Medina and Lawrence: Trying to Draw Parallels in a Paradoxic Universe

By Kat on May 1, 2008 | | Comments (8)

[Kat]

At Small Wars Journal: Lawrence and his Message

during a bout of illness when even Lawrence’s prodigious reserves of strength were utterly sapped, that he developed his epiphany regarding the route to victory in the desert. Over the course of a few days he developed the guiding principals which helped him bring his Arab forces to the apogee of success. Thus it was not in his abilities as a cultural polymorph, but in the clarity of thought which he brought to the military problem he faced, that we may derive something useful today.

From Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence notes his strategy:

the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that?[snip]

Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind;[snip]

Then I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all this ground, to save it from our attack-in-depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of those hundred thousand square miles[snip]

it seemed they would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. If so, they would need six hundred thousand men to meet the ill-wills of all the Arab peoples,

Bateman goes on to describe Lawrence's ultimate plan:

In earlier operations Lawrence had already demonstrated the vulnerability of the Turkish controlled city of Medina to interdiction of its logistical supply line via the single track railway which ran through the Hejaz desert. His new contribution was to note that, seemingly counter-intuitively, the possession of Medina by a Turkish garrison of some 20,000 was advantageous to British.

In simple terms, the more Turkish soldiers he could force into holding Medina and the Hejaz railway which supplied it, the fewer Turkish soldiers there would be to face the conventional strength of the main British forces.

Read the rest at Small Wars

The final point that Gentile and Bateman jump to is that Iraq has become our Medina. That it serves both the AQ and Tehran's interests to keep us in Iraq.

My response in flash traffic.

1) Lawrence notes, immediately, that he is talking about bedouins and not urban populations. They require something else. Iraq's population is largely existent in urban centers. the problem would have been if we had concentrated only on securing Baghdad (as we did in the beginning) and not any other population centers. Baghdad would have been Medina.

Strangely, though, it turned into Zarqawi's Medina. The why of it is very simple and applies to the greater reason why Iraq and Baghdad are important.

Historically, Baghdad has been the center of the Islamic empire for many more centuries than Istanbul. It has a significance, both historically and ideologically, for any group, be that Al Qaida or Shi'ite Tehran. Much more so for the AQ variety because a good portion of their ideology is based on both real and mythological history. (One reason that they resemble Nazis and their quest for the third Reich).

I would say that, simply put, to lose Baghdad or to never gain it, is to lose Baghdad permanently. For the Salafists, anyway. The Iranians, if they are at all pragmatic, would consider the back door approach through politics and economic ties would give them leverage at a later date to "win" Baghdad.

2) One might note that the Bedouins of Lawrence's time had a significant advantage over, say, foreign fighters. Aside from the fact that they came from the tribes that were banned together, you can't say that the Bedouins drove into villages and massacred all the local people in horrific ways. Unlike, say, the AQ folks or even some of the hold overs from the Ba'ath or their own.

In fact, historically, it's the Turks that are more comparable to the AQ types in that regard. I recall two memorable moments, highlighted in the movie on Lawrence, both circling around the massacre of innocent villagers. One results in Lawrence, et al, attacking a column of Turks and giving back as good as the Turks had given. The second is the Bedouin who charges the Turks by himself. The shiehk explaining that the man was the last of his tribe that was earlier massacred by the Turks.

In short, there are some parallels, but it would take a pick up stick master to put all the pieces in some sort of context from the historical acts of others compared to recent acts to come up with a true comparison.

But, reversing what Bateman said, had the Bedouin set about massacring anyone they thought was even remotely connected to the Turks, threatened any tribe or village that had not joined them against the turks with complete destruction, etc. Would they have received the same protection and been revered as the liberators?

And, if the Turks had, instead of putting their boots further on the necks of the Arabs, in turn protected the populations and tribes from these roving bands of criminal murderers, then we would have had a Mao moment.

You know, where Mao explains that, if a guerrilla army cannot turn itself into an actual army with its discipline and real political concepts accepted by the population, they would be considered roving bandits that prey on the population, not legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the people.

If I was looking for a parallel to Iraq, that would be much closer to reality.

But...

3) Who's Medina is Iraq? Who has to own it at all costs? Many here are certain that it is not the United States. That may be true, but I have rarely, if ever, seen anyone talking about why anyone else, rather AQ or Tehran might need to own Iraq.

