Update: Not that crazy. Apparently, they've decided to take what they've gotten and declare it a victory. In the long run, Ossetia and Abkhazia are Russian territories and Georgia remains under threat as long as the Russians have the ability to base troops in Ossetia. Now it will depend on what the Russians and Georgians agree to. So, consider the following to be a review of the political and tactical reasons the Russians decided to stop after Gori.
Current news has Russian forces just east of Gori about one hour from Tbilisi. The Russians have taken a "tactical pause" while still carrying on "reconnaisance" that appears to be resulting in light fighting. The areas that this is occuring in remains unspecified. The main Georgian army has fallen back to Meskheta as ordered. (Red squares are probable Russian positions with red lines representing known or likely routes, red broken lines are possible routes; red and white squares are probable Georgian positions, red and white circles possible militia or light forces).
To get a good idea about why these positions are being held we need a relief map with roads and bridges (click on link and then click on map to get a large overview of Georgia, roads and rivers, courtesy Javakkh Travel). The following is a cut out of this map with markings added for tactical viewing:
The Russians have paused outside of Gori for several reasons. First, working from Colin Powell's doctrine, the political issues is "if you break it, you own it". If the Russians take Tbilisi and depose the Georgian government, they will own Georgia. However, that does not mean they will control it. Georgia is a hilly and mountainous country with many rivers, lakes and marshes near Tbilisi that creates natural redoubts or defenses for guerilla or harassing forces. Southwest of Tbilisi is a fallback, defensible valley that can only be entered through certain roads over mountains with many river crossings in between. For any long serving Russian officers (Afghantsi), the words Afghanistan and Chechenya are probably running through their minds.
Further, Russia has claimed to be liberating South Ossetia, not the Georgian people, though the claim that Saakashvili is a "fascist". If they continue, it will no longer be about liberating S. Ossetia, which they already have, but will be about naked aggression. The mask has already slipped to some degree from Russian politics as it was Putin who took control of the situation and is issuing official communiques. Medvedyev is effectively sidelined. The US has cancelled war games with Russia, intimated that they will be rejected from the G8 (Secretary Rice calling it the G7) and that Russia's entry into the WTO is on permanent hold. President Bush has demanded that Russia withdraw and Rice backed that up by stating that it "is not 1968". Clearly indicating that Russia will not be allowed to drive over any American ally or Eurasian country.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the President's statements may simply have come at an opportune time as the Russian's paused for other tactical reasons.
The Russians appear to have paused between Gori and Kaspi. Exact location unknown except to say an hour from Tbilisi. That leaves really only one place to stop where their backs are not to a river and their rear and flanks are protected. That would be east of Gori and west of Kaspi. They could be paused on the east of Kaspi, pass the two rivers and west of Meskheta northwest of Tbilisi.
The yellow line represents an international or interstate highway. It is probably the best road for driving a large number of armored vehicles to Tbilisi. However, to reach Tbilisi, the Russians will have to make two river crossings, possibly three. All of these create serious choke points that, even if the Russians managed to cross the river or two, it puts the river at their backs and could cause severe losses and delays. At the least, they could be held up long enough to allow more Georgian forces to escape across the river to the mountains along with the Georgian government and any number of refugees.
There is a road that travels along the south of the Meskuri River. There are at least three bridges that the Russians could cross, but that puts the Russians between a mountain range and a river. Not to mention that those forces could be harrassed by light forces with missile launchers and anti-tank weapons that could have them equally penned and massively damaged with little damage to the Georgian forces except for exposure to Russian air assets. Further, the road is probably narrow and winding over at least rolling landscape that would make for tactically unsound ground. Then again, the Russians might count on light forces on that side of the river. Likely that "reconnaisance" and reports of continuing attacks are related.
