There are recent reports that a bombing raid on a Taliban stronghold is being re-investigated. Sources with cell phone video, similar to the Haditha incident, forwarded the video to the UN that then shared it with US commanders. It would be easy to simply dismiss this issue with a claim of unsubstantiated propaganda. But, in a counter-insurgency, to quote an infamous "insurgent", half the battle is in the media. And we are losing.
Dissatisfaction with the Afghan government and NATO/US forces is extremely high. Much of it is directly associated with two aspects: 1) aggressive raiding leading to civilian deaths, much of it from the air and 2) the general weakness and corruption of the Afghan government that leads to over all crime and a desparate economic situation.
This issue should not be ignored. In the beginning of the Iraq insurgency with added Al Qaeda presence, one of the causes of locals joining the insurgency or Al Qaeda was the death and detention of family members. Aerial bombing had led to many incidents that either legitimately or falsely claimed to involve civilian casualties. The reality as well as the false propaganda simply became a narrative for recruiting insurgents.
The United States simply had to change its tactics using aerial fire power effectively, but more sparingly while putting more boots on the ground to support a true COIN including managing the information war. The question is whether the US can do the same in Afghanistan and if the trade off would have the same outcome as in Iraq.
One of the biggest differences between these two nations is its terrain. Beyond that are the distances, infrastructure and location of its demographics. Iraq is largely flat with large urban populations and, despite destructive bombings, a road infrastructure that is much more extensive than Afghanistan's largely singular "ring road". This meant that helicopters could fly in close support for ground troops with a more effective approach though less explosive and deadly payload, limiting potential "collateral damage". In addition, ground troops can more easily and quickly arrive at a flash point to back up other forces.
Troops in Afghanistan do not have the same luxury. First, the the terrain is full of mountains and valleys that have historically hidden forces that can nuetralize close air support from helicopters or the arrival of ground troops. Second, the infrastructure available does not provide a multitude of options for ingress or egress from any area. In fact, it is just about non-existent in many areas. Third, the distances between bases and operational objectives are much more extensive than in Iraq. Partly because of the terrain again where having the types of COPs (combat outposts) as seen in Iraq with such small forces, would leave them highly vulnerable to being overrun. That difficulty is compounded by the lack of necessary troops to cover the most important areas.
That vulnerability also leads to propaganda victories for the Taliban and Al Qaeda when outposts are "nearly" over ran. Such as the media grabbing death of nine US forces in Kunar, 10 French in a recent ambush and, as late as Sunday, the wounding of 9 Australian forces. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are going for big propaganda attacks.
To mitigate all of these issues, the NATO combat forces along with the US have been much more open and willing to use aerial bombings to take out suspected enemy positions. These have also been very effective tactically in securing the worst of US vulnerabilities while covering a wider area of operations.
Strategically, without a more effective ground campaign, this tactic may lose the ground war. Or, just as terrible, provide the perpetuous for an even greater insurgency that results in even greater death among civilians and military forces alike. As we learned in Iraq, killing more of the enemy in an insurgency does not necessarily equate to winning the war. Yet, the necessities imposed by numbers and terrain demand some effective use of aerial fire power.
There is definitely an attitude in the Afghan theater that they are much more alone in their endeavors than in Iraq. This may also lend to a more extensive use of aerial fire power than necessary.
One thing that is clear is that many are waiting to see what sort of plan and discipline can Petraeus bring to the Afghan mission. It waits to be seen whether Petraeus can pull this seemingly lost cause out of the dumps as well as he did in Iraq.
The real problem, IMHO, is that these same liberals still dominate the major print and broadcast media, and Hollyweird, acting as gatekeepers for the flow of information to the American public. They know that they still have the power to shape people's opinions and attitudes on major issues.
They fully understand that much of these opinions and attitudes are shaped by the INITIAL reporting - FIRST IMPRESSIONS - of news stories. Once these first impressions are created, it's awfully hard, almost impossible, to change them later. Thus, corrections to false and erroneous information that is buried on Page B36 several days later don't do much to lessen the impact of the negative opinions first created by the initial reporting.
Besides which, in our modern Western culture of instant gratification, myopic attention span and celebrity worship, everyone's already moved on to the next story du jour about Britney Spears and Paris Hilton, caring not a wit about other, more important events occurring elsewhere.
