
Heh. Even when it's a "Must Do."
There’s a lot of email floating about in the Redleg community. Its a discussion of where the Chief of Artillery and his staff feel the branch is, and where it needs to go. There is much to ponder in there, for us Redlegs. For the Army. For whoever wins in November, for that matter.
An excerpt:
…We must improve how we prepare Field Artillery Soldiers, leaders, families, civilians, and units for the challenges they will face. This is a daunting task, complicated by the fact that we must execute it as we fight.
We've been at war, in one form or another, almost continually since Clinton sent us to the Balkans. The next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict against determined enemies. For us to remain the dominant player in the Fires and Effects world, the Field Artillery must transform into an adaptable force capable of operating in any location and cultural environment, regardless of the where it's at. We must have the capabilities-as well as capacity and depth- to counter emerging kinetic and non-kinetic threats while simultaneously retaining our preparedness to conduct major combat operations in a manner that defeats those who threaten our nation’s interests and the interests of our allies and partners. Like the Army, our approach must be well planned, measured, and deliberate.
Emphasis mine. You betcha it does. Why? Consider this:
Again, emphasis mine. I've discussed that in this space before. Part of what that’s saying is that my generation of Redlegs, the guys who mostly stood around and stared down the Soviet Bear, with diversions to Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Kuwait, Somalia and the Balkans, are just about the only ones who remember how to do Fire Support in the Big Way. The guys who wrote Corps Fire Support Plans that allocated the resources of hundreds of tubes and missiles. Who planned Groups and Series and Series of Groups. Who wrote the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) progams. Who generated the logistics annexes to support all that. Who have an idea of what it take to *mass* fires, in a timely and accurate fashion.Training. Our greatest challenges, in number and scope, are in the area of training. The level of Field Artillery training in the operational forces has reached a critical stage. We are witnessing a significant degradation of core competencies with regard to the delivery and integration of joint, lethal, and non-lethal fires. Both fires battalions and fires brigades are experiencing an atrophy of conventional war fighting skills across the board in core tasks such as counterfire, fire support coordination, clearance of fires, fire support planning, and support of divisions and corps conducting major combat operations. Across the Field Artillery, units no longer have the ability to retrain themselves because this extended period has made this loss of skills permanent—outside help will be required.
This decay is the result of a number of factors, but in particular: a high percentage of fires units conducting “in lieu of” missions; second and third order effects of modularity force structure changes on training responsibilities for fire support personnel; and limited opportunity to train in core competencies (at all levels) during the reset phase of the ARFORGEN cycle.
When you look at how we are using artillery today - mostly as a long range precision sniping weapon - you see why the problem exists. The COE, the Current Operating Environment, demands that we do so, and our current enemy doesn't present targets that are candidates for massed fires. The reality is that if a Gunner of my era were to take a modern Officer Advanced Course tactics test - we'd fail if we gave the answers - to the exact same questions - that were correct in my era. Just as today's Captains would most likely fail the tactics tests I administered by students, back in the day. There's the challenge the Chief of Artillery faces.
You get the idea.
I await my recall orders to teach the youngsters how we did it old school.
Think it’s not that bad? Can’t be? Consider this PAO announcement that I received from Fort Riley last week which prompted this post:
The locals shouldn't get too upset. They haven't had to listen to as much of it as they used to, like back in the day when I was stationed at Riley. Hmmmm. That might be why the Fort Riley PAO sent out the note.`PROUD AMERICANS' FIRE ARTILLERY FOR FIRST TIME IN 23 MONTHS
FORT RILEY, Kan. - The 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division will conduct its first artillery live fire in 23 months on Oct. 20-24. [emphasis added]
The exercise will validate the battalion's core competencies as artillerymen after training and performing infantry-oriented tasks since the last live fire. [emphasis added] Soldiers will fire the M119A2.
The two firing batteries, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and its support battery, will deploy to Fort Riley training areas to conduct dry and live fire artillery tables. The 2nd Bn., 32nd FA, `Proud Americans' deployed in February 2008 with 4IBCT for 15 months in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom's troop surge.
