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Small Wars Journal - Today's Junior Army Officers.

Over at Small Wars Journal, a good, toothsome bit gets tossed up by Captain Hsia.

When I read it, I thought to myself, Captain Donovan could have written this. Major Donovan would not.

Today’s Junior Army Officers

By Captain Tim Hsia, U.S. Army

Debating retention of junior officers is a perilous matter but there are just too many vital issues currently concerning the future of the officer corps that it is necessary to inject some realism within the debate. Junior officers are leaving the army at an alarming rate and not simply because of continuous deployments and the state of affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenants and Captains, although focused at the tactical level, still ponder what exactly senior officers and politicians have in mind in regards to the plan and endstate for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and how it will affect the Army as an institution. These important questions are debated by junior officers on a daily basis. Nonetheless, these questions at a personal level are subordinate to an even more vital question which junior officers contemplate, and that is whether to leave the military for the corporate sector.

You should read the whole thing, over at Small Wars Journal.

So, I pushed it around to some serving officers I know. The best response I got is posted below.

John,

Prepare for rant. 5...4...3...2...1....

Given the constraints of printed word, I will give CPT Hsia the benefit of the doubt and say that I think his perspective, experience and subsequent analysis are too narrow in focus. Part of what is driving the high promotion rates, and accentuating the issue of captain attrition, is both an overall increase in Army requirements and an overall increase in authorizations. Since the no-money early 90s, promotion rates have gone up for MAJ and LTC. This trend started before 9/11 and even before transformation. Why? We weren't authorizing retention of enough officers. Result: many functional areas (FAO being my direct, transitory experience) were drastically short handed. Transformation only made the problem worse by not only adding units, but adding more authorizations to BCT and DIV staffs. I don't know how the current retention rates measure up against the 90s. But here are a few challenges we faced back then that are gone now.

The rest is in the Flash Traffic/Extended Entry. Whatcha all think?

YG89 had a selection rate to CPT of less than 90%. This was with selection happening just before the four year mark, pin on close to five. This was also after DA allowed early voluntary separations and took the last month of YG89 and deferred their board to YG90 (my YG). The selection process was so difficult, that even having a still authorized B&W photo was considered a discriminator (advice from branch managers). Next year, the selection rate was just over 90%...still traumatic. Promotion rates to MAJ were around 60-65%, LTC around 50%. Selection rate to CGSC was around 50%. Worse, because the primary zone for LTC was at the 16 year mark, getting passed over twice meant that you were out of the Army at 18 years. Period. No retirement.

So, what happened was that many who stayed in faced a very early, and obvious, defining moment as captains: company command. If your OERs didn't have you walking on water by the time you finished command, you were 'defined', in a bad way. You were at risk for promotion to MAJ and probably were not getting CGSC. This meant you were, if promoted, starting your MAJ window in the bottom half of your YG. Looking ahead to the LTC board, what were your odds? Many captains figured that out. My class, according to our class registrar, shows that there were two distinct waves of exodus: immediately after Desert Storm, and in the middle of the captain's window (i.e., right after command). There were exceptions, but not many.

So, if you were a young captain, and didn't walk on water for your last command OER, what were your options? Seek refuge in a functional area? Their promotion rates were no better (if not worse) than DA averages. And all of us were in one central selection board (minus medical, JAG, Chaplains and maybe some other specialty that escapes me at the moment). The point is, you had poor job security. Why risk getting booted as a passed over captain or major?

What drove the rates so low was simply a lack of personnel dollars to fill all the authorizations. When I dabbled in FAO, I quickly discovered that the promotion rates were actually slightly lower than my basic branch, but the shortages in MAJ and LTC were huge. There simply was no money to retain the required end strength.

That all started to change in the mid to late 90s. Promotion rates went up. Selection board for MAJ moved up to the ten year mark. Pin on time for 1LT to CPT cut down to the 4 year mark. DA made the decision to remove CGSC as a discriminator by mandating 100% attendance (still working on that one...). Does that mean the Army was retaining mediocrity?

How do you define mediocrity? OERs were so inflated that they were almost worthless. The new OER only achieved one thing: senior rater accountability. Not everyone could be a top-block anymore. However, CPTs currently don't get a senior rater block check. So their verbiage is what matters. No quality control equals generally the same problem: the OER is still a poor tool for measuring quality control (unless you get the 'velvet hammer' OER...damnation by faint praise).

This is where the young captain conflates promotion rates with quality. Quality is more a function of how the OERs are written, if the senior rater and rater took the time to craft their OERs and were being honest. Promotion rates are high because the requirements have gone up AND we have the money to retain end strength (the latter being more important). I don't know how the captain's attrition rate of today compares to the late 90s, when things were looking up. The real issue of identifying and retaining quality in the officer corps has little to do with promotion rates. The requirements are driving rates up, and since we're still stuck with a promotion system tied to time in service, promotion rates really don't serve as an indicator of quality.

