FORT RILEY, Kan. — Standing next to a screen illuminating a long list of tips, Maj. Anthony Nichols looked out at the classroom of neophyte military trainers and began a lecture about the ways that fellow soldiers will look down at them while they serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Other soldiers will call them "undesirables," sent in because they had no other place on the battlefield, the instructor said. Some units will kick military advisers out of security briefings. One recommendation: to "patch swap," carry alternative military insignia for their uniforms so they can pretend to be members of other units. It will help them get supplies and equipment more easily. Or at least more respect.
"I came armed with a stack of patches. . . . Who am I going to be today?" Nichols said about his time in Iraq.
Actually, I think I've read that last "patch" comment somewhere else, but it wasn't from an MA. I think it was from an FOB dweller, but his reason was the same: no respect.
Gates recently talked about insuring that military personnel with unconventional resumes would be given as much attention and room for promotion as any who followed the conventional career paths. Gates was not just talking out the side of his face, he actually put it in motion by bringing Petraeus back to over see the promotion board for the next set of generals. He's quoted retired Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl who wrote about a permanent Army Advisor Corps (complete with tab) of about 20,000 for America's future "wars" where, as Gates and Nagl puts it, we will augment our security, not by fighting every war ourselves or by ourselves, but with the assistance of allies in the country or region.
But, as Kaplan noted in this piece last year, it was tantamount to declaring war on the military brass. Not just the brass, though, it will be military culture that will have to change. It isn't just about inter-service rivalry. Every unit promotes the idea that it is the best in order to push their personnel to be the best. That typically goes towards general harassment and feelings of superiority as well as a sense of privilege among some.
Part of the issue is about "chain of command" concepts. The military operates on a strict adherence to command structures. This is ostensibly to maintain control and eliminate, as much as possible, any confusion in orders, priorities and expectations. In a complex battle situation, with war raging all around, the simpler the command structure, the less confusion and the more likely an operation will come off successfully.
This can also cause a somewhat stagnated and moribund adherence to old structures and ideas that can lead to disasters. Think of it as the "Charge of the Light Brigade" in the face of massed artillery behind a redoubt or massed infantry charging out of trenches across wide spaces covered by machine guns, artillery and snipers of the enemy in World War I. Or, the Maginot Line fortress defenses being built as Germany created the machinery and doctrine of "blitzkrieg".
Or, as John Gates (no relation to Secretary of Defense Gates) wrote in a paper on the US Army and Unconventional Warfare, the conventional warfare methods of the US army in Vietnam against a guerrilla force. J. Gates notes that the army had gravitated away from 18th century "Captains of War" to the managerial, careerist "professional" military of the 20th century where promotion was set in concrete steps and often had little time or patience for "unconventional"; neither in personnel or in function.
Gates also noted two other complementary ideas. First, that the command structure in Vietnam was confusing and more representative of an inverted pyramid with more decisions being made from offices and officers (or, in some cases Pentagon and Oval office) far away from the battlefield. The type of autonomy officers get in their areas today was unheard of fifty years ago. The second issue was that such decision making cycles and chains stifled creative thinking and resolution. In the case of Vietnam, Marines who were conducting CAP (civil affairs patrols), living within villages and doing what is now associated with COIN, were eventually redirected to active, mass operations, abandoning the villages and the likely most successful strategy.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, the idea of counter-insurgency was a dead subject by most commanders who preferred the Powell Doctrine: get in, smash the enemy and get out. It had to go the long way around to get to where it is today. And, the same thing nearly happened in Iraq: we nearly lost the war for want of a unified counter-insurgency strategy.
Also in Iraq and Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, military advisers occupy a nebulous "tween". They are attached to one command, but reliant on many to do their jobs. They have to fight for the things they need because the Army, right or wrong, focuses first on supplying their own needs and supporting their own operations. Transition teams with advisers to allied units don't always have the support, supplies or money necessary to do what they believe is necessary to develop their AOs.
In terms of being "chased out" of briefings, it is about a myriad of things that include command structure, operational necessity, a fear of disruption, a fear of lost security and, finally, sometimes about hoarding control. The power of an adviser truly comes down to "how to influence people and make friends". This concept and nebulous position of the military adviser does not necessarily win him or her accolades among those who live, and die, by the command structure.
