Via Michael Yon, a link to an opinion piece by someone he calls a friend.

To Bring Peace n In Afghanistan, Talk to the Taliban

Or, in other words, why Petraeus had to go to CentCom. I wrote last August that the problem in Afghanistan is that there is no Petraeus. Prescient or just common sense? Both, likely.

I'll skip past the "we are failing" opening gambit and the "we don't need to keep so many troops there" (I'll get to that comment). Let's head right for the meat of the "failed counter-insurgency" in Afghanistan:

Before the arrival of our forces in strength in the south in the summer of 2006, I visited Afghans independently in the provincial capital of Helmand. ‘If the British bring security and reconstruction, they are welcome here. But if they don’t bring them, then they should leave.’ A year later — after high levels of violence and tiny amounts of reconstruction — I sat nervously with a group of young Helmandis: ‘The British tell us that we have security and reconstruction — but where is it? They should show us, not always just tell us.’

[continued in flash traffic]

In short, as in Iraq, you have to do both security and reconstruction. It can't be an "either/or" situation. It has to make a difference to people directly in a community and it must be visible. If we built a list of priorities, what would you put on it first? We are still building the giant "ring road" that, when finished, will allow greater movement of government aid, military forces and product to market. Hopefully, not the poppy kind although that is already what is happening on completed roads.

Do schools come next? Or, wells? Or, electricity? Or, agriculture? Graineries?

What if many of these things are bing done, but piece meal across the nation, without connection from community to community? In short, using "broken windows theory" (also once referred to as the "oil spot" plan) as was done in Ramadi and Fallujah, requires a rolling economic, security and political plan.

There is a huge disconnect between aid programs through NGOs, military operations and Afghanistan government activities. Complicated by various issues such as NGOs who feel that they have to operate separately from the military in order to have trust and get things done. Which they are limited on anyway, as Holloway points out, because the areas are often considered too dangerous to leave their small enclaves or the big bases.

Then there is NATO and the various limitations on their operations and areas. In fact, one would have to hope that Petraeus is capable of wrangling these various entities into some semblance of a single plan and direction. How to get them to concentrate on a few, visible and important projects in a specified area. Particularly one that is "hot".

Of course, the issue with money going into the hands of corrupt government officials is similar to problems in Iraq. Nothing gets done at the local level, but, in some ways, it buys off the bigger players and keeps them on our side (nominally) of the fence. In Iraq, US forces simply started by-passing this to some degree by co-opting local officials, paying them off (much cheaper in the long run) and putting the money right in the hands of the locals either through the local co-opted official and unofficial leaders or by planning and paying for much needed projects right out of their own pockets.

Does that happen in Afghanistan? If it does, it's either "not so much" or "not enough".

Still, where I disagree with Holloway in the beginning is whether we need more forces to do it effectively or less. In Iraq, it took more because they actually had to secure the area at the same time they built. They had to live out among the people.

US Marines, arriving after many deployments to Iraq, having learned these very lessons, are now starting to deploy out to their forward operating bases. Will COPs be next?

Holloway goes for the 9 thousand mile approach. Withdraw, let them sort it out and simply support with money, weapons, etc with NGOs providing most of the work. Besides, he notes, Afghanistan is no more important than any other troubled third world spot. And, except for it being the cradle for the 9/11 attacks, it has no real significance in comparison. At least, that is what I gather. We can some how keep track of the AQ folks another way.

Of course, I disagree with that view of Afghanistan as I do with Iraq for similar, but different reasons. Iraq was, in fact, stealing history from the Islamists who have the grand caliphate as its united goal, however achievable that really is. It was central to the rest of the Middle East. In their back yard, so to speak, and they, the Arabs and surrounding terror supporters, could not ignore the realities of extremist activities and the real danger to themselves from a failed state with an active Islamist guerrilla force. We couldn't let the extremists have it, no matter what.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, was far away from the people and the money of the Arab lands in the ME. People could send money, support and men to that war without feeling the direct effects. Certainly, no political activities in Afghanistan was going to bring democracy, freedom or any sort of political or ideological pressure on the boiling pot of the ME.

Not letting Afghanistan go then comes down to a few necessities. Not the least of which is that, if we can win, why would we concede one iota of scrubby brush land of Afghanistan back to Al Qaida? As the incubator for 9/11 and the modern Islamist global war, to let that go is to become the Russians to the mujihadeen in the 1980's. Without ever committing the number of forces or money that the Russians did. "Paper tiger" would be the least of our worries.

Still, I agree with him. Our counter-insurgency efforts have been lackadaisical from a central planning and execution aspect.

The next question is: should we talk to the Taliban?

Yes.

Keep in mind the Iraq model. Not every insurgent is a terrorist and not every terrorist is an insurgent. We have to be much better at separating the elements and creating solutions based on boots on the ground, community truths and realities.

It is unclear whether, after all this time, we have really learned that lesson or been in a position to do so.

Do we need more troops in Afghanistan? Why, yes, I believe we do. One may ask why we haven't done so or considered it until of late when we sent the Marines. It is often couched in the "either/or" reflection of Iraq: if we weren't in Iraq, we would be winning in Afghanistan. I believe that is a "yes" and "no" as well.

I believe there are some very interesting, long term and over arching strategies that effected our decisions about how much effort and troops we placed into one combat theater or another. I noted a central idea above: Iraq is in the heartland and had the most impact on the centers where extremism are supported physically, materially and monetarily.

Without being too obfuscating, in Generation Kill I wrote about a very classic maneuver warfare tactic: feinting in one direction while bringing up the central attack on a totally unexpected front. In the words of Sun Tzu, attacking where the enemy is least prepared. Check the map showing the "feint" and "push" to Baghdad.

Holloway gets it to some degree. Why would we put major effort into one theater when so many are troubled and possibly create a much broader and more serious threat? Or, in context of Iraq and Afghanistan as I noted above, when one area is likely to be much more important and effective in the over all, long term, strategic war of ideologies against Islamist extremists?

We move some forces into Afghanistan (feint) where it looks like our major effort against the main body is going to be and then attack the weak center. Keeping in mind, this is a global war that requires a global strategy. Thus, global theaters fall into the same categories and strategic necessities as any immediate and local theater or front. In brief, we hold the main AQ force in Afghanistan/Pakistan (where's Osama and Zawahiri?) while we destroy them, their ideas, their support base, some place else.

In military speak, Iraq got inside of AQs OODA Loop. They had to play catch up in Iraq because they weren't there in force and they enacted bad strategies that back fired. Not just in Iraq, but within the greater Islamic community they hoped to influence. We made them use money, men and materials along with a large amount of wasta (cache) to try to take back an historically and strategically important center.

Now that AQ in Iraq is all but busted, it's time to start looking towards Afghanistan and shoring up the forces that constituted our "feint". Just like Rolling Thunder took out Baghdad and then forces focused to outlying regions or enemy forces, we have taken the center of the ME, the center of jihad, and now need to move to the peripherals: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iran.