Dissatisfaction with the Afghan government and NATO/US forces is extremely high. Much of it is directly associated with two aspects: 1) aggressive raiding leading to civilian deaths, much of it from the air and 2) the general weakness and corruption of the Afghan government that leads to over all crime and a desparate economic situation.
This issue should not be ignored. In the beginning of the Iraq insurgency with added Al Qaeda presence, one of the causes of locals joining the insurgency or Al Qaeda was the death and detention of family members. Aerial bombing had led to many incidents that either legitimately or falsely claimed to involve civilian casualties. The reality as well as the false propaganda simply became a narrative for recruiting insurgents.
The United States simply had to change its tactics using aerial fire power effectively, but more sparingly while putting more boots on the ground to support a true COIN including managing the information war. The question is whether the US can do the same in Afghanistan and if the trade off would have the same outcome as in Iraq.
One of the biggest differences between these two nations is its terrain. Beyond that are the distances, infrastructure and location of its demographics. Iraq is largely flat with large urban populations and, despite destructive bombings, a road infrastructure that is much more extensive than Afghanistan's largely singular "ring road". This meant that helicopters could fly in close support for ground troops with a more effective approach though less explosive and deadly payload, limiting potential "collateral damage". In addition, ground troops can more easily and quickly arrive at a flash point to back up other forces.
Troops in Afghanistan do not have the same luxury. First, the the terrain is full of mountains and valleys that have historically hidden forces that can nuetralize close air support from helicopters or the arrival of ground troops. Second, the infrastructure available does not provide a multitude of options for ingress or egress from any area. In fact, it is just about non-existent in many areas. Third, the distances between bases and operational objectives are much more extensive than in Iraq. Partly because of the terrain again where having the types of COPs (combat outposts) as seen in Iraq with such small forces, would leave them highly vulnerable to being overrun. That difficulty is compounded by the lack of necessary troops to cover the most important areas.
That vulnerability also leads to propaganda victories for the Taliban and Al Qaeda when outposts are "nearly" over ran. Such as the media grabbing death of nine US forces in Kunar, 10 French in a recent ambush and, as late as Sunday, the wounding of 9 Australian forces. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are going for big propaganda attacks.
To mitigate all of these issues, the NATO combat forces along with the US have been much more open and willing to use aerial bombings to take out suspected enemy positions. These have also been very effective tactically in securing the worst of US vulnerabilities while covering a wider area of operations.
Strategically, without a more effective ground campaign, this tactic may lose the ground war. Or, just as terrible, provide the perpetuous for an even greater insurgency that results in even greater death among civilians and military forces alike. As we learned in Iraq, killing more of the enemy in an insurgency does not necessarily equate to winning the war. Yet, the necessities imposed by numbers and terrain demand some effective use of aerial fire power.
There is definitely an attitude in the Afghan theater that they are much more alone in their endeavors than in Iraq. This may also lend to a more extensive use of aerial fire power than necessary.
One thing that is clear is that many are waiting to see what sort of plan and discipline can Petraeus bring to the Afghan mission. It waits to be seen whether Petraeus can pull this seemingly lost cause out of the dumps as well as he did in Iraq.