previous post next post  

From Russia With Love, Pt 2

Update:  Check out Blackfive for another good look at Russian reasons for aggression.

Yesterday started reporting the Russia-Georgian conflict.  Reporting seems very limited coming out of the area though Russian news is all over it, blaming the Georgians for an unprovoked attack on Russian "peacekeepers".  Georgians are insisting that they were shelled or mortared first by some "separatists" and responded.  The Russians are saying that response ended up killing ten peace keepers in their barracks.

Both are claiming that the other is an aggressor.  Of course, on the Russian online forums, there are plenty of people writing and insisting that the United States "America" is behind the attacks that WE timed it to start with the Beijing Olympics.  Georgians are claiming the same about the Russians and several American analysis see the same thing: Russian timed aggression with separatists to go along with the Beijing games because all eyes will be on Beijing.  Russia/Georgia trading a few blows and allowing Russia to bring in tanks to take control of Ossetia under the guise of protecting Russian forces or citizens?

My best guess?  Russia has had a huge reserve force hanging out in the area for just such a purpose and such a purpose was bound to come sooner or later as each side in the Ossetia situation ratcheted up the tension.  When you have guns pointing at each other's heads, sooner or later, someone blinks or their finger twitches.  It's a good enough excuse to put an existing plan in motion.  Yes, Virginia, the Ruskies have had a plan for two decades on how they would invade Georgia if necessary, just like we have had a plan on how to invade Mexico, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and any other country, hostile or not, since who knows when...before even Teddy Roosevelt started carrying a big stick...because it represents some vital strategic point.

Transatlantic Politics grabs the all important paragraph from a Times article on the reasons why the Ruskies are willing to gamble on war with Georgia: Oil.  Lucas, in the Times, points out the oil pipeline that goes through Georgia from the Caucus states and Russia's attempts to maintain some control over the states and areas that pump it in order to maintain some economic control or interest over Europe.  I'll take that a step further and point out this longer analysis from 2005: Russia and Iran Matrix: Ripples from Iraq to Afghanistan.  (please ignore the Chechenya outline; it's a little too big, a better map is further down the post).

There are three or more important aspects at play here and it has existed since Russia first took steps to become a world player under Peter the Great.  Russia has a large land mass and many natural resources.  It's main problem for centuries has been a lack of sea ports through which to export these resources to countries beyond those that surround it; specifically, Europe.  To that end, whether Russian Czars or Soviet Premiers or even modern Presidents and Prime Ministers, Russia has sought to expand or control access to markets through sea ports or "friendly" lands.

Historically, Peter went after access by fighting with Sweden and then attempting to take the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea.  Catherine the Great later expanded that to the Crimean Peninsula and down through Georgia.  Back then, Catherine claimed to be invading Georgia to save the Christians from the expanding Turkish Ottoman Islamic empire.  The Georgian's went along with it because they couldn't defend themselves against the Ottomans without Russia, but they have always been rather independent minded (one of the reasons that Stalin was happy to starve them out in the '30's). 

After that, Alexander I had made a deal with Napolean in order to gain access to European markets.  However, Napolean had little intention on sharing that area and eventually attempted to invade Russia on its own pre-emptive pre-text.  The Crimean War was fought, again, for control of the Crimean Peninsula with the European powers allying with Turkey in order to keep Russia from competing with their empires through the Black Sea's Mediterranean access.  The Russians attempted to expand further in the east through Korea and Manchuria (China) in order to gain a warm water port.  That started the Russo-Japan wars in 1903 that left Russia extremely weak and began the boiling of revolution.  It also set the stage for Wolrd War I.

In 1914, Czar Nicholas II made the same mistake that his great-grandfather made, getting involved in another European war in order to try to gain access to the Baltic Sea ports and European markets.  The horrendous losses on the Eastern front, the poor economy and a totally clueless monarchy led to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.  However, that did not end Russian attempts to gain or control access to markets and sea ports.  The Soviet expansion through Europe and Central Asia throughout World War II and after was a direct result of this driving need.   

Russia knew then and knows today that it cannot be a global player without the ability to import and export goods.  Second, it has known for over three centuries that it cannot be a global player without a Blue Water Navy and that navy needs Blue Water ports.  Without access to markets, ports for import and export or a Navy to defend them, Russia is nothing but a giant, land locked, economically vulnerable, second fiddle to any other nation who has all three. 

Russia would also like to have some control over these markets in order to sustain much needed revenues.  Oil and natural gas represents 70% of Russia's revenues.  They have been enjoying the huge spike in oil costs.  It also seeks alliances with other OPEC and non-OPEC producers in order to have some political influence over decisions to pump more or less oil.  It's also a major reason that Russia has continued to work with Iran on nuclear energy, despite our concerns.  Not only does it give Russia an "in" with Iran on OPEC, but they are hoping to maintain some sort of relationship for mutual protection of both of those nations' resources in the Caspian Sea area.  Without that, both Iran and Russia become much poorer, weaker and vulnerable states.

To better understand Georgia's role in this situation, take a look at this map (pdf).  The pipeline that ends in a Georgian port and oil terminal runs through Aizerbaijan from the Caspian Sea.  One of the major issues isn't just where the oil goes through or comes out, but where it is coming from.  Looking at this map (click map again to expand), it's clear to sea that Russia is in major competition for the oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian.  It is also clear that, though they have staked out spits of land to take in these resources, the major rail and pipelines (how oil and natural gas usually leaves the area) either go through Aizerbaijan and Georgia or through the very unstable Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechenya republics.  As noted in 2005,
 

Further, democratization and liberalization may spark independence movements in its (Russia) remaining Caucus states that will cut off access to the Caspian and Caucus energy reserves and access to ports, pipelines and railroads. Again, sparking an economic crisis.


