<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
    <channel>
        <title>Comments for MG Lynch, Part III:  Growth and Transtions</title>
        <description>We&apos;re the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost.  All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT,  and KA 2003-2007</description>
        <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html</link>
        <atom:link href="http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1_rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />

        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 03 Aug 2008 15:55:14 Z</lastBuildDate>
        <generator>Movable Type 4.12</generator>
        <language>en</language>
        <copyright>Copyright 2008</copyright>
        <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>

        <item>
            <title>MG Lynch, Part III:  Growth and Transtions</title>
            <description>[Final installment of my interview with Major General Rick Lynch, Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division (MND-C, Iraq). Part I and Part II.] In January when I interviewed the 3ID Chief of Staff, he was obviously concerned about getting help with rebuilding the economy and infrastructure. COL McKnight said, &quot;we are very good at security operations, but other enablers can help us with the economy.&quot; He expressed the need for private investment and expertise, and help with building infrastructure. However, he said he expected to see more of that soon, as things continued to calm down. So, last week I asked...</description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html</link>
            <guid>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 05:34:34 -0600</pubDate>
        </item>

        
        <item>
            <title>Comment from FbL on 2008-05-15</title>
            <description>
                Thanks for all the compliments, guys!  I thoroughly enjoyed this trek through the 3rd ID brass.  It was an education in not only what is happening in their AO, but in everything related to them and their work.  
            </description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-73100</link>
            <guid>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-73100</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 18:50:06 -0600</pubDate>
        </item>
        
        <item>
            <title>Comment from Ledger on 2008-05-15</title>
            <description>
                <![CDATA[<em>I asked MG Lynch if there was anything I hadn't mentioned that he feels is not being heard back home. He replied with intensity, "I continue to find myself frustrated by the idea that the American army is at the breaking point!" He referenced 3ID's record-breaking rate of reenlistment, with fiscal year goals met in March despite having deployed 3 times since 2003 and currently finishing up a 15-month deployment. "But [they are] reenlisting because they believe that what they are doing is important--protecting our freedoms and way of life--in their souls. They believe in the mission, as I do</em>."

This is the MSM filter at work. Or even worse, the MSM in bed with the enemy (they learned a lot from media blitz during Vietnam).

To get the good new out you will just have get stories like this out to the Larger Blogs. You make want to try Pajama Media or certain large blogs for stories like this. Also, it maybe possible to get the Wall Street Journal to carries stories like this. 

Keep up the good work Fbl.
]]>
            </description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-73048</link>
            <guid>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-73048</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 03:44:49 -0600</pubDate>
        </item>
        
        <item>
            <title>Comment from fdcol63 on 2008-05-14</title>
            <description>
                <![CDATA[Great job, indeed, FbL! Very interesting series.

So much sticks out, but this particularly struck me as I read:

<blockquote>" ... This is clearly a touchy subject, as it goes back to the long-running Iraq-related feuds between DoD and State/CIA. ..."</blockquote>

This quote reminded me of an interview that Powerline blog did with Douglas Feith about his new book,  <i>War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism</i>. In it, Feith says:

<a href="http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020415.php" rel="nofollow"><a href="http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020415.php" rel="nofollow">http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020415.php</a></a>

<i>" ... I’ve been doing many interviews about my book in recent days – and I’ve heard from many journalists and others that the book surprises them. It tells a story that contradicts key parts of almost all the major books about the Iraq war."</i>

<i>"For example, it refutes the notion that President Bush came into office determined to go to war no matter what – that the administration refused or failed to consider the arguments against war. In fact, as my book reveals, the most serious analysis of the downsides and risks of war was produced in the Pentagon by Rumsfeld and his top advisers – not by Colin Powell, Rich Armitage, George Tenet or other officials who are reputed to have been the voices of caution."</i>

<i>"My book contradicts the common allegation that Pentagon civilians did not plan for post-Saddam Iraq. It explains what is wrong with the charge that the State Department had a plan that Defense officials discarded. It explains what is wrong with the charge that Rumsfeld and his advisers were dupes of the Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi – and what is wrong with the assertion that we intended to “anoint Chalabi” as the leader of Iraq."</i>

<i>" ... And perhaps most newsworthy, the book explains for the first time anywhere the key postwar plan developed by the administration – the plan for political transition in post-Saddam Iraq. It was a plan developed in the Defense Department – and it aimed to prevent a prolonged US occupation of Iraq. It was a plan to put Iraqis in charge of their own government promptly after Saddam’s overthrow. It was a plan that built on our experience in Afghanistan, where the US overthrew the Taliban regime but did not establish a US occupation government. As I say in the book, it was a plan “which my office drafted, Powell and Armitage tried to delay, President Bush approved, Jay Garner began to implement, and L. Paul Bremer buried. ... ”</i>

As is often the case, we can only imagine the difference that might have resulted if DoD and State had cooperated more fully. And yet again, it appears as though certain people at Foggy Bottom had an opposing agenda.]]>
            </description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-72995</link>
            <guid>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-72995</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 09:00:33 -0600</pubDate>
        </item>
        
        <item>
            <title>Comment from MaryAnn on 2008-05-14</title>
            <description>
                Great interview series, FbL! Well done.
            </description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-72989</link>
            <guid>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/05/mg_lynch_part_i_1.html#comment-72989</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 06:33:26 -0600</pubDate>
        </item>
        
    </channel>
</rss>

