First, extremely good comments by a resident denizens on tribal issues in Afghanistan that impact our ability to work with the tribes and integrate them into the Afghan government.
Canonneer reports on President Bush's announcement that the US will work much more closely with the tribes and probably reflects Petraeus' strategy starting to come on line.
Which is also reflected in two more reports. This report indicates that Petreaus is likely the reason for stepped up raids into Pakistan.
Which is interesting when compared to reports that Bush is authorizing Petraeus' trade mark "surge", though much smaller than many expected at this time. The initial force for early 2009 is 4,500 when generals have asked for at least 10,000. Adm. Mullen linked additional force availablity for Afghanistan to withdrawals from Iraq.
The generals are very concerned that they can go in and hit the insurgents, but cannot stay to hold. The same problem that was manifest in Iraq before the implementation of the surge and new COIN directives.
There are two likely issues here. Over 30,000 troops have been withdrawn from Iraq in the last year, but these troops will need rest, refitting and replacements along with some updated training regarding Afghanistan terrain, culture, language and politics. While 3,000 marines had been deployed earlier in the year, many of their rotations have already come to an end and these apparently were expressly for more aggressive moves against infiltrating Taliban rather than a true "surge" and long term engagement.
The attacks into Pakistan are also likely to attrit Taliban and Al Qaeda forces to give NATO/ISAF forces and the Afghan government some "breathing room" while additional political and military preparations are made. Though Petraeus has been the head of CentCom for two months, it seems most of his time has been spent putting together a short term strategy and developing relationships with the new Pakistan government.
These new relationships are likely the reason that we championed "democratic change" in Pakistan. However useful Mushareff has been as an ally and however much the Pakistan military acts as a buffer against extremist ideology coming to power in Pakistan, he and the military have seen India as a greater threat than their internal radicals. That fear of India has had both the ISI and parts of Pakistan's military apparatus playing a double game, leaking information to the Taliban. India has publically accused Pakistan of being involved in the attack on their embassy in Kabul that left 40 dead.
The new coalition government in Islamabad is even weaker than Mushareff and are obviously willing to negotiate their relative complacency on strikes in Waziristan for continuing monetary assistance from the US. Plus, the destruction of internal radicals, though a double edged sword, helps keep the physical danger of government collapse from occuring. It would also be safe to bet that this agreement includes a much more circumspect relationship in regards to information since previous sharing led directly to tip offs to terrorists who moved their camps.
The fact that we were able to relocate these camps indicates that, regardless of what information was shared, our real intelligence assetts involved were not compromised. Though, this is likely the reason that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been concentrating their attacks against police and "intelligence chiefs" in certain areas inside both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the local networks that prove the best assets and the enemy knows it.
What will the continuing war look like? Likely a much larger "surge", but numbers and date would be inappropriate to speculate . Petreaus is likely not only assessing Afghanistan as a battle field, but who, how, what and when these forces will be best deployed. Of great importance is the accessibility and safety of the supply line out of the Karachi port in southern Pakistan. Without a secure supply line, great numbers of troops would simply be more troops vulnerable to cut supplies.
Finally, over all readiness and availability of troops in what time periods will be ready to deploy. It is likely that he wants to continue to use veteran forces from Iraq who already know the drill, though these forces have already been deployed many times. Even if greater numbers of "green" troops come into these units, Petraeus will likely be counting on veteran NCOs and Officers providing a good continuation of operational understanding.
So, while it may seem disheartening to hear that only 4,500 were approved to go and not until next year with additional troop withdrawals from Iraq, it is actually part of a much bigger and brighter sign that Afghanistan is giong to be getting a lot of attention shortly.
Expect to see even more Taliban/al Qaeda propaganda videos of dead women and children.
Canonneer reports on President Bush's announcement that the US will work much more closely with the tribes and probably reflects Petraeus' strategy starting to come on line.
Which is also reflected in two more reports. This report indicates that Petreaus is likely the reason for stepped up raids into Pakistan.
In July, the leadership of Central Command, which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, was given the sole authority to approve ground assaults in Pakistan. Late last month, the American military began launching ground attacks in the country on a near daily basis, depending on local conditions and intelligence, according to a military official who requested anonymity.