Residents in the Fort Riley area should expect noise from the exercise.
Look at that again: The cannoneers of 2/32FA conduct their first artillery live fire in 23 months on Oct. 20-24. Good luck, Chief. Training the Cannoneers back to MTEP-standard will be the easy part. Training the staffs will be a much greater challenge. Maintaining that 'full-spectrum" dominance pulls you in many directions.



Does MPRI know about this?
On the subject of MPRI (My Pay Really Increased), I really appreciate the work those guys are doing. The Army, starting with TRADOC is so risk adverse that it's almost impossible to get realistic training. MPRI is filling the gaps with realistic, effective live fire training while TRADOC has decided that the answer is to put everyone on a make believe FOB and teach outdated material poorly. That attitude seems to be spreading. I'm really hoping that the new senior leadership encourage the growth of some fuzzy ones among the people who are supposed to make sure we're ready to fight effectively. Of course that's another topic altogether. :-)
Granted, it's not planning a Corps TOT to smash a Krasnovian bridgehead. And I think it's symptomatic of a larger problem - at the big unit level, our Army is no longer prepared or trained to fight a conventional fight against a near-peer adversary. If the Artillery thinks they've got it bad, they should look at their Air Defense brothers - the Army has largely done away with the branch by assuming a permanent state of friendly air supremacy. And when was the last time anyone saw a Division or higher level Warfighter exercise for a conventional fight? Rough guess, I'd say early 2003 at the latest. And the Optempo won't allow us to do any anytime soon.
And, interestingly enough - points up one of the weaknesses of the brigade-centric Army.
The problems in the artillery are just symptomatic of a larger systemic problem as we've adapted to fight this war.
Which, short- to mid-term is okay, we're really not likely to face anyone who is going to stand up to us toe-to-toe, but the skills to do so will have atrophied over time - leaving us on a more even par with an enemy who *is* willing to fight the big fight.
Clearly, Argent - I proposed a solution. I await my recall orders!
Mostly, I'm just putting this out, as information, to see what kind of discussion it might generate.
For the amateurs here, I'd suggest reading Geoffrey Perret's "There's a War to be Won." One of the topics he covers was MacArthur's insistence on forming "task forces" when the existing structure was not only more than adequate, but simpler to control.
There are also Fires Brigades, although I'm not sure exactly how many of these there are. I think there are currently 7, but don't quote me. These can vary in their exact composition, but generally include various types of artillery (the 18th here at Bragg has towed 155s and HIMARS) plus counterfire radar batteries, as well as an O6 HQ.
MG Vangjel's plan would add a few more Fires Bdes (so each division HQ would have one) and have them function as what they call the Force Field Artillery HQ (basically, DIVARTY) for that division. This is where the expertise and training in things like mass fire planning and execution would mostly reside. (Actually, in the Stryker battalions, you can almost do it on a smaller scale, but with mortars, since all the rifle companies plus the battalion mortar platoon have 120s. 10 120mm tubes on a single target is nothing to sneeze at.)
I think the knowledge we throw away in the form of death is a terrible waste. That's why paper is so good. But conveying stuff through paper is kinda second best.
GMLRS and Excaliber put more gun bunnies out of business than acting as infantry in Iraq did.
Acquiring and servicing discrete enemy C4ISR targets in a 21st-Century version of Radio-Electronic Combat is the full spectrum 3GW mission against a near peer. Opportunities for massing fires on area targets aren't likely to arise much in the future, and when they do, we probably won't have enough tubes and big bullets in range to go Old School anyway.
You guys used to have a "beaten zone" into which you poured hellfire and scunnion, killing some, demoralizing the survivors, and suppressing their ability to shoot back . Now you are snipers. One shot, one kill. Rinse, repeat.
Until EMP fries all the Buck Rogers War Machines and everybody's in Degraded Mode. Then Old School will be New again.
That statement makes a pretty hefty assumption...