We're the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost. All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT, and KA 2003-2010 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:28:57 Z Movable Type 4.12 en Copyright 2012 http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification "I'm not surprised they are good pilots...they just flew in an air force owned by an a$$hole." [Dusty said that, in response to Bill's email-turned-into-a-post below. It's kind of how I have viewed the French Army in my interactions with them - they really are good soldiers, and a pretty good Army, operationally. They've just been cursed with lousy ownership when it comes to the highest levels of management. I'll step aside and let Bill tell his story. - the Armorer] Some of you may recall I mentioned this incident last month after John smacked me on the ass engaged... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html Wed, 16 Apr 2008 04:49:17 -0600 John, Damian, AFSister... my apologies if I sounded a little gruff on that comment. Guess I'm still a little emotionally attached to the folks out there, as well as their mission. Hard to leave for home when you're so attached to the mission. Thanks for putting the good word out on this situation and the many others out there that go unreported. Cheers! EC http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72093 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72093 Thu, 17 Apr 2008 08:49:32 -0600 They’re dodging small arms, missile fire, sand storms, and a “quazi-free for all” VFR combat air space while they’re learning how to fly in an operational capacity. Substitute "torrential rain" for "sandstorms" and you've got Vietnam. We lost a lot of helicopters *there* due to weather-related accidents before we taught ourselves how to survive. That lesson wasn't lost on the Iraqi Air Force, either -- which is why they insisted that us rotary wing instructors have an Army Aviation background, rather than a USAF one. When the Flight School Commander found out that two of us *were* Vietnam helicopter vets, he was ecstatic...]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72085 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72085 Thu, 17 Apr 2008 07:07:47 -0600 Heh. Given what Cassie came here for... I doubt it was a pert *nose*... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72082 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72082 Thu, 17 Apr 2008 06:58:23 -0600 SCOOOORE!!!! Cricket, Ymar and Cassie in the same thread! http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72079 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72079 Thu, 17 Apr 2008 06:46:32 -0600 light hearted electronic bondage... err... badinage...???? Great goodly moogly! A girl could really get her pert little nose out of joint :p /flouncing off]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72075 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72075 Thu, 17 Apr 2008 05:38:31 -0600 The Forces may purchase American sourced equipment, but it is not USAF or USN standard. Uh...yeah...which is why I purposely used the phrase "American pedigree." Are you forgetting I've actually flown in most of them?]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72069 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72069 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 22:55:13 -0600 Damian The Forces may purchase American sourced equipment, but it is not USAF or USN standard. Back in the 80's we lost three Hercs and were offered replacements by Lockheed at a must-buy price. The aircraft were sitting unsold at the factory; the price to be charged was for the bare airframe. Unfortunately, the aircraft would have required partial stripping to remove the wiring/electronics and install the RCAF standard kit. The rebuild would have brought the acquisition cost up to the price of a Herc purchased the 'normal' way, which the Air Force could not afford. There's a company in Kelowna which tries to sell Russian hels to the Air Force, but their aircraft are fitted with Canadian standard avionics, not Russian. Cheers http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72055 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72055 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:55:27 -0600 This is why I am a landlubber and don't like heights and don't like to fly and and and...WOW. I am impressed. This is Good Stuff. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72054 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72054 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:38:12 -0600 Same here. The point is that training on American helicopters and then flying Russian helicopters seems to be an issue due to the instrument panel differences. That's what was meant by hodgpodge- not that they have shoddy equipment, or that they're trying to put Russian parts in American copters or visa versa. And no one is saying that the IrAF pilots are incompetent- quite the opposite. After you read Bill's AAR, you understand exactly how this kind of thing could easily happen. It's like driving in America your whole life, and then renting a car in England for a week's vacation- you're bound to screw up the right-sided steering, or at least struggle with it. Being in the air has far more dire consequences though. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72051 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72051 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:27:36 -0600 El Capitan, no disrespect was intended in my remarks. Canadian Forces aircraft are currently all American in pedigree, but we are constantly being pushed to buy something other than U.S. designs. I have concerns about mixing and matching, and was honestly asking for feedback, given that this post made me reflect on an issue that touches my military, but also quite a number of others. