The attackers were driven back in a pitched four-hour battle, and they appeared to suffer scores of dead and wounded of their own, but the toll they inflicted was sobering. The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation was under way.
With nine Americans dead and at least 15 injured, that means that one in five of the American defenders was killed and nearly half the remainder were wounded. Four Afghan soldiers were also wounded.
American and Afghan soldiers inside the base were hit by flying fragments from bullets, grenades and mortar shells that insurgents fired from houses, shops and a mosque in a village within a few hundred yards of the base, several officials said.
At the lightly fortified observation post nearby, American soldiers came under heavy fire from militants streaming through farmland under cover of darkness. Most of the American casualties took place there, a senior American military official said.
American warplanes, attack helicopters and long-range artillery were urgently summoned to help repel the militants.
But the insurgents made it so far that a few of their corpses were found inside the base's earthen barriers, and others were lying around it, Tamim Nuristani, a former governor in the region, said after talking to officials in the district.
Some answers to those questions are more sobering than others.
All are bad, but some are worse than others.
But it does look like Afghanistan is shifting to a "More troops, please" mode.
And *much* more intel.
But if the answer is... "inside Pakistan" the solutions to the problem become very complex.
No doubt in my mind they got trained up in the same areas the Pak Cobras hit a year ago. The area is perfect for guerrilla train-ups and is so isolated the Pak Army doesn't maintain a presence -- too easy to interdict lines of communication and supply. Putting TOW missiles into Taliban caves forced the Talib to shift back into Afghanistan, where they got chewed up. Quietly, with no fanfare in the media.
Ironically, all the fuss from Washington about wanting to see a more visible effort from Musharraf in the GWOT resulted in the Pak Army re-orienting southward -- into an area of "higher visibility" for the media -- and let the TaliQaeda rebuild in the Karakorams.
As Iraq was drawing to a close last year, I noted that I believed Pakistan would be the next fight and fiercer even than Iraq or Afghanistan. There is the question of who is going to do the fighting.
Pakistan is it because there is literally no other states left that provide AQ et al with such a protected area as they once enjoyed in Afghanistan and in parts of Iraq.
And, yes, the difficulty becomes how do you supply, operate or defend troops in these remote areas with limited access? How do you disrupt the ability to mass, train and attack on such a scale out of these areas?
I think the answer to part of John's question about how they do amass, train and attack comes from how many groups were involved in the operation. Obviously, our forces are tracking any large scale movements. Likely, ten or more men on the move would alert from a UAV or other outpost. It is highly likely that these men moved to their attack position in very small groups of men, maybe 3 or less.
Second, these groups of men very likely coalesced as extremely small units at compounds where they trained and drew little notice because its not uncommon to see that many men in an extended family or village. My guess would be 20 or less.
After that, getting such small groups to come together to attack as one large group with any sort of discipline means to me that there are some highly capable, veteran commanders over seeing both the training and the battle planning. I keep in mind that these forces do not want to occupy our bases. They just want to over-run them and kill as many as possible before withdrawing. Their own men are highly expendable due to the "paradise clause".
Still, even with that last note, I cannot help but wonder how any commanders expect to be able to carry out any continuous missions such as that and hope to be anywhere near successful when they lose at least 10-20% of their forces. Then again, I'll answer my own question. It is all about perception. The propaganda from this attack will insist on an overwhelming victory for these groups. Men and boys will flock to them as "lions".
I think that our major concern will be how do we cut them off and leave them starving in Pakistan? I have a suggestion, but it won't play well in Peoria.
I have a suggestion that won't play well *any*where, except with Pakistani Rangers...
It's a tricky situation. Pak is one of those countries that can go either way- piss them off, and they'll go after you and your friends, and we can't afford any more enemies in the ME right now.
You said that Afghanistan is shifting to "more troops, please", but that shift has been happening for a year now- or at least the call for more troops by the troops already there. Anyone who has followed the 173rd's tour in the Korengal Valley knows that activity near the Pak border has been on the upsurge for quite a while now. They've sustained heavy losses, and have endured some incredibly rough conditions and firefights. We've needed more troops up there for a while now, but with the concentrated effort in Iraq, that hasn't happened. Now that Iraq is back under control, I anticipate a shift back to AFG. And when that's back under control again, Iraq will be a mess, so we'll be shifting over there again. And so on. And so on. And so on....
The war in the Middle East is a never-ending project, if we intend to hold on and keep troop levels high enough to sustain the peace we've managed to achieve at this point. The only way around that is to get Pakistan and Iran on board with eliminating the terrorists within their borders, and the weapons supply lines coming from them to AQ.
Blaming it on Iraq is a convenience to mask a strategy or to mask a weakness. From politicians, it is all about the political. As someone famous once said: losers focus on strategy, winners focus on logistics. or something.
