My response, which I have copied from my post at The Torch, to the Canadian logistics post:

One problem that leaps out of this discussion is that in the absence of a price system people resort to gaming the rationing system by declaring everything high priority, and then creating a parallel economy of favors owed and due actually to move things.

What I would like to see would be experiments with an auction system in which units would get monthly allocations of points to bid for cargo slots. Supply personnel could then decide which supplies they were requesting were sufficiently high priority to warrant large expenditures of points, and which were not.

Models (examples) of such systems exist. They are not perfect nor magic bullets, and require continuous refinement, but the current way of doing things is not working that well either.

Scroungers are doing what scroungers have always done. There's a reason why it's such a valued unofficial skill in the military.

There's also a reason most units squirrel away excess parts instead of turning them in. There's always pressure from On High to turn in excess so that it may be re-issued to units that need an item "Just In Time."

What actually happens is that the excess is centrally-warehoused until some bean counter decides that it costs more to warehouse the items than to purchase them new, so the items are auctioned. Kicker is, the new items never get ordered in the quantities needed, when they're needed.

Our maintenance officer got tired of waiting for The System to send an AH-1 pressure gauge we'd needed for two months and found one at an Army-Navy surplus store five miles away -- still in the factory packaging, sitting in a box labeled "Army Vehicle Parts"...

Challenge? That was a challenge? I thought you were just making a snarkily-accurate observation about modern politics.

Now that I know that's a recipe from Stalin, it's just darn scary...

SOrry FuzzyB, I'm going to have to dissent on the hit Iran thing. Sure, NAvy and AF are underutilized and can rain down death like nobody's bussiness in this. The question is, what does it get us? Not much, not enough that justifies the costs. Doing it all air as an attempt to force political change is going back to LeMay and Harris theory of strategic bombing, and that stuff was outlawed for good reason since it didn't work the way they thought it did while racking up a goodly number of civilian casualties. All that's old is new again. Look at airguy's comments at Lex's. That's scawwwy.

I've seen Gahlran's link before. J over at Armchair had it last week. We've seen these ratchet ups before. They happen yearly, sometimes twice yearly, and many times are part of a rotation, but not always. I think it's more rattle than preperation for rumble. It could be a set-up for hitting things like IRG training cadre and bases near the Iran-Iraq border but the Full Monty is not happening.

Barnett's saying it too. I think they're all wrong. It isn't happening. Not on the level people seem to be talking about. Small level raids against IRG stuff? Si. Hitting the nuc sites and other infrastructure to halt nuc program and cause regime change? Not on your life.

I'm with Ry on this - but, since I'm not a strategerist, just an operationalist, I admit it's outta my bailiwick.

But Lex has some insight on this kinda stuff, from previous experience, so I won't just discount it out of hand.

I just don't see the utility of poking Iran with a stick, big or small, given what I *think* our current posture in Iraq is.

But I'm as likely wrong as I am right on this one.

And the fact that I'm even commenting on it at all means I have *zero* insidery gouge on it.

Has anyone else considered the possibility that the current activity in Lebanon is Iran's way of diverting attention or is in actuality a prelude to something else?

I don't think many of us wants to bomb Iran, especially if we don't have the capability or will to finish what we start.

But I ask these following questions:

1) What are the consequences if the Iranians get nukes?

2) Can we accept or live with those consequences?

3) If not, then what do YOU propose that we do about it, given Iran's past and current support for terrorism, their current proxy war against us in Iraq and elsewhere, their very public threats to destroy Israel and the West ..... and the failure of "diplomacy" and "dialogue" to settle the issue so far?

4) Whatever path we take, what effects will it have? As our recent exploration of alt history shows, there are always Unintended Consequences, and Murphy's Law always reigns.

It's always safest to argue in favor of the status quo. But there are very serious consequences for INACTION as well as for ACTION.

I didn't post those links because I wanted to convince anyone that the U.S. is going to attack Iran, or that it should. I just found them a thought-provoking analysis (Lex's post), a fascinating bit of connect-the-dots (Galhran), and some provocative gossip (Prairie Pundit). Altogether, they make for interesting discussion.

I am honestly very glad I don't have to make the call on this issue because (as Lex laid out so well) there are no good answers.

Not a lot of reality on that top 25 most influential conservatives. Michael Savage with 10 million listeners beggars all but the grand poohbah at the top of the list. Mark Steyn in the top 5 Michelle Malkin number 2? Somebody must have been hitting the bottle.

Influential among... bloggers, Jim.

We're a self-absorbed group, though I think you dis Steyn a bit.

It was bloggers being polled, so of course La Malkin made the list.

I admit, she did *not* make my list.

Getting back to the Iran deal, the posters at the Belmont Club think the naval battle groups heading for Iran are not going to used in the Straits of Hormuz for technical reasons ie., It’s too small for maneuverability of big ships and war games have proven that the Iran speed boats will swarm big ships and damage or destroy them and so on.

I don’t know if this is true. But, I would assume we would have to have some naval power keep the sea lanes open and free of mines and other threats.

If anyone can verify that the US Navy battle groups would be ineffective in the confines of the Straits of Hormuz please speak up.

See: Islands in the stream

Re: Iran

There's a lot to be said about finishing a job before you move on to a new one. I know multifront wars do happen but I don't see them as preferred.

As Ry puts it what does it cost and what is the gain? This also includes a choice not to do it. What are the costs and gains from that? Think and be clear on it. Doing it just because they are a thorn in the side is just revenge politics and it's my firm opinion this isn't any good for anyone.

Ledger - I've been a participant in some of those wargames, at least the ones from the early 00's.

If the Iranians have sufficient small boats with near suicidal crews, it can get ugly pretty fast. Enough so that people got very unhappy with some rule changes and had (I think at least partially justified) public tantrums on the issue.

But in the time since the games I participated in were played out, the Navy has "taken measures" to address that issue.

I have *no idea* of the gamed effectiveness of those measures, however, not being involved in subsequent efforts along those lines, much less their actual effectiveness.

And I rather suspect if I had been, I wouldn't be sharing those results any time soon.

But I think the Navy is well aware of the dangers, and I can think of several things I would do (and that's as a ground-fighter, not a naval warrior with real expertise) to mitigate those risks.

But yanno, there hasn't been a major fleet action since 1945, so it's all a crap-shoot in some regards, anyway. The Navy has been a mobile air and gunnery platform, gunnery especially during Korea, but as for fighting off threats to it's own hulls, it's been a while since the Navy has had to do anything other than game it.

I'm sure they've got plans, but ya always got to be a little nervous about 'em when they haven't actually been tested - except by the Brits in the Falklands, which showed that the lightly- built ships (in comparison to the armored monsters of WWII and previous) make "preventing" hits, vice "surviving" hits a premium skill, as the greater damage potential and less robust (in terms of steel and armor) ship structures mean hits generally cause a lot of damage.