I have been reading much about Afghanistan and I want to write something more comprehensive in the near future with links to source material. Right now, there is a large amount of writing going on in the foreign press including face to face interviews and observations inside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Arguably, the area that most poses a threat to the future stabilization of Afghanistan and the area that is currently host to a conglomeration of Islamist organizations. Admiral Mullen referred to it as a "syndication" of Islamists.
First, let me refer back to an original post on the general challenges that Afghanistan poses. They are even more pronounced than those we experienced in Iraq.
That was November 2007.
Whatever people imagine about Iraq and its purposes for either the United States or Al Qaeda, during its heightened media attention, Afghanistan received little. There were complaints and references to "the Forgotten War" was not the worst thing that could happen to it. It certainly had taken the pressure off of Afghanistan from both expanded terrorist attacks and the ability to operate without the woes that heightened scrutiny often brought in terms of any information war.
On the other hand, it also meant that the problems that kept the necessary building and stabilization of that nation were not addressed as they should have been. In short, we may not have used the time wisely or profitably.
The lack of scrutiny also means that the average US citizen (and politicians) have no real idea about the problems, the obstacles or our strategy in Iraq. The reporting on the recent assault on a combat patrol outpost that resulted in nine deaths and some subsequent comments questioning the purpose and protection points to a deep misunderstanding of the operations.
There are two geographic aspects of Afghanistan that guides how our strategy is laid out, its strengths and weaknesses. These are also directly related to the tribal relations that impact our counter-insurgency efforts. These two geographic aspects are high mountains and deep protected valleys with limited approaches.
The mountains pose a particular problem along the Afghan/Pakistan border. According to this study:
Hindu Kush roughly translates to "Hindu Killer". At those heights, it requires excellent fitness to transit these mountains. Those who do not know the way or who are not prepared can be caught in dangers from terrain, weather and militants that attempt to control and maintain paths for their own transit.
These mountains have very few roads, but numerous foot paths. Those roads that exist are narrow, dangerous pathways that cling to sides of the mountains, winding through treacherous terrain and areas that present easy ambush points. There are terraces that present places to set up camp or observation posts, but those are known by locals and regular travelers.
However, the extensiveness of the mountain range, its difficult terrain and the passageways available make controlling the border extremely difficult. It requires a different take on strategy and tactics that does not equate to "clear and hold" in any current counter-insurgency strategy.
The General strategy in combating the problems these mountainous passageways present is two fold. First, it is literally impossible to control every inch of these mountains or their passageways. The difficult transit routes and heights means that implacing, supplying and protecting many stationary bases is physically and logistically challenging. It would require a nearly inestimable number of troops, far more than even stationed in Iraq.
It would also require a much different logistics program and equipment. Air drops would be the most likely as convoys would be in significant more danger of being totally destroyed and over run. The destruction of such attacks would be even more devastating, physically, logistically and information-ally than the many attacks that were suffered in Iraq. Such attacks and lack of convoys would leave these outlying bases extremely vulnerable.
Air drops would become increasingly difficult as the terrain rises. Helicopters could be used in some cases, but many temporary bases even today are in places and positions even the most skilled would find difficult to manage. Air drops from the sky would also be hindered by both the terrain, the altitude and general location. There are already reports of air drops landing in enemy controlled territory.
The US and ISAF forces must be able to interdict or over watch as many crossing points as possible. There are technological and human methods to do so. US and ISAF forces attempt to patrol these routes, setting up temporary patrol bases and observation posts. These forces provide several advantages and disadvantages. They cannot stay out any longer than they are capable of carrying supplies or reaching any more permanent bases they can use to resupply.
This method is "recon by force" or "recon by contact". It hearkens back to deploying skirmishers to make armed recon against enemy forces. A method that has been long deployed in military history. By this method, these forces can establish contact with both the enemy and potential informants or simply gather intel on the area and its inhabitants. They can call in additional support or recommend action. They can establish how active those passageways are and, with eyes on the scene, they can determine who and what kind of traffic is making its way across the border.