Nagl's idea about an advisor corps might have some merit, but that corp will still have to learn to live and operate with the rest of the army when both types of operations are being conducted. Nagl suggested a "combat advisor" tab to designate these men from others, much like special forces or other specialized units. This may go someway towards mitigating the lack of respect or appreciation among the rank and file, but, what is most likely to earn these service members respect will be the successful build up and transition to the Iraq government and its armed forces. Along with the concurrent reduction in other military "combat" personnel from the country.
Some of that will only occur while "combat advisers" are actually out in the field getting shot at along with their indigenous forces (which is happening now). The rest of that respect may only come when the military comes to grip with its dual role as a peace breaker and a peace maker.
Maybe it will only come when they accept "unconventional warfare" as an actual doctrine of war instead of an aberration.
Interesting that we didn't look down on the advisors in RVN. We understood the job they were doing and gave them whatever support they needed, whenever they needed it, and we (and they) got downright creative in our thinking.
Casting advisors as outsiders isn't a result of combat-unit esprit, or autonomy or decision-making cycles or hoarding information, it's the result of people being arrogant and stupid.
Medved must be reading you.
I got barred from a "Top Secret" briefing once. As I was walking out, an NCO whispered, "Who are you, anyway?"
I whispered back, "I'm the guy who's gonna be flying the mission. See ya out at the aircraft."
You always have the best stories, BT. Kind of reminds me about waiting in the lobby of our corporate office for an hour for somebody to come and get me (for security reasons, you had to be on the list and have an escort). Chic gets down to the lobby and says, "Sorry it took so long. Everybody is in a meeting."
I said, "I know. I'm supposed to be giving the main presentation."
Well, either some folks read here or great minds think alike. Kind of cool though, to see it taken public.
In the CF, the guys and gals who live and work out of the FOBs are pointy-end. FOBs are austere, and just a place to bunk on those rare nights when you're not actively patrolling. This is FOB Sperwan Ghar in Kandahar.
It's the soldiers who never step foot outside the wire at Kandahar Air Field who get razzed by those who do.
My thoughts, being a simple civilian, sometimes wonder into: why don't we have a battalion in the brigade or a company in a battalion, etc, that is built specifically as a "transition team" or "advisors"? Kind of like how you have infantry, artillery, mech, mobile, medical, etc, etc, etc. All the tools, so to speak to do every war, whatever that war may be. Then it would be up to the commanders to use that tool effectively in their AO, bring it to the front or push it to the back depending on the conditions in their AO.
That is basically what we are doing now. Of course, what that means is that some commanders would have to learn to do both "smash and dash" as well as "unconventional" in order to make good decisions. I think anothe problem would be, as we see with this report and can extrapolate, what program takes precedence and when? How to organize the activities of other units around either concept when it is being used?
Again, problems we already experienced the last eight years. One of the things that might help is that, yes, there are going to be some up and coming Btn and Co. Commanders who will be up for promotions. They will be the new stratosphere who will already have this type of "unconventional" warfare decision making: combat operations three blocks away while hosting a tea party with the local sheihk.
I think we will see that "resistance" fade at the mid level somewhat, but senior officers are going to go kicking and screaming.
In all honesty, our guys are learning to do this now, it just takes time. But, what I see is that these divisions, bts, etc, are going to have to learn how to use their artillery and heavy mech differently. Security v. smash and dash.
They are definitely resistant to assimilating COIN as a doctrine of operations and training.
They have a rather good reason to do so. COIN is another way of saying "use insurgency tactics". The Army would have to refuse to use their superior firepower and conventional forces if they were to use "insurgency" tactics. Because you can't use insurgency tactics to any great effect if you are the one with the superior firepower and strategic/tactical position.
There's no way you can use hit and run attacks while at the same time using occupation tactics. Those two things are mutually exclusive.
One seeks to occupy and protect the status quo, the other seeks to disrupt and disaggregate the status quo. The Army has always prefered the take and hold philosophy, with the Marines dong the "take and keep on going" philosophy. Thus the Marines often have more of a use for insurgency type tactics that focus on mobility, hit and run, and situations where the Marines are outnumbered or eclipsed by the firepower of the enemy, than the regular Army. At least on the local tactical level.
