Why Not Ossetian Independence?

AFSis and a few others, I imagine, are wondering why the Republic of Georgia would fight to keep a recalcitrant little spit of land?  Even to the point of taking on a much bigger adversary to keep it.  It is a good question.  Another good question is why would Russia want it?  In fact, by recognizing South Ossetia as joined to North Ossetia, a Russian territory, it brings that territory into Russia proper and gives them a territory where they can "legally" station thousands of more troops than they currently have under a "peace keeping" agreement.  What good are those troops?

First, we need a map.  A relief map with an indication of transportation hubs and water ways:


 
Historically, national borders have been drawn based on geographic markers: mountains, rivers, lakes, seas, etc, etc, etc.  Sometimes they are based on political/ethnic realities, though, that has not always been the case in the last several hundred years as empires have come and gone.  Mostly, these take in consideration important national needs such as defensible territory, raw materials, natural resources, water, transportation, ability to import or export goods for trade, etc. 

The viability of a nation depends on the existence of these valuable points and the ability to maintain their integrity.  If any nation is capable of threatening any of those necessities, a nation can become powerless; a subject or client nation of the threatening nation. 

The Caucasian Mountains to the north of Georgia have, for centuries, presented a natural defense against invasion.  In fact, the red line coming from the north, through North Ossetia into South Ossetia and Georgia proper, represents some of the few roads that can be transited through the Caucasus.  Further, it goes through the Roki Tunnel and, if controlled by the sovereign nation, is called a "choke point" and renders attacks difficult.  In the case of the current conflict, Georgia was unable or unwilling to cut off the Roki Tunnel and allowed Russian troops and armor to enter.

I say "unwilling" because they may have been trying to avoid confrontation with Russia that would have immediately grown much wider and fiercer if they had directly and purposefully killed Russian troops in the beginning of the conflict.  That is purely speculation and makes little sense if they were aware of the probability of Russian interference with armor massed on the other side of the territory.  Most likely, they were simply unable to reach the tunnel in time to cut it off. 

The red line road ends at Ts'khinvali, the nominal capitol of South Ossetia.  South Ossetia reaches down like a finger that effectively cuts Georgia in half.



It's a small spit of land, but important in its geographic location to the rest of Georgia.  The blue line represents the second half of this major roadway that runs out of South Ossetia all the way down to Gori.  The parallel black line is a major railhead.  Both could be used by foreign forces to quickly move on Gori that sits on four major transportation and resource hubs.  (Current reports indicate that Russia is moving on Gori right now)


These include the major highway that connects the Georgian capitol of Tblisi in the east with the western half of the country that contains all of the sea ports where most of Georgia's food and other products are imported and exported.  The black line that runs parallel with the red roadway running east and west is the major rail road that also transports goods or (troops to defend the country).  It also sits on the river, another transportation node and a vital national resource that, if cut off, cuts off fresh water for one end of the nation or another.  Finally, not represented here, is the major BTC oil pipeline that runs from Azerbiajan through Georgia to Poti on the coast and down through Turkey. 

Controlling Gori would leave only one major southern road way to transport troops and goods.  This would easily be harassed and cut off by an invading force.  Particularly, an invading force with a decent air force that could bomb that road into oblivion and cut off western Georgia with definitive finality.  Of course, Russia has also already bombed two air ports outside of Tblisi and several military air bases, cutting off any aid from air cargo making the southern road THE transportation connection for Georgia and very risky to transit.

With Russian ships blockading the western sea ports on the Black Sea, Azerbaijan to the east shaking in their boots, Iran a nominal Russian ally (that was recently promised, again, by Russia to fuel their nuclear plant at Bashir; conveniently), land locked Armenia to the south, that leaves any relief for Georgia coming through Turkey.  That's a big "if" Turkey wants to become involved. 

Turkey could, if they felt that Russia was sufficiently threatening an economic resource like the BTC pipeline that runs through Georgia, past Gori and down into Turkey.  That pipeline transports 1.2 million bpd of oil and could significantly impact not only Turkey, but Europe and other nations.  The pipeline out of Poti on the Black Sea only transports about 115,000 bpd and, while damaging some supply, doesn't necessarily put more of a crimp in the oil supply than a slow day in Iraq.  Russia has already shut that port down.  However, the amount of oil through the BTC and the nations it flows to and from is one reason that Russia has been somewhat circumspect in bombing the BTC pipeline to Turkey.  That would effectively expand the war to Turkey and possibly force other nations to become involved.

