National Military Strategy 2008

The new edition of the National Military Strategy of the United States is out.  This is the DoD roadmap of how DoD sees itself fulfilling it's roles and missions as laid out in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as ongoing operations and long-range strategic analysis.

As I read it - this represents a rhetorical codification of the shift in emphasis onto current wars vice the future wars - i.e., Gates' v. Rumsfeld's worldview.

The rhetorical shift is greater than the actual shift will be, if the past is any indicator.  There are many high-inertia threads in the Defense realm that limit the actual amount of change that a single Secretary can impose on things - which, on balance, is probably good - and the difficulty in shifting the momentum of something as large as the US military is amply demonstrated by the fact that Secretary Gates felt he had to sack the leadership of the Air Force to shift the momentum of that service, which he felt was arguably suffering from both what he has termed "next-war-itis" as well as an attention to detail problem in the nuke side of the business.

A significant change from the Rumsfeld approach is Secretary Gate's repudiation of what he perceives as the militarization of American foreign policy.  The new strategy makes sweeping (and ambitious recommendations about a more comprehensive approach to foreign policy issues across the board of US cabinet-level agencies *and* working with other governments and NGOs to advance US policy objectives, and to take a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism aside from just killing terrorists. 

As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical, biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensive damage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play a key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to help develop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities.

Emphasis mine.

However, one must note that  there's a *reason* Rumsfeld essentially went solo - the rest of the government agencies wouldn't play and President Bush wouldn't make them - and other governments, with their own policy imperatives, aren't necessarily interested in dealing with terrorism in ways we would like... because, as in the example of many governments in the ME, that would call for changes to how they govern...  or in the case of Europe, cost money, making the natives of the welfare state restless, not to mention making the non-natives of the muslim in-migration to Europe restless. 

The rhetoric still supports the "Long War" concept of engaging the terrorists abroad, but envisions a shift to a new phase on the war - having largely decapitated or pinned down the leadership of the major threat, it's time to start addressing the broader issues - which requires a less bayonet-driven approach, and needs to be full-spectrum diplomatic/political/economic with military support, rather than full-spectrum military with diplomatic/political/economic support.  Which means it will take time, and we need to structure ourselves to meet those requirements, while still maintaining the ability to fight major combat actions if they arise.  To do this means we need to find the strategic space to reset the forces, the current pace is unsustainable from a hardware perspective, leave aside the potential manpower issues.

This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.

Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent extremism. Often our partners are better positioned to handle a given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better than we do or ever could. In collaboration with interagency and international partners we will assist vulnerable states and local populations as they seek to ameliorate the conditions that foster extremism and dismantle the structures that support and allow extremist groups to grow. We will adopt approaches tailored to local conditions that will vary considerably across regions. We will help foster security and aid local authorities in building effective systems of representational government. By improving conditions, undermining the sources of support, and assisting in addressing root causes of turmoil, we will help states stabilize threatened areas. Countering the totalitarian ideological message of terrorist groups to help further undermine their potency will also require sensitive, sophisticated and integrated interagency and international efforts. The Department will support and facilitate these efforts.

Secretary Gates, being a long service government bureaucrat insider, is better equipped by personality and experience to try to start this ball rolling than Secretary Rumsfeld was.  Of course, it remains an open question whether the next President will agree with Secretary Gate's vision, and will appoint someone to the position who can shepherd the process along.  I would *not* put General(R) Wesley Clark in that column...

Of course, in the focus on the here and now of the geopolitical situation, there is perhaps less focus on finding ways to gain/keep engaged with Russia and China in an effort to keep from slipping into a more toothsome adversarial status - such as has been suggested by Putin in his call for an examination of whether or not Russian should re-engage with Cuba, a clear shot across the US bows regarding the forward stationing of anti-missile systems in eastern Europe.  He's flipping the coin to show the other side, making a point about how it looks to Russia by putting us in a similar position.  While the new National Defense Strategy suggests engagement with foreseeable superpower challengers like Russia and China as a way to blunt their rise as adversaries, being too focused on the 25 meter targets in the current war could has the potential to lead to the erosion of the broad-spectrum technology lead that characterizes the US' global military dominance.