For the Army to truly adopt COIN in their minds and hearts, they would essentially have to fight like weak people. Weakness can mean different things. The Marines, due to their lack of numbers and certain logistical constraints, can be seen as "weak" and less numerous than the regular Army, but it also means the Marines are stronger in esprit de corps across the board and are able to think outside the box because the Marines can't rely on superior numbers to win battles. This translates to, weak people use more nasty cloak and dagger type deception operations in order to turn the strong's disadvantage against them. The US Army is the strongest army in the world. They will not become weak forces voluntarily unless somebody forces them to, in war or politics. Usually, it's a good idea to have the upper hand, but the disadvantages are obvious. When you're the Top Dog of the world all the time, you start to lose sight of how to fight people stronger than you, and that means you lose touch with civilians and innocents, who always must fight those stronger than them.In situations where the Army cannot achieve victory with the tools of superior firepower, either because they can't use them or they don't wanna use them or they would kill their allies if they used them, the Army will have problems fighting as the weaker army when their entire tradition has rested upon strategic superiority in strength.
My thoughts, being a simple civilian, sometimes wonder into: why don't we have a battalion in the brigade or a company in a battalion, etc, that is built specifically as a "transition team" or "advisors"? Kind of like how you have infantry, artillery, mech, mobile, medical, etc, etc, etc. All the tools, so to speak to do every war, whatever that war may be.
It just doesn't work like that from my study of history. The kind of esprit de corps and training it takes to make an army or unit useful requires training and experience. Nobody can be experienced in "everything", after all.
Even the Romans, who had centuries of military experience, still ended up using local auxiliaries rather than their own archers and heavy cavalry. Why? Because the locals were fracking better horse archers and kataphract archers than the best Rome could ever produce. Although for kataphracts, they had to copy the Persians and the Persians never did sell their services for gold to the Romans. At least, not to my knowledge.
So it is only when you literally cannot get a certain type of unit for a certain type of role, that any army starts developing their own forces in that vein.
A nice example of the dichotomy between how strong and weak forces fight is this.
There are certain qualities that criminals, the OPFOR in this little scenario, looks for in their victims. Many of their victims are women, but some are men as well depending on certain cues. Criminals are detered from using too much violence or taking out too many victims because they never know when they will encounter somebody armed with the knowledge of true violence or even an additional tool of violence such as a knife (What a Marine used to defeat 3 teenagers, one armed with a sawed off shotgun, also killing the ring leader, who was a girl) or even a firearm.
What this means is that the people that are able to defend themselves, cops and citizens knowledgeable in the field of dealing death out to others, are often NEVER targeted. Cause criminals KNOW not to target these people by instinct. And the ones that don't... often die.
But what if not everyone is strong like that? Then what we have is an occupation situation where the government forces are well protected and safe from the OPFOR, but the civilians and those that don't know how to fight, are not.
Then what good is security forces when they are safe, but the people they should be protecting aren't? And how will security forces attack the OPFOR when the OPFOR purposefully evades those with the power to kill them?
The only real way to break through this little Catch 22 is for strong people to appear weak. To essentially create Q-Ships. Women who look like weaklings but can kill assailants on a dime or are backed up by extremely heavy firepower.
But guess what, often the official forces like the cops, don't want people like women to be armed and capable of killing assailants. The cops want to solve things by putting criminals in jail, after the bodies have been left to be cleaned up by the cops, that is.
The victims, however, don't want to have their bodies cleaned up after the fact. They don't want Coalition forces coming in with bombs or house to house searches "after the fact" of a terrorist attack. And when you disarm the population and prevent them from ensuring their safety, and you can't provide them security yourselves, then the population starts turning on you if they haven't already.
Mao's natural terrorist forces always prefered the strategy of attacking the occupation, in order to motivate the occupation in committing atrocities on the local villagers because they can't find Mao's forces. This provides more recruits for Mao, at the expense of some villagers. Good trade off for people like Mao.