New media is gaining ground in this cultural and ideological struggle, but it will still be a while before the balance of power really shifts. And even then, will it be enough ...... and will it be soon enough .... to help us in the larger struggle with radical Islam?
The problem of Afghanistan is EXTREMELY complicated. Kat mentioned the topography, which is immensely challenging, as everyone from Alexander the Great to the Brits to the Red Army can attest. Throw in the multitude of ethnicities, which is at least an order of magnitude more complex than Iraq. Then there are tribes within the ethnic groups...ugh itps messy.
Another complication with the geography, and the distances involved, is artillery, and the limitations thereof. The new smart, GPS guided arty shells are just as accurate as JDAMs, but the only weigh 100lbs, vs at least 500 for a JDAM. But an awful lot is done out of range of those guns (especially by the special ops types), and when the guns can bring down the steel, you have to use aircraft. Local topography can also limit the effective range of the big guns, since firing at a high enough trajectory to clear high ridgelines can limit how far from the guns the shells can reach, or create 'shadows' in their lee where the guns can't reach. (Correct or clarify me here as necessary, John.) Mortars don't have this problem as much, but their range in much more limited.
Then there's the enemy, which isn't nearly as unitary as in Iraq. Yes, they all want the current government gone, but after that, their interests diverge. They all have different POCs into the local populations, and different connections into local criminal organizations. (Yes, a good bit of the violence is simply criminals trying to keep the government out of their area so they can go about their criminal business.)
As far as the information battle, there are really two parts to that - one inside Afghanistan, and one outside. Believe it or not, most Afghans don't read, see, or hear our MSM. They get info either from local radio or TV (much more radio than TV outside the major cities) or old fashioned word of mouth. The bad guys are experts at getting their message out to the population; we're not nearly so good at it. Example: we're shifting troops around, shutting down some of our smaller COPs/FOBs, mostly because the unit there is too small to do much beyond secure themselves (This costs us in terms of area covered, but gains us tactical maneuverability.) The enemy has been able to successfully portray this as them "driving the infidels out" of these places, when that is not the case.
As far as our media, I honestly think that the problem in some part comes because a large part of the MSM has completely lost the ability to want the US to win, and want us to lose. (Whether this will change if there's a Dem in charge remains to be seen.) Another part of the problem is the natural bias toward bad news - the "It bleeds, it leads" problem. I'm willing to bet the reporter who wrote that story didn't go out to RC North or RC West (these are the parts of the country worked by our, erm, less enthusiastic allies. ) If they did, they didn't include it in the story, because those areas are mostly quiet and doing well. But slow, steady progess and people who aren't complaining don't make for exciting stories. Finally, most reporters tend to be lazy. The areas discussed in the story are easier to get to from Kabul than the quiet areas in the North and West, and most of them are assigned to US forces.
I could go on, but I need to get back to work.
I just think that we need a surge in afghanistan and we need to secure Helmand and the rest of Pashtunistan plus do much, much better on local govnernace and infrastructure.
“Increasing the involvement of Afghan tribes”, if they’re serious, will turn Irregular Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense in Afghanistan on it’s head.
On the other hand, as long as we don't cede the ground, having an alliance is not completely bad. I think this has been really hamstrung by Karazai's government who still has a considerable amount of angst held over from the bad ol' Taliban days (which, if you think about it, are still the bad ol' Taliban days). I'm sure he can't be too excited about the prospect of having the Taliban in his government becuse he'd have to fear a future where they decide once again too over throw the government. Which has been true many times, even before the advent of the Afghan/Russo war.
@ "The OLD Pharts", How many times have we gone in and helped some of these Countries out of some really tight spots. We work rebuilding their Countries and their armies. Then they take our weapons and use them against us. I'm not saying they must kiss our butts, but don't bite them.
The Soviets, civil war, the Taliban and the last 7 years have done to the Pashtun what the smallpox, winter campaigns, and the extermination of the buffalo did to our Plains Indians.
I also forgot to add that India, Pakistan, and China are all playing their own regional version of the Great Game in Afghanistan. The historic emnity between India and Pakistan is one of the major problems with getting the Paks to be serious about the problems in the areas bordering Afghanistan (FATA, NWFP, Baluchistan) - because they perceive India to be a bigger threat to them.
And they don't recognize the Durand Line as a boundary in the first place, which makes things *very* interesting at the national level for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.