, ships, cars, buses and motorcycles to date). It's reported that the ships were laden with explosives. Possibly to sink the ship, cause damage to the port and ships in the port and maybe kill any potential port security, navy or coast guard boarders.
While most discussions about port security in the US discusses cargo container screening for potential explosives or even dirty bomb materials or chemical weapons, the real danger to our ports does not necessarily require the cargo containers to come ashore or ships to even be tied up at the docks. The danger lies in any ship coming into the port or bay area and exploding or sinking. Or, even where terrorists can use these ports to come ashore and cause havoc in the port city as seen in Mumbai.
Had one or more ships exploded or sank in Mumbai's port, it would have long term effects on the shipping that goes in and out, the rate of insurance of ships making port there and the over all economy of India. (See, Strategic Convergence) It would have had world economic impact since many inexpenisve goods come from India including food, textiles, clothing, chemicals and computer parts, to name a few. Not to exclude the amount of shipping that goes into India.
As discussed in this 2005 post, Al Qaeda's War for Oil and Other Things, terrorism, specifically, Islamist terrorist seeking a wider war against non-Islamic nations, does not require these groups to actually take over any one country or become its government to threaten nations. The initial plans, as set out by Al Qaeda in their call for global war, is to cause enough damage physically, psychologically and financially ("vex and exhaust" or "death by a thousand cuts").
In the short term, reviewing the contested areas, maritime routes, materials and production, the strategy to "vex and exhaust" the United States, its allies and other target states, does not require the actual take over of any one state and does include a wider economic strategy beyond "military" or "political" cost. Generally, these movements only require that the area or country stays in turmoil, thus increasing the cost of production, exporting, importing and transporting goods as well as securing ports. For instance, 18 of 20 highest volume container ports are in South East Asia. Basically, the strategy of "a thousand cuts".
This strategy is meant to cause these nations to retract from their support or interaction with these states, weaken them to the point of collapse and then over take those states with little or know military or material cost. The last is part of the long term strategy to move these states back into the Islamic sphere. Or, as the long term goal states, to recreate the Islamic Caliphate.
Many dismiss this over all goal as "a bridge too far" because all of these groups are disparate organizations with some competing regional or territorial goals as well as competing leadership and competition for finance. However, each of these Islamist organizations have stated in their manifestos the over all intent to establish the hemispheric or global Caliphate.
This is following the classic Maoist guerrilla tactics with the final goal being global in respect and not limited to nationalist agendas. As Mark Steyn points out, treating these events as local or regional problems with no international impact is a false choice:
The Jerusalem Post's headline writer poses the question:
Homegrown Terror Or International Jihad?
False choice. The answer is: Homegrown terror in the service of international jihad. Clearly, India has had a Muslim problem to one degree or another in the 60 years since partition, but increasingly those locally driven grievances have been absorbed within the global pan-Islamic ideology. What strikes you, as the dust clears in Bombay, is that one assault provided an umbrella for manifestations of almost every strain of Muslim grievance.
Essentially, America is a mercantilist state and it always has been, in spite of our preferred national focus on the religious- and political-freedom reasons that our immigrant forebears travelled here. Yes, many of the first non-native 'Americans' came here for religious reasons, but many, many more--in fact, most--came here for reasons of commerce. Spain, England, France, Russia, and all the others were looking for revenue to fund their incessant wars, among other things, and the new world was that source. Even the slaves were brought here for business reasons. The U.S. is all about commerce and anything that encourages or supports it is ok with us, while anything that prevents it is not and will be dealt with, violently if necessary.
I know this glosses over a great deal of 'the rest of the story,' but the core truth is this as I see it: Unless government is designed from the outset (or remade with violence) to foster and support commerce and secure property rights, it does exactly the opposite in direct proportion to its power and its involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the governed. In the U.S., we have evolved a political-philosophical construct over the past 400+ years intended primarily to give individuals as much latitude as possible within the confines of a community to pursue their livelihoods and their dreams in a fashion that best suits <i>them</i>, not the government. To that, we have added what makes the U.S. different from all other former colonies everywhere, the national ego and aggressive attitude that comes from having thrown off the 'yoke of repression' instead of waiting for it to be removed. Moreover, we did it with arms, which established permanently in our national psyche and character the conviction that when all else fails, it's plenty ok to break out the guns. In this, as we have so many times since 1776, we set ourselves apart from the rest of the world.
Unfortunately for Al Qaeda and everyone else who doesn't understand these aspects of our national character, we are not only good at business, we are more than willing to use violence to protect our interests when all other methods fail. And of course, we are very good at making war, having built upon the foundations of western-style warfare established by the Greeks 500 years before Christ's birth, and adding to them the fuel of free commerce that encourages innovation and individual excellence. It may be a dubious honor for some, but it pleases me no end to know that there is no other country in the world today that holds a candle to the U.S. when it comes to war. War is not all we're good at, nor is it what we are best at, really, but as with everything else, we do not enter an endeavor to do anything less than win, and win big.
And so it comes to this, I think: Al Qaeda is fighting the wrong war (as we were in Vietnam), or the right war with the wrong enemy. Americans do not care about Islam, per se, either for or against, as long as Islam doesn't get in the way of doing business. Essentially, Al Qaeda is fighting a war of religious ideology, which is an even more restrictive subset of beliefs, and therefore harder to get committed fighters for, than political ideology. The U.S., on the other hand, is fighting the war for two reasons. First, we were attacked, and that can <i>never</i> be allowed to go unanswered. Second, and more important, we are fighting to defend our right to do business globally, according to a set of acceptable, mutually agreed to rules. Simple as that. If anything, we're in a war over the right to make choices--the right for people everywhere to choose what we're selling instead of what some tyrant or some hidebound government insists they accept as their only due, whether it be goods, ideology, or culture.
Of course, for Americans, this is not about culture, because we don't really care what people in other countries wear, think, do, or say as long as they buy our products, sell us the stuff we need and want, and otherwise leave us alone. As most Americans know, but the rest of the world (including the French) does not seem to get, most of us could care less about 'exporting' our culture. We're just doing business and enjoying our lives, and if the rest of the world likes what we have here, well, whose fault is that? Certainly not ours.
It for these reasons and more that Al Qaeda can never win against the U.S. and why its 'death of a thousand cuts' will never work. Al Qaeda has given the West no alternative vision but its own, and that will never be accepted, so no matter how long this goes on or how many cuts are made, the world will adjust and flow around them, like a river around a rock. In the end, as long as we keep fighting--and we really have no choice, since we've been given none--Al Qaeda is doomed to die a weary, wasted death, not because it can't fight well, or because it can't motivate individuals, but because it just can't motivate enough of them. There are simply not enough jihadist-nutcases to overcome most of humanity's burning desire for less pain, hardship, and repression, and more of all the good things that open markets and free trade can bring them. The United States is the Pandora's Box of freedom-of-choice in all things, and Al Qaeda and the other losers of the world can fight until the end of time, but they will never be able to put everything we've given to the world--for good or bad--back in that box. I'd say it sucks to be them.
V/R
SangerM
P.S. While the U.S. has developed an eminently workable blend of commerce and freedom, it and the world owe a great deal to Queen Elizabeth I, whose understanding of the power of commerce to offset military might was the reason England survived and prospered in spite of having fewer people and fewer natural resources than its two powerful rivals. We have done well for ourselves, but we didn't invent commerce as a national strategy. That honor belongs to England.