In fact, AQ spent a lot of human, material and monetary resources to gain Iraq. To no avail, it would seem.

Does the United States lose out in its long term goals or does it win? I'm not talking about Iraq. I am talking about the long term goal to discredit, disrupt and, ultimately, destroy Islamic terrorism. Or, more succinctly, the Salafist ideology that foments the the kind of terrorism we have been subjected to.

I am not going to say that its perfect or that that long term goal is simply met and succeeded in Iraq, but it is an excellent start.

To round out that comment at Small Wars, AQ has not only made Iraq and Baghdad an ancient historical point of their ideology, but, more recently, in 1998, Osama made Iraq a center of his grievances. When we went there, AQ could not ignore our presence. It became a point of necessity, of proof of their ideological imperative.

They lost. But, equally importantly, whether democratic and free or whatever, Iraq as an ally, friendly to the west, becomes a thorn in the sides of both the AQ and Tehran, even if Baghdad is equally or somewhat friendly to Tehran.

So, in context to our long term goals, whose Medina is Iraq?

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8 Comments

By Fishmugger on May 1, 2008 6:37 AM
Laurence, while a good movie, was not a big stregic ploy. Mostly tactical to pin down as many Turks as possible for two main reasons. One, to keep the Turks off balance after their defeat and retreat at the Canal and two, to syphon off as many troops as possible from the Galipoli front that was quickly becoming a mess. The Brits armed the Arabs with light arms and as shown in the movie light artillery. These were tribes, many different tribes, more interested in finding and controlling water. The Turkish influence on their daily life was not great. Big oil wasn't going to be discovered for another 20 years and France and Britan just replaced the Turks as the overall administrators. That's the way countries controlled markets back then...you took them over. The French, British, Dutch, German (before the war) colonial systems were huge. They controlled commerce both ways and took a slice out of every middle. Our Revolution was more about the ability to sell Cod fish on the open market then having to tranship all catches through a wholesaler in Britain. If while drilling for water they found water instead of all that black goo they didn't want and couldn't use, events for Laurence would have been less then tactical. His main purpose was to screen the canal and keep the Turks off balance, not build countries and empower the Arabs. Just think of what would have happened if the Brits were able to force the Straights and supply Russia and keep them in the war with the Czar in power.
 
By ry on May 1, 2008 1:29 PM
I can't believe I'm even remotely defending this piece by Bateman. Kat, the point of the piece was that Iraq is a tool by which Iran keeps us tied down and wasting resources so we can't go after them or go on the offensive elsewhere. Which is the great failing of the piece since it sets up a different pathway under which a) attacking Iran ends the influence they have in Iraq. Simply realize that they're stinging us along by the nose and shift to the real target, the real head of the snake or b) cutting deals with Iran stops all the nonsense. Which, is rather wrong. Iran's part of the problem, but not all of it. Doing Iran doesn't fix the problems in Iraq for which Iran isn't culpable. But, if you accept that Iran is doing proxy war stuff, then, yeah, he's mostly right. By doing that they tie up massive numbers in a perversion of the '3:1' rule. The rest of it is just nitpicky. The main thrust was US and Iran, not Iraq as itself. Complaining that his analogy isn't 100% accurate isn't going after the central idea, which is the only thing of real consequence here: Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants. They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)
 
By Argent on May 1, 2008 2:13 PM
oo "analogies, not xeroxes" I'm going to xerox that one. I dunno I think Kat brings up a fair point. To the question "whose Medina is Iraq?" I think Iran is not the answer. AlQ and the US to a degree yes but both can afford to loose it and/or could extend their reach further if desired. Pakistan in an odd way maybe. The US' real problem is political which is derived from domestic will. But I have no doubt the US could do more if it was felt to be needed. AlQ has also sunk a lot into Iraq and I don't feel they could say it yields much good for them. However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.
 