Also, being passed over twice is no longer a career ending affair. Does that mean that an officer passed over twice is automatically a dud? Not necessarily. They may still have all the patriotism and desire to serve, but it just didn't work out. However, there are still nearly automatic things that will get you drummed out. That's what the SELCON board is for. This is a big deal if you are a MAJ. Now you can at least stay in until 20 if you've already served 16+ years and were passed over. I think that's a significant improvement for retention.

I interpret CPT Hsia's real issue with quality control in the officer corps to be an issue of a lack of rewards for above average or excellent performance. I doubt CPT Hsia has been able to read his peers' OERs and compare them to his (one way a rater/senior rater rewards top performers). So what does he expect? You won't see a real divergence in perceived quality (I use the term with tongue in cheek because of the OER still is not a comprehensive evaluation) until battalion command selection. What does he want? Higher ascensions which will drive promotion rates down? That's an expensive solution, especially if there are no requirements to justify an increase in LTs. Oh, and the Army isn't letting LTs out before their commitments are up, like they did in the early 90s. That means that you will just about automatically stay in for the captain's board (which is at the three year mark, I think). With such a high demand for captains, of course promotion to CPT is almost automatic. As I recall, it was that way in the 80s as well.

So when does the first real screening occur whereby lower performing officers either get weeded out, or transfer to another specialty where they may be more suitable? I would offer that this first occurs at the career field designation (used to be at the end of the CPT window, I think it is now mid CPT window). This is where the functional areas and branches that don't need LTs, but do need CPTs, get healthy. This doesn't mean that functional areas or these other branches are made up of second rate officers. Many basic branches, such as mine, seriously neck down at the MAJ and LTC level. If we all stayed in our basic branch, the Army would either have to lower promotion rates, or force officers into other career fields. The point is, due to high promotion rates brought on by high retention dollars, you now have options.

This is especially important for rewarding risk takers. Junior officers now can take risk and not have it automatically equate to separation if you fail (unless you fail big time, such as UCMJ). That wasn't the case in the 90s...

I could go on, but it's getting late. I agree that the Army doesn't have enough branch managers to provide the quality of support as other services. His comment on having to manage his own career = whining. I sure as hell am not going to abdicate complete responsibility for my career to someone else. CPT Hsia doesn't delineate what he thinks his responsibilities should be.

Sponsorship/mentoring = unit problem. However, has he reached out to the MAJ in his SQDN? Junior officer clique = it happens anyway. Lots of highly suspect generalizations such as the retention bonus only appealing to those who want to stay in, junior officers deciding to get out because they don't know what their options are (ever go on line to your branch page?), 'brain drain among officers' (I thought that didn't happen until your mandatory lobotomy when you made MAJ). As to his statement that the promotion system needs to be better explained, I agree. Try asking the MAJ in your SQDN. If they don't take the time, ask the CDR. As to not knowing how the selection process works, why worry about a process you can only influence by keeping your records straight?

I will give him the benefit of the doubt in the next to last para with the line "these problems are acutely highlighted for junior officers..." to also include all junior Soldiers. I don't agree and think this is more a reflection of his perceptions than an accurate generalization.

Same para, up a few lines: "For high achieving officers there is little financial incentive to outperform their peers...". Hm...are you saying you are in it for the money? Or are you insinuating that 'somebody' have a bag of cash they can hand out (with some type of governance process?) as arbitrary awards? Not sure I like the idea of how this would look in execution. It doesn't work to well in the DA civilian side (everyone tends to get the same, or very similar, award). The DAC side does have some supervisor controlled things like quality step increases. Maybe de-link pay from time in grade? That could get ugly if not tightly controlled.

The last para just flat out confuses me. After reading all this, this is all just a 'cyclical evolution of the historical norm'? I haven't read Kitfield, so I'm not sure what CPT Hsia's point is. Maybe later.

Ranting complete...for now.

LTC Marty

4 Comments

Well...my brother is air force and a Captain. A lifer as it were, since he started out enlisted. I don't think he would agree with this whiney individual about lack of opportunities, lack information, lack of rewards not keeping people in the service. In fact, we recently had a discussion about whether he was going to stay in the military or get out (since this year constitutes year "20", including enlisted and officer time). He was telling me about several people that he knew who had "gotten out" and joined some corporate firms who had a rude awakening when the alleged "higher pay" suddenly had giant chunks taken out for insurance (especially family coverage), taxes, etc; there was no BAQ, hazard pay or other additional pay that is typically added. There were so many "real world" expenses that several people discovered they were not making the money they thought they should.
 
Er...and, my brother is not leaving. He knows several of these folks who have left and severely regret it.
 
SWJ should learn to distinguish between a martyr who was at "Calvary" from someone who is trying to sound like a martyr while serving in the Cavalry... little whining puss. off topic: John, check your yahoo inbox
 
All those great "demonstrated leadership" command gigs and umpty-zillion service schools don't always translate into *marketability* with the Fortune 500 set. I know HROs who have instructed their recruiters to concentrate on the tabulae rasae just out of grad school because they consider vets multitalented individuals who are -- alas! -- psychologically incapable of adhering to the Company Way. That said, there are still boatloads of good, vet-friendly companies out there, but a newly-on-the-street JO had better be prepared for a severe salary-shock...