Strategic Communications: Speaking A Universal Language - Take 2

These studies offer many similarities, yet, often differ in one area: economics. Many studies, particularly statistical studies on the background of known terrorists, tend to note that many a young "terrorist" comes from a poor family and that they are often poorly educated. In first world nations, the quality and availability of education is linked to the economic status and ability of the state as well as the individual to give or gain information and education. Thus, reducing "education" or, better yet, "critical thinking" to an economic imperative. A number. In short, the lack of education and critical thinking skills reduces their judgment and leaves them open for suggestion and indoctrination into radical and often violent ideologies and movements.

Other studies have indicated that terrorists or rebels evince from middle and upper economic classes. These are often spurred on by their education where they are exposed to these ideas or where education brings into question their commonly held beliefs, leaving them open for indoctrination into often violent ideologies and movements. This education is available due to their economic capabilities or those of their parents or state. Again, reducing the creation of radicals to a number.

My problem with this is that, in truth, both are correct. Poor, middle and upper economic classes are drawn to radicalization. But, since their over all economic or "number" status is not equal, I am hard pressed to identify economics as the common denominator. Then again, I tend to reject such ideas of Marxist reductionism of the human experience for both ideological and intuitive reasons. Not the least of which is that, indeed, people across all economic classes can be drawn to an ideology, religion, a community, a political party, etc, etc, etc.

I also read several books not long ago about the origins of terrorism. In fact, one called "The Origins of Terrorism", written in 1996, spoke about "self-selection" where individuals with little contact with other actual terrorists, became radicalized and sought out organizations that most resembled their own ideas of their own volition. The book actually used terrorist organizations like the Weathermen, the Red Brigade and the Badr-Meinhoff group as examples. Yet, it's something that we've seen in the last seven years with Islamic extremists.

Crenshaw noted that these groups were able to exist and commit terroristic acts because, even though many would not agree with their tactics, some agreed with their ideas. That led to tacit acceptance and indirect support for their efforts such as witnesses simply refusing to give information. Eventually, that changed because the community at large began to reject their methods as too violent and extreme compared to the alleged offenses of any government or individual. In effect, their target package was too big and did not align with the community's concept of responsible parties and acceptable targets.

It also changed because, internally, these groups began to separate as individuals within the organizations began to become more radical and urged more violent acts while others considered they had gone as far as their conscience (their morals?) had allowed them to go and still others believed that even the acts they had already committed had already gone past some internal red line. Morals.

We are seeing that right now within the the current crop of terrorists. The Awakening, both Sunni and Shia, is basically the community rejecting the radicals because they crossed the communities' "red line". The radicals were killing too many people, the "wrong" people, who often had little to do with the actual complaints of the insurgents. While these groups were prepared to kill certain people, even in gruesome and horrific ways, they still had to justify it to themselves and to the community at large.

We also see it in the internal debates from the radicals themselves who have been issuing communiques critical of or urging certain acts even long before Zawahiri ever wrote Zarqawi to tell him to knock off the public, horrific and too wide targeting of individuals. Zawahiri had written at least two other books and several pamphlets about his radicalization and the failures of past "jihad" organizations. In Knights Under the Prophet's banner, he explained that the Ikwan in Egypt had lost support because, when they bombed and shot several "officials" it resulted in some unfortunate collateral damage. One of the bombings resulted in the death of a young girl riding her bicycle in the yard. that occurred just before the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was tracked down and imprisoned. That is no coincidence. They lost the support of the people. They became easier to find.

Imagine being Zawahiri today and having to learn or try to teach that lesson all over again. He must be extremely frustrated (ed...good). He isn't the only one. After the 1992 destruction of the Ikwahn uprising in Syria, there were many analysis written by former participants that evaluated their operations including whether they should or should not have acted in certain ways that allowed the global community to accept their destruction as "just".

In any case, over and over again, we see the same pattern. Where it ends is with individual and group "red lines" or conscience or morality or values or humanity. Whatever we want to call it, it is those lines, when reached or crossed, that begin to effect the ability for radical, violent organizations to operate or remain effective.

Argent discussed in comments that he rejected the idea of calling it "morals" because there so many imperatives within a culture that effect these morals, not the least of which is religion which, on the face of it, we do not share with our current adversaries.

The Christian subset of morals is one thing but there are other subsets, each religion, each culture. We're talking largely incompatible dialects. What you are talking about is really more like humanism which I think would not be your intention at all.

I have to disagree with that for several reasons. First, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all referred to as "Abrahamic" religions because, at their base, they share a common beginning or point of reference. They do share common ideas. How we address them and the types of consequences that go with transgressing against them are often different, at least in today's society. Yet, we do share some very basic concepts.

I'll eschew Argent's example for a less ribald one. Take stealing. Almost universally, stealing is unacceptable. It harms the bonds of trust within a community, causes discord and can lead to retribution that, in many cultures even today, could cause long standing rivalries that tear a community apart.

Even in communities where theft is considered an art and honorable profession (such as gypsies and various other societies) there are still limits to what is acceptable. In the gypsy culture, for instance, it is acceptable to steal from everyone that is not a gypsy, but it is less acceptable to steal from a fellow gypsy, even less acceptable to steal from a gypsy within the tribe and, finally, the least acceptable to steal from a family member within the tribe.

Believe it or not, these groups will expel people from their families and tribes for those acts, even though stealing in general is acceptable. Why? because stealing from family, friends and fellow tribe members creates discord and may damage their ability to stay together. In tribal societies, staying together means survival.

At its base, we share a common morality: stealing is bad for the community. The real difference here lies in who we admit as our "family" or "tribe" and what we consider mitigating circumstances. Even in our society today, we accept things as mitigating the actual crime. We are probably less likely to hand down extreme sentences for some impoverished elderly lady who steals a loaf of bread because she is poor and hungry. There was a time when our western culture found it acceptable to hang children as young as twelve for stealing said loaf of bread.

This is not pointed out to create any sort of "equivalence", but simply to indicate that there are core values, morals, concepts, what have you, that most communities share. What is different is the set consequence for such acts and what things, if any, could be considered "mitigating" circumstances.

To some degree, those accepted consequences and mitigating circumstances are part of a community's morality or values. That may be where we part ways, but it does not mean that we cannot find some common ground, even if we decline to accept every moral or consequence as moral.

Where do numbers come in to this discussion? Numbers come into play in what Malcolm Gladwell called, "The Tipping Point". Numbers work both ways. In Origin of Terrorism, the number of members that join a group can act as a "tipping point" that moves a group to finally act on their previously internal discussions of ideology. Similarly, Malcolm Gladwell's "tipping point" show that it can work the opposite way when the number of people believing or acting in a specific way can act to the good. What we would normally call "peer pressure", which we know can be both positive and negative.

That is where "numbers" come to play. The question is, what part of a community needs to be effected, how wide and how public does the rejection of terrorism have to be in order to prevent even a single member of the community from acting?