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  <title>Comments for Iraq Economy - Basra and Um Qasr: Part I - Sadr and the Labor Unions</title>
  <subtitle>We&apos;re the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost.  All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT,  and KA 2003-2007</subtitle>
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    <id>tag:www.thedonovan.com,2008://1.9035</id>
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    <published>2008-04-14T05:09:46Z</published>
    <updated>2008-05-10T17:10:53Z</updated>
    <title>Iraq Economy - Basra and Um Qasr: Part I - Sadr and the Labor Unions</title>
    <summary>[Kat] One of the most fascinating aspects of watching all the reporting about the Basra offensive at the end of March is that every single report attributed the assault to either Sadrist propaganda insisting it was a political shaping tool to reduce Sadr&apos;s influence in the south prior to elections to give the SIIC (SCIRI) an advantage or as part of a security rush to secure the people of Basra and reduce Iranian backed militia attacks on infrastructure, Iraqi and American security forces. Each of these has its place in the strategy to secure Iraq and bring it the last...</summary>
    <author>
      <name>Kat</name>
      <uri>http://themiddleground.blogspot.com</uri>
    </author>
    
    <category term="<![CDATA[<s>GWOT</s> Whatever it is...]]>" />
    
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      <![CDATA[<p>[Kat]</p>

<p>One of the most fascinating aspects of watching all the reporting about the Basra offensive at the end of March is that every single report attributed the assault to either Sadrist propaganda insisting it was a political shaping tool to reduce Sadr's influence in the south prior to elections to give the SIIC (SCIRI) an advantage or as part of a security rush to secure the people of Basra and reduce Iranian backed militia attacks on infrastructure, Iraqi and American security forces.  </p>

<p>Each of these has its place in the strategy to secure Iraq and bring it the last step forward towards reconciliation and reconstruction.  But, the third leg of this program sits squarely in the realm of the Iraq economy.</p>]]>
      <![CDATA[<p>There are political issues at hand, but the main issue has been Sadr using the Mahdi to hold up political progress at gun point.  He has believed for some time that, either through popular support or repression of dissent through the use of the Mahdi, he has a significant chance of obtaining a much larger representation in the parliament and local elections.  </p>

<p>His organization is premised on the idea that the Shia, representing the majority in Iraq, should be the rulers.  Further, he has very little intent to give the Sunni any voice and little representation in government.  His entire focus has been in keeping the Sunni out because he sees them as both the oppressors under Saddam and as the group responsible for killing thousands of Shia after the invasion during the long insurgency.  Those who follow him or tacitly support him, believe the same.  </p>

<p>The problem, of course, is that it does not recognize any Sunni grievances nor give any ground for negotiating a complete reconciliation and recovery of Iraq.  He is barely considerate of any Kurdish concerns and believes the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) and Kurdish Autonomous Region are illegitimate.  He considers the Kurdish just short of traitors for effectively opening up the possibility of a federalized, three part Iraq with their demand for the new constitution written in 2005 to include a law providing three or more provinces ratifying "statehood".</p>

<p>He attacks the Iraqi security forces as "puppets" of the American occupation and he believes that the Americans brought Al Qaida and allowed the Sunni insurgency to attack the Shia.  He was unhappy from the beginning of the invasion because, as he has stated several times, he believes that the Shia were on the point of rising and could have taken Saddam out by themselves, giving them the full power to rule.  He believes the Americans would and have allowed the Ba'athists to continue to exist and enjoy some continuing power.</p>

<p>Through various means, including withdrawing his politicians from the cabinet, boycotting parliament, infiltration of the military and police, assassinations, intimidation, destruction of infrastructure, theft of oil and gasoline, hi-jacking convoys of goods both on the road and from the port, kidnapping contractors and third country nationals, and many more acts, Sadr and the Mahdi Army have attempted to keep the central government weak and support their movement with ill gotten gains.  They have hoped that the government would collapse or parliament be disbanded through lack of confidence in order to gain their own political power through arms or through new elections or both.</p>