The Georgians have drawn up around Meskheta. This topographical road map (courtesy of Library of Texas, CIA maps). An enlarged cut out shows the likely positions for Georgian defense:
There are four bridges before Tbilisi. To cross any of these bridges, the Russians would have to pass through some narrow passes again placing the Russian army between high ground, probably occupied by the Georgians, and the river. These bridges are also like "dialed in" by artillery and missiles. Possibly set for destruction. The Georgians had originally attempted to slow the Russian advance by blowing the bridge above Ts'khinvili. The are likely willing to destroy these bridges as well. The Russians may be planning for the potential that the bridges won't be available for crossing.
The Russian tactical pause may be to assess the best way to handle these potential crossings and to bring up equipment to bridge the rivers. It may also be to allow recon forces to scope the bridges and possibly even take control to allow possible crossing. If that happens, expect op tempo to increase exponentially. Another option might have the Russian swing north, crossing a bridge at Dusheti (see map) and coming south along a smaller state highway. That also presents problems of terrain and having their backs to the river without a place to retreat to or a bridge to retreat across. Or, they could cross at Dusheti, travel on to Tianetti to the east and south over another state highway to Tbilisi. Although there are no rivers to cross or be trapped by, there are still hills and low mountains that could still present choke points. If the Russians were to do this, they would probably put forces head on to Meskheta to hold the Georgians while swinging a trap door down to crush Georgian forces caught on the north side of the river. The russians would soften up the Georgian positions by air and artillery before attempting a run on Tbilisi.
However, the United States has already sent humanitarian aid via air and sea. Secretary Rice is on the way and so are representatives from McCain's campaign. The presidents of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland are in Georgia and appeared at a rally with Saakashvili. Effectively creating high profile human shields.
Whatever the reasons, Russia has decided not to risk trying to depose Saakashvili directly or running on Tbilisi. They are announcing that they are withdrawing from Poti and Gori. It remains to be seen if this actually occurs or in what time frame.
Current news has Russian forces just east of Gori about one hour from Tbilisi. The Russians have taken a "tactical pause" while still carrying on "reconnaisance" that appears to be resulting in light fighting. The areas that this is occuring in remains unspecified. The main Georgian army has fallen back to Meskheta as ordered. (Red squares are probable Russian positions with red lines representing known or likely routes, red broken lines are possible routes; red and white squares are probable Georgian positions, red and white circles possible militia or light forces).
To get a good idea about why these positions are being held we need a relief map with roads and bridges (click on link and then click on map to get a large overview of Georgia, roads and rivers, courtesy Javakkh Travel). The following is a cut out of this map with markings added for tactical viewing:
The Russians have paused outside of Gori for several reasons. First, working from Colin Powell's doctrine, the political issues is "if you break it, you own it". If the Russians take Tbilisi and depose the Georgian government, they will own Georgia. However, that does not mean they will control it. Georgia is a hilly and mountainous country with many rivers, lakes and marshes near Tbilisi that creates natural redoubts or defenses for guerilla or harassing forces. Southwest of Tbilisi is a fallback, defensible valley that can only be entered through certain roads over mountains with many river crossings in between. For any long serving Russian officers (Afghantsi), the words Afghanistan and Chechenya are probably running through their minds.
Further, Russia has claimed to be liberating South Ossetia, not the Georgian people, though the claim that Saakashvili is a "fascist". If they continue, it will no longer be about liberating S. Ossetia, which they already have, but will be about naked aggression. The mask has already slipped to some degree from Russian politics as it was Putin who took control of the situation and is issuing official communiques. Medvedyev is effectively sidelined. The US has cancelled war games with Russia, intimated that they will be rejected from the G8 (Secretary Rice calling it the G7) and that Russia's entry into the WTO is on permanent hold. President Bush has demanded that Russia withdraw and Rice backed that up by stating that it "is not 1968". Clearly indicating that Russia will not be allowed to drive over any American ally or Eurasian country.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the President's statements may simply have come at an opportune time as the Russian's paused for other tactical reasons.
The Russians appear to have paused between Gori and Kaspi. Exact location unknown except to say an hour from Tbilisi. That leaves really only one place to stop where their backs are not to a river and their rear and flanks are protected. That would be east of Gori and west of Kaspi. They could be paused on the east of Kaspi, pass the two rivers and west of Meskheta northwest of Tbilisi.