Yo, se?
I just wonder and hope if we have been building up the appropriate supplies, roads and fire bases for the necessary activities.
re. bases.
The 173rd guys replaced the xyz guys (can't remember- sorry). The 173rd has been there for 14 months, and the guys before them were also there for at least a year. During the past two years these guys have been patroling and occupying the same area (Korengal Valley), virtually nothing has been done to improve their living conditions. We're 7 years into this war, yet these men are still taking baby wipe baths! So no, from what I've heard, they do not have adequate supplies or bases. Roads... I don't know, maybe.
I'm telling you, the AFG-PAK border has been a hotbed of activity all year long, and started heating up two years ago, but our leaders have not done enough about it. The attack this past weekend is just the tip of the iceberg (or sand storm, heh.). Those men have been fighting their asses off, daily, for well over a year, but reinforcements have yet to arrive.
BTW - McMaster, and an old buddy of mine, Ross Ridge, made BG.
The list is also notable for the number of women from mainline specialties on it (vice medical, legal, etc).
The leading edge of the expansion of women in the officer corps that started in the late 70's is making itself known.
Second, the item on which you focus provides the explanation for the odd numbers. We need the 800,000 to supply and maintain the 200,000. It's been that way since at least WW2.
The way the Times reported this incident makes me want to pound my head against the wall:If you read carefully,what actually happened is that the Talibs attacked an unsecured (i.e. not completely functioning) outpost with a 3-1 advantage in numbers.
If this starts happening with some regularity, then I'll be concerned.
The only way that happens is if we are planning to go all Hannibal on Pakistan.
In the meantime, I think people confuse our capabilities in the relative flat lands of Iraq (which posed its own problems), to the exquisitely more diverse and difficult terrain in Afghanistan. Or the capabilities we would need to have. Or even the increased number of casualties related to 'hard landings" we might experience courtesy of either mother nature or the Taliban.
It wasn't any more unsecured than ususal... it's regularly manned outpost. It's incomplete by modern standards, but that's where those men have been stationed for months. The statement "increasingly stretched thin as they are dispatched to far-flung and often isolated mountainous outposts" is also accurate. That's what I've been trying to say on this post: the outpost that was attacked is not unusual; they are *all* unsecured mountainous outposts near the Pakistan border. There's been little attempt to make them "secured" outposts over the past two years, other than what our guys on the ground have been able to do for themselves. They go out there for 3-4 weeks, and then head back to the more established base for a week. While gone, they are living on MRE's and baby wipe showers, and anything else they were able to procure during their one week on base. Harsh conditions by today's standards, especially when you consider that some of our bases in Iraq and Afghanistan have western restaurants, like Burger King, Subway, Pizza Hut, and even Starbucks.
John: pthththththththth
I am wound up about this, can you tell? hahaha
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/05/memorial-day--1.html
http://soldiersangelsgermany.blogspot.com/2007/10/173d-brave-taliban-rugged-terrain-in.html
And this blog, in general, has covered their tour from beginning to bitter end:
http://tankerbabelc985.vox.com/
Make sure you read her most recent post if you have any doubts as to what I've already said about the conditions these men have endured, or the sacrifices they've made.
Want to help with their coming-home celebration?
http://tankerbabelc985.vox.com/library/post/help-us-welcome-home-the-173rd-2-503-inf-airborne-back-to-italy-in-american-style.html
They are far, far, far from their $125,000 goal. Please help if you can!
And that's not the way to fight a guerrilla war -- not unless you intend to lose it.
Actually, if you read, they were in another post a little way up the mountain, but it was continuously attacked as well. I believe they just moved to this post and were building up the basics including an observation tower that was incomplete. Further, if I read the story correctly, that incomplete tower was where a number of casualties were experienced. Our men were trying to keep the high ground and spot the enemy for the men on the ground, the artilery and the air assets.
So, yes, the post was "incomplete" by the general standards expected of an outpost.
Further, I do not expect that we can build much better there as there is a noticable lack of water along with any other amenities. Whoever stays there will be living a very harsh existence in order to be the furthest and pointiest tip of the spear. Lest we plan to blow off the top of a mountain and pump in a man made resevoir. These men are literally clinging to the side of the mountain.
I might point out that one of the issues here, also sotto voce in the article, was that the position in relation to the village was so "new" they had as yet to establish any extensive contacts or "intelligence" there which left them very blind. The enemy, however, had very good intelligence to know that the new outpost was there, its incomplete condition, its small garrison and, what's more, that they had as yet to establish any knowledge of the area or occupants, giving the enemy a short window of opportunity that they exploited.
It is all very sophisticated, really. That should give us an idea about the type of forces and commanders the enemy has moved to the area. And, the fact that they put so much importance on over running this post in that area in that time.
