Live from Iraq: No (MSM) News is Good News

In preparation for the interview, I had scoured the major media for reports from 3rd ID's area of operations over the last two weeks and had come up mostly empty. I opened the interview by mentioning that problem, and BG Huggins confimed that indeed, no news is good news in 3rd ID's case. However, he showed the cautious enthusiasm that is typical for 3rd ID's leadership: "Things are progressing well. I don’t want to give everyone a false impression… [there's] still a lot of hard work to do, but in terms of security things are progressing pretty well."

The facts BG Huggins supplied support his evaluation. For the month of February, 3ID averaged two attacks per day, and with the exception of a single large-scale terrorist act (which I'll cover below), an average of one civilian per day died from violence. Those numbers are less than fifty percent of the already-low numbers reported in the end of January when I began interviewing 3ID leadership.

Right now 3ID's kinetic activity centers around Operation Marne Grand Slam, conducted along the eastern edge of the Tigris River. This is a counterpart to Operation Marne Thunderbolt, which consolidated gains along the western edge of the river in an effort to reduce the flow of "accelerants" of violence into Baghdad. BG Huggins reports that operations are close to wrapping up, and will culminate with the building of another patrol base southeast of Salman Pak. The patrol base will help consolidate Iraqi and Coalition control of the the Tigris river valley from Baghdad to about 50 km south. According to BG Huggins, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have been integrally involved in Operation Marne Grand Slam.

The big event in 3ID's AO in recent weeks was Arbaeen, the end of the yearly ritual mourning for a 7th-century Shiite imam. In the course of a week, six million pilgrims from all over the Middle East arrived in Karbala on foot. According to BG Huggins, "Things went incredibly well." As during Ashura, ISF again took the lead with coalition forces providing aerial overwatch and standing by as ground backup. In an echo of the flood of people for Arbaeen, two million pilgrims are now continuing into Najaf, under the protection of ISF.

BG Huggins exclaimed over the tremendous volume of Arbaeen pilgrims he had seen from his helicopter flyovers conducted to check force positioning, and how well the Iraqi checkpoints handled them. In an effort inspired by the Sisters of Fallujah, the Iraqis planned for and hired women to inspect female pilgrims at each checkpoint, setting up tents to ensure privacy (similar systems exist at the border checkpoints in 3rd ID's AO). All in all, BG Huggins seemed extremely pleased with the Arbaeen holiday, pointing out that the sheer volume of pilgrims was a "strong statement" of Iraqi and regional faith in Iraq's newfound security.

The only major security breach in the AO during Arbaeen was a suicide bomber who attacked near an Iraqi checkpoint in Iskandariyah where many pilgrims were gathered during their trek. According to BG Huggins, the bomber had concealed his explosives vest under his clothing and nobody suspected anything before he blew up, killing over 50 soldiers and pilgrims.

Something that hasn't been greatly publicized is 3ID's detainee-release program. When people are arrested on suspicion of involvement with terrorist or insurgency activities, the brigades screen them and the worst are placed in a "high-risk" category that will not be released under any kind of amnesty. But in an additional process, other detainees are screened to find individuals who might be eligible to re-integrate. Each detainee must have a "guarantor," a sponsor such as a sheik or Sons of Iraq participant, who will accept responsibility for the detainee's actions if he does something wrong. Sponsors then sign Arabic documents making them liable for the detainee's behavior, and the detainee is released into their protection and guidance.

BG Huggins reports that there are no set standards for release, but things are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Evaluations are made all the way up the chain of command, beginning with records of their educational activities and behavior while at Camp Bucca, the coalition prison. Often this process begins when somebody approaches a coalition soldier and says, "This guy is my cousin, he really isn’t that bad a guy. If he comes back, I’ll take care of him--and it’ll help his family." BG Huggins openly acknowledges that there is a risk factor to this, but in practice it has been a mechanism for strengthening communities by returning breadwinners, and giving a second chance to people who may have done paid jobs for the insurgents simply out of desperation. "[They are] folks we can take a little risk with," he says.

