[Armorer's note: Dusty posted this late yesterday, after the bulk of our traffic had passed - so I moved it so the people who come by early will get a chance to see it.]
I'm a little busy right now (got annual sim training and checkride tomorrow and Saturday) but in the FWIW department, sounds like the Top Two just pegged Bob Gates' fun meter. Such is life.
I don't know anything about Wynne but I met Moseley briefly when John Jumper was prepping him at Langley before his assumption of command at 9AF/CENTAF. He's a shrewd and flexible air warrior and air campaign strategist (and his technical expertise is superb) but in the last few years things just haven't been going very well.
From Goldy Goldfien's tripping himself up over the T-Birds to the unscheduled nuke tour, all kinds of "stuff" did precisely what the Wired article said it did, i.e., provided "bureaucratic cover" for Gates' move. This is a backhanded slap at Gates in my opinion. Who needs "cover" anyway? Only a wuss does, and I can't say Gates is one, one way or 'tuther. I doubt it.
The tussle over UAVs has been going on for awhile. Ironically, Jumper was a solid champion of Predator, aggressively incorporating it into day-to-day USAF battle planning and employment in support of the overall combat effort, to say nothing of his near-single-handed internal bureaucratic crusade for its being armed with Hellfires. It's the overall force management joint windmill that the USAF tilted against, much to Gen. Moseley's misfortune. There is an advantage to central management for procurement/development/sustainment economies of scale but it sounds like the Air Force a) didn't make that case very well; or b) got locked into a turning fight with people more influential on who should be in charge and why; or c) dragged its feet on supporting the mission; or d) buffooned the argument for more operator support, or e) a combination of the above.
I hope the reports about Gates saying the "F-22 has no role in the war on terror" was a gross example of taking a quote out of context. (I think/(hope!) it was.)
That is correct, of course, but begs the question, "And, therefore, what...?" This is also true for nuclear sub SLBM platforms, all our nukes, all our heavy combat ground units, all our carrier battle groups, and just about everything associated with responding to a strategic threat from a peer or near-peer competitor, whether it be a direct one or one against our allies...and if you really want to include all their possible uses, against an asymmetrical threat as well.
However, comma, if Gates felt that these guys were not getting with the overall DoD program, if he felt he was spending more time putting out fires that from his vantage point these guys were unnecessarily starting inside and outside the Five-Sided Puzzle Palace, then, well, this makes sense.
They may be wrong or Gates may be wrong. in such cases, the SecDef wins. Game. Set. Match.
Finally, if I were Buzz Moseley, I would sure as hell walk out the door with head held high. From what I know of him, he's a good man, a fierce fighter and can fly the shite out of an airplane. I'm sure there are people in the Air Force who would disagree and are glad to see him go--this is a byproduct of that thing called "command," something that precludes you from being universally loved. He has done more good for his country than most, and that includes many senior elected officials--I'm talkin' to YOU Murtha!
P.S. I could go on about this, but like I said I'm a little busy. I did however enjoy the suggestion in the Wired article comments--"They should take the opportunity and as quietly as possible, fold the AF back into the Army." Now THERE'S some forward thinking! (Original, too. Heh.)
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