In a very real sense, that is why Russia has been supporting the Ossetian separatists.  They are looking for allies in the area that will help orient the area back to Russia, provide acceptable areas for them to station military forces (cutting off the rebels in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia from any rear support) and threaten Georgia.  Further, it's the reason that Russia will never let Chechnya become an independent republic, nor Dagestan or Ingushetia.  It is why they were willing to bomb Grozny into the ground.  Despite any world approbation from human rights groups or governments.

In the end, who gains the most from these actions?  It is the Russian Bear who gets everything it wants by having an excuse to invade Ossetia.  It does nothing for Georgia who, no matter how well equipped or trained, can't compete in size to Russia.  It does nothing for the United States to push a weaker ally into a situation where they are bound to lose and the US accomplish nothing.  In fact, worse, because destabilization in Georgia, with a huge oil pipeline going through it, will cause another spike in oil prices in a US economy that is already stumbling around and in a situation where the US is unable to respond significantly in Georgia's defense due to its over extension in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places.    Even the fact that we are withdrawing significant forces from Iraq (much closer to Georgia than forces here) could have been the signal.  Another good reason for Russia to feel the time is ripe. 

Frankly, for all the Russian nationalist drum beating that it was America behind the Georgians, the entire episode has the markings of the old time, heavy handed Soviet excuses for sending troops into one country or another.  Particularly, as Russia could have simply withdrawn its "peacekeeping" forces to avoid casualties and not send in heavy tanks, bombers or fighter jets to bomb Georgia proper over a region with less than 70,000 people. 

But, peacekeeping wasn't really the point, was it?

6 Comments

The 58th Army has responsibility for Chechnya as well as Georgia. With the Georgians configured at light infantry / light mech, and no air force to speak of, the Russians don't need much to inject a superior force into the conflict.

It appears the Georgians may have intended to run this op as a large raid, with follow on to build FOB's, etc., just like they learned in Iraq. If you believe the Russians, their barracks was targeted. If so, a big mistake on the Georgians' part. Also a mistake was their faliure to seize or close the Roki tunnel.

Without Russian intervention, the Georgians succeed. Now that the Russians are in the field, it's a matter of time and tenacity to see what the Georgians can hold on to.
 
I'll leave this cryptic comment: When Kosovo decided it wanted to split from Serbia, the US was all for "self-determination." Now South Ossetsia wants to split from Georgia, and the US is insisting -- in essence -- self-determination shouldn't apply. I threw that out there for you guys to gnaw on. More tomorrow, as part of something a bit out of the ordinary...
 
Well, Bill, it is obviiously about a few realities

1) the Ossetians weren't getting ethnically cleansed into mass graves by the Georgians
2) Yep.  When we recognized Kosovo's independence, Serbia was basically split in the middle and made it an untenable situation, but also turned a Russian ally with any control in south Eastern Europe into the size of a nickel and just about as much "buying" power, too. 
3) South Ossetia with Russian troops put a similar finger of land right down the middle of Georgia and Russian troops within "reach out and touch someone" distance of the oil pipeline that runs through the area, effectively putting serious pressure on Europe (which they had lost in the last little struggle with the Ukrainian elections of a westward leaning government).

So, yeah, we got it, but it doesn't make it any more tolerable. 
 
No, it's not tolerable, and Russia *does* appear to be trying to either gain or exercise control over natural gas and oil distribution in the region.

Well, now, the Kosavars weren't getting ethnicly-cleansed into mass graves by the Serbs, either. The Serbs *did* learn their lesson from Bosnia and they kept the actual killing to "acceptable" levels -- meaning, below the threshhold of triggering world outrage. Most of the actual killing that went on in Kosovo was done by the people we decided needed *protection* -- the KLA. There *is* some talk about "ethnic cleansing" in Georgia's current plans, but it appears to be limited to statements made by the South Ossetian ambassador to the Russian Federation.
 
Self determination is a bit of a horned dellima, ain't it?  It always leaves one with the problem of how far to take it, how large a population has to be before it merits or for how long it has been conglomerated before it no longer applies.  We're seeing the same sort of grumbling, without the violence, in Brussels. 

And of course, there's the hypocracy angle.  Consistency is a big issue in geo-pol.  At least from a propganda line.  It undermines us to be hypocritical. Kind of hard to crit Russia or PRC when we're flip=flopping on what merits.

And you can't always deal with something as if it exists detached from everything else.  Ripple effects *do* matter.

It simply isn't so easy as 'right/wrong' in a drill down fahion because you also have to see the horizontal effects of 'right/wrong' too.  Sometimes you compromise a principle in serving a larger one, and if one hasn't prepared for that, well, one can find themselve's in pretty serious trouble down the road.  Which I think was the Chief;s point.  At least that's what I saw in it, Kat. 
 
Kind of hard to crit Russia or PRC when we're flip=flopping on what merits.

Aye, there's the rub. Who's the arbiter when a *legitimate* case for self-determination can be made historically, by the majority of the inhabitants, or by enlightened self-interest when that issue runs counter to someone else's definition or view of the situation?

Then there's that whole Late Unpleasantness Between the States thang, where two parties placed differing interpretations on the same document.

Worms, can of, one each, fifty-gallons in size...