The yellow line represents an international or interstate highway. It is probably the best road for driving a large number of armored vehicles to Tbilisi. However, to reach Tbilisi, the Russians will have to make two river crossings, possibly three. All of these create serious choke points that, even if the Russians managed to cross the river or two, it puts the river at their backs and could cause severe losses and delays. At the least, they could be held up long enough to allow more Georgian forces to escape across the river to the mountains along with the Georgian government and any number of refugees.
There is a road that travels along the south of the Meskuri River. There are at least three bridges that the Russians could cross, but that puts the Russians between a mountain range and a river. Not to mention that those forces could be harrassed by light forces with missile launchers and anti-tank weapons that could have them equally penned and massively damaged with little damage to the Georgian forces except for exposure to Russian air assets. Further, the road is probably narrow and winding over at least rolling landscape that would make for tactically unsound ground. Then again, the Russians might count on light forces on that side of the river. Likely that "reconnaisance" and reports of continuing attacks are related.
The Georgians have drawn up around Meskheta. This topographical road map (courtesy of Library of Texas, CIA maps). An enlarged cut out shows the likely positions for Georgian defense:
There are four bridges before Tbilisi. To cross any of these bridges, the Russians would have to pass through some narrow passes again placing the Russian army between high ground, probably occupied by the Georgians, and the river. These bridges are also like "dialed in" by artillery and missiles. Possibly set for destruction. The Georgians had originally attempted to slow the Russian advance by blowing the bridge above Ts'khinvili. The are likely willing to destroy these bridges as well. The Russians may be planning for the potential that the bridges won't be available for crossing.
The Russian tactical pause may be to assess the best way to handle these potential crossings and to bring up equipment to bridge the rivers. It may also be to allow recon forces to scope the bridges and possibly even take control to allow possible crossing. If that happens, expect op tempo to increase exponentially. Another option might have the Russian swing north, crossing a bridge at Dusheti (see map) and coming south along a smaller state highway. That also presents problems of terrain and having their backs to the river without a place to retreat to or a bridge to retreat across. Or, they could cross at Dusheti, travel on to Tianetti to the east and south over another state highway to Tbilisi. Although there are no rivers to cross or be trapped by, there are still hills and low mountains that could still present choke points. If the Russians were to do this, they would probably put forces head on to Meskheta to hold the Georgians while swinging a trap door down to crush Georgian forces caught on the north side of the river. The russians would soften up the Georgian positions by air and artillery before attempting a run on Tbilisi.
However, the United States has already sent humanitarian aid via air and sea. Secretary Rice is on the way and so are representatives from McCain's campaign. The presidents of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland are in Georgia and appeared at a rally with Saakashvili. Effectively creating high profile human shields.
Whatever the reasons, Russia has decided not to risk trying to depose Saakashvili directly or running on Tbilisi. They are announcing that they are withdrawing from Poti and Gori. It remains to be seen if this actually occurs or in what time frame.
i can arrange the paperwork, we'll fly in John to administer the oath, but we'll need to kind of rush the ceremonial salute/dollar exchange piece because i'll need you to have another set of powerpoint slides ready for this evening's shift change briefing.. i'll do the brief tonight to show you how it flows, but tomorrow morning, you brief the CG yourself. don't forget to start the brief with a time hack and the 5-day weather and light data.... remember to close the briefing with a joke about the French.
Too many rivers.
Wait, isn't that a song?
I know it's sun tzu: don't cross the river unless you have to. If you have to, get across and get away ASAP. Russia would pay dearly to take Tbilisi. I think XBradTC hit the nail on the head over at his site. Georiga traded space for time and Russia loses the longer it goes on. The crossings at Tbilisi buy a ton of time and kill a lot of Russian armor and men. The Russians could have taken Tbilisi, but begs the question: at what price?
This is not Baghdad. The rivers around Baghdad had to be crosses and presented some issues, but they were large, winding rivers with many down river crossings preceded and followed by open terrain that could be quickly transited once the river crossing was done and allowed the main body of troops to leave the river area without getting penned against it.