It's likely that these patrols and temporary bases move, not just due to supply issues, but to seek better line of sight or observe other suspected areas of transit. Constant (but not routine) patrolling of these passageways keeps the enemy from having steady and uninterrupted access. Though, recent attacks have stepped up and transit has increased in preparation for a resurgent battle for Afghanistan.
The second method for monitoring these areas might include "seeding" the area with sensors, over watch flights by manned and unmanned air craft, and satellite technology to name a few. The best method is patrolling with armed forces because they can better establish whether that traffic is benign or malignant. They can identify and respond physically when necessary. They can interact with the population.
These are also much more dangerous and difficult to maintain. Electronic methods are not always reliable, on station nor able to distinguish the purpose of that traffic. The trade off is less danger of ambush for troops, but it may result in greater destruction and death from coalesced enemy forces making their way into Afghanistan.
In order to combat the weaknesses presented by the inability to hold the terrain in these mountainous passages, US, allied local and ISAF forces have to concentrate on effective COIN strategy in "the valleys".
First, let me refer back to an original post on the general challenges that Afghanistan poses. They are even more pronounced than those we experienced in Iraq.
As Iraq cools down, Afghanistan heats up. Al Qaeda and it's Islamic terrorist affiliates are being pushed back on many fronts including the destruction of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, MILF and Abu Sayaf in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines among the many places. It has sought to expand into the contested territories in the Caucuses including places like Ingushetia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and the like.
Al Qaeda has begun to concentrate foreign fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan as this represents their last, best hopes for establishing a long term and protected base from where they can launch attacks.
That was November 2007.
Whatever people imagine about Iraq and its purposes for either the United States or Al Qaeda, during its heightened media attention, Afghanistan received little. There were complaints and references to "the Forgotten War" was not the worst thing that could happen to it. It certainly had taken the pressure off of Afghanistan from both expanded terrorist attacks and the ability to operate without the woes that heightened scrutiny often brought in terms of any information war.
On the other hand, it also meant that the problems that kept the necessary building and stabilization of that nation were not addressed as they should have been. In short, we may not have used the time wisely or profitably.
The lack of scrutiny also means that the average US citizen (and politicians) have no real idea about the problems, the obstacles or our strategy in Iraq. The reporting on the recent assault on a combat patrol outpost that resulted in nine deaths and some subsequent comments questioning the purpose and protection points to a deep misunderstanding of the operations.
There are two geographic aspects of Afghanistan that guides how our strategy is laid out, its strengths and weaknesses. These are also directly related to the tribal relations that impact our counter-insurgency efforts. These two geographic aspects are high mountains and deep protected valleys with limited approaches.
The mountains pose a particular problem along the Afghan/Pakistan border. According to this study:
The highest peaks are over 7,000 meters above sea level and are found in the eastern part of the country. In comparison, Mount Everest, which has the highest elevation in the world, stands 8,853.5 meters above sea level. The mountains of the Hindu Kush diminish in height as they stretch westward. Toward the middle of the range, near Kabul, they extend from 4,500 to 6,000 meters above sea level. In the western portion of the range they attain heights of 3,500 to 4,500 meters and at the extreme western border are lower still. The average altitude of the Hindu Kush is 4,500 meters (see fig. 4). The Hindu Kush runs about 966 kilometers laterally, and its median north-south measurement is about 240 kilometers.
Hindu Kush roughly translates to "Hindu Killer". At those heights, it requires excellent fitness to transit these mountains. Those who do not know the way or who are not prepared can be caught in dangers from terrain, weather and militants that attempt to control and maintain paths for their own transit.
These mountains have very few roads, but numerous foot paths. Those roads that exist are narrow, dangerous pathways that cling to sides of the mountains, winding through treacherous terrain and areas that present easy ambush points. There are terraces that present places to set up camp or observation posts, but those are known by locals and regular travelers.
However, the extensiveness of the mountain range, its difficult terrain and the passageways available make controlling the border extremely difficult. It requires a different take on strategy and tactics that does not equate to "clear and hold" in any current counter-insurgency strategy.