But you gotta provide security somehow over time, Chief. If an outer bastion strategy gets you that, why not do it? If you play an inside and outside game(like having Norm Nixon and Kareem Abdul Jabbar on the same team) where the inside guys take care of the stragglers while the majority are out in the hinterlands(the outside guys) doing interdiction stuff where's the flub? I'm not saying you're wrong, like I'm qualified to say that anyway, I'm just picking you brain as to why this is a bad strategy.
Despite the possible propaganda points scored, this does prove how resilient even an outpost is when properly supported.
Geo- plenty of stories of fights like this from Vietnam, too. Exactly like this, in many respects.
Respect the propaganda points. It worked for Ho Chi Minh.
Having a strongpoint is fine, as long as long as you can keep the other guys out of it when they hit it, and then you need gunships to roll the bad guys toward a kill zone and to whack them when they're breaking contact. I know gunship tactics and I know Apache tactics -- the Apache isn't a gunship, it's an anti-tank platform. In broken terrain, you need to do diving fire, because the opposition will be hunkered down behind boulders and using gulleys as trenches and reverse slopes as massing / movement areas. Apaches don't *do* diving fire -- they're long-range direct fire platforms.
With friendly forces on the ground, even the APache helicopters might be deemed expendable if you could capture or annihilate the whole force. Pilot crashes also will be easier to evacuate out if land forces can maintain some kind of superiority.
It seems like these outposts are being pushed out in order to check or engage the enemy.
With the recent Taliban execution of people that they claimed were serving as prostitutes to a Western base (I'm not sure if they said Western or American, I suppose it would make a big difference), I'm curious about the state of local relations in these remote villages.
To what extent will our forces mobility and security be sabotaged if the locals are forced to betray us? And to what extent, if any, are we able to entrap Taliban forces if we do acquire the loyalty or trust of the locals.
Afghanistan seems like a big mountain range, so there's not a lot of people seemingly scattered about like in Iraq, the Fertile Crescent.
Course, the Russians would have been overun. Ditto the French or Germans. ROE or what not by my guess. Air support most definitely. French once said their air support won't obey American requests without going through French officers for clearance or something.
The fact that the Taliban can't even overrun an outpost, says something about their relative lack of open field power. But it also says something about our inability to pursue them and annihilate their forces once they are in retreat.
I wished we could acquire 100% casualties on the Taliban side after they launch one of these attacks.
I just read Bill's last comment and it makes sense concerning the Apache. The only thing it has that could kill infantry in large sustained numbers is that chaingun and it only has like what, a limited ammo supply?
A-10's are good, but they aren't exactly fast response helicopters. The good thing about helicopters in mountains is that you can launch from anywhere you have a pad and supplies.
So when's the Army going to make a gunship helicopter that can spew out death for hours on end without returning to base?
They run in, make as many casualties as possible and then leave. Whatever forces are injured or killed are expendable to them so long as they can inflict casualties of more than one in a spectacular attack.
You know all the civilians back home are gasping with the news of so many casualties in one fight in one little rinky dink village. It isn't the actual fight that mattered anyway. it was the planning and execution of the attack with the resulting free press coverage that mattered.
It is why John cautions about dismissing the propaganda value. I would add, whether that value is counted here or over there.
It had 'em. UH-1Ms and AH-1Fs -- but they're "legacy" aircraft, therefore not sexy enough for combat. The Task Force uses AH-6Js, which is the T-tail version (MD-530) of the Loach we used to stick miniguns on back in the days we stuck machineguns on everything that could move.
The amount of ammo you carry is secondary to the effectiveness with which you dispense it. A small, fast, agile AH-6 with a good pilot and a doorgunner will be able to get in fifty effective shots or several pairs of rockets from directly above while an Apache crew is still working out ballistic solutions. Smaller helicopters make smaller targets, but if you're hit someplace vital, like the tail rotor gearbox, fuel control -- or the pilot -- you're going in. On the positive side, you're probably 300% more likely to survive a crash in an MD-500 variant than in an Apache or a Cobra. On the other positive side, you can buy four AH-1Fs or six AH-1Js for the price of one AH-64D, and, as John is so fond of citing, "quantity has a quality all its own."
John's not doing his Stalin impression, is he?
Quantity only has a quality all on its own if you can actually use all your numbers at once in a combined attack. In this case, that requires intel and foreknowledge. Even if we had the hardware, we would still be helpless and forever in a "defensive crouch" waiting to get hit by the cluebat if we didn't have advance forewarning of Taliban actions.
<B> It is why John cautions about dismissing the propaganda value. I would add, whether that value is counted here or over there.</b>
I had a talk with BillT on the same subject over at Villainous Company. While I have my own prefered solutions to the propaganda Gordian Knot, there wasn't much I could say about that area of an issue given I only read the post here.
I hadn't read the NYTimes propaganda piece when I used the word overrun. To me, being overrun means you are getting pushed out of your defensive positions to the point where you have no fallback. Whether the Taliban intended to hold that outpost or piece of dirt was immaterial to whether they could push American forces back with enough casualties that American forces could no longer sustain an effective combat force in that specific area.
Sooner or later, a unit is going to run out of bullets or bodies if people keep attacking them. But in this case, that didn't happen. Which, the New York Times finds troubling and wants everyone else to find troubling as well. Yes, it is something to be sad about and something to make us ashamed of our people that they could not be overrun by a Taliban surprised attack which inflicted "One Fifth" fatalities on US soldiers. Or they meant we should be sad that US outposts are so lightly defended against courageous and daring Taliban forces. Either way, the New Yrok Times is like the Taliban in Pakistan. We know we should go and hit them to obliterate them, their logistics, and what not. But there's something blocking our way. A genkai or limitation. Sort of like the critical mass limitation that prevents a chain reaction in a nuclear fission thingie.
When the media says "overrun", I tend to think they mean "kill a bunch of Imperialist pigs that'd sooner we see dead than victorious". But that's just me, other people's views might differ.
Btw, I was wondering about the organization tables of these things.
<B>The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation was under way.</b>
I was under the impression that a platoon was somewhere around 33 people and a squad is 8 people, with 2 fireteams of 4. Now given such organization tables, why is the Afghan soldiers missing like a squad and the Americans seemingly being reinforced by an extra squad?
Did they prefer to have the heavy weapons squad be in the American sphere while the Afghans were more used like light infantry, or was it the other way around?
In that respect, I believe there's some potential to use the media to our advantage on this. We know the AP and New York Times are connected to the Taliban, directly or indirectly. If we can figure out the links specifically, we might be able to acquire locations on Taliban forces or perhaps leak information to the stringers and local AP allied propagandists. Given that the Talibancarry such attacks out for propaganda value, getting a lock on the propaganda sources they use and carry with them, could be a good way to figure out in advance what their next target will be. And if we figure that out, we can offer them the perfect target, complete with counter-ambush in place. And if the AP stringer dies in the process.. ahh well, shit happens in war I suppose.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20080711.aspx
Man, one might almost forget that we had "any" allies in Afghanistan. There goes the media's lies and butt plug claims about America needing "international support". Why? Cause there are NO other people in Afghanistan but those 30k US Troops!
I suppose we tried to tell the media we didn't need useless NATO people like France or Germany, that would take up our budget and logistics but provide no fighting capacity, but I think they kind of ignored us as cro-magnons.
Something, I think, we know, but cannot say about gathering intelligence.
But isn't there a difference between, say tactical and strategic mobility? I'm not saying do a Khe San as fly trap attrition deal. I kinda think we're talking about the same thing. Bastion may have implied building forts everywhere and hunkering down to tempt the enemy into coming at them to die in great number, but that just leaves the initiative with the other dude. Nicht gut. Ridgway proved to me the importance of maintaining contact thru active patrolling. Yet, on the level of conflict I'm comfy talking about(Dude, I'd never deign to try to tell you tactics---not since I've grown up a tad in the last 3 years. I'm not *that arrogant* anymore. I'm kinda trying for aufgatragst..... (whatever the phrase is in German)) it still works out as a bastion/barrier to enemy crossing with inside folks to deal with leakers, CA stuff, infrastructure building, and policing---the Galula and Nagl jobs, essentially, don't it?
"They run in, make as many casualties as possible and then leave. Whatever forces are injured or killed are expendable to them so long as they can inflict casualties of more than one in a spectacular attack"
Kat, this is why I keep cringing whenever someone makes an overly big deal about stability in Iraq. One big body count shows that to be 'a lie'. Mao's 4 dicta come to mind.
Which is why developing robust ties to The Media is important in modern conflict. Maybe one side is going to have to bite the bullet and bend a little to get some play with the other. I don't see the High and Mighty Intelligentsia doing it, so, that kinda leaves it to....
Germany? I think a) they've got a serious constitutional problem(honor NATO treaty or be literalist on our 'no offensive warmaking' plank. b) they've got serious problems with the will of the people over there. We did kind of sort of shaft them with the initial invasion of 'Stan, and then Iraq is really unpopular with them. I don't give Germany as much slack since there's nothing I've heard about their military having suffered serious long term neglect like I have about France though.
But, dude, don't dis our Canuck buddies. They're there. I'm glad they're there. And they carry their own weight. (I believe in Combined too, John. What's the colo(u)r code for that since Joint is purple?)