<p>Basra and Um Qasr by association, become the epicenter of all three issues: political, security and economics.</p>

<p><a href="http://s210.photobucket.com/albums/bb224/kehenry1/?action=view&current=IraqPoliticalMapsm.jpg" target="_blank"><img src="http://i210.photobucket.com/albums/bb224/kehenry1/IraqPoliticalMapsm.jpg" border="0" alt="Photobucket"></a></p>

<p>Basrah represents one of several economic regions within Iraq.  In fact, it could be considered the premier economic center of Iraq since it sits on the main transport corridor for imports and exports through Um Qasr, the single Iraq sea port that is the busiest and most economically important transit hub in Iraq.  </p>

<center><a href="http://s210.photobucket.com/albums/bb224/kehenry1/?action=view&current=basrah.jpg" target="_blank"><img src="http://i210.photobucket.com/albums/bb224/kehenry1/basrah.jpg" border="0" alt="Photobucket"></a></center>

<p>Every sort of goods from food to textiles to oil and gasoline passes through the port.  There are two major oil platforms in the port that account for most of Iraq's oil exports and revenue.  Refined oil products like oil, gasoline and diesel are returned through the port and transported by truck or train through Basrah and parts north.  </p>

<p>According to <strong><a href="http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18420&Itemid=128">Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), Um Qasr</a></strong>:</p>

<blockquote>“The estimated flow of goods into Iraq is 60,000 tons with 15,000 passing through UmQsar,” said Todd Stratton, Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq.

<p>“The single largest commodity is food such as wheat, rice, sugar and other food items,” Stratton said. “The port is a critical gateway to supply the Iraqi nation with food imports.”</p>

<p>According to Stratton, the port has a grain silo that can process 7,500 tons a day with 5,000 tons being hauled away. </blockquote></p>

<p><strong><a href="http://dbacon.igc.org/Iraq/2005umqasr.html">After the invasion in 2003</a></strong>, the United States awarded the contract to operate the port to Stevedore Services of America.  The nearby port of Zubair was awarded to the Dutch company Maersk.  Thousands of Iraqi dock workers and port operators from Um Qasr and near by Basrah were put out of work though they continued to receive their salaries from the government.  In 2004, the CPA and transitional government reduced these salaries and pensions by a third.  Workers attempted to organize, but a 1987 anti-union law enacted by Saddam was left to stand and the weak labor organization was pushed back, though not over by a long shot.</p>

<p>During this time, Sadr's organization was beginning to be a major issue.  He disliked the transitional government and called for immediate, direct elections though under what governing structure and purpose was unknown.  He considered the TA was full of outsiders who had not been in Iraq suffering persecution like he and others who remained. Likewise, he was skeptical, if not equally rejecting, the returned SIIC (SCIRI) and militia of the Badr brigade as both "foreign" and "Iranian" though he had not actually rejected Iranian money or guidance at the time or later.  </p>

<p>The lack of immediate political and economic gains for the Shia underclass gave Sadr the onus he needed to create his Mahdi militia that eventually went toe to toe with American forces in Najaf throughout the summer of 2004.  He used the discontent in Basrah and Um Qasr to subvert the legitimate complaints of the local unemployed and poor into his political movement.</p>

<p>In 2004, the labor movement in Um Qasr and Basrah gained strength and organization.  Sadr's lieutenants infiltrated the movement, helped organize it, provided "security" and funneled money to the organizations.  Eventually, the labor movement blockaded the port for three days and caused it to virtually shut down.  Both Maersk and SSA left Zubair and Um Qasr siting "security issues".  The ports were turned over to the Iraqi government which then negotiated with the local labor "union", putting thousands of laborers back to work, but also giving distinct power to Sadr's movement and the Mahdi militia over one of Iraq's most important economic hubs.</p>

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