The Russians were not going to have the same opportunity here. The rivers were tight into mountains, the river crossings were close and there was no where to run to get away from the river once you started across. Mountains to the left, right and in front.
As soon as I saw the topographical after the Georgians ordered their army to Meskhet, I thought that was brilliant. Too much to hope the Russians would fall into it, but a good ploy to mark time, re-organize and get resupplied.
How many centuries have the Georgains been using that tactic?
The bridges matter. They aren't a shield. They won't hold anyone up for long. A day at each river at the most. Which could be a blessing in disguise. Allows for stockpiles to be built-up relatively close to the front. Which Georgia will have a hard time finding or hitting.
The US faced similar conditions, sans rivers in many spots, in Korea. The Russians aren't totally bereft of aircraft borne sensors to sweep those hills. Remember, AirLand and Network centric are offshoots of Soviet operational art. This is much like the Neo-Anabasis where one side controls the air completely and the other does not. That's a serious intelligence advantage. Any reports of Mays flying about? I honestly wouldn't be surprised if the Russians didn't simply blast organzied forces with ranged fires before their first echelon made contact(which is what they've pacticed doing for how long?) or simply blasting the hills to be sure which would undo the attrition inflicted on the Russians assumed in the argument put forward.
Bridges and rivers aren't that serious an impediment if Russia can control the air and hit Georgian artillery, even if blown(with the caveat of if they take out many support pillars). Hiding in the hills to inflict mass casualties also is unlikely to be as effective as assumed if Russia continues to control the air and exploits that intelligence advantage to hit far and wide to disrupt 'the hills forces'.
I am one of those geeky people who watches the commentary at the end of Gettysburg and God's and Generals so I know where the armies were and why.
Right. It's not that the bridges are impassable or the terrain ungovernable, it just makes them difficult and requires extra thinking and weighing of options before committing to potentially higher losses. It is why I mentioned the political aspects as well. If you are doing a cost to benefit ratio, it may not be necessary or desirable to absorb that cost, even if you could.
As for the BMP and airborne forces, I suggest you google earth the area. Maybe the Russians have become airborne gods, but we are talking about mountainous ranges (Tbilisi sits nestled in between) with interesting valleys from all the glaciers that have retreated over the years. I might be wrong, but that terrain does not say "airborne" to me.
I would say that goes along with the "operational pause" I was referring to. I believe that they were bringing more supplies forward, but also likely some vehicles with the flip down bridges. I just don't think those were traveling in the front of the troops. usually, those are slightly back and aren't brought up until they are needed. Otherwise, they can't fight, they can't defend, and if they get blown up they are not good for crossing bridges and they block the road for the rest of the force.
Further, while I made very short work of it (at that point, they were announcing the Russians were pulling out of Gori so the discussion seemed less urgent), I did say that the Russians would soften up any Georgian positions with air and artillery before going in. The issues that would guide their effectiveness though would circle around a few other items.
for instance, lets not forget that the Russians have lost at least four planes in this attack. to Georgian forces firing anti-aircraft missiles. Secondly, that this apparently has given the Russian pilots a little pause. some reports indicate Russian planes flying in, barely taking aim and flying out again with a marked decrease in accuracy. then again, maybe they really didn't give a damn what they hit? Hard to say. In either case, I think that does give Russia another thing to contemplate prior to any move on Tbilisi.
Nyet, commrade. At least not to my knowledge. Someone else might know more, but everything I get seems to be talking about bombers and fighter bombers. Maybe some equipped with jamming equipment. I assume they have some sort of air intelligence flying around.
I don't know about you, but I am findng it difficult to balance out the Rissoam capabilities with reality. Largely because they have great weapons systems, but, when I see the pictures of their soldiers and their discipline, I have a hard time reconciling the two to come up with a good picture.
While the main blitzkrieg and battle went relatively well for Russia, something seems off.
Maybe it is the four downed air craft. We know, theoretically, what the Russians could do, but those air craft keep buzzing my mind telling me something was wrong and it had implications for the greater Russian military. coupled with some of the images of their soldiers...
