
Army Capt. John Williams (left to right), commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), observes the hill top while Army Staff Sgt. William Randall, HHT, directs Army Sgt. Shawn Seymour,a M-240B machine gun operator in HHT, during Operation Mountain Highway II April 27 in Nuristan province, Afghanistan.
By Army Staff Sgt. Brandon Aird173rd ABCT Public Affairs
NURISTAN PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Soldiers from 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (Airborne) and Legion Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), teamed with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Border Police to conduct Operation Mountain Highway II in eastern Nuristan province, Afghanistan recently.
Operation Mountain Highway II started April 22 when Soldiers from International Security Assistance Force and the ANA simultaneously air-assaulted at night onto three mountains above Gowerdesh Bridge.
Afghan and American Soldiers created Observation Posts Mace, Hatchet and Brick, which enabled the ABP and ANA to drive up from the south and seize the Gowerdesh Bridge April 26.
“It was very in deft synchronized air-assault to get everybody in,” said Army Capt. John Williams, commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (Airborne). “Over four months of planning was put into this operation.”
During the four-month planning phase, ABP were retrained on weapons, vehicle searches, first aid and reacting to contact, said Army Capt. Kafi Gwira, an ABP embedded tactical trainer from Chicago. The ABP were also issued new uniforms, weapons, ammunition and equipment for the operation.
“We got them ready to seize the bridge for good this time,” said Gwira. “The ABP will now maintain a presence at the bridge at all times.”
The ANA built three local observation posts near the bridge during the first few days of the operation, which were handed over to the ABP a few days later.
“The reason why this bridge is so critical is that its one of the last ones left for insurgents to use,” said Williams. “If they can’t use the Gowerdesh Bridge, this severely limits their capabilities in this area.”
According to Williams the bridge is part of a route used by insurgents to travel from Pakistan into the interior of Afghanistan.
Last summer, insurgents drove off the ABP and destroyed their security check point. The Gowerdesh Bridge has been a key altercation point between insurgents and Afghan forces over the last year. Numerous fire fights between ISAF and insurgents have occurred near the bridge.
“They need strong positions, which is why we provided the engineers to build the bunker positions at the bridge,” said Williams. “They also needed local OP’s, which we’re building near the bridge. So now, we can see all the area around us. The enemy can’t come here unimpeded like they have been.”
ISAF will continue to operate two of three larger observation posts to support the ABP, but once the bunkers and fighting positions are built the ABP will take over operations at Gowedesh Bridge.
According to Williams, Operation Mountain Highway II is an ongoing operation, but it’s already considered a great success.
“Since we have secured this bridge, we can now bring development to this region,” said Williams. “We can fix the road and bring economic and government development here. The insurgents have lost the upper hand in this area.”

An Afghan National Army soldier carrying a PK machine gun pulls security near the Gowedesh Bridge during Operation Mountain Highway II in Nuristan province, Afghanistan April 27. The ANA, Afghan Border Patrol, U.S. Army and Marines worked together during the operation to rebuild an ABP check point at the Gowedesh Bridge, which was partially destroyed by insurgents last summer.
One of the dilemmas of this kind of warfare. The bad guys only have to get lucky once, you have to be good (and lucky) all the time. And in terrain as cross-compartmented (Army-speak for lots of ridgelines cutting the area into "compartments") as Afghanistan, knocking out bridges can effectively isolate an area, creating a safer (nowhere is *safe* in an era of airplanes and thermal sights) environment for the insurgent to work on the population.
What's key now is - can the Afghan government hold and protect it - with their own troops and police... i.e., will the locals have enough confidence to have the courage to rat out the terrs?
That's the hard, slow work of counter-insurgency.
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