It's one thing to have this happen cause it can't be avoided when fighting the occupation. But Mao, if I recall correctly, did this on purpose.
Fundamentally, any forces with an upper hand on the situation, must first recognize that they are in fact weak and should act like weak forces in the face of superior enemy forces, before they can start patching up the weak spots in their armor.
Even "strong armies" must think like that, unless they want to become a scattered and defeated army.
An Army's strength has never been in numbers or technological or qualitative strength. It has always been in the minds of the officers and enlisted.
It takes a special kind of deceptive thinking for people that are strong, to purposefully go out to look weak in order to attract attacks by criminals and terrorists.
That is the kind of thinking the US Army has been learning in Iraq. That it is not dishonorable for the strong force to use deception and appear weak, in order to take advantage of terrorists and what not. That it is not dishonorable to stab enemies in the back, given that those enemies are purposefully targeting women and children, targets that cannot fight back at all.
Think about US Submarines. Think about US carriers. In all those cases, they were seen as assassins, dishonorable wretches, or what not. The "status quo" leaders scorned such methods, not because they were unconventional, but because these methods were "unfair".
The people that are strong, yet are willing to appear weak, they are the people who realize what war is truly about. War is about winning, and America's wars have always been about killing enemies of humanity, not about fighting things according to the "rules". Laws have a purpose, but wars aren't about laws.
The people that wanted to have a battleship vs battleship fight, have lost sight of what the war was all about when they had carriers that could kill a battleship from afar with minimum losses. It wasn't about fullfilling their egos or doing what "has always been done". It's about protecting the people you have a duty to protect. And if that means using 'assassins' and 'bullies" underwater to take out 'defenseless' merchant ships... well, then so be it. Many people won't like it, but then again, wars aren't supposed to be "liked".
To a certain extent, superior military forces became superior because of tradition and esprit de corps. They have an inner pride in how they do things, which keeps them fighting when all seems lost. This is a good thing. But that kind of respect for tradition and esprit de corps have costs as well. The US Marine Corps were the last service to integrate and only did so because of Truman's orders after WWII. But the US Marine Corps, once they adopted the tradition of having blacks fight on equal terms with whites, are now the greatest preponents of equal opportunity. Both, were consequences of esprit de corps and tradition.
Regardless of what the military has or has not learned, what will always remain true in warfare is this.
What works is what will be adopted as official policy, tactics, and strategy. The people who don't adopt such things, will die.
<B>why don't we have a battalion in the brigade or a company in a battalion, etc, that is built specifically as a "transition team" or "advisors"?</b>
In point of fact, if you want a real battalion that acts as a transition, what you want would be called Imperialism. Because that's the only way you're going to do it correctly.
If you want Native Forces to meet your standards in the fastest and most efficient fashion, what you do is to have American NCOs and Officers lead a unit, comprised solely of locals. Then you promote the locals, replace the American NCOs, and even tually the locals, once they have progressed far enough in the career advancement path, will lead the unit themselves as officers and NCOs.
But that means those locals will be paid by America, not their local government. They will be given orders by America, not their local forces.
If you do it any other way, then you are going to hit obstructions, both from your own forces (who are fixing new stuff up for some local army they don't respect or perhaps even care about) and from the local forces (who sure as hell don't know who you are or whether you can be trusted).
We do have the top motivator as we do own the land and the superior fire power and, at some point, the money in the beginning. But, as our current success shows, it does not remain that way nor did we have to assimilate them into our military.
So, my point is pretty simple: if we do it now "unofficially" what are the hold ups for the "official" implementatin?
Seriously, mech and artillery units have been moved to this phase in the first place and probably would, even in a future with a separate advisor corps or career path. Even if they took me up on my suggestion and created an "advisor" btn.
Of course, you did hit on one point that was interesting and may be why Nagl is talking about a whole separate entity. That being that a company must train in order to be good at what it does. It would be likely impossible to train to every possible culture and language though some basics could be developed (and obviously are if we are doing classes at Ft. Riley). So, a company would be hard pressed to be the specialized advisors for Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Darfur, etc, etc, etc Maybe it would be wiser to have a special group that had different section that did specialize and could quickly develop and implement "train the trainer" to extrapolate their power exponentially.