The escalation in Pakistan is due in part to the incoming leader of Central Command, General David Petraeus, who has been credited with changing the course of the Iraq war and is said to have the full trust of President Bush. Before formally taking the reins at Central Command, General Petraeus began meeting in June with Pakistani political leaders to develop an effective strategy for combating Al Qaeda in the border provinces.
Which is interesting when compared to reports that Bush is authorizing Petraeus' trade mark "surge", though much smaller than many expected at this time. The initial force for early 2009 is 4,500 when generals have asked for at least 10,000. Adm. Mullen linked additional force availablity for Afghanistan to withdrawals from Iraq.
The generals are very concerned that they can go in and hit the insurgents, but cannot stay to hold. The same problem that was manifest in Iraq before the implementation of the surge and new COIN directives.
There are two likely issues here. Over 30,000 troops have been withdrawn from Iraq in the last year, but these troops will need rest, refitting and replacements along with some updated training regarding Afghanistan terrain, culture, language and politics. While 3,000 marines had been deployed earlier in the year, many of their rotations have already come to an end and these apparently were expressly for more aggressive moves against infiltrating Taliban rather than a true "surge" and long term engagement.
The attacks into Pakistan are also likely to attrit Taliban and Al Qaeda forces to give NATO/ISAF forces and the Afghan government some "breathing room" while additional political and military preparations are made. Though Petraeus has been the head of CentCom for two months, it seems most of his time has been spent putting together a short term strategy and developing relationships with the new Pakistan government.
These new relationships are likely the reason that we championed "democratic change" in Pakistan. However useful Mushareff has been as an ally and however much the Pakistan military acts as a buffer against extremist ideology coming to power in Pakistan, he and the military have seen India as a greater threat than their internal radicals. That fear of India has had both the ISI and parts of Pakistan's military apparatus playing a double game, leaking information to the Taliban. India has publically accused Pakistan of being involved in the attack on their embassy in Kabul that left 40 dead.
The new coalition government in Islamabad is even weaker than Mushareff and are obviously willing to negotiate their relative complacency on strikes in Waziristan for continuing monetary assistance from the US. Plus, the destruction of internal radicals, though a double edged sword, helps keep the physical danger of government collapse from occuring. It would also be safe to bet that this agreement includes a much more circumspect relationship in regards to information since previous sharing led directly to tip offs to terrorists who moved their camps.
The fact that we were able to relocate these camps indicates that, regardless of what information was shared, our real intelligence assetts involved were not compromised. Though, this is likely the reason that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been concentrating their attacks against police and "intelligence chiefs" in certain areas inside both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the local networks that prove the best assets and the enemy knows it.
What will the continuing war look like? Likely a much larger "surge", but numbers and date would be inappropriate to speculate . Petreaus is likely not only assessing Afghanistan as a battle field, but who, how, what and when these forces will be best deployed. Of great importance is the accessibility and safety of the supply line out of the Karachi port in southern Pakistan. Without a secure supply line, great numbers of troops would simply be more troops vulnerable to cut supplies.
Finally, over all readiness and availability of troops in what time periods will be ready to deploy. It is likely that he wants to continue to use veteran forces from Iraq who already know the drill, though these forces have already been deployed many times. Even if greater numbers of "green" troops come into these units, Petraeus will likely be counting on veteran NCOs and Officers providing a good continuation of operational understanding.
So, while it may seem disheartening to hear that only 4,500 were approved to go and not until next year with additional troop withdrawals from Iraq, it is actually part of a much bigger and brighter sign that Afghanistan is giong to be getting a lot of attention shortly.
Expect to see even more Taliban/al Qaeda propaganda videos of dead women and children.
I still think we need more Afghan feet in those boots on the ground. Rather than add another Marine battalion and a brigade combat team to the head count to do kinetic operations I'd rather see them doing FID, plussing-up Embedded Training Teams, Police Mentoring Teams, Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, and now Paramilitary Liaison Teams. Reconstitute the ASF . Cross attach American rifle companies to ANA Kandaks and vice-versa. Recruit Afghan Augmentation To U. S. Army. We need friendly witnesses integrated at platoon-level to testify on our behalf and refute the Taliban's version.