The General strategy in combating the problems these mountainous passageways present is two fold. First, it is literally impossible to control every inch of these mountains or their passageways. The difficult transit routes and heights means that implacing, supplying and protecting many stationary bases is physically and logistically challenging. It would require a nearly inestimable number of troops, far more than even stationed in Iraq.
It would also require a much different logistics program and equipment. Air drops would be the most likely as convoys would be in significant more danger of being totally destroyed and over run. The destruction of such attacks would be even more devastating, physically, logistically and information-ally than the many attacks that were suffered in Iraq. Such attacks and lack of convoys would leave these outlying bases extremely vulnerable.
Air drops would become increasingly difficult as the terrain rises. Helicopters could be used in some cases, but many temporary bases even today are in places and positions even the most skilled would find difficult to manage. Air drops from the sky would also be hindered by both the terrain, the altitude and general location. There are already reports of air drops landing in enemy controlled territory.
The US and ISAF forces must be able to interdict or over watch as many crossing points as possible. There are technological and human methods to do so. US and ISAF forces attempt to patrol these routes, setting up temporary patrol bases and observation posts. These forces provide several advantages and disadvantages. They cannot stay out any longer than they are capable of carrying supplies or reaching any more permanent bases they can use to resupply.
This method is "recon by force" or "recon by contact". It hearkens back to deploying skirmishers to make armed recon against enemy forces. A method that has been long deployed in military history. By this method, these forces can establish contact with both the enemy and potential informants or simply gather intel on the area and its inhabitants. They can call in additional support or recommend action. They can establish how active those passageways are and, with eyes on the scene, they can determine who and what kind of traffic is making its way across the border.
It's likely that these patrols and temporary bases move, not just due to supply issues, but to seek better line of sight or observe other suspected areas of transit. Constant (but not routine) patrolling of these passageways keeps the enemy from having steady and uninterrupted access. Though, recent attacks have stepped up and transit has increased in preparation for a resurgent battle for Afghanistan.
The second method for monitoring these areas might include "seeding" the area with sensors, over watch flights by manned and unmanned air craft, and satellite technology to name a few. The best method is patrolling with armed forces because they can better establish whether that traffic is benign or malignant. They can identify and respond physically when necessary. They can interact with the population.
These are also much more dangerous and difficult to maintain. Electronic methods are not always reliable, on station nor able to distinguish the purpose of that traffic. The trade off is less danger of ambush for troops, but it may result in greater destruction and death from coalesced enemy forces making their way into Afghanistan.
In order to combat the weaknesses presented by the inability to hold the terrain in these mountainous passages, US, allied local and ISAF forces have to concentrate on effective COIN strategy in "the valleys".
Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
Afghanistan does not accept Durand's Line.
Pakistani Frontier Corps controls much of the high ground, greatly to the Afghan National Border Patrol's embarrassment. Heavy weapons on high ground can be very persuasive.
FC is heavily infiltrated by Taliban sympathizers.
All the foot paths and donkey trails could be blocked by the judicious application of high explosives. Karzai doesn't want that because he hopes some day that those crossing points will be deeper inside his country. Plus he doesn't want to listen to the whining and fussing from those inconvenienced.
Too bad U. S. Army Special Forces is too bowed up doing direct action to organize a tribal lashkar Afghan National Auxiliary Border Patrol / Import Tax Collection Agency. Who does unconventional warfare these days?
Step One: Move into an area in strength and establish a semipermanent base, usually in an old Brit outpost, because there was sufficient level ground to for three pairs of Cobras.
Step Two: Launch a convoy through the adjacent hills ("Trolling for Taliban") in numbers small enough to invite an attack, but large enough to prevent being overrun for as long as it took for the Cobras to arrive -- usually about twenty minutes.
Step Three: Pound the daylights out of the attackers and sweep up the survivors.
Step Four: When the convoys were no longer attacked, reposition fifty miles away and repeat the process.
Worked like a champ as long as they kept the convoys on the roads below the 3,000 meter contour line, because of the Cobra's performance limitations above 12,000 feet. There was one outpost at the 5,000 meter line they resupplied with a Eurocopter Llama -- they shut down to save fuel and couldn't get it started again. It's still there.
Just be glad they didn't call it
*ooog*
a Vicuña...