I asked BG Huggins about Sunni and Shia interaction and integration within the ISF he works with. He said that successful integration is dependent very much on leadership, pointing to what he called "the best of the ISF," the Iraqi Army's 4th Brigade of the 6th Division. It is about 75% Shia, operating in an area in which cities are largely Shia and rural areas are 99% Sunni. According to BG Higgins, leadership trumps sectarianism: 4th Brigade's commader is a Shia married to a Sunni, with two sons--one carries a Shia name, the other a Sunni one. "The brigade is received well everywhere," he says.

There have been reports of a great deal of resistance at the national level to bringing the Sons of Iraq (local citizen security groups sponsored by the coalition) and Awakening participants into the national government. BG Huggins says, "It's still a little bit slow. We'd like to see it move faster."

One area that has been successful in bringing citizens into the national government is the Iraq police academy. Under a special "test" agreement, selected SOI members are now given two weeks of training at the academy (rather than the typical eight), then hired as provisional police for a 3-month contract at half-pay. "It's a step in the right direction, but we'd like to see a little more effort to go faster at the national government level," BG Huggins says. So far, 1,000 former SOI members are participating in the program, but many Iraqis are very frustrated at the slow pace of the national government's efforts. A lot of coalition effort has been put into establishing relationships between SOI or Awakening leaders and national leadership, and into encouraging them to be patient. Dialogue and meetings are occurring," reports BG Huggins. "If we can continue that drumbeat [of a request to reconcile], then it should improve."

Part of the problem is that many Sunnis and some Shiites refused to participate in the 2006 elections, and so now do not have the representation at the national level that would help them in their efforts. So, the "dialog" is part of an effort to make sure nationally-disenfranchised Iraqis "stay engaged until provincial elections make more opportunities for them."

In fact, BG Huggins describes successful elections as even more important than economic concerns to the Iraqis he talks with. "Sunnis that I deal with (SOI, etc.) are very conscious of the fact that they missed the vote." They're anxious to get themselves back into a position to have a voice. “Iraqis I talk to want to see provincial elections sooner rather than later.” Elections will lead to more opportunity and fair representation in sectors where they don’t have it now, and the pressure is to have elections so that they can take control of things and fix problems they face. BG Huggins allowed that the farmer may be more focused on his own local needs, but there is a great desire to be allowed a voice. Iraqis and coalition forces seem to be putting a lot of hope in having elections this October, but the national government has still not finalized the laws that would make that possible.

Iran has been a somewhat touchy subject in my interviews with 3rd ID's leadership. They have reported no "direct evidence" of Iranian involvement in their AO, but acknowledge uncovering caches of EFPs that are "assumed to be of Iranian provenance." Acknowledging the delicacy of the issue, I pointed to General Odierno's direct comments on the subject, and asked BG Huggins, "Are you seeing direct evidence of Iranian involvement beyond EFPs, and would you tell me if you did?" He laughed, but after pausing a moment, went on to be more open on the subject than his fellow officers so far. He mentioned the checkpoints along the Iranian border in his AO, and other efforts to watch out for Iranian involvement, but "all of that has revealed nothing—and I tell you that honestly. We have intelligence reports of movement through the area, but no engagement--moving through the British area, particularly." He said they are finding a great deal of munitions specifically marked as Iranian, and getting reports of people moving both northward and southward within their AO, but they haven't caught anyone they've been able to directly connect to Iran.

Part II of this interview will be posted on Monday and will focus on 3ID's intensive rebuilding efforts, including "embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams," agriculture redevelopment, and what BG Huggins told me he has learned about fish hatcheries. Update: Part II.

Other 3rd ID interviews in this series: COL McKnight, CSM Andrews, and BG Cardon. Related: Ambassador Charles Ries.