...so I might as well get a couple of cents in.

The propaganda battle is raging over the reasons and effects of the operations in Basra. Most American sources are focusing on the potential political outcome: did Maliki or Sadr win? Some are calling it a draw, particularly because Sadr and his Mahdi/Mehdi army survives, if somewhat deteriorated. As one person notes and Maliki concurs, does a winning party call for a truce? I've seen very interesting claims that Sadr wins, at least politically, that often repeats what can only be called "Sadr's Propaganda".

Including claims of a battalion or more of Iraqi army surrendering to Sadr, policemen abandoning their posts by the hundreds and that the attack on Sadr's forces was politically motivated to insure the DAWA and SCIRI win the provincial elections. The truth is hard to see.

A piece I wrote in August 2007 regarding the coming Shia split: Sadr, Badr, Oil and Federalism

The continuing efforts of US forces with the Sunni tribes in Anbar and surrounding regions, driving out Al Qaeda, re-enforcing the Sunni and protecting them from further incursions by the Shi'ite while simultaneously decreasing the treat to the Shi'ite from Sunni nationalists and Al Qaeda, is placing the tension back on the fractures within the Shi'ite parties.[snip]

Time constraints are also being placed on the Shi'ite parties to sort out their differences and manage into the next stage of a stable, Shi'ite dominated government.[snip]

Sadr recognized this and has made many attempts to weaken the government and flex his power by having his cabinet members and parliamentarians suspend their cooperation with the government. If he can force the government to collapse prior to any referendum by the southern provinces to create a federal state, he may be able to stop it completely.[snip]

Sadr's other problem is also directly related to the peace process and its success. The Mahdi Army will no longer be needed as a security force and their mafia like tendencies to exploit people, control resources and general over all corruption may spell a spiraling discontent with his organization.[snip]

The SCIRI/Badr organizations are also pressed for time and suffers from a reputation of corruption and criminal activity. As the insurgency dies down, the need or demand for a separate Shi'ite state may also wane, though not disappear all together[snip]

Many focus on the greater Sunni, Shia and Kurd divide with emphasis on oil revenue sharing as the main problem hindering political progress. This may not even be half of the problem. The fight for political supremacy and the future control of Iraq among the Shi'ite will decide whether this government survives and the insurgency is totally quailed. Once that is settled, Iraq may be able to implement many of the other necessary plans such as reducing corruption, insuring non-sectarian governance and providing Iraqis with a sense of real justice.

Read the rest for some serious background on the Badr/Sadr situation (starting before Operation Iraqi Freedom): Sadr, Badr, Oil and Federalism

How do you know Maliki and the national Iraq government "won" in Basra? The government did not collapse and Maliki is still the Prime Minister. Further, a united Iraqi parliament has served notice to Sadr: Disband the militia or leave politics

(continue reading in flash traffic including links to excellent analysis regarding the Iraq situation from Roggio, Kazimi and others)

A leader within Iraq, however, says that its not going to happen:

"Shiite Cleric Muqtada al Sadr did not think of dissolving the Mahdi Army," said Sheikh Salah al Ubeidi told Voices of Iraq on April 7. "We have no right to interfere in freezing or dissolving the Mahdi Army because it is an exclusive right of Muqtada al Sadr."

Roggio thinks it's Sadr "changing directions", but it is really the two groups within his movement vying for the control and direction of the Sadrist movement. The last few times, Sadr has stood his militia down in exchange for political compromises which is why many point to Sadr and the militia's survival as a "win". They fully expect the same and may be somewhat correct.

However, every time Sadr has exchanged some of his militia for political power, he ends up actually weaker and less able to manage or direct the affairs of state. Whether that is in Najaf in 2004, his Sadr/Badr clash pre-election 2005, the clash between Sadr/Badr/security forces in Karbala 2007, his walk out from the government in August 2007, the provincial elections negotiations January 2008 (where both the soon to be minimized Sunni block and Sadr both left the negotiations in protest of "lack of protection" in the new provincial election laws - protections for their ability to maintain any power) and on to Basra and various other cities within Iraq.

Sadr gets short term gains in exchange for his "truces", but ends up with long term losses.

For the political and operational aspects of the Iraqi operations in Basra, I suggest the following links:

Talisman Gate (visiting Iraqi scholar at the Hudson Institute Nibras Kazimi):
What's that sound? (people falling over in shock form their too quick to jump to conclusions reports on Maliki's "Loss"
Numbers and Assertions (media conflating national numbers to represent facts on the ground in Basra are wrong)
Roggio: Operation Knights Charge (backs up Talisman Gate's assertions about the conduct of the military and police, not just in Basra, but across Iraq)
Side Lining the Sadrists
Fighting the Mahdi in Sadr City
WaPo: Preparing for the fight in Sadr City

Pessimistic (realistic?) view of the situation from Captain's Journal: The War over the War

British force return to Basra as "advisers"

Central government/Maliki consolidating power:
New Electricity project slated for Karbala (city contested by Sadr)
Maliki allocates $100 million for support services in Basra

Stand by for a look at the economic importance of Basra and Um Qasr.