By kat-missouri on May 1, 2008 3:06 PM
Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants. They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)
One, he talks about Iran, but very off handedly. I didn't think he really identified who or what equated to "bedouins". Also, yes, I would agree with you, that anology stunk because the bedouins didn't have any fixed assets. Iran does. Thus, you are correct, if we just wanted to stop this nonsense, we could drop some heavy water on Tehran and be done. But, since he didn't really specify who or what (or if everyone) benefited from our being tied up in Iraq, I went down the list of immediate potential beneficiaries and it ends up with two: Iran and AQ. Secondary beneficiaries might be a whole host of nations who have turned Iran into their proxy (like DPRK, Russia, China, etc). But, if you get back to the main antagonists, it's Iran and AQ. Thus, as argent notes my final question: Who's Medina is Iraq?
However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.
I agree, but there is one part that always slips by us when we are talking about the necessities of having to win a particular battle or not and that is where fanatical ideology comes in. Our enemy is sometimes rational and sometimes not. They really do resemble Nazis in the regard that they tie certain strategic necessities to their ideological demands. Baghdad isn't just the place that the US is and where we provide big targets in the form of our military or even where we could be held down and made to spend ourselves stupid. Baghdad and, by extension Iraq, are part of their entire ideology that insists on the re-institution of the caliphate. Now, whether that is plausible or not is neither here nor there, but when their entire ideology is based on real or mythological history, their entire existence depends on their ability to make that ideology a physical and political reality. I believe fully that this reason is the number one reason why Zawahiri continues to tell the would be jihadists that the primary battle front is in Iraq. In terms of the top reasons why I would not want to give up Iraq, that would be #1. When we detroy their history, we destroy their ideology. We are stealing their history right now and they can't stop us.
 
By Grumpy on May 1, 2008 3:23 PM
Kat, it appears to this Very Grumpy Old Vet, you have this thing about finding the most dense briar patch and you walk right through the middle of it. Anybody with any common sense walks around it, but they miss some very important truths, in doing so. Thank you. To get to your subject, my concern with this whole conflict is this. We are starting to look at this conflict as THE model for all modern warfare. This present strategy will work in this region primarily because of the Bedouin Code. This code is not universal, but region-specific. The big thing is to keep a conventional force with a COIN option. You raise the issue of Iran. I believe they are looking at this situation in many ways. They see the Americans in the two countries on its borders, human shields. These conflicts are draining people, money and weapons. This is everything they want, without the grief. The character you want to watch is Sadr. He figures he is playing it smart. He's got his fingers in just enough things that he can control them. Eventually, he'll become the new Saddam. I guess this is just the way things are, and we just need to accept them. Or do we? Kat, did you read the script, as you can tell, I surely haven't seen it. The old Sea Hag, named, "History" may just have a completely different view. For all I know, "History" may show Sadr just "hanging" around off some bridge. I think we have him some 90 year-old spinster virgin school-teachers to have with him for all of eternity. Kat, Thank you, for all your hard work. Grumpy
 
By ry on May 1, 2008 6:35 PM
Actually, I apparently have a very different read of Bateman than you do, Kat(not in the face, not in the face). Bateman *did* say toward the end who the Bedo, Brits, etc are in the last paras I thought. The Brits are Iran(they're benefiting from Lawrence's work), the Bedo are the various insurgents that Iran may/may not be supporting in Iraq(they're the people doing the grunt work as the BEdo were for Britain), and the Coalition forces, mostly the US, are the Turks(who're beeing bled white or dispersed to hell and gone). IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear. So I didn't see you walking into the Briar Patch(as Sir Grumpy did) so much as being really nit-picky as if this were a lit-crit mag or something. So, I'm cornfused as to what you did or didn't see. Maybe i ought to go read it again?
 
By Grumpy on May 1, 2008 7:13 PM
Kat and Ryan, my point about the "Briar Patch" is this, Ryan, you are the same. Both of you, you do your homework and try to deal with some very tough issues. You are both shedding light into some into some very areas. Thanks, to both of you, Grumpy
 
By kat-missouri on May 1, 2008 11:54 PM
IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear.
So, you must wonder why we give them what they want? And, I don't necessarily mean that we leave, but what other options to do we have? I would say that, while they are thinking in the lines of keeping us from physically attacking them, that may never have been in the cards. Or, at least, not in this decade. I may be mistaken, but the point of the strategy to "drain the swamp" was not simply to draw in jihadists and kill them on end. Democracy, freedom. Two borders of Iran, as you pointed out in an earlier post, are now with whole different governments sitting on them. And, all the smuggling does not go one way. Let us not imagine that there is not strategic gain here that has real long term benefits in our total regional or global strategies to change terrorist supporting states. Aren't we always arguing that this is not always necessarily done at the pointy end of a missile?