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MAD Iran: Bloody Apples and Oranges Part I

By Kat on May 30, 2008 | | Comments (5)

[Kat - Part I of a two part rebuttal to the rebuttal]

Having opened the door to a Cold War comparison with "Who Dies First?" and the follow up on Rational State v. Mad Mullahs, it is only fair to respond to Ry's rebuttal: Talking to the Dead.

I'll start with a note that the dead are, indeed, dead and, if they could speak at all, might simply voice the opinion that they would have liked to have lived.

There are certain calculations in war and peace that do, in fact, force us to decide what exactly we can live with as a cost for either. But, in order to make those calculations, we need to understand the starting point. Possibly, even agree on it. That starting point must begin with at least one fact: Iran does not have a nuclear weapon - yet.

[continued in flash traffic]

I find it some what egregious that the argument for learning to live with a nuclear Iran assumes that we must accept that they will have a nuclear weapon or that we should begin our approach to Iran as if they already had one. Why are we precluding the prevention of those circumstances? Even unto military intervention of one stripe or another?

Second, in making that acceptance a center of our approach, we elevate Iran far above its actual current station that is politically, economically and militarily inferior to the United States. I don't mean to imply that it makes Iran less dangerous nor that their capabilities should be ignored nor even that it implies we should take whatever actions we like including immediate military intervention. However, no one has yet to give an acceptable answer as to why we should handicap ourselves and make Iran equal at the negotiation table.

This isn't a sport where sportsmanship demands each participant have an equal start or equal chance at winning the game. This is national survival and the state should seek to have the strongest position possible to insure it can have the most options available in dealing with another state. It is one of the reasons that I eschew the idea voiced by Senator Obama that he would reach out and seek an audience with Ahmedinejad without pre-conditions, thereby, doing exactly that: elevating Iran and Ahmedinejad's political position.

That is exactly what it would be and it would not only give the Islamic Republic cache in its own country, but on the world stage. Historically, every act of recognizing Iran or attempting to negotiate with it has led to Iran insisting they had the upper hand and, very often, rejecting negotiations all together. Believing, if you will, that they have already achieved their goal by a simple act and going forward from there. It's a brilliant political move on their part, but hardly imbues negotiations or "talks" with them with some greater value for us or any other erstwhile supplicant.

One idea is that elevating them may force them to grow up into a rational state and jettison their revolutionary ideas. Much, as was contended, as was accomplished with the USSR. I have to disagree with that considering the current political realities of Iran.

Most people look at Iran and see a state run by religious authority that came to power in the revolution. That is true in so far as the Grand Council still remains the guiding power. Many people also consider these men to be "the revolutionaries" since it was their ideas and leadership in 1979 that overturned the Shah's government.

However, the real revolutionaries were the students and Ahmedinejad was a key member. It is suggested that the Khomeinists had neither expected nor advocated for the taking of hostages at the US embassy and that it was a stand alone plot by the students that Khomeini was forced by circumstances (and possibly good political positioning) to support lest he lose the zealous revolutionary followers. There was and is a split within these revolutionary clerics as to whether they should pursue external revolution or simply concentrate on insuring control of Iran and its continuation as the embodiment of the Islamic idea.

Today, it is these same student revolutionaries who are quietly, and not so quietly, consolidating their power over Iran. They have maneuvered to place supporters on the Grand Council who will pick the next Ayatollah and have "purged" clerical allies from public office. When I say "they", I am speaking of Ahmedinejad and his other "former" Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, many of whom were the original revolutionaries. These men are indoctrinated with the revolution and their responsibility to grow it including outside of the Iranian borders.

These men also consider that the Council and many clergy there have lost their way from the revolution. They believe Iran is being pulled inexorably towards western culture and politics. They mean to re-instate the revolution and stop the slide as they see it. One of the reasons that they do reject open relations or simply talking to the US and others. With the IRGC at the controls, they believe that the clergy will be forced to support them or end up losing power and becoming figureheads under the new revolution.

In a paradoxic twist, the Mad Mullahs may end up being the cautious moderates in the face of a resurgent revolution. That is the issue that plagues the question of who exactly will have control of a potential nuclear Iran. Or whether, as has been suggested, it could be "grown" into a "rational state" a la the USSR. At least in any time that will preclude the deployment of nuclear weapons or any other egregious act.

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5 Comments

By Argent on May 30, 2008 5:54 AM
Man this is like tennis. Ok you have a grande point on the they don't have the nukes yet and what is can mean. However, your arguments from the beginning have been on the basis of when they get them. And they will, they know their survival depends on it nationally and personally. Of course there's here and now negotiation tactics but the fact is Iran and the US are not negotiating so it's irrelevant. Iran needs them the US demands they not have them. The scope for talks is really small. On this basis the US either takes non-talk action or does not. So far it has not. I'm not so sure I'm with you on Ahmedinejad being more extreme. Can you back this up?
 
