Iraq Economy: Light At the End of the Tunnel Part I

In the United States, coal is the number one fuel for thermal electrical plants. Iraq is not a coal producing nation. It's main resources are oil and natural gas. A majority of Iraq's electrical plants are run on fossil fuels including gas, diesel and oil. Most of these plants date back to the 1950's, and the turbines (the engines that drive electrical production) are old Soviet models that were no longer in production at the time of invasion. Most were out of production long before the invasion.

Prior to the invasion, Iraqi engineers spent a lot of energy and money to have parts manufactured piecemeal from existing parts or old specs. Otherwise, they were forced to use parts that were close approximations that they then re-engineered to fit their needs. These electrical plants were already highly inefficient, and the "make do" engineering simply added to the problem. Most of this was due to the age of the equipment. Some of it was due to the sanctions that made obtaining certain equipment difficult, if not impossible, as it was on the list of "dual use" banned items.

Other issues included highly inefficient electrical transformers, and wiring that had also been in place for many decades and did not come close to most modern specs. All of this meant that, all along the production to delivery of electricity, power was being lost from the system before it ever made it to an end user. Even the end users contributed to the problem because there were little, if any, engineering and electrical regulations that required houses or buildings to be energy efficient or electrical wiring to meet defined specifications, causing an additional loss of wattage along the delivery line.

To combat these problems and keep the electricity on in Baghdad, Saddam had instituted a program that forced most of the power production to be delivered to Baghdad and cities where he held the most political and personal sway. That made these areas the economic centers of Iraq, as well as helped maintain his political power and alliances. The rest of the country was literally dark most of the time, meaning that they were also without any ability to develop an economy. That, in turn, kept them politically and economically dependent on Saddam's good will and hand outs, which were highly limited.

This is the condition of electricity that the United States Army Corps of Engineers inherited after the invasion. The insurgency and looting, leading to the destruction of electrical plants, transformers and electrical lines, simply made the existing terrible electrical problem worse. The EIA estimates that up to 1000 MW of power haave been lost from sabotage of the electrical grid around Baghdad, including 80 transmission towers from Baiji to Baghdad, interrupting power delivery to Baghdad. An additional 1500 MW are lost due to the lack of water and fuel for the hydro-electrical plants.

Insurgent attacks on oil and natural gas pipelines severely damaged the ability to deliver fuel to these generation plants. Smugglers and militia routinely tap into these pipelines to drain oil and gas for sale on the black market.

Add the current problems of people tapping into the electrical system with a hodgepodge of wiring and machinery (also not up to spec and highly inefficient), with new homes being built with little central planning or control of specs. The drain on power is tremendous, and the production and delivery ends are having to perform miraculous and heroic deeds to offset the losses and meet demands.

[This is a three part series on electricity in Iraq based on information gathered for research to facilitate FbL's interview with Ambassador Reis from the US Embassy Baghdad. Additional Economic series may appear regarding Iraq's oil Infrastructure, water, sewage andbanking. Also look for additional posts on other economy and reconstruction stories. To quote an unknown source in Glenn Zapotte's IEEE report (Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers): "Never before has so vast a reconstruction program been attempted in the face of enemy fire or managed in the shadow of geopolitics."]