Of course, there are reports that the PKK (Kurdish separatists) have bombed the BTC pipeline inside Turkey, already damaging the flow.  This may either be direct coordination with Russia or simply the PKK taking advantage of the situation to harm Turkey.  It wouldn't make sense for Russia to coordinate with this group to do so because it would bring Turkey into play and they cannot really want that to occur.  Turkey controls the Bosporus Straits which is the only entry and exit to the Black Sea.  If Turkey felt threatened, they could render the Russian Black Sea fleet a useless, easy target by blockading the straits and effectively capturing the fleet inside the Black Sea (There is a list of conflicts involving Turkey and Russia where Turkey had done just that including the Crimean War and World War I). 

For those who wonder, aside from the Middle East mess, this is exactly why the US may have been pushing the EU to admit Turkey; why Turkey may have hesitated - wanting to remain able to make its own decisions outside of EU issues; and why the EU may have balked, for all it's pounding fists about Turkey's alleged human rights issues.  It only takes a few months of incredibly high natural gas prices in the middle of winter, threatening to cut off supplies through the Ukraine, to make Europe tremble. 

It's a delicate dance that Russia must do and Russia is more a blacksmith with a hammer than a tiptoeing ballerina. 

Returning to the original question: Why didn't Georgia just give up South Ossetia?  Does their "right" to secession trump Georgian sovereignty and national geographic integrity?  Would it have been easier and avoided this conflict? 

The answer is "no" to all of the above.  Had Georgia simply given South Ossetia to Russia (which is really what would happen for all the talk of joining North and South Ossetia), the Russian fist would have been right down the middle of Georgia and given Russia effective control of the territory.  All without a fight from Georgia.  That would have made the Georgian government a non-entity immediately and Russia the controlling power.  Georgia would no longer be free. 

Would anyone in the United States have stood still for their government to do such a thing here?  

Regardless of the much sped up conflict, had Georgia given South Ossetia to Russia, Russia would have immediately put a much larger military force inside Ossetia for "protection" instead of the smaller "peace keeping force" they had there as cover.  They would have put many more air assets in the territory and these would have been within ten minutes of Gori and twenty of Tblisi.  For all the reasons listed above that represents Russia's current strategy, that made South Ossetia's secession untenable and Russia's presence a gun to the Georgian's heads. 

The Russians have been massing forces on Georgia's northern border for over a month.  Essentially, they have been conducting "military maneuvers" that mirrored the maneuvers that the US and Georgia were training on together last month.  Ostensibly, to prepare Georgian military for action in Iraq.  However, that seems rather simple with a little hindsight applied.  Likely we and the Georgians have known that Russia was planning some sort of action.  The larger US military contingent left over a week ago, right before the "separatists" began earnest shelling of Georgian positions.  A likely ruse to provide Russia with an excuse to bring in more troops.  

Many are saying that the Georgians fell into Russia's trap by sending in large forces against the rebels and giving Russia an excuse to attack.  However, Russia was coming one way or the other.  Georgia had two choices:  1) Roll over and let Russia in without a fight, losing their sovereignty; or, 2) take a risk by a pre-emptive strike that would have cut off the Roki Tunnel and Ts'khinvili, limiting the Russians to air strikes and a sea blockade they would have been hard pressed to sustain with international out cry, Ukrainian rejection of their fleet and Turkey possibly getting antsy.  Not to mention, had Georgia handed Russia a defeat at the Roki Tunnel and captured their "peace keepers", Russia would have been militarily humiliated again and might have kept them from entertaining any future ideas of taking Georgia or other former Soviet Republics.  It's a risk that Georgia had little choice but to take and they have effectively lost. 

Georgia offered a ceasefire and Russia has chosen to ignore it, insisting that Saakashvili has to step down, calling him a "war criminal" and "fascist".  They say they will not negotiate with him because of that, but it is very likely that it is an excuse to allow Russia to break Georgia completely and factually make Georgia a Russian satellite instead of nominally.  

The question is not really why Georgia didn't just surrender in the first place, but "Now what?"