COIN: Stop Being the Alien

When the "good enemy" becomes the attacker, we must become the defender. Not of our own forces or bases, but the defender of the people.

To accomplish that, a counter-insurgent has several basic tasks. First, to secure the population physically and, as the Broken Windows theory shows, mentally. In Baghdad, the first thing they did was to seal off neighborhoods with concrete barriers, setting up check points, combat outposts and joint security stations. Finally, we stopped doing "presence patrols" in humvees and started "walking the beat".

In Broken Windows theory, this same approach had significant psychological effect on both the law abiding and non-law abiding citizens alike.

These findings may be taken as evidence that the skeptics were right- foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

The issue here was that the officer gave the impression of "order". What citizens feared most in Newark, NJ were attacks by strangers. By keeping strangers "moving along" and the disreputable locals behaving within "informal community rules", order or the perception of order was increased and maintained. Even when violence did not seem to immediately decrease.

In Iraq, one of the reasons that we partnered with local "concerned citizens" or "sons of Iraq", etc was because, as residents of the area, they would know better than we did who belonged and who didn't. They knew who the "strangers" were. With the barriers and check points in place, strangers were kept out of the neighborhoods or "moving right along" if they had any business being there.

Many checkpoints in Al Anbar would call someone in the village to verify the stranger had legitimate business there and would establish this contact as the "responsible party". They would also take the stranger's identification. This limited the stranger's ability to move about freely without the escort of the responsible party. It also meant that, if something did happen, the security forces would know where to start looking first and that meant the responsible party could be in trouble, too. This effectively limited both the active and passive support of the population for any outside infiltration or activities that could be dangerous to the rest of the population.

These check points were not always the best nor as thorough as they could have been or should be. Infiltration, poor training, intimidation, limited resources and many other aspects interfered with their ability to perform at a high standard. But, as Broken Windows shows, it wasn't really the physical capabilities that mattered, it was the psychological effect. The citizens perceived improved security so they acted on it. Someone was near by to hear their complaints, to act when danger was perceived or real. Even if they didn't always get there before the act occurred or apprehended the criminal afterwards. When perceived dangers existed, someone was there and would respond.

The same psychological effect acted on the insurgents. Not every checkpoint was attacked nor did insurgents try to or succeed in smuggling in arms or bombs through every checkpoint. Some attacks that did occur were extremely devastating, but something kept happening; the debris was cleared, the dead and wounded removed and the checkpoints remained. Even in relative success, the insurgents had failed.

Eventually, the odds of success in an attack or ability to smuggle in men and materials, even though still in favor of the insurgent, gave the impression that it was too costly. The presence of US military, IA and IP patrolling as well local "Sons of Iraq" gave the impression of security among the population and led some to provide information or make reports about suspected insurgents. It wasn't anywhere near a majority of the population, but it didn't matter. The ability of the insurgent to remain anonymous and retain the passive support or neutrality of the population was gone.

Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point expressed the idea that the tipping point wasn't dependent on gaining a majority, but that the right people at the right time were in the right place to sway just enough of the right people. Once a few felt safe enough to act safe and then to turn against the insurgents or, at least, to stop being neutral, thus, passive supporters, it quickly spread by word and example. It became a "good" social "epidemic".

In Lawrence's "algebraical factors", he calculated the number of foreign troops needed to secure territory. What he did not add to his calculation was the exponent that represented the power of the citizens arrayed against the insurgents. He barely considered it a possibility.

Of course, it wasn't just the check points manned by local citizens or police. Further, the locals weren't going to partner with us just because they didn't like the insurgents or extremists. In fact, some of the "local concerned citizens" who did partner with us had been insurgents. Many suggest that it was strictly a cold calculation of physical and political survival or even choosing the lesser evil.

Even in the last calculation, how did these people know that we were "the lesser evil" or simply better than the insurgents and extremist foreigners? After all, what were we doing different than the insurgents or extremists? For several years we drove through neighborhoods, barely stopping, on the way to find "bad guys". When we arrived or were attacked, we had a fire fight. People were killed, property was damaged and then we left, returning to our bases.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

In response to fear people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring: to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."

In Iraq, insurgents and extremists still remained in control of the territory and the people just by dent of their continuing existence, even if they were no more numerically superior than our forces in the area, within even a neutral population that either passively supported or were intimidated into that support.

Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

The insurgents and extremists were there among the people and we were not. We were still the aliens. We were separated by distance, by culture, by language, by perceived differences in security and, finally, by a hunk of metal.

Broken Windows - Newark, NJ

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen.

How simple it all must sound in a complicated combat theater. We stopped being occupiers and started walking the beat. The Sons of Iraq became an exponent, exponentially increasing our capabilities, not just in man power or coverage per square mile as Lawrence figured it, but a dynamic denominator that gave the US and coalition forces, the "aliens", a connection to the population, a shared common need and way to accomplish those goals.

That is what Lawrence assumed incorrectly. He assumed that the alien would just remain "alien" because they simply were and any actions after that kept them "alien", only compounding the disconnect.

So, the first rule of thumb for a first time patrolling force: stop being the alien!

Get out and talk to someone.