Call me crazy, but I think that is why I gave the Georgians a little more credit for their defense location.
It isn't to say they would survive long, just survive longer than if they didn't.
The 'May", check that I meant the 'Mainstay', is the Russian answer to the C-3 Sentry. I haven't looked in a while but they may have added look down capability so that it is a bit like J-STARS. I would assume that they did. If their aircraft are air direct instead of ground directed they almost certainly have Mays up.
I think you're over-estimating time and casulaties. AIrmobility of 'minitanks'--change BMP to BMD, my bad--- means that sitting static just means the Russians can, and probably will, take the initiative and go chase them down. An airmobile brigade with BMD can go after infantry, armor, aritillery hiding in the hills. While enjoying the benefits of aerial reconassaince to help them find the enemy, avoid what they can't handle, and direct long range fires as needed.
A valley is crap for an air drop many times, but the BMD does not have to float down on a parachute with the crew inside. they can simply move them with heavy lift helicopters, short jaunts. Or maybe move them with the Russian eq. of the C130(the AN-22, or the Il-76, which can carry more than one) and do a low altitude dump out the back(if width of valley is not that small) via drogue delivery system.
And, they could use the larger BMP with the AN-22 as well or the larger Il-76. That's essentially a force of Bradley MICV going after someone fairly hard core. This is a cavalryman's dream, no?
Secondly, that this apparently has given the Russian pilots a little pause. some reports indicate Russian planes flying in, barely taking aim and flying out again with a marked decrease in accuracy. then again, maybe they really didn't give a damn what they hit?
Disruption sufficies. A unit that's taking cover from air attack is not firing on forces crossing a river, nor is it firing on a unit closing for an attack. That euphamism of 'friction'.
4 aircraft is nothing, imo. You have to expect *some* losses. 4 out of a few score or a hundred? That's peanuts. I wouldn't be surprised if that is not below the estimate for acceptable losses by the Russian staff.
I'm just not seeing it as causing significantly more(an increase of 10% or more). Not when network centric holds, and has been proven, to allow a much smaller force with the dual advantages of precision strike and intel to have its way with a force that is unable to contest in the air. A BMD--or mixed BMD/BMP--- force could route the Georgians ala LZ X-ray(but with armor this time).
SovietRussian Frontal Air. Not only have they taken losses in SU-25s (which is somewhat to be expected) they lost a Backfire on a recon/strike mission. They aren't going to be trundling around in a May in that environment. And don't forget that control of the air only means the Georgians can't mass for the offensive. We've seen since WWII that the defense can still be mounted under enemy air superiority. I haven't seen the Russians show the kind of close air support needed to root out small forces hiding on the ground.Can the Georgians stop the Russians at a river crossing? Maybe not, but it is the best place to try. It is tough to cross a significant river under the best of circumstances. I suspect that many of the rivers can be forded by tanks and BMPs for the assault crossing, but you still have to get your trucks over eventually. But there are only so many good crossing points, which takes away your ability to maneuver, giving the other side a good chance to take a shot at you, not only with arty, but with direct fire weapons as well. Plus, Russian tanks have limited main gun elevation, so shooting into the hills is tough for them.
ah..a missing part of the information. and, if you look at a google satellite image of the place, we're talking about some really incredible places to hide small contingents with portable weapons, concealed from air assets except maybe with use of ground sewn censors. I think the Georgians still have a decent advantage there.
Plus, I'm not sure we appreciate their anti-aircraft capabilities enough considering the four downed fighter/bombers.
I understand that the Russians have yet to leave Gori. Obviously holding out for the best negotiations and not wanting to look like they turned tail as soon as Bush shook his finger at them. Besides, they hold the transportation system hostage a little longer and make the Georgians pay by reducing food, clothing, energy, etc. A little increase on the misery index while they collect up more intel. It's a win/win situation. For a little longer.
Another 24 hours it will be the weekend and everyone will pretend that a weekend at war is like a weekend at work: everything stops until Monday. That means the Russians get three more days to play.
