The Cult of the Suicide Bomber in Iraq

The Defense Department has been pushing out a big story over the last two days--their debriefing of 48 prospective suicide bombers who were captured or who surrendered. As part of that, they made made Air Force Colonel David Bacon, Chief of Special Operations and Intelligence Operations, Strategic Communications for Multinational Forces - Iraq, available for a Blogger's Roundtable (audio file), of which I was a participant.

The 48 would-be suicide bombers form a fascinating demographic study of suicide bombers in Iraq. Surprisingly, the Associated Press has an article on the topic that tracks very well with what we were told at the Roundtable.

While al Qaeda in Iraq is composed of both foreigners and natives, the foreigners comprise about 10-15% of AQI, but the majority of that segment operate either as leadership or suicide bombers. The suicide bombers are over 90% foreign, and perform the most deadly and ultimately effective of AQI's attacks. Thus, understanding their behavior, methods and movement into the country are a high priority for the Coalition.

The terrorists of 9-11 were middle-to-upper-class and educated, but these recruits for simple suicide bombings are young, under-educated and often lonely or social outcasts. COL Bacon paints a picture of deception and manipulation on the part of al Qaeda recruiters, describing recruits as having been brought into "Jihad" by someone (usually not an Imam) who befriends them and offers to help "correct" their worship. These recruits end up radicalized, though they had not shown signs of it before. As I listened to the colonel, I was struck by the similarity of AQI's techniques to the methods used to suck young Westerners into cults.

Of course, suicide bomber recruiters paint a heroic picture of going to Iraq to help Iraqis fight the American "oppressors." They say al Qaeda is defeating the U.S., which is abusing the Iraqis. "Be part of a winning team," they say. Eager to prove themselves special in their large families and heroic among a society from which they feel cut off, they head out to Iraq.

COL Bacon reports that most of the prospective suiciders come into Iraq through Syria (all 48, in this case). And to the disappointment of their charges, their Syrian handlers are quite secular, entertaining them at discos and bars before shepherding them across the border.

Iraqis have come to distrust foreigners due to previous bombings, so AQI foreign fighters are hidden once they are in-country and are housed in very poor conditions. Their passports and money are taken, and suiciders are often isolated even from each other. This comes as a surprise to the recruits. A key point that the 48 recruits made was that they "came expecting to see Americans get killed...but they saw Iraqis getting killed and it bothered them." They were further disturbed to see their fellow recruits blown up in infrastructure attacks rather than assaults on Americans. Additionally, must recruits do not arrive in-country expecting suicide missions. They have to be pressured into it once there: "This is your duty. This is what we need you to do for the Jihad. You could be more useful… a martyr." After a few weeks of difficult living conditions and disillusionment, they reported simply "going into survival mode." They "felt relief when they were captured," reports COL Bacon, with some crying with relief during debriefings.

One participant asked whether these recruits were "evil" people or just brainwashed. COL Bacon said some were more ideologically-driven than others, but of the 48 profiled, most were youngsters looking for respect, friendship, or a sense of importance. They were ideological, but only after they met their recruiter.

The recruitment networks are paid for each recruit. While they seem to be focused on Iraq right now, they recruit for al Qaeda activities around the world--evidence that AQI is not separate from AQ itself, despite media efforts to paint it as such.

Colonel Bacon also spoke of efforts to break the supply lines and networks for suicide bombers through military and diplomatic means. He gave a surprising description of cooperative efforts from both Saudi Arabia and Syria, including things like Saudi Imams preaching that it is "not a righteous cause." These activities have severely restricted the number of suicide bombers and other foreign terrorists entering Iraq. According to captured records, during May and June of 2007, about 124 potential bombers entered Iraq. That number is down to about 50 per month, now. Currently there are 240 in Coalition custody, with an additional unknown number in Iraqi custody.

As on the "frontline" side of things, Mosul is a center of particular focus for those attempting to disrupt suicide bomber supply networks. And like the other military leaders I've spoken to, COL Bacon points out that greater economic opportunity and continued improvements in security both work to reduce incentive and support for militant activities.

One final note: on the subject of Mosul, COL Bacon used a phrase about the terrorists I've now heard from sources as diverse as reporters, to Senator McCain--"To win, they need Baghdad. But to survive, they gotta keep Mosul.” Baghdad is still hanging in the balance in many ways, but the terrorists do not currently hold it; in Mosul, they are fighting for their lives. Like the patchwork quilt I've seen on the economic side of things, there are obviously multiple kinds of fronts on the kinetic side... each one developing and strengthening one aspect of the fight. Stitch them all together eventually, and it'll be quite a quilt.

I find I've been holding my breath when I think of Iraq these days. So much is going right, but so much still hangs in the balance.

[I'll add a link to the Roundtable transcript when it becomes available. UPDATE: transcript (pdf) and video.]