By AW1 Tim on May 30, 2008 7:33 AM
Kat, I am squarely in the camp that takes the position that Iran cannot be allowed to possess nukes, no matter the cost. The cost to accept a nuclear-armed Iran is too great for civilization, let alone the United States to bear. I reject your consideration of the governing powers of Iran as rational actors. They have yet to demonstrate any rational diplomacy. rather, they continue to ejaculate inflammatory rhetoric and pronouncements aimed primarily at Israel and secondarily at the west. They continue to reject the concept of Human Rights and are well on their way to stripping both Universities and all libraries of any western influence through mass book burnings. Iran is the world's leading state-level sponsor of terror, funding Hamas, Hezzbollah, and helping to train thousands of foreigners in nefarious means to use against the west. On that last basis alone, we must conclude that Iran seeks nuclear weapons in order to carry it escalated attacks against the west, especially Israel and the United States. We must listed to what Iran is saying and take them at their words. We cannot do less, because to do less is to follow the same course that permitted Hitler to take power and start the conflagration of WWII. Everyone believed Hitler wasn't serious. No one wanted to take him at his word(s). Governments everywhere considered his actions and speeches and propaganda as just politics, just sabre rattling and nothing more. Iran is acting in the same manner. Iran is stating plainly it's intentions and is rapidly arming itself to carry out those intentions. We decline to take action at our own peril. And yes, I am well aware of the risks and costs associated with such a move on our part. My own son leaves for basic in 2 week's time.
 
By Barb on May 30, 2008 10:40 AM
"We decline to take action at our own peril." I agree, and I worry that the administration doesn't appear ready to take that action. I fear that we don't have the will to take action, and that worries me.
 
By ry on May 30, 2008 11:11 AM
I find it some what egregious that the argument for learning to live with a nuclear Iran assumes that we must accept that they will have a nuclear weapon or that we should begin our approach to Iran as if they already had one. Could it be because, well, everyone that actually has a nuclear power program can turn out a working device in 30-90 days? Japan, S. Africa(though they abandoned, they could go back quickly), one of the Viking country nations(forget which, but their whole program is deterrence by proxy), India(remember all that rumbling about how US help would mean proliferation? That wasn't just talking out of one's butt.), etc. If one accepts that Iran has nuclear power one also accepts that they have, at least in potential just like Japan, nuclear arms. Period. Them's the facts. Why are we precluding the prevention of those circumstances? Even unto military intervention of one stripe or another? I'm not precluding anything. I'm just asking if it's smart and in our favor to buy cantelope for $9 of for $2, so to speak. Why pay more for something when I can get the same damn thing for a whole lot less. (But, apparently, that means I'm insane and not serious.) Second, in making that acceptance a center of our approach, we elevate Iran far above its actual current station that is politically, economically and militarily inferior to the United States. Or, perish the thought, alternatively, we could actually be accepting the reality on the ground: they are Numero Uno in the ME militarily and all that comes with it. We can start down a path of muscular confrontation, and all that that entails, or we can take a cheaper path that gets us to the same spot, accepts the facts on the ground, and takes a little longer. This is national survival and the state should seek to have the strongest position possible to insure it can have the most options available in dealing with another state Exactly, which is why you're talking out of your butt about detering them from obtaining nuclear weapons. It's the great equilizer. It's the only way they could ever really accept security garauntees from us or anyone else in the West. They've taken Teddy Rex to heart. They cannot be talked out of it, they can't be intimidated out of it, no economic carrots are going to be enough since for them it's national survival on the line. You're a bit off with the initial Ayatollah, too. The Pasdaran aren't only the Iranian SOF, but also the Gestapo or the internal security forces of the USSR for the Mullahs. They don't like you, the Padaran makes you disappear. If Ahmedinejad and his rabble rousers were as powerful and a threat to the Mullahs like you claim he'd be dead. He's the Tragedian in Lewis' The Great Divorce. His chain gets shaken and he does his little monkey dance. In a paradoxic twist, the Mad Mullahs may end up being the cautious moderates in the face of a resurgent revolution. Nothing paradoxic about it. They understand that they are a nation-state, and have been since Jimmy decided to negotiate instead of replanting the Shah as gov't head(and, it's kind of hard considering that doing so would've given the Sovs good reason to get involved to support friends like the IRC who talked a "Liberation Islamism" line at the time). They've got Great Power concerns. They know what's up(and the guerilla warfare is a tool of great powers. That could be holding us up so that a Shia majority secures the Iranian left flank, and not some bit of Revolucion! idoelogy spreading as previously contended.). I fear that we don't have the will to take action, and that worries me. It isn't will. IT's resources. It's also brains. This may or may not be the best play. Far more serious study needs to be done before one makes this call. Whether one's kid is in it or not. YOu cannot forget the scale of misery you're unleashing here. If we can avoid that while still getting our way, predominately, why not? Mussolini was right in that blood is the grease of history's wheels(it was said slightly differently in the play Major Barbara too) it's a question of how much, not if. Which was J's point from the other day, by and by.
 
By kat-missouri on May 30, 2008 1:59 PM
Because the $2 canteloupe is rotten.