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72044 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72044 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:22:02 -0600 Just to be clear, El Capitan, Bill, Dusty and I were being *supportive* of the Iraqis, and not critical. That said... Your information is illuminating. Thanks! http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72043 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72043 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:19:31 -0600 This is the first I’ve written about the Iraqi Air Force Mi-17 Crash last month. I didn’t personally know Staff Sergeant Chris Frost, the US Air Force Gunner who was killed in the crash, but do I remember seeing him whenever I was up at Taji. I had the highest respect for the USAF gunners and pilots who flew with and trained the Iraqi Airmen. Those men and women are the unsung heroes of the US effort to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force. I worked with several Iraqi Air Force Mi-17 crewmen, so odds are I knew some of those who were lost in the crash. I wanted to wait until the official report was released before discussed the situation. After reading the comments to this post regarding the after action report, I couldn’t remain silent. I’m very proud of the Iraqi Air Force, and proud of the Airmen of the United States Air Force who are training their fellow Iraqi Airmen. The Iraqi Air Force does not have a 'hodgepodge' of equipment as is assumed by many. Their Mi-17 fleet, though currently small, will triple in size over the next couple of years. The Iraqi leadership chose to purchase more Mi-17s because they're good at flying them, and their maintainers are very experienced working on them. We pushed the Hueys on them because the Huey II is an excellent helicopter and we could bring them in faster than the Mi-17s. We almost convinced the Iraqis to purchase another 30+ Huey II’s last fall, but the Iraqi Air Force rightfully decided they should stick with what they're good at and purchased more Mi-17s. Ironically last August when I was ordering the Mi-17s for the IqAF I was asked by the Iraqi Air Staff time after time to make sure the helicopters had two modern radar altimeters, something not standard on the Mi-17. I was told that during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 80+ helicopters crashed in the early morning darkness enroute to Kuwait because their altimeters were sub-par. The Iraqi leadership still remembers that lesson, and they stressed the importance of ordering only the best altimeters for their helicopters. I did just that. The new fleet that is inbound this year will be modified immediately after they leave the Russian assembly line by a US company. They will all have the appropriate altimeters, and hopefully a tragedy like this won’t happen again. As for the transition from Hueys to Mi-17s being a contributing factor in the accident, what else could the Iraqi Air Force do? The Hueys were the only operational helicopters available to the Iraqi pilots first, so most pilots trained on them. The ones who transitioned to the Mi-17 were limited to flying inside the perimeter of their base because of a lack of defensive systems and trained gunners. Once those limitations were overcome, the Iraqis began flying operational Mi-17 missions outside the wire with great success. Their first missions were to Basra last fall. They did an outstanding job and the crews quickly learned to adapt. The flight that crashed this March was flying north of Mosul, something the Iraqis haven't done in years, but they had to fly up there to provide the support their nation is asking of them. The Iraqi Air Force sortie rate increased from 30 per week in January 2007 to 300 per week in December 2007 because the Iraqi government desperately needs organic air power in the Counter-insurgency war they are fighting. This ‘surge’ in air power will most likely double throughout 2008, so the pressure is on for the US and Iraqi Airmen to train, equip, and join the fight. Are the pilots inexperienced? Some of them. Are they learning and adapting quickly? Absolutely. Are our US Air Force pilots training the Iraqi pilots to the same standards as we train our own. You bet. Still, it's a new, young Air Force. No matter how many obstacles you overcome in your training and maintenance, mistakes will still happen and lives will tragically be lost. And remember, the Iraqi Pilots and Crewmen are all learning how to operate in a combat environment, which makes this entire enterprise even more difficult and costly. They’re dodging small arms, missile fire, sand storms, and a “quazi-free for all” VFR combat air space while they’re learning how to fly in an operational capacity. Yet they're still flying, and we're still training them. Why? Because no nation can be secure without Airpower, and the Iraqis have always known this. It's just taken us 4 years to finally do something about it. I worked directly for the Iraqi Air Force for 6 months, and I'd do it again if called upon. Our Air Force is doing an outstanding job growing and developing what once was, and soon will be again, one of the most respected Air Forces in the region. