You want to know how we die in Afghanistan? Right here. This paper relegates the PRTs to paper pushing and chauffering dignitaries. I have never read such bureaucratic BS. The situation with the PRTs and the multitude of various other alphabet groups really shows one major malfunction in Afghanistan:
Lack of Unity of Effort
Many people point to the Iraq surge of troops as the turning point in Iraq. Others discuss the development of the COIN strategy. But, none of it mattered without one really important development:
Unity of Effort
Not just militarily, but across the State Department, UN, US and foreign aid agencies. It took a dynamic concept and people with a single purpose. It took people like Petraeus and Crocker to stop the infighting and push these organizations to work together. Crocker worked, not only with the Iraqi government, but with the foreign aid organizations and the UN to move them towards a single plan. Petraeus also exercised influence over the national government and Iraqi military, but most importantly had his teams focus on local governance and security. They acted as the first line to identify the needs in their areas after securing their AOs. PRT efforts concured with security efforts.
Afghanistan lacks that in spades. Both in the American effort and the general Coalition.
They can create any number of organizations with initials as long as the alphabet. They can read the COIN manual and try to implement it. Build wells, roads and schools. Nothing matters unless we have one goal and one direction.
One other aspect of the strategy involved how it was employed. Right now, Afghanistan resembles a quotation. To paraphrase: he who seeks to do everything at once, will accomplish nothing.
With limited forces, the action must be focused.
We should be working on the Ramadi model. Establish a center and work out from there. A rolling surge that builds on established success. With most of the population living in the rural areas, there will be no concrete barriers to separate pacified or friendly groups from troubled areas. It will be sheer will and strategic deployment of troops.
It is going to take someone that can pull together the disparate groups and make them all work towards one goal.
While Petraeus made it happen in Iraq, the differences are myriad. The "coalition" effort was quite limited and established to specific tasks. For most of the Iraq theater, Petraeus had largely US forces with Iraqi indigenous forces. He had direct command and generally developed the strategy with one command group reporting to the US command.
In Afghanistan, there are many more nations with more troops that nearly equal the number of US forces deployed. Mandates by other nations on exactly what their forces can or cannot do or participate in are manifest. Bureaucracy is killer and the long logistics lines through a dangerous nation without US ability to secure it may limit the capability to support a significant increase in troops.
What Petraeus will need is the power and authority to move forces and an absolute capability of navigating international politics. He will need patience and strength. He will need to convey the message that he gave in Iraq: Unity of effort.
Lack of Unity of Effort
Many people point to the Iraq surge of troops as the turning point in Iraq. Others discuss the development of the COIN strategy. But, none of it mattered without one really important development:
Unity of Effort
Not just militarily, but across the State Department, UN, US and foreign aid agencies. It took a dynamic concept and people with a single purpose. It took people like Petraeus and Crocker to stop the infighting and push these organizations to work together. Crocker worked, not only with the Iraqi government, but with the foreign aid organizations and the UN to move them towards a single plan. Petraeus also exercised influence over the national government and Iraqi military, but most importantly had his teams focus on local governance and security. They acted as the first line to identify the needs in their areas after securing their AOs. PRT efforts concured with security efforts.
Afghanistan lacks that in spades. Both in the American effort and the general Coalition.
They can create any number of organizations with initials as long as the alphabet. They can read the COIN manual and try to implement it. Build wells, roads and schools. Nothing matters unless we have one goal and one direction.
One other aspect of the strategy involved how it was employed. Right now, Afghanistan resembles a quotation. To paraphrase: he who seeks to do everything at once, will accomplish nothing.
With limited forces, the action must be focused.
We should be working on the Ramadi model. Establish a center and work out from there. A rolling surge that builds on established success. With most of the population living in the rural areas, there will be no concrete barriers to separate pacified or friendly groups from troubled areas. It will be sheer will and strategic deployment of troops.
It is going to take someone that can pull together the disparate groups and make them all work towards one goal.
While Petraeus made it happen in Iraq, the differences are myriad. The "coalition" effort was quite limited and established to specific tasks. For most of the Iraq theater, Petraeus had largely US forces with Iraqi indigenous forces. He had direct command and generally developed the strategy with one command group reporting to the US command.
In Afghanistan, there are many more nations with more troops that nearly equal the number of US forces deployed. Mandates by other nations on exactly what their forces can or cannot do or participate in are manifest. Bureaucracy is killer and the long logistics lines through a dangerous nation without US ability to secure it may limit the capability to support a significant increase in troops.
What Petraeus will need is the power and authority to move forces and an absolute capability of navigating international politics. He will need patience and strength. He will need to convey the message that he gave in Iraq: Unity of effort.
But you're right there is a major unity of effort problem. One of the advantages in the US 'going it alone' in Iraq was a more united effort. Even in Australia's case and the others we worked in the same framework.
In Afghanistan the framework is a plate of spaghetti. Lord knows where all the strands go. I do not envy Petraeus his job, I believe it will be hard work trying to balance the politics. He also has to deal with the fundamentally problematic economy where it's so weak basic services are harder to make permanent and drugs are appealing. It's also inland and surrounded by people who love us. I wonder if the tribal aspect is more difficult too.
Well it's a crucible in a way. With some luck we might get some intra-national respect happening which is a silver lining to all these problems. Maybe less letters too my head already swims with acronyms, I don't need more!
The security has to come first -- no discussion necessary. Without security, there won't be any venture capitalists or enterpreneurs (other than arms dealers) interested in setting up shop in an area where there's the possibility of being grabbed in broad daylight and publicly executed in the village square.
In the Mekong Delta, beginning in 1969, the program was to establish chains of strategic hamlets with well-trained and aggressive Citizen Reaction Forces supplemented centrally-located RF/PF units (think National Guard). In areas where the roads were kept safe by active patrolling *paralleling* the roads, the program worked. The hamlets were mutually-reinforcing and if they were hit with a large attack, they could hold until reinforced by RF or ARVN troops.
Hamlets which were isolated from outside help were either re-located closer to their neighbors or served as the nucleus of a new series of fortified hamlets. There were fits and starts, but within about a year, it was working.
Didn't see much in the papers about that? Gee, what a surprise.
There was fighting in the Mekong for two years *after* the fall of Saigon -- the hamlet chains kept it up until they ran out of ammo.
Betcha didn't see much of that in the papers, either.
That hamlet idea sounds brilliant. There has to be a snag.
BillT, no Tribal Ruff Puffs allowed. Focused district developed, multicultural, politically correct Dudley Dorights are what we want.
Hamlets in Indochina can be relocated. Plenty of water in their new digs.
Villages and compounds in the Registan Desert can't be relocated. They are where they are because something can grow there.
Perfect! Same with the Delta -- the place wasn't one huge rice paddy, y'know.
The people who live somewhere -- aka, "the natives," "the locals," "the indigenous personnel," or whatever the PC buzzword is these days -- know what they need to make themselves safe. Ask them what that is and pay attention to their answer -- listen to them and don't let your own background color what they're telling you.
Then make it happen.