There are other ways to achieve the same results, but they don't work as fast nor as efficient. There will always be more barriers to the other methods than this one.
There isn't "have to lead their forces" ,it is only the best out of all possible ways. Even training autonomous forces of a sovereign nation, sovereign other nation that is, benefits extraordinary from Americans personally leading local forces. Even if it is 'unofficial".
We don't pay the Iraqi military and we are not their chain of command though we have very strong "influence".
Which is why before Petraeus took over the training of the Iraqis, things were fauked up and nobody even knew about them and certainly the media didn't care. It was a kind of "separate but equal" training. Separate from what the US uses to train Americans, but supposedly "almost as good". It wasn't even almost as good.
The SF have ways to work around such things, but they still have limitations due to their adiser status. They can only advise local governments on policy or training, they cannot just do what they know needs to be done. They are just military advisers and trainers. And unless there's a hot war going on out on a front somewhere, their influence is rather limited.
<B> But, as our current success shows, it does not remain that way nor did we have to assimilate them into our military.</b>
The Iraqis didn't shape up until they were actively led into combat by US forces. There have always been reports that Iraqi police won't do jack unless an American goes with them and leads from the front. This was back in the day, of course.
If you're willing to suffer troop routs and desertions for a couple of years before things get fixed, then yeah, you didn't "have" to assimilate them. But if you want results, now, then 100% assimilation is the solution. If you want half arsed results that still works but takes a little longer, then you do partial assimilation, or unofficial assimilation.
<B>if we do it now "unofficially" what are the hold ups for the "official" implementatin? </b>
The only official status such things were ever given, historically wise, were in Imperial structures, where both military and civil bureaus had men and women ready and able to go into new conquered provinces to setup the military systems and civilian rule of law that they know works, because it works in the Empire.
Another hold up to the official implementation is the political choice made in America for America to not be an Empire. So even though America, historically, has such experiences in Nazi Germany, the Phillipines, Japan, and Vietnam, the "official" result is that these experiences and lessons learned get forgotten. Because America, unlike an Empire, never expects or plans to occupy another naton in the future. Empires, however, do. That is their basic assumption, if the yare expansionist based. America's not expansionist, even though the State admission laws and precedent offer an easy way to annex new territories. America is not an Empire, solely because Americans have de-selected it. In all other aspects, AMerica fits the criteria perfectly.
<B>So, a company would be hard pressed to be the specialized advisors for Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Darfur, etc, etc, etc</b>
The thing about that is that usually when officers complete their official schooling, they then undergo an unofficial schooling by NCO and reality on the actual battlefield.
So who are going to be the mentors of all these people? Somebody's gotta have the institutional knowledge and experience ready to pass onto the next generation, otherwise it just disappears. Sort of why Japan lost in the Marineas Turkey Shoot. They never sent their experienced pilots back to Japan to teach the younglings the tricks of the trade.
Maybe it would be wiser to have a special group that had different section that did specialize and could quickly develop and implement "train the trainer" to extrapolate their power exponentially.
You're talking about a cadre, I assume. A group of people highly trained that knows the subject inside and out. We already have that group of people, they are in SOCOM.
As for whether they can be reassigned to teach the tricks of the trade to a branch of the conventional Army, that's a different issue. A lot of the things SOCOM does is because they are SOCOM and conduct war differently than the regular army. If the regular sends people to SOCOM to be trained, and then those people have to obey Army regulations and commanders versed in the "old way", I'm not sure what will happen.
But, that is where a new division should come in. Train Army people, not SF qualified, at SOCOM, and then have them lead their own division. Make their own traditions, create their own regulations, locally at least.
Petraeus knows the people that can do so. Democrats, however, won't allow the funding because 1. it's not defunding the regular military and 2. it will help America's allies fight our mutual enemies better.
So, once again, we go back to the real original insurgency. The domestic insurgency here in America.
Or, you could call it; "Bill and Bobs' Afghan Adventure". I think it would sell. I'd buy a copy. I really liked the chapter titled "Seargent Shakala and the Hyena of Doom".
I actually made my wife read that. She cracked up!
Thanks for what you did!