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72037 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72037 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 12:40:59 -0600 wonder how difficult it is, institutionally speaking, to overcome problems like the one you described? Up in the snowy, white north, we get people arguing all the time that we should be buying relatively cheap Russian or even more expensive European kit (especially aircraft). The example usually cited is the Indian military, which buys from whomever they can. You could go with the Israeli model and buy the A/C w/o instruments, and install your own]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72028 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72028 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 11:16:26 -0600 This also brings up an interesting additional facet concerning when people accuse the US of aiding Iraq against Iran back in the day. In real life, actions have both negative and positive consequences. People who either focus all on the negative or the positives, to the exclusion of the real deal, are bombs waiting to go off if you strap them to your mission payload. And they're not going to go off when you think they are going to go off either. Such people make an extreme disaster of operations, precisely because they either look at America's support of Iraq and try to use it to destroy America's support of Iraq in the here and now by overplaying the negatives, or they look at the so called "positives" of cheap, inaccurate, "better" Russian hardware for the Iraqis in order to discount the advantage of interoperability and training which would come from getting the Iraqis the M-16 family of armaments. Russia's quality control seems to be rather weirdly different to AMerica's, if not in the suckage compartment. Their industrial or technological base isn't the problem, it's the way they do quality control. Take a look at how they maintain, or rather don't maintain, their nuclear armaments. Which is probably why their most popular armaments like the Ak 47 don't need quality control because they have low tolerances. The popular refrain seems to be that you could bury an AK 47 underground for years, dig it back up rusted and gunky, then fire it off. It won't be very accurate though... Little things like making the artificial horizon more intuitive, doesn't really seem to factor in for the Russians compared to the American or Western obsession with making things more streamlined and intuitive. Different philosophies, different methodologies. For people, whether Leftists or not, just interested in the minor tactical advantages of Russian arms and their lack of a need for maintenance, are ignoring the logistical question. It's one thing if it is a tactical choice between more firepowr and less firepower. It is one thing if it is a tactical choice between weapons that work and weapons that just don't work even if you did everything you could to clean them, sort of like VIetnam plastic rifles. But this is a difference between solidifying American and Iraqi logistics by cutting out foreign equipment, or stay as we are while we try to get the Iraqis logistically independent of us. Better logistics in the lnog run is always better than any slight improvements in tactics that could be effected, in my view. On another note, it is always fascinating to see the perspective from another party in a warfare, rather than your own. Makes learning things faster. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72027 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72027 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 10:55:42 -0600 Well, it's what happens if you can't maintain some structural separation. Back when I weont on my final trip to the Sandbox for saber rattling, Operation Desert Thunder, the Kuwaiti Army had a brigade each of Pact gear, French gear, and US gear, and kept track of it that way. They didn't swap people out from unit to unit willy-nilly. But it certainly complicates things, no matter how you manage it. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72024 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72024 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 10:42:08 -0600 Damian, This story is EXACTLY what happens when you get a hodgepodge of equipment. Tragic. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72020 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72020 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 10:26:15 -0600 I wonder how difficult it is, institutionally speaking, to overcome problems like the one you described? Up in the snowy, white north, we get people arguing all the time that we should be buying relatively cheap Russian or even more expensive European kit (especially aircraft). The example usually cited is the Indian military, which buys from whomever they can. I wonder what a hodgepodge of equipment like that does to your safety, interoperability, orphan stock costs, and training costs? http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72017 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72017 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 09:56:27 -0600 I think that goes along with Iraq now purchasing american weapons, etc. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72013 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72013 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 09:17:49 -0600 Wow... talk about a lightbulb moment. You're right: It makes perfect sense now. Damn. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72011 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72011 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 09:05:17 -0600 Wow. That is some fascinating stuff. Thanks so much for sharing it! A question: So the Iraqis are training on one style of artificial horizon, then using another style for operations? Was that something that nobody had picked up on?! If so, is anything going to be done to align the training and operational equipment? http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72010 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/continuing_to_e.html#comment-72010 Wed, 16 Apr 2008 08:59:18 -0600