YOu don't have to fly a Mainstay in the same way you do a Backfire, not in a air control capacity you don't. That does, without question, mean it would have problems with looking at the ground(horizon is moved back), but you can still fly a Mainstay to coordinate air assets and act as comms relay.
Kat, 4 is nothing. Don't hold Desert Storm, OIF, and teh Clinton adventures as the norm by which to weigh things against. They're anamolous. Most countries will take significant losses. RUssia has yet to attain significant losses in aircraft. They've lost 4. There's somthing on the order of 250 SU-25 in Russia, spread among 6 districts. That's about 10%(4 out of approx 40) if only one district has been comitted to battle, they've got spares aplenty if they want to continue. THe Backfire is slightly more sig since there's much fewer of them.
No, I'm not discounting AAD. AAD is what made Dusty's job so fun, what with every mudmarcher possibly carrying a MANPAD. Someone knocked down an F-117, once, by being smart. If pressed hard I'm sure we'll eventually lose a B-2 to enemy action too. It should be harder to take down an F-117 than a non-stealth SU-25, a design from the '70s(and, something ironic I'm getting out of my sourcebook is that the SU-25 used to be built in Tblisis. Oh, that's cosmic.) I'm saying less than 30% losses to enemy action(and that includes making it back to base but not being able to sortie again due to damage) is well below the norm. So I make two possible deductions. 1) Georgia doesn't have many launchers or reloads for those launchers, and tehrefor they haven't been able to claim more in direct shoot downs. 2) Russian SEAD is working fairly well, and that's why they're not losing more.
Any time someone says we're going to launch a raid by air I assume we're going to lose the use of one fourth to one third of the force that launches. I think that is a decent estimate moving forward from Vietnam to present.
THere's two elements to the idea of landing an airmobile operation. One is to scour. The second is to bypass and threaten a strategic target the Georgians have to keep. Say, another bridge. Over which Georgian supplies must cross.
The BMP/BMD are, in my mind, the exploitation forces between bridges. Indirect fire weapons like the D-30 can be moved in as well as Russian heavy mortars like teh M-160. Infantry engages, artillery decimates, the mini-tanks race ahead to cut off retreat and fark with Georgian artillery and logistics in the rear. If you've got over a kilometer's worth of range you don't need a tremendous elevation change of barrel. You use a bigger 3-4-5 proportioned triangle. The Georgians have to mass somewhat to oppose a landing, otherwise what's the point. So they can't deploy in great depth so there's an ATGM team at every bend in the road. ANd the BMP/BMD are MICV. They're 4 parts APC with 2 parts tank. Infantry to go mess with the tank killers while the MICV lays down covering fire. Spraying a slope with 12.5mm and cannister from the main gun isn't going to be doing the Georgians any favors. Of course, you have to assume *some* losses. Can you accept losing 20% of your BMP/D and attached infantry if it sweeps the way clear for your true assault forces? I think so.
And scouring can work in a 'reverse' fashion. Land between two bridges, and then work your way back toward your own forces. Take the Georgians in the rear. They have to react or fear being a) cut off(starve, both ammo and food) b) captured.
Either way you're taking heat off the crossings and causing probs for the Georgians. You're cutting down on casualties by making the Georgians dance to your tune instead of you to theirs. If the Georgians are forced to fight in two directions simultaneously they aren't going to be causing great casualties on the crossing forces. If the valleys are more than 150m wide 100m up then this is possible(The AN-22 has a wingspn of 55m, the IL of almost 100m. Trying to give quite a bit of safe room.). Helicopters require even less. Hind and Havoc are very capable of delivering infantry, and as the Afghanis found out quite good at going after folks hiding in hills.
The short of it? The Georgians are still fracked, the Russians can get thru a downed bridge in 2 days at the slowest(with the ability to improve the flow over the river growing), and therefor I deduce that it is not extra casualties that the Russians are fretting over. It's something else. Maybe they aren't evil horrible bastards after all. A drive toward Tblisis scared the piss out of the Georgian politicians and those jokers are now willing to be a little more amenable. Intentions are different than capabilities.