Hope all is going well now that you're "back in the world" with your' family.
Cheers!
ChrisP
That was supposed to be "Seargent Shakalaka".
Too much whiskey and too little time.
Cheers!
Chris
Counterinsurgency is not acting like an insurgency. It is using the position of strength in such a way that you are able to separate the insurgent from the people. First, you have to be there, on the ground. Big Army thinks that means going to where the insurgents are massed and attacking them with weapons. While that is certainly part of it, it's actually a small percentage of the real work.
Insurgents, including the Afghan insurgents, do try to goad the bigger force into attacking civilian targets. When the government forces oblige, that helps to separate the people from the government and lean towards the insurgents.
Galula likened insurgents to fish, and the people to the water that they swim in. Big Army likes to go after schools of fish, but is lost on how to handle the smaller groups that blend into the population. The wily guerilla, on the other hand, knows better than to mass unless they believe that there is a direct benefit, like actually being able to defeat a unit of government forces.
Galula also explained that the Army tends to move into areas that are troubled and step on them. The insurgents squirt away from the pressure, leaving only token forces to harrass and let the people know that they haven't abandoned them... remember, the insurgent has an appeal to the people; "we are the good guys, and we are in need of your help. We care about you, but the big guys don't understand or care about you."
That's simplistic, but it gets the gist of it. Part of the counterinsurgent's job is to understand the enemy's message and coopt it; take away the significance of the message. If the message is, "you want jelly beans, and our insurgency will get you jelly beans," then the COIN forces need to start working on getting some jelly beans. Again, simplistic.
That part is particularly difficult when fighting an Islamic "religiously-based" insurgency. How do Kafirs such as ourselves take that high ground? Obviously, we can't. However, there are elements that are perfectly suited to dealing with the other problem that results from stepping on an area.
While that area calms down while the Army is there, the Army's attention is then drawn elsewhere. Insurgents go and become strong where you ain't. So the Army goes there, and then the area you just left descends once again firmly into the sphere of the insurgent.
That's where the police come in. However, if the police had been doing a good job and had the respect of the people, the area wouldn't have been under the sway of the insurgents in the first place. They need to be fixed or replaced. There can be no consistent security on the ground without them.
If Big Army goes after the schools of fish with tuna boats, the local police use the smaller nets constantly in their local areas, then they occasionally need a speargun when they learn of or find where a big fish is lurking. Big Army's SOF are great spearguns... but you even want to leave the indigenous forces with that capability, too.
When the host nation can do all of these things and develop the ability to provide other governmental services throughout their country, the insurgents become irrelevant; as long as you have addressed the concerns of the people that made them support the insurgents in the first place.
Galula pointed out that, while you may have some forces that act insurgent-like (SOF,) that by and large the government needs to act like the government and cannot reduce themselves to the level of the insurgents.
The government needs to basically criminalize the insurgents. "Freedom fighters" are sexy. Mafia thugs are not.
Okay, here's where Big Army has a problem; counterinsurgency is not sexy Audie Murphy stuff, and does not feed the elitism. Killing one or two insurgents once in awhile doesn't add to the unit's legend or prestige, and arresting them counts for even less... in their minds.
The Army doesn't want an advisor corps for the same reason that the Navy resisted submarines. Most naval officers weren't submariners. Most naval officers... especially the ranking ones weren't carrier pilots, either. First, they didn't understand it; second, it threatened what they did know; third, it changed everything.
Giving manuever units a small internal advisor team is like putting a submarine on the deck of a battleship. It sounds neat, but the battleship commander will rarely know what to do with it. He'll use it as a garbage skow or a grocery-getter. The maneuver force commander will do the same thing. The advisors will wind up staffing his TOC at night like the internal red-headed stepchildren.
The DSTB, 82nd Airborne, did a pretty good job of supporting us. They did, on occasion, use it as a hammer to get things done the way that they wanted them done, though.
There needs to be an established mechanism to support the teams in the field. Basic stuff like fuel, food, bullets, maintenance, and housing became big problems fast when our jobs ran counter to the battlespace owner's ideas/taskings/job.
There was one other major issue, but